In Matter of Estate of Rousey, 568 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that inter vivos transfers must be rescinded when the estate has presented clear and convincing evidence that the transfers were the product of undue influence over the deceased’s financial and legal decisions. (Id. at 731–32). The Rousey’s were a financially successful family and had built a substantial portfolio of properties in and outside of Alaska. (Id. at 721). As Erna Rousey aged, her memory began to decline, leading to her dementia diagnosis in 2015. (Id.). When her husband James entered into rehabilitative care in 2017, Erna lived alone and began to depend heavily on her son Jimmy. (Id.). Jimmy was involved in all aspects of Erna’s life, from household and yard upkeep to advising her on legal and financial matters, with his involvement only increasing after his father’s death in 2018. (Id.). By the end of 2019, Erna had transferred all five of her properties to Jimmy, added him to her bank accounts, and transferred him nearly $225,000, leaving her with just $950. (Id.). After Erna’s death in December 2019, the estate filed a probate petition requesting rescission of the inter vivos transfers to Jimmy. (Id.). Finding that Erna was susceptible to undue influence because of her dementia and reliance on Jimmy, the superior court held rescission of the transfers was necessary and awarded the estate attorneys’ fees, granting an enhanced award due to Jimmy’s bad faith not only during the litigation, but in his fraud against his mother. (Id. at 734). Although agreeing the estate is entitled to attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court remanded for a reconsideration of the amount, finding that the court may not hold a litigant’s pretrial actions against them when conducting the collective bad faith analysis. (Id.). The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that rescission of inter vivos transfers is proper where the recipient abused his confidential relationship with the grantor and thus exerted undue influence over the grantor’s actions. (Id. at 731–32, 735).

In Tripp v. City & Borough of Juneau, 563 P.3d 17 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a public employer has no duty to train employees against excessive alcohol consumption outside of work hours and therefore could not be held liable for an employee who drives drunk outside of work hours. (Id. at 21).  The case itself concerned a Juneau Police Department (JPD) officer who rear-ended another vehicle and injured the driver when he had a blood alcohol content of 0.239. (Id. at 22). The officer struggled with both alcohol abuse and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). (Id.). Tripp, who was injured, alleged that JPD was negligent in failing to provide the officer with counseling for his PTSD or training to manage his alcohol abuse. (Id.). The superior court dismissed the case because it did not believe that the JPD had a duty of care, and the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska. (Id. at 24). Tripp claimed that the duty of care could be sourced from: “(1) AS 18.65.130, a provision setting out general policies for the Police Standards Council; (2) CBJ’s Drug-Free Workplace policy; and (3) JPD Rule of Conduct 114.” (Id. at 25). The Supreme Court of Alaska disagreed. (Id.). Instead, the Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that the statute itself was too broad to create a specific duty of care, and the internal policies and rules of conduct did not extend a duty outside of the workplace. (Id. at 25–27). Finally, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that public policy did not mandate creating a duty of care due to the limited foreseeability of the injury and the strained relationship between the proposed duty and the tortious conduct. (Id. at 31–32)  As a result, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the case. (Id. at 34).

In Rochon v. City of Nome, 568 P.3d 8 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that municipalities are immune from liability when providing gratuitous emergency services outside of city limits. (Id. at 17). After he was injured in a single-vehicle accident 35 miles outside Nome, Rochon sued the City and an emergency responder for negligently providing assistance and aggravating his injuries. (Id. at 12). Rochon claimed that the emergency worker failed to adequately secure him in the ambulance, exacerbating his injuries. (Id.). He alleged that the City of Nome was vicariously liable for the emergency worker’s conduct and additionally sued for negligent hiring, supervision, and training, seeking over $100,000 in damages. (Id.). Rochon filed a separate lawsuit against a woman he claimed had provided alcohol to the underage driver of the ambulance, and the superior court consolidated the two cases. (Id.). The ambulance department charged Rochon $1,775 for its services, its standard rate. (Id.). The City offered Rochon $7,500 to resolve the lawsuit, but Rochon did not reply to the offer. (Id.). Summary judgment and attorneys’ fees were subsequently granted for the City. (Id. at 13). Rochon appealed the superior court’s summary judgment and attorneys’ fees award, both of which the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed. (Id.). Alaska law immunizes municipalities and their agents from lawsuits based on their performance during the gratuitous extension of municipal services. (Id. at 14). Because the City had no obligation to provide ambulance services 35 miles away but charged Rochon the standard fare, the service was gratuitous. (Id. at 17). The Supreme Court of Alaska also affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 18). The Court noted that the City proposed to Rochon a $7,500 settlement offer, but Rochon received $0 in the final judgment. (Id.). Under Rule 68, a party that declines an offer of judgment must pay some part of the offering party’s attorneys’ fees if the final judgment is at least 10% less favorable to him than that offer. (Id.). Affirming the superior court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that municipalities are immunized from liability for providing gratuitous emergency services outside of city limits. (Id. at 17).

In Griffith v. Hemphill, 556 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that (1) “negligent infliction of emotional distress” claims cannot be based on litigation conduct and (2) “malicious prosecution” claims require those bringing the claim to have won on all relevant issues in the previous litigation. (Id. at 939–41). In a previous case, landlord Griffith sued his tenants Hemphill and Davis for eviction. (Id. at 936). Hemphill and Davis counterclaimed on various breach of contract claims. (Id.). The court entered judgment in favor of Hemphill and Davis on Griffith’s suit and on one of their counterclaims. (Id.). In the case at hand, Griffith sued Hemphill and Davis over their counterclaims, alleging (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress and (2) malicious prosecution. (Id. at 936, 940). To the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme Court of Alaska reasoned that, since litigation conduct could not form the basis of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it also could not form the basis of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 939). As to the claim for malicious prosecution, the Supreme Court of Alaska articulated two standards based on California precedent. (Id. at 940). The first standard required that the person bringing the claim to have won on every issue in the litigation. (Id.). The second required that the person bringing the claim to have won on every “separable” issue. (Id.). The court declined to decide on which standard to use because Griffith did not meet even the second, lower standard. (Id. at 940–41). The court reasoned that Hemphill and Davis’s counterclaims were not separable from one another because they were all compulsory to Griffith’s claim. (Id. at 941). Since Hemphill and Davis gained a favorable judgment on one of their breach of contract counterclaims, Griffith had not even won on every separable issue. (Id. at 940–41). The Supreme Court of Alaska held that (1) “negligent infliction of emotional distress” claims cannot be based on litigation conduct and (2) “malicious prosecution” claims require those bringing the claim to have won on all relevant issues in the previous litigation. (Id. at 939–41).

In Kisling v. Grosz, 565 P.3d 226 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that when a jury awards noneconomic damages, the court must first allocate fault before deciding whether a damages cap applies. (Id. at 227). After Grosz was traumatically injured while helping his friend Kisling hang a crucifix on the wall in Kisling’s home, he sued Kisling for negligence. (Id.). The jury awarded $1.2 million worth of non-economic damages but found that Kisling was only 25% at fault while Grosz was 75% responsible for his own injuries. (Id. at 228). Alaska law caps noneconomic damages in personal injury cases at $400,000. (Id.). The parties disagreed as to how to apply the statutory damages cap to Grosz’s recovery. (Id.). Kisling argued that the court should apply the cap to reduce the award to $400,000 before applying the apportionment-of-fault percentages, resulting in a $100,000 recovery for Grosz. (Id.). Grosz, on the other hand, argued that the court should first apply the apportionment percentages before deciding whether a cap should apply, resulting in a $300,000 recovery (25% of $1.2 million). (Id. at 228–29). The superior court agreed with Grosz’s sequencing and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed. (Id. at 229). The Court reasoned that the cap applies only to the amount for which the defendant is responsible. (Id.). While the Court acknowledged that the legislature intended to limit a defendant’s exposure and plaintiff’s recovery in implementing its damages cap, it noted that the statutory text and legislative history do not require reductions below the cap. (Id. at 231). The statutory cap is a limitation on a defendant’s liability, not on the entire damages award. (Id.). Affirming the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that courts must first apply principles of comparative fault to determine what the claimant is owed and then decide whether that amount is subject to a statutory damages cap. (Id. at 235).

In Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc., 563 P.3d 34 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the lower court was not required to make a damages award based on the post-accident earning capacity the plaintiff suggested. (Id. at 39–40). Downing sued Shoreside Petroleum, Inc. (Shoreside) after she was injured by a truck driven by an employee of Shoreside in 2017. (Id. at 36). At trial, Downing’s expert witnesses testified about the traumatic brain injury she suffered from the accident, and the superior court found that it was more likely than not that Downing suffered a loss of earning capacity as a result. (Id.). However, the court dismissed Downing’s claim for damages for lost earning capacity, reasoning that she failed to prove the amount of her loss to a reasonable degree. (Id. at 37). When Downing appealed, the Supreme Court of Alaska remanded to the superior court, holding that once the court had found that Downing suffered loss of future earning capacity, it was obliged to award damages based on its best estimate of that loss. (Id.). On remand, the court did not find Downing’s expert witness’s estimate of loss of future earnings persuasive and instead awarded based on Shoreside’s expert witness’s estimate. (Id. at 37–39). Downing appealed again, arguing that the superior court should have found that her post-accident earning capacity was somewhere within the range of figures her witnesses proposed. (Id. at 39). The Supreme Court of Alaska held that because the superior court did not find Downing’s witnesses credible, the court was not required to rely on that witness’s estimates for damages. (Id. at 40). The Court also reasoned that the superior court complied with Alaska Civil Rule 52 by clearly calculating that she had 6.3 years of work life expectancy and basing their damages calculation on that. (Id. at 41–42). Because these calculations used the average retirement age for women, the Supreme Court of Alaska therefore held that the superior court did not clearly err by using their calculations in awarding Downing damages, instead of using Downing’s expert witness’s calculations.

In Alaska v. Express Scripts, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (D. Alaska 2025), the United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that organizations can still engage in a RICO enterprise with a common purpose even if they compete with one another in other respects. (Id. at 1174). Express Scripts was a Pharmacy Benefits Manager. (Id. at 1157). Pharmacy Benefits Managers are administrators that set drug coverage and reimbursement conditions in health plans called “formularies.” (Id.). The State sued Express Scripts for its involvement in the opioid crisis, alleging that Express Scripts colluded with opioid manufacturers to favor opioids on its formularies. (Id.). The State claimed that Express Scripts’ relationship with manufacturers constituted an “association-in-fact” enterprise under RICO. (Id. at 1173). Express Scripts argued that there not have been an association-in-fact with the manufacturers because the manufacturers were all competing with one another over the opioid market and therefore could not have a “common purpose.” (Id. at 1174). However, the court reasoned that although manufacturers may have competed over their shares in the market, they also cooperated with Express Scripts to expand the market as a whole, collectively benefiting from the increased total sales. (Id.). Denying in part Express Scripts’ motion to dismiss, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that organizations can still engage in a RICO enterprise with a common purpose even if they compete with one another in other respects. (Id.).

In United States v. Alaska, 151 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “public lands” under Title VIII of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) includes navigable waters where subsistence fishing traditionally has taken place. (Id. at 1127). In this case, the United States sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Alaska from interfering with federal efforts to implement the rural subsistence priority. (Id. at 1135–36). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, and Alaska appealed. (Id. at 1136). The Katie John Trilogy interpreted “public lands” to include water rights where the United States holds water rights. (Id. at 1127). In contrast, Sturgeon II interpreted “public lands” differently in another ANILCA section based on subsistence-fishing context that was not at present in the Katie John Trilogy. (Id. at 1127–28). When Alaska argued that the Katie John Trilogy and Sturgeon II are clearly irreconcilable, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument. The Court stated that the contextual differences between the two sections rebuts the presumption of consistent usage for “public lands” and analyzed legislative history to ground its opinion. (Id. at 1128, 1141–42). Affirming the lower court’s judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government has the authority to implement the rural subsistence priority on navigable waters within federal conservation units in Alaska. (Id. at 1143–44).

In Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Keluco General Contractors, Inc., 572 P.3d 537 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that insurance companies’ internal procedures to record mailings do not satisfy the United States Postal Service (USPS) certification requirements under Alaska Statute § 21.36.260. (Id. at 543). Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America (Travelers) issued a workers’ compensation insurance plan to Keluco General Contractors (Keluco) in March 2016 that was to expire in March 2017. (Id. at 539). In January 2017, Travelers mailed to Keluco a renewal notice in advance of its policy expiration. (Id.). Travelers internally recorded the January 2017 renewal notice through a USPS Form 3877 and an internal affidavit. (Id. at 542). Travelers did not seek a certificate or other verification of mailing from USPS. (Id. at 543). The letter never reached Keluco. (Id.). Consequently, Keluco did not renew its workers’ compensation insurance, and only realized its policy had lapsed when an injured Keluco worker sought to file a claim with Travelers against Keluco (Id.). Keluco brought suit that Travelers had failed to send notice of nonrenewal in accordance with Alaska Statute § 21.36.260. Travelers argues that their internal procedures—which were submitted to USPS but required no verification by USPS—satisfied the mailing notice requirement under Alaska Statute § 21.36.260. (Id. at 540). The Supreme Court of Alaska held that Travelers’ internal recording procedures did not fulfill the renewal notice requirements in Alaska Statute § 21.36.260. (Id. at 543). The Alaska Legislature amended Alaska Statute § 21.36.260 in 1987 to clearly require insurers to obtain a mailing certificate from USPS when sending renewal notices to clients. (Id.). Travelers’ internal procedures cannot be deemed equivalent to obtaining a certificate mailing from USPS (Id.). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the trial court, holding that insurance companies’ internal procedures to record mailings do not satisfy the United States Postal Service (USPS) certification requirements under Alaska Statute § 21.36.260. (Id.).

In Estate of Wheeler v. Garrison Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 564 P.3d 611 (Alaska 2025), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a pollution exclusion clause in a homeowner’s insurance policy does not exclude coverage for carbon monoxide poisoning arising out of an improperly installed water heater. (Id. at 621–22). A seventeen-year-old renting a cabin from the homeowners died from carbon monoxide poisoning which leaked from an improperly installed water heater. (Id. at 612–13). The homeowners had an insurance policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage resulting from pollutants. (Id. at 613). The insurance company argued carbon monoxide is a pollutant and thus the death was not covered by insurance. (Id.). The Supreme Court of Alaska examined the text of the homeowner’s specific insurance policy and asked what the reasonable expectations of the insured would be. (Id. at 615). While acknowledging the word “pollutant” can be construed broadly, the Court reasoned other provisions in the insurance policy would indicate a narrower interpretation of the pollution exclusion. (Id. at 618–19). Following the pollution exclusion clause were exclusions for lead paint, lead based products, and asbestos which the Court reasoned a reasonable insured could infer means exposure to toxic substances typically found within the home would not fall within the pollution exclusion clause. (Id. at 619).  Finding that an insured could reasonably expect coverage for liability from carbon monoxide poisoning based on these additional clauses, the Supreme Court of Alaska held the pollution exclusion in the homeowner’s insurance policy does not exclude carbon monoxide poising resulting from an improperly installed water heater. (Id. at 621–22).