IRIS - Publications

Iraq Economic Review: Fourteenth Edition

shvan.najm — Tue, 25 Aug 2026 07:15:46 +0000

Looking Beyond Oil and The Qatar Model

This edition examines the evolving landscape of Iraq’s economic integration with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) amid ongoing regional conflict, supply chain disruptions, and political shifts. The publication first evaluates Qatar’s strategic, $9+ billion investment in Iraq’s energy, infrastructure, and logistics sectors to determine whether pragmatic bilateral partnerships, rather than formal GCC membership, offer a realistic model for regional integration while navigating internal risks like Iraq's "militia economy".

It then shifts focus to grassroots, non-oil commercial trade, analyzing how the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and surging freight costs along traditional Gulf corridors (such as Jebel Ali and Khorfakkan) are disrupting low-margin wholesale imports and driving Iraqi businesses to either permanently reorient their supply chains northward toward Türkiye, or center their focus on Gulf-Asia trade due to the constant disruptions within Iraq's landscape.

Contribution includes the following:

Dr. Zeidon Alkinani - The Qatar Model: The Future of Iraq-GCC Economic Integration?
Abdulla Al-Kalisy- Looking Beyond Oil: how Hormuz Disruption in Reshaping Iraq-GCC Trade

Click here or the photo below for the full report.

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Iraq Economic

Looking Beyond Oil: How Hormuz Disruption Is Reshaping Iraq-GCC Trade

shvan.najm — Thu, 23 Jul 2026 06:31:01 +0000

Introduction

After years of hesitation and disruption following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent removal of Iraq’s observer status from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),¹ the last decade has witnessed slowly growing Iraq-GCC integration. While this growth is marked by official transnational agreements, Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), and investment commitments, it represents only a part of the picture.² Integration of this kind rests both on formal agreements between governments, and on the everyday commercial relationships that connect Iraqi businesses to GCC logistics and distribution networks. With the current conflict, beginning on the 28th of February with a US-Israeli attack on Iran,³ and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, both layers of this integration have been placed under strain. While the disruption is usually analyzed through the security or oil sectors, what I explore here is the grassroots trade economy that is too often overlooked as an integral segment of economic integration. By grassroots, I mean the everyday commercial activity of individual traders and wholesalers who move goods through established routes and credit relationships, beneath the level of formal agreements between states. I approach these dynamics through the specific case of Iraq-UAE trade, which offers a lens onto a broader evolution in Iraq-GCC relations.

These commercial relationships are easy to overlook because they sit beneath the level of formal diplomacy, and they are harder to restore once disrupted. Where energy markets are buttressed by states and long-term contracts, grassroots trade depends on cost predictability and credit built up over time. From this economic perspective, I explore potentially overlooked sectors that – while not as dominant as energy⁴ or security – may actually be harder to restore as they lack the formal backing and foundation of Iraq-GCC economic integration.⁵ Specifically, and to highlight this grassroots integration, I explore the disruptions to the manufacturing and production sector that relies on grassroots traders importing construction materials from East Asia to the UAE and then to Iraq. I underscore the effects of the closure of the Strait and take a deeper look into the example of Iraq-UAE trade disruptions that could be harming Baghdad’s approach to greater GCC economic integration.

Ultimately, from Baghdad’s point of view, disruption and reconfiguration of GCC trade corridors possess important implications for its regional economic integration approach. Iraqi businesses typically utilize the UAE’s Jebel Ali Port located on the Gulf, viewed by Iraqi traders within the regional trade economy as a safe and predictable route. UAE’s Jebel Ali Port is ideally placed en route from China, Thailand, and Singapore to Iraq that are typically utilized to import construction materials (pipes, fittings, etc.). However, even with the April 7 ceasefire,⁶ the closure of the Strait continues to shift attention to alternate routes, such as the UAE’s eastern port on the Gulf of Oman that leads to the Arabian Sea and then the Indian Ocean, or more consequently alternate suppliers altogether, such as Türkiye. Iraqi businesses have few other options.

The erosion of Iraq-GCC trade in overlooked sectors such as manufacturing is a meaningful, but underappreciated consequence of this crisis.

With Türkiye available, both as a manufacturer and more predictable trade route, traders have positioned themselves as engaging in a waiting game, with their patience running out in trying to maintain their East Asia-UAE-Iraq trade route. As Saloom suggests, “The GCC is not the only actor shaping Iraq’s external options. Turkey, already Iraq’s largest non-oil trading partner and the anchor of the Development Road corridor, will fill this space.”⁷ The war and its aftermath are eroding some of the Iraq-GCC integration in ways many perhaps do not think about, particularly at the grassroots level. Speaking to traders on the ground that engage in this economy, as well as corporate stakeholders, I argue that the erosion of Iraq-GCC trade in overlooked sectors such as manufacturing is a meaningful but underappreciated consequence of this crisis and could consequently undo some of Iraq’s recent approach to GCC economic integration.

The limits of formal integration

The informally dominated Iraqi political sphere complicates any sort of growing Iraq-UAE (or GCC) integration.⁸ This is highlighted in the way UAE and Iraq have signed various agreements to protect mutual investments from an Iraqi political context that is unpredictable.⁹ These form a wider UAE strategy to shift its dependence away from the US, and practice some form of political hedging, building stronger regional ties with, for example, Syria even before the fall of the Assad regime.¹⁰ Notably, however, this protective approach is designed to allow the strengthening of trade ties to protect both countries’ investments from non-commercial risk, such as nationalization, confiscation, judicial seizures, and freezing.¹¹ The UAE's strategy and fears are understandable, as the changing internal dynamics within Iraq are neither fully controlled by the formal state institution nor centralized under any single faction.¹² Economic integration with Iraq is a complex interplay of numerous actors and renders state policy as one part of the picture.

Iraqi policy is itself fragmented, which raises the question of what is operationally possible in terms of GCC-Iraq integration, economic or otherwise. It perhaps explains why integration has been pursued more through economy than diplomacy. However, even this economic integration, which carries an informal component at the grassroots level that I explore below, is facing serious challenges with the closure of the Strait. High-level policy commitment, while important, does little to address the practical realities that traders and manufacturers currently face. Baghdad’s desire to align with the GCC depends not only on agreements between governments, but on whether the ordinary commercial relationships beneath them can be sustained.

Wartime Iraq-UAE trade

In my assessment of Iraq-UAE trade, one of two changes appears to be brewing. Some traders have found themselves fed up with the constant disruptions, either from the current war or from the political turmoil in Iraq, and see the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as the final straw. With the Houthis also threatening to close Bab al-Mandab,¹³ traders have begun exploring alternative options to the use of the East Asia-UAE-Iraq corridor. Traders have underscored the viability of Türkiye as a solution to the closure of the Strait, due to both its spatial proximity and its ability to provide the goods needed to maintain certain trades. Construction materials reach Iraq by sea from East Asia, transiting the Strait of Hormuz into the Gulf to the UAE’s Jebel Ali Port, before moving onward into Iraq. The closure of the Strait severs this sea leg, which is why routing through Khorfakkan, Sharjah (which is located in the middle of Emirate if Fujairah, and oftentimes referred to as the Fujairah port despite being in Sharjah), on the Indian Ocean side of the chokepoint, has become the principal workaround.

Prior to the war, the cost predictability of this route enabled traders in low-margin sectors to operate.

The location of the UAE, and especially, the advanced technology and infrastructure of its Jebel Ali Port, makes it a primary hub for transshipment. With its limited operations due to the closure of the Strait, in my research I found traders’ complaints of cost spikes due to rerouted maritime traffic to be industry-specific. Speaking to traders it was clear that particular changes were occurring to the trade of construction materials and plastic fittings along the trade route from East Asia to the UAE, and onwards to Iraq. Those working with high-value goods such as electronics (e.g. phones, gaming consoles, etc.) are facing little disruption to their work as they can simply transfer the raised costs to the consumer. Meanwhile, traders of construction materials that import from China and Thailand, and to a lesser extent Singapore, are at a crossroads as the spike in price cannot justify continuing to use the Gulf as a port of entry. Prior to the war, the cost predictability of this route enabled traders in low-margin sectors to operate.

This occurs as the rise in the price of oil has generated a trade system that faces a blow to its main source of movement. In speaking to Iraqi traders based in Iraq and the UAE, I found that some were more concerned with the closure than others. Traders in high-value goods typically import shipping containers that are worth nearly $500,000. As one trader explained, “my containers that I would import from China or Singapore used to cost me $3000, and now they cost around $12,000, but this is not a big issue for me. I simply have to add a small markup of around $6-8 to each one of my gaming consoles or products and I’ll be fine.”¹⁴ This trader was not simply suggesting that this change would keep him afloat but would even keep him profitable within what is considered an unprecedented crisis. Meanwhile, those importing low-value goods (such as pipes, fittings, sanitary products, furniture – these are among the traders I have spoken to, but presumably other sectors are similarly influenced) have all bemoaned their inability to operate.

As one trader explained, “my goods [pipes and fittings] do not cost much, the margin I add to it is so small. Basically I am a wholesaler, so when the shipment cost jumps by this much, I can’t pass that cost on to my customers, they would just leave me.”¹⁵ This trader in particular highlighted that himself, and many of his colleagues, operate on a credit-based system. The trust that has developed between himself and retailers makes it difficult for him to pass this cost on, and difficult for him to extend his pre-war credits to retailers. The effects of this on his business are still yet to be incurred fully. However, what I found to be more central was the feasibility of being able to hike prices to match the added cost of logistics and transport. Such low margins leave little room for profit and thus make it difficult for traders to pass on the added cost to the consumer, “I can’t do anything now but wait. It’s impossible for me to import anything with these prices, it just does not make sense.”¹⁶

What this particular trader was alluding to were the different circumstances he faces in importing compared to those working in high-value sectors. The change from a $2-3,000 shipping cost to an estimated $12,000, for a container that holds a value of $50,000, is detrimental to their trade. They cannot shift the cost onto the customer, as the 20% increase for something considered both cheap and large in size (taking up stock in the shipping container) means the product’s value cannot absorb the cost without significantly harming the demand. Additionally, he explained how the effects of this are already being felt as construction in Iraq as a whole has either stopped or is being maintained by utilizing limited stockpiles of materials.

An important caveat drawn from both cases of traders is how they have begun hedging away from Iraq altogether as well. Even though high-value goods traders explain that their business is largely unaffected, there is a desire to grow away from Iraq as trading center, and perhaps only focus on working between East Asia and the UAE, a feeling they feel has been somewhat justified by the current war. One trader and, as he explains, many of his colleagues that maintain the Iraq-UAE trade economy are not multinational firms with diverse supply chains. They are smaller traders who rely on predictable costs and established credit relationships. When this is constantly under stress, either through failing transport mechanisms, or internal political turmoil in Iraq, the relationships traders have built with retailers and customers begin to erode.

The consistency of the disruption has pushed many to pull away, with this war being a final straw, “I only do it [trade with Iraq] because I know its market, and to keep my foot in the door. I don’t really want to anymore, I do it to give my brothers a job and keep them employed, but really, if you ask me, I think it's time to pull away.”¹⁷ In our conversation, he made it clear that alternatives to Iraq have become more viable, and in particular with the UAE’s desire to bypass the Strait by shifting its central trade port from Jebel Ali to Khorfakkan and ensuring it can maintain its trade quotas even without relying on the Strait of Hormuz.

From Jebel Ali to Fujairah

Map of the Gulf with arrows pointing through the strait and beyond

One of the reasons traders have singled out Iraq, and not the UAE, is due to the UAE presenting alternative options to the Jebel Ali port that promises to bypass the Strait. As shown in the map above, the Khorfakkan port offers access from the Indian Ocean, directly into the UAE, with its recently built Etihad Rail connecting Fujairah to the UAE’s major cities and ports. However, this is currently proving to be an underdeveloped option. As one trader explained to me, “when they closed the Strait, I already had a container on its way from China to here [Jebel Ali].
We decided to have it rerouted to Khorfakkan and then had our cargo transported by truck to Jebel Ali. This little reroute alone cost us 7, 8 thousand dollars, without considering the original cost of shipping from China which was 2 thousand dollars.”¹⁸

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as expected, forced a rerouting of maritime traffic. However, as this presented an opportunity for the UAE to shift its central maritime port from Jebel Ali to Khorfakkan, there is still work that needs to be done to advance its infrastructure at the pace this ambition requires. The Fujairah Oil Industry Zone (FOIZ) was established in 2011 as a strategic bet on exactly this scenario, designed to position the emirate as the heart of a new energy corridor stretching from east of the Suez Canal to Asia.¹⁹ However, moving goods from Khorfakkan to Jebel Ali, and then onward to Iraq, requires overland transport across a mountainous landscape that was never designed for the volume of traffic Jebel Ali processes daily. This infrastructure gap is not new, but the war has accelerated and magnified the problem and changes it may cause to the market.

This has resulted in a significant cost increase. Transporting goods from Fujairah to Jebel Ali, then onward to Iraq, adds thousands of dollars per container. One trader suggested this was both the nature of an additional step in the shipment course, and the hiked wartime prices of fuel and transport. However, he stressed that “the prices will never go down to what it was, but if it would at least go down to something more reasonable, we could convince our customers to bear some of the additional cost.”²⁰ The cost of fuel may be projected to return to some form of normalcy with the opening of the Strait, or with the UAE being able to shift its dependence to Fujairah and having withdrawn from OPEC.

Notably, this leaves the infrastructure gap of routing goods from Khorfakkan to Jebel Ali and onwards to Iraq to maintain this Iraq-UAE connection, and with the opening of the Etihad Rail, this appears to be a short-term issue. However, Fujairah, a mountainous and – comparatively to other Emirates – underdeveloped region, requires more efficient and potentially large-scale logistics zones such as those that define Jebel Ali. The UAE appears to be aware of this as one stakeholder explained to me, but its main concern is maintaining the oil economy through Fujairah. As the website boasts, the capacity of the FOIZ is in the region of 70 million barrels, making it the Middle East’s largest commercial storage capacity for refined oil products. However, there is a window that the Iraq-UAE market is now operating within, wherein if traders begin cementing their shift towards Türkiye, and Türkiye in turn captures this market share, especially if credit relationships reorient in this direction perpetuating trade relationships, Iraq-UAE may struggle to bounce back within these sectors.

The policy question becomes whether, as the UAE appears to be doing, Iraq can accelerate infrastructure solutions to preserve these trade relationships before they shift. Speaking to business owners and stakeholders in the UAE, it became clear that while the Khorfakkan port offers limited solutions, it is perhaps a problem the UAE does not recognize as urgently as Iraq may. That is, it is already understood that currently Khorfakkan's port cannot, by way of infrastructure or size, offer what the Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZA) and port offers. This has created an understanding within Iraq-UAE business relations that no matter the current harm to trade routes, trade will inevitably return to JAFZA, and what is perhaps offered elsewhere in terms of routes through Bab al-Mandab remain short-term solutions for traders. As it stands the Fujairah port is being rebuilt and expanded to be able to take on some of JAFZA’s traffic, but it faces hurdles and a long path to reaching the size and structure of Jebel Ali.

Some may argue that the Etihad Rail, the UAE’s new rail system that operates from Fujairah in the East to the UAE’s western border, passing through major cities, including Dubai, offers a solution. However, in my conversations with stakeholders, it was clear this was not one of the major concerns of the nation’s economic infrastructure. Stakeholders continuously insisted that there will be an inevitable return to Jebel Ali “once things go back to normal”, citing the port’s size and advanced infrastructure as too large to fail. Even when I pushed him to consider the shift of Iraqi traders to Türkiye for their materials, he dismissed the concern. He argued that these secondary markets would come back regardless, and that even if they did not, their influence on the UAE's market was minimal. He acknowledged that Jebel Ali makes money both from traders that bring materials and sell them at the port, and from serving as a passage point into Basra.

If Türkiye was genuinely cheaper and better, traders would have shifted their businesses there even before the war.

But he maintained that if Türkiye was genuinely cheaper and better, traders would have shifted their businesses there even before the war. He further brushed off the secondary market that JAFZA had offered Iraqi traders, whereby imports from East Asia would either use Jebel Ali as a stop on the way to Basra, or be sold from East Asia to traders in Dubai who would then sell their materials onwards to Iraq, generating various customs revenues for the UAE. Traders’ short-term issue remains cost and logistics. As traders look towards Türkiye, bypassing the closure of the Strait, the question is whether infrastructure development at Fujairah (or the reopening of the Strait) can stabilize the route or whether Iraq's supply chains will reorient northward, with lasting consequences for both Iraq-Asia and Iraq-GCC economic integration.

Faced with seemingly unviable Gulf routes, as well as growing distrust with the Iraqi market, traders explained where their more long-term solutions lay. Türkiye appeared to be the constant solution to both the issue of trade reroutes and supply disruptions, particularly when looking at construction materials. One trader explained this to me in detail, that the decision to look to Türkiye as either the route or the supplier itself is based on a complex reading of the Iraqi market:

“First of all, I cannot rely on the Chinese or Thai market anymore when the Strait stays closed. And if construction starts up again, I think the transport companies are going to look to either bring things through Bab al-Mandab, through Türkiye, I don't know some way like that. It might cost more but it will at least be reasonable. Or, the other solution, is I start to bring my materials [pipes and fittings] from Türkiye. You cannot bring these materials from Saudi, even though they have factories themselves, they make these materials too high-end, like the Europeans. The Iraqi market will not accept that, they want something in between cheap and reasonable. I cannot sell these Gulf products on the Iraqi market, so the solution is Türkiye. They have the right materials, it’s a little more expensive than China and Thailand, but it's there, and it has easy access to Iraq. The route is already there and ready.”²¹

With much to unpack here, I asked this trader what the situation would be should the rise in transport prices make Gulf products price-competitive. The answer remained similar, where he insisted that these products are not desired in Iraq. He continuously insisted on brand recognition, wherein Gulf products, whether in reality or perceptually, are considered too high-end for the needs of the Iraqi market. This suggests that there is movement occurring within the Iraqi-GCC market that may not recover from the war and Strait closure. The compounding reasons are pushing traders westward, into what is considered a less contested, and more predictable route.

Ultimately, while the GCC’s concerns lie elsewhere, traders on the ground are reorienting their flows away from the Gulf. This matters because these grassroots trade ties have historically tightened Iraq-GCC integration. If Baghdad allows this shift to continue unchecked, it risks undermining its strategic objective since the late 2010s, that is, to reorient Iraq's economic dependence away from Iran.²² That strategy was always about encouraging Iraq-Gulf engagement, that promised GCC businesses the ability to operate without becoming entangled in Iraq’s complex internal politics, steadily building ties that outlast any single administration or political situation in Baghdad.

Policy Recommendations and Conclusion

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed a quiet crisis in Iraq-Gulf economic integration, one that extends beyond oil exports and food security headlines. The traders who move manufacturing inputs through the UAE to Iraq are being priced out of a route they once relied upon for its predictability and cost stability. These overlooked sectors lack the scale to absorb massive shipping cost increases, and their erosion represents a meaningful but underappreciated consequence of the war. Some have already begun redirecting their supply chains toward Türkiye, drawn by product suitability and the promise of a less contested route. What makes this shift significant is its direction, as trade relationships built on credit and trust among smaller traders do not reorient easily, and once they do, they take time to be pulled back.

These traders operate beneath the level of formal agreements but can be the foundation upon which longer term economic alignment takes root. If Baghdad and its Gulf partners allow this reorientation to unfold without intervention, they risk undercutting a strategic objective that has driven Iraq-GCC engagement since the late 2010s. For the newly formed government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, the erosion of these routes presents a practical obstacle to maintaining the informal foundation of Iraq-GCC integration. Al-Zaidi's past as a businessman will perhaps lead him to recognize that high-level memoranda of understanding do not solve the problems of traders on the ground. Baghdad should establish direct engagement with chambers of commerce, traders' associations, and transport companies to understand where the real friction points lie.

The Iraqi government could also consider targeted support for low-value sectors, including temporary tariff reductions, expedited customs clearance, or subsidized freight costs for containers moving from Fujairah to Iraqi border crossings. Rather than permanent subsidies, the goal would be a bridge until infrastructure solutions mature or the crisis of the Strait is resolved. Al-Zaidi's administration must also act on information asymmetry. In partnership with the GCC General Secretariat, Baghdad could establish a publicly accessible dashboard tracking container freight costs, transit times, and route viability from Khorfakkan, Jebel Ali, and Turkish ports to Iraqi border crossings. Traders currently operate with limited visibility into alternative routes, and better data could limit fears that are perhaps outdated.

For wider GCC stakeholders, the preservation of Iraq-GCC trade routes should be treated as a strategic priority, not solely a commercial one. The nearly decade-long effort Gulf states have spent trying to pull Iraq's economic center of gravity closer to themselves was about steadily weaving ties that could outlast any single administration or political crisis in Baghdad. The closure of the Strait threatens to undo this work at the most basic level of trade. If Iraqi traders permanently reorient their supply chains toward Türkiye, the Gulf loses both a trade route and an opportunity to engage with Iraq's economic alignment at a moment when that alignment is being contested by the regional war.

This would mean directly engaging with the Iraqi government on infrastructure solutions, supporting data transparency initiatives, and recognizing that low-value sectors, while less glamorous than energy or defense, are the foundation upon which longer term economic integration is built within Iraq's complex political sphere. The window to act, however, is narrowing quickly. Every container rerouted through Türkiye, credit relationship that shifts northward, and trader who decides that Iraq is no longer worth the hassle makes the return to a Gulf-oriented trade corridor harder to reverse. If Iraqi and Gulf policymakers want Iraq to remain within the Gulf's economic orbit, they cannot afford to wait for normalcy to return.
This article will be included in the fourteenth edition of the Iraq Economic Review.

Endnotes

1. Yerevan Saeed, ‘Iraq Deepens Ties With GCC Neighbors’, Arab Gulf States Institute, 2023, 4. Kuwaiti oil output has dropped by roughly 53% while the UAE’s output has dropped by 44% over the course of the war, see Spencer Kimball, ‘Middle East Oil Production Plunges Due to Iran War, OPEC Data Shows’, CNBC News, 2026, 5. The oil industry overshadowed notable significant changes to other sectors that perhaps are incapable of warranting the same attention. For example, there have been detrimental effects on food security as Iran and the GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman have accounted for nearly 30-35 % of global fertilizer production, see Food And Agriculture Organization, Global Agrifood Implications of the 2026 Conflict in the Middle East (United Nations, 2026), 6. Bassem Mroue et al., ‘US and Iran Agree to 2-Week Ceasefire as Trump Pulls Back on Threats’, AP News, 2026, 8. Arabian Post, ‘UAE Seeks Broader Cooperation with Iraq’, The Arabian Post, 2024, 10. Al Jazeera, ‘Syria’s Assad Visits UAE in First Trip to Arab State since 2011’, Al Jazeera, 2022, 14. Interview with author, 2026.

15. Interview with author, 2026.

16. Interview with author, 2026.

17. Interview with author, 2026.

18. Interview with author, 2026.

19. Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, accessed July 6, 2026, foiz.gov.ae.

20. Interview with author, 2026.

21. Interview with author, 2026.

22. Abbas Kadhim, ‘The Geopolitical Imperative of Iraq-GCC Relations’, Arab Gulf States Institute, 2026, */

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The Qatar Model: The Future of Iraq–GCC Economic Integration?

surkew.hamakarim — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 13:12:36 +0000

Source of Photos: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Republic of Iraq

Among GCC states, Qatar has emerged as Iraq’s most active economic partner, committing more than $9 billion since 2023 across energy, logistics, infrastructure, and real estate.¹ Its investments include participation in the Gas Growth Integrated Project, expanded cargo operations through Milaha, and support for the Development Road Project.² No other GCC state has matched the breadth of Qatar’s engagement. Qatar’s engagement offers a way to think about what Iraq–GCC integration can realistically look like.

It suggests that integration need not run through GCC membership or a single institutional framework, and that bilateral investment can create meaningful economic linkages. Qatar’s relationship with Baghdad rests on conditions other Gulf states do not share, so it cannot be copied as a template. However, it still offers a lesson. No two Gulf states will engage Iraq for the same reasons or through the same channels, yet none can afford to ignore a market of Iraq’s scale and consumer base, and in every case the decisive factor is whether Baghdad can provide the governance and operating environment to turn investment into lasting transformation.

Qatar-Iraq engagement has been tested by the wider regional war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Qatar is among the most exposed states in the Gulf to these disruptions. Almost all of its liquefied natural gas, the source of the wealth it has been deploying abroad, must transit the Strait, and Doha has no pipeline bypass of the kind Saudi Arabia and the UAE rely on for their oil. The disruption reaches the revenue base that funds Qatar's investments in Iraq, and it poses two questions that run through what follows. The first is whether a relationship built so heavily on Qatari capital can withstand a shock to the source of that capital. The second is whether the same disruption makes Iraq more attractive to Doha, or less.

The Strategic Logic on Both Sides

Qatar’s engagement with Iraq is not primarily driven by proximity or shared history, but by a broader strategy of economic statecraft that uses investment and commercial ties to build influence and mitigate the vulnerabilities of a small state operating in a volatile regional environment. Qatar’s position in the Gulf has long encouraged it to cultivate networks of economic interdependence that reduce its strategic vulnerabilities, particularly following the 2017–2021 Gulf crisis.³ Iraq fits this approach well. By investing in Iraq’s energy, reconstruction, and logistics sectors, Doha gains not only economic returns but also a long-term stake in Iraqi stability and influence within the country’s evolving economic architecture.

Doha’s ability to build strong relations with Baghdad beyond (or regardless of) the GCC’s priorities with Iraq derive in part from Qatar’s relationship with Iran. Qatari political analyst and media personnel Abdulaziz Al-Ishaq states that despite periods of “regional tension between Iran and other Arab states (particularly the GCC)”, relations between Baghdad and Doha have remained relatively stable – regardless of the implications of Iraq-GCC relations from Iranian political influence in Iraq. This resilience stems partly from “Qatar’s policy of avoiding direct confrontation with Iran,” which has limited the extent to which Iranian influence in Iraq has hindered the development of bilateral ties.⁴ This assessment reconciles with previous interpretations of the Qatari engagement with Iraq over the years being much more “immune” to Iranian influence in Iraq, unlike its Saudi counterpart.⁵

Iraq’s Ambassador to Qatar, H.E. Mr. Mohamed Jafar Al-Sadr, argues that the ‘Qatari model’ demonstrates how institutional cooperation can strengthen Iraq–GCC relations, and that expanding this approach across GCC states could deepen regional economic integration and transform bilateral ties into strategic partnerships. “Growing Gulf, particularly Qatari, investment in Iraq highlights the model’s potential to overcome structural challenges when supported by political commitment and effective implementation.”⁶ The potential for deepening Gulf investment in Iraq, alongside the emerging pattern of GCC member states independently pursuing bilateral ties with Baghdad, points to a significant recalibration of Gulf foreign policy — one that transcends the historically "sect-centric" paradigm that long constrained relations between the Gulf and Iraq post-2003.⁷

Growing Gulf, particularly Qatari, investment in Iraq highlights the model’s potential to overcome structural challenges when supported by political commitment and effective implementation.

Iraqi policymakers should recognize these geopolitical dimensions of Qatar’s engagement. By becoming integral to Iraq’s economic revival, Qatar reduces Iraq’s dependence on its immediate neighbors while reinforcing its own regional influence and relevance to Washington, which remains invested in Iraqi stability. For Doha, the relationship is not merely bilateral but part of a broader diplomatic strategy.

Iraq’s incentives are equally concrete, and they begin with a structural economic vulnerability that no Iraqi policymaker can afford to ignore. Oil revenues account for more than 91 percent of Iraqi export earnings, approximately 88 percent of the government budget, and roughly 53 percent of GDP.⁸ The IMF’s 2020 Article IV review of Iraq projects widening fiscal deficits and rising debt-to-GDP ratios through the mid-2020s, driven in large part by oil price volatility and an absence of economic diversification.⁹ Against this backdrop, Qatari capital can be seen as patient, politically sophisticated, and familiar with the region’s operating environment in a way that Western or Asian investors are not, and that represents a qualitatively different kind of partnership.

Qatar’s engagement is significant not only as a source of capital but also for its sectoral impact. Investment in the Gas Growth Integrated Project supports technology transfer and capacity-building, while Milaha’s operations at Umm Qasr strengthen Iraq’s trade links with GCC and international markets. The Development Road MoU with Turkey and the UAE could generate up to $4 billion annually at full capacity, helping reduce Iraq’s dependence on oil exports and deepen its integration into regional supply chains.¹⁰

Investment amount	Details	Project
25% of $27bn = $6.75 billion	Qatar owns a 25% stake in TotalEnergies' $27 billion integrated energy project in Iraq. Iraq's Basra Oil Company holds 30%, while TotalEnergies retains the remaining 45%.¹¹	Gas Growth Integrated Project
Included in the $27bn	Energy production of 1.25 gigawatt; serves 350,000 households; completion between 2025–2027.	Solar Energy Project in Basra Governorate
50% stake in the solar power component of the TotalEnergies project	QatarEnergy has also secured a 50% stake in the solar power component of the TotalEnergies project.¹²
$5bn (promised)	Promised and committed investment from Qatar to invest in Iraq through various channels.	Overall committed investments

Table: List of Qatari investments in Iraq.¹³

A few clarifications on the table above: Qatar's 25% stake in TotalEnergies' $27 billion energy project is not included in the $9 billion figure, which covers only Doha's direct investment in new projects — the TotalEnergies stake will likely be added once its returns become clearer. QatarEnergy's 50% stake in the project's solar component is excluded for the same reason, and may have been an unintended byproduct of Iraq's push to diversify away from Iranian energy imports. The separately promised $5 billion remains pending, though publicly confirmed by the Iraqi Embassy in Doha.

The institutional architecture sustaining this engagement has also deepened. The seventh session of the Qatari-Iraqi Joint Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation, convened in Baghdad on July 7–9, 2024 and co-chaired by both countries’ trade ministers, focused on investment opportunities across industry, infrastructure, renewable energy, digital transformation, and financial services. Qatar Chamber has initiated discussions with the Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce on establishing a joint business council and a Qatari-Iraqi Business Forum, signaling that the relationship is beginning to move below the state-to-state level, where durable economic ties are ultimately built.

Risks and Limiting Conditions

An honest appraisal of the Qatar–Iraq relationship must reckon with the risks that complicate it, and these are risks that Iraqi policymakers bear primary responsibility for addressing. The most immediate challenge is the “militia economy.” Iran-aligned armed factions hold economic interests in sectors attractive to Gulf investors, including reconstruction, border logistics, and real estate. As a result, Qatari investment risks becoming entangled in factional competition or facing pressure from armed actors that view Gulf capital as a resource to be captured. However, foreign and Gulf investors have rarely been directly targeted, despite extensive militia-linked criminality.¹⁴

Doha’s response has been deliberate. Qatar has relied on formal state channels, including joint committees, investment agreements, and MoUs, rather than informal networks. This serves as both risk management and a political signal: investment depends on Iraq’s ability to provide a predictable and secure environment. For Iraqi policymakers, this conditionality is not an obstacle but an incentive to strengthen state institutions and attract broader Gulf engagement. Mr. Al-Ishaq rejects the notion that Qatar seeks to draw Iraq into a specific geopolitical alignment, stressing instead that “Qatar has maintained constructive relations with a wide spectrum of Iraqi political actors.”¹⁵By engaging a wide range of political actors, Doha has gained an advantage (in contrast to its neighbors) in accessing Iraq’s economic and investment opportunities.

Qatar has maintained constructive relations with a wide spectrum of Iraqi political actors.

According to Dr. Seloom, Qatar’s engagement in Iraq follows a selective model focused on large-scale energy and infrastructure projects. Its resilience stems from structured investments, international partnerships, and relatively secure operating environments rather than state-to-state channels alone. While effective for major projects, the model has limited reach into Iraq’s wider private sector, resulting in a footprint that is deep but narrow.¹⁶ The IMF’s Article IV review similarly argued that reforms in labor markets, the financial sector, anti-corruption, and state capacity are essential for turning investment pledges into lasting economic gains. Without them, Gulf capital risks reinforcing patronage networks rather than productive investment. The main constraint is not only Gulf willingness, but Iraq’s absorptive capacity.

A further risk concerns the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which remains largely excluded from the Development Road framework.¹⁷ This could narrow the project’s economic base and create political friction between Erbil and Baghdad. If the Development Road is to serve as a genuinely integrating infrastructure project, the KRI’s position must be resolved. The most significant risk to the relationship is the wider regional conflict centered on Iran. Because Iraq hosts both Iran-aligned armed groups and U.S. forces, it remains vulnerable to proxy escalation and spillover violence. Sustained conflict could disrupt the air, port, and transport infrastructure targeted by Gulf investment and trigger instability in oil markets, on which Iraq’s fiscal position heavily depends.

For Qatar, the exposure is more direct than for any other Gulf investor. Almost all of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas exports, the foundation of the wealth it has been deploying across the region, must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Doha has no pipeline route that bypasses the chokepoint. The closure of the Strait and the damage to Gulf energy infrastructure during the current war therefore strike at the revenue base that funds Qatar’s overseas investment, narrowing the fiscal space from which its commitments to Iraq are made. This poses a direct question for Baghdad, of whether Qatari investment in Iraq is insulated from such a shock or among the first commitments to be deferred when Doha’s own income is squeezed. Qatar’s careful balancing of relations with Washington, Tehran, and its Gulf neighbors would also narrow under a prolonged conflict, reducing the diplomatic space on which its Iraq strategy depends.

Yet the same disruption cuts the other way. A chokepoint that can be closed at will is precisely the vulnerability that makes diversification attractive, and Iraq offers Qatar exposure to energy, logistics, and overland routes that do not depend on Hormuz. The Development Road, which Doha backs, is in part a wager on corridors running north through Turkey rather than south through the Gulf. On this logic, a sustained threat to Hormuz could make Qatar’s Iraqi investments more strategically valuable rather than less, provided the war does not also render Iraq itself too unstable to operate in. Whether Doha reads the moment as a reason to retrench or to deepen its position is one of the central uncertainties now hanging over the relationship.

According to Mr. Al-Ishaq, Qatar’s foreign policy is defined by its role as a neutral mediator able to engage competing actors, a position it has maintained even during periods of tension with Iran. The sustainability of this approach rests on Qatar’s preference for avoiding rigid alignments and on the shared interest of regional and international actors, including Iran and the United States, in preserving Doha as a credible intermediary.¹⁸ This interpretation aligns with how Qatar has long navigated a delicate balance between Washington and Tehran, avoiding alignment with either side while leveraging its position as a diplomatic intermediary to facilitate backchannel communication between the two powers in pursuit of de-escalation.¹⁹

A prolonged regional conflict would strengthen Iran-aligned factions in Iraq, deepen the militia economy, and raise the cost of investment in key infrastructure and energy projects. For initiatives such as the Development Road and the Gas Growth Integrated Project, sustained instability could increase security risks and encourage a more cautious Gulf investment approach. The durability of Qatar-Iraq cooperation may therefore depend on insulating economic ties from regional instability.

Implications for Iraq–GCC Integration

What does the Qatar relationship tell us about the prospects for Iraq’s broader economic integration with the Gulf? The honest answer is encouraging but conditional. Qatar’s case is in part specific to Qatar. Its ability to work across Iraq’s factional lines owes much to its non-confrontational posture toward Iran, and Seloom’s account of a footprint that is deep but narrow shows how far the model is built around large energy and infrastructure projects rather than the wider economy. Those conditions will not reproduce elsewhere, and no two Gulf states will engage Iraq for the same reasons or through the same channels. What Qatar offers, then, is a demonstration rather than a blueprint. None of the Gulf states can afford to ignore a market of Iraq’s scale and consumer base, and Qatar shows that self-interested bilateral engagement, pursued on each state’s own terms, can still accumulate into real economic integration, provided Baghdad supplies the governance to sustain it.

Integration does not require GCC membership or a single institutional framework. Given Iraq’s ties to Iran, the United States, and Turkey, any integration model must accommodate Baghdad’s sovereignty concerns and multiple alignments. The Qatar model shows this is possible. Bilateral investment, the Development Road, and private-sector engagement can generate the economic linkages usually associated with formal integration. Together, Saudi electricity interconnection projects, UAE involvement in Grand Faw Port, and Qatar’s multi-sector investments are already creating a de facto integration that is reshaping Iraq’s economic geography.

The durability of this integration ultimately depends on decisions made in Baghdad. GCC states engage Iraq because they see economic and strategic value, but this will endure only if Iraq improves governance, protects investment from the militia economy, reduces business costs, and delivers on key infrastructure commitments. In this regard, the ongoing disarmament campaign is a positive signal of the state’s effort to strengthen control over the economy and reflects growing political and societal resistance to continued militant influence, despite concerns over the process itself.

Beyond the existing economic relations, potential industries or markets in Iraq that could be of Qatar’s economic interest include, but are not limited to: renewable energy; digital economy and technological infrastructure; education, research, and career development; and reconstruction and infrastructure.²⁰ From Baghdad’s perspective, the concentration of Gulf interest is a rare strategic asset. Qatar’s $9 billion commitment [excluding Qatar’s stakes in the TotalEnergies’ project], the UAE’s involvement in Grand Faw Port, Saudi electricity interconnection projects, and the Development Road MoU reflect unprecedented confidence in Iraq’s economic future. Yet this confidence is not unconditional. The key question is not only whether the Gulf is willing to engage, but whether Iraq can provide the governance and operating environment needed to turn investment pledges into lasting economic transformation.

Qatar’s experience suggests the pathway is open. Whether Iraq walks it is a decision that rests with Baghdad, and on whether it can turn a rare moment of Gulf interest into the governance and operating environment that lasting investment requires.

This article will be included in the fourteenth edition of the Iraq Economic Review.

Author: Dr. Zeidon Alkinani

Dr. Zeidon Alkinani is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS), a Middle East political analyst, and the Founding Director of the Arab Perspectives Institute.

Endnotes

1. This $9 billion USD figure excludes additional stakes in a TotalEnergies project in Iraq.

2. Ranj Alaaldin, "Building Bridges: Qatar's Strategic Investments in Iraq," Middle East Council on Global Affairs, March 2024, */

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Iraq Economic Review: Thirteenth Edition

banu.omer — Thu, 26 Feb 2026 14:13:25 +0000

Can Iraq translate renewed oil flows and fiscal expansion into sustainable economic stability?

The review also examines Iraq’s federal budget outlook in a shifting oil price environment. With the tailwinds of high oil prices fading, the next government is expected to confront widening deficits, rising sovereign debt, and increasing debt-servicing burdens. The edition considers the trade-offs between domestic and foreign borrowing, the risks of debt monetization, and the implications for Iraq’s long-standing social contract. At the same time, it identifies structural improvements—including banking sector reform, macroeconomic stabilization, and gradual gains in non-oil revenues—that may help cushion the adjustment period. This edition underscores the difficult policy choices ahead as Iraq navigates lower oil prices, growing debt pressures, and the need for deeper fiscal and institutional reform to secure long-term economic resilience.

Contribution includes the following:

Mohammed Hussein - KRG Oil Exports: Progress Toward Stability or Temporary Truce?
Ahmed Tabaqchali - Then and now: Budgets, oil prices and the economy

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Redefining The "Just Energy Transition" For Iraq

saya.abdalsattar — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 14:56:40 +0000

How can Iraq pursue a just and sustainable energy transition while remaining deeply dependent on oil revenues for economic stability and household livelihoods? This report, “Redefining the Just Energy Transition for Iraq,” prepared by the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) in partnership with the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), as part of the “The Just Transition Green Bridge,” co-funded by the European Union through its Civil Society Facility for the Mediterranean, and the Kingdom of Sweden through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), examines Iraq’s worsening air pollution and health risks from gas flaring, even as the country remains heavily dependent on oil. Despite repeated government pledges to reform the energy sector and expand renewables, progress has been slow, revealing deeper governance challenges shaping Iraq’s energy future.

We were grateful for the chance to work closely with environmental organizations across Iraq to develop a framework for a just energy transition that speaks to the realities of a post-conflict country in which the basis of the economy and citizens’ livelihoods hinge heavily on oil.

- Dr. Zmkan Ali Saleem, Senior Research Fellow, IRIS

The analysis explores Iraq’s deepening environmental crisis, where gas flaring and oil-related pollution continue to damage air quality and threaten public health despite repeated pledges of reform. Reflecting on the process, Zmkan Saleem, Senior Researcher at IRIS, noted: “We were grateful for the chance to work closely with environmental organizations across Iraq to develop a framework for a just energy transition that speaks to the realities of a post-conflict country in which the basis of the economy and citizens’ livelihoods hinge heavily on oil.” The report also highlights the long-standing dilemma at the heart of Iraq’s energy sector: oil revenues remain vital for the economy, yet the sector is simultaneously a major driver of environmental harm.

A just energy transition in Iraq requires recognizing that timing and phasing are essential. The process must start with harm reduction within the oil sector, grounded in transparency and accountability. Iraq must pursue a phased and pragmatic move forward that focuses on near-term harm reduction like eliminating gas flaring, while also opening the "black box" of energy governance.

- Shayan Kamil, Research Fellow, IRIS

The report outlines what a just energy transition should look like in Iraq, balancing the realities of oil dependence with the urgent need to reduce environmental and social costs. It also maps the institutions and political actors shaping the country’s energy trajectory, providing insight into the dynamics that will influence Iraq’s shift toward a more equitable and sustainable future.

Shayan Kamil, Research Fellow at IRIS, emphasized: “A just energy transition in Iraq requires recognizing that timing and phasing are essential. The process must start with harm reduction within the oil sector, grounded in transparency and accountability. Iraq must pursue a phased and pragmatic move forward that focuses on near-term harm reduction like eliminating gas flaring, while also opening the ‘black box’ of energy governance.”

The IRIS experts and researchers who authored the report

• Dr. Mac Skelton – Executive Director, IRIS
• Dr. Zmkan Saleem – Senior Research Fellow, IRIS
• Shayan Kamil – Research Fellow, IRIS

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Iraq Economic Review: Twelfth Edition

saya.abdalsattar — Tue, 25 Nov 2025 10:01:27 +0000

How can Iraq build a more resilient and sustainable economy amid ongoing fiscal pressures, political uncertainty, and regional volatility?

The Twelfth Edition of the Iraq Economic Review explores this question through targeted analyses and discussions that highlight the country’s most urgent economic challenges. A central focus of this edition is Iraq’s ongoing gas flaring crisis, where flare volumes continue to rise despite expanded investments in gas capture and repeated promises to curb waste. The review outlines the technical and institutional barriers that have limited progress, while noting emerging opportunities for long-term energy reform. The review also highlights the unemployment crisis in the Kurdistan Region, drawing on insights from a roundtable in Erbil. Years of fiscal strain, limited public hiring, and political influence have left many young graduates without opportunities.

The discussion underscored the need to strengthen the private sector, improve coordination among ministries, and expand vocational and SME support to revitalize the labor market. The edition also reviews Mosul’s urban planning hurdles, shaped by land conflicts and fragmented oversight. Still, the discussion identifies realistic pathways for improvement through targeted development and better coordination. The issue concludes with an analysis of the Iraq–Türkiye Pipeline (ITP) following the resumption of northern oil exports. It underscores the pipeline’s strategic importance for Iraq’s energy security, especially as the country seeks alternatives to its vulnerable Gulf export routes amid regional tensions.

Contribution includes the following:

Ahmed Tabaqchali - Iraq's Gas Flaring Paradoxes: Economic and Technical Obstacles
H.E. Kwestan Mohamad Abdulla - Interview: Unemployment in the Kurdistan Region
Sanger Youssif Salih - A Roadmap Toward Economic Recovery in Erbil and the Kurdistan Region
Firas Saleh - Spotlight on Mosul: Pathways to Economic Recovery
Yesar Al-Maleki - Rebuilding Resilience: The ITP's Role in Iraq’s Oil Export Security

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Iraq Economic Review: Eleventh Edition

saya.abdalsattar — Mon, 11 Aug 2025 06:28:32 +0000

Can Iraq’s energy and agricultural sectors overcome entrenched challenges to secure the country’s economic future? The latest Iraq Economic Review examines this question, focusing on debates over power generation, energy policy, and food security. Ahmad Tabaqchali analyzes Iraq’s chronic electricity shortages, contending that piecemeal measures—whether domestic gas capture, regional imports, or renewables—are insufficient without a multifactorial, long-term strategy that addresses grid deficiencies and rising demand. Mohammed Hussein considers the Kurdistan Region’s “Runaki” Project, an initiative to deliver 24-hour power and phase out diesel generators, assessing the economic, political, and social factors that may determine its outcome. Dr. Hussein Mishbak reviews agricultural policy in Dhi Qar, finding that current government approaches have struggled to balance the needs of key crops such as wheat and barley, with implications for food security under conditions of climate stress and water scarcity. This edition highlights the reforms and policy adjustments required to strengthen Iraq’s economic resilience.

Contribution includes the following:

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Kurdistan Region Electricity Reform and the “Runaki” Project

saya.abdalsattar — Sun, 03 Aug 2025 12:47:54 +0000

Source: The supply demand figures are collected by the author from various sources [8].

How Runaki Works

Runaki focuses on managing electricity consumption through the use of smart meters, which digitalize electricity bill collection. This system enables real-time monitoring of electricity usage and allows consumers to track their consumption and adjust their usage patterns accordingly. It replaces the previous flat-rate system with a tiered billing structure that incentivizes efficient energy consumption. In sum, Runaki achieves 24-hour electricity by lowering overall demand by imposing higher costs for higher consumption.

Most households have historically purchased a large portion of their electricity from private generator operators. According to KRG officials, the project aims to provide reliable electricity for low- and middle-income households who typically consume less than 800 Watt-hours (Wh) per month, which replaces the combination of subsidized grid electricity and diesel generators. As of July 2025, 2 million residents reportedly benefit from 24-hour electricity, mostly in the centers of the major cities [9]. The KRG’s goal is to extend this to all of the KRI’s 6.4 million residents by the end of 2026. So far, 1,260 of the KRI’s estimated 7,354 diesel generators have been shut down as part of the program, according to officials [10].

Figure 2 illustrates the progressive electricity pricing for households/business entities

Source: The data in the Figure 2 is taken from the KRG’s website [11].

As Figure 2 shows, the prices for households are progressively structured to charge more for higher consumption, ranging from 72 IQD (USD)/kWh for low usage and up to 350 IQD (USD)/kWh for high usage. For business entities, rates vary based on sector: enterprises in agriculture pay 60 IQD/kWh, heavy industry pays 125 IQD/kWh, manufacturing pays 160 IQD/kWh, and general business pays 185 IQD/kWh. According to some KRG estimates, 64% of households currently fall within the first two tiers of the progressive pricing by consuming no more than 800 kWh/month; [12] however, these estimates have yet to be independently verified.

Concerns about Financial Burdens

Consumers are used to paying either just 18 IQD/kWh under the previous system for national grid electricity or getting it for free by dodging their bill entirely. The burden these new costs place on ordinary families is significant. Almost all the opposition parties, which collectively hold more than 27% of the seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, have publicly rejected the proposed tariff model. Instead, they want to maintain the current semi-flat rates or provide extensive subsidies for low-income households. Adnan Said Hussein, an MP from the New Generation Movement in the Kurdistan Parliament, said in a statement: "For households who would have to buy electricity at 350 IQD per kWh, they would end up paying 19 times more than what they currently pay under the existing system. This is unbearable. Civil servants, who already lose the equivalent of about two months’ salaries each year due to the corruption of the ruling elite, simply cannot afford this?" [13].

Unless the KRG clearly explains and implements relief for low-income households, the new system will effectively entail a massive shifting of the cost of electricity from the government to the people.

Thus, the financial sustainability of subsidies represent a delicate balancing act, given outspoken opposition and the KRG’s budget constraints. Even if Runaki represents a necessary step forward in the KRI’s electricity sector, it faces significant implementation challenges and the most visible one is political polarization related to the project. The KRG insists that the government will find ways to alleviate the financial burden for consumers, particularly for low-income families, but details on the scale and nature of this relief have been very scarce. Authorities have an obligation to clarify these measures and to implement them urgently. Otherwise, the new system will effectively entail a massive shifting of the cost of electricity from the government to the people, with the most vulnerable citizens suffering disproportionately.

Potential Benefits

If the government succeeds in alleviating the burdens placed on vulnerable citizens, Runaki could have far-reaching implications for a wide range of stakeholders with substantial benefits for households and businesses. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and service providers could enjoy more reliable electricity supply, operate more efficiently, minimize costly downtime, and improve their competitiveness. Lower energy costs compared with the diesel generators supports better financial sustainability and growth.

Secondly, for the broader population, Runaki is expected to generate significant environmental benefits by replacing diesel generators with natural gas power plants. "The main source of pollution in Kurdistan is certainly these diesel generators, followed by cars. Once these generators are shut down, we will eliminate a big source of the polluting particles and cancer-causing substances produced by diesel, in addition to getting rid of their constant noise." Said Yerivan Shaswar, an academic and environmental activist who works on air pollution in the KRI [14].

If KRG authorities can clarify and effectively implement subsidies for vulnerable citizens, Runaki’s substantial public benefits should help build popular support and sustain momentum.

Results of a survey from the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (KRSO) shows the generators consume about 444 million liters of diesel per month during peak times [15]. A diesel generator emits approximately 1.27 kg CO₂ per kWh of electricity produced [16], while natural gas power plants emit approximately 0.49 kg CO₂ per kWh [17]. Moreover, some fuel products consumed by the generators in the KRI are mixed with lead, making it even more harmful to public health than standard fuel [18]. In total, Runaki is expected to reduce the KRI’s CO₂ per kWh by at least 61 percent.

Third, for the KRG, the project could strengthen the government’s fiscal and governance position. It reduces fiscal pressures by phasing out costly fuel subsidies resulting from unpaid bills and electricity theft. The KRG used to pay more than 2.6 trillion IQD (about 2 billion USD) per year to the private electricity producers that supply the KRI’s grid, while it collected about 0.6 trillion IQD (about 462 million USD) [19]. Runaki is expected to address this issue by enhancing bill collection and implementing more systematic power consumption.

Employment and Market Impacts

The consequences for employment may be negative in the short-term. Runaki will put 7,746 people employed in the diesel generator sector out of work [20]. Monthly income for generators during peak demand reached IQD 274 million, according to the KRSO [21]. Estimates from the Union of Generator Owners found that approximately 28,500 people relied on 5,700 generators for their livelihoods, including owners, operators, bill collectors, and technicians [22]. These people have created a politically sensitive sector dominated by powerful local actors who have resisted past attempts to reform the power sector. They managed to create popular pressure in 2018 to disrupt reform attempts in Baghdad and southern Iraq [23]. Similar pressure to scuttle the Runaki project also occurred in the KRI during 2024 [24].

Runaki also affects fuel producers and traders. As demand for private generators declines, the market for diesel fuel will shrink dramatically. The diesel generators consume about 444 million liters of diesel on a monthly basis during peak periods [25]. Lower fuel sales threaten a historically lucrative sector and the livelihoods of those involved in refining, fuel distribution, and oil products trade. Ako Essa, one of the fuel traders and owner of a small topping plant that produces a specific type of diesel mainly used by generators, said: "We used to supply 124 diesel generators in Erbil until last winter. Now, only 26 of them remain operational, and very soon we will lose the rest. This has substantially affected our diesel sales"[26]. Consequently, the elites tied to the generator economy will see their influence diminish and control over electricity access and revenues will shift to the government.

Risk Management & Policy Responses

While Runaki promises cleaner and more reliable energy for the KRI, its success depends on effectively managing a range of political, technical, and social risks. The KRI’s exhausted grid infrastructure will pose consequent challenges. As demand rises with the shift away from diesel generators, the existing infrastructure may struggle to deliver consistent power. Transmission inefficiencies, inadequate maintenance, and widespread illegal connections currently undermine system reliability, reduce revenue collection, and exacerbate disparities in electricity access. Some performance tests showed that the Runaki Project is expected to reduce both technical and non-technical losses. Technical losses are projected to fall within a standard range—below 15%, and electricity theft is also expected to decline between 10% and 15% from previously estimated levels of around 40% [27].

To mitigate the risk of public resistance to the new pricing model, the introduction of targeted subsidies for low-consumption tiers can protect low-income households from sudden price shocks. Complementing this with phased tariff adjustments, rather than abrupt increases, can ease the transition and reduce the likelihood of backlash, enhancing the project’s long-term sustainability.

The 28,500 individuals—generator-owners, operators, bill collectors, and technicians—who will lose their livelihoods as a result of Runaki’s introduction remain an active aggrieved social group that could oppose the project unless properly compensated. The KRG has kept the shut-down generators in place and pledged to pay 1.5 million IQD per generator until Runaki is fully operational. However, these payments have been inconsistent, prompting many to sell their generators to operators in other parts of Iraq rather than waiting to see if Runaki succeeds [28].

Expecting a large segment of the KRI’s population to change their behaviors overnight remains an understudied aspect of the Runaki Project.

Moreover, to ensure better communication, the KRG needs to continue its awareness campaign to explain the benefits of the project (e.g., 24-hour power, reduced noise and air pollution, and improved public health). This should be associated with tips for efficient electricity use, better management, and on-time bill payment. Shamal Karim, a construction worker, said that low-income consumers like him are unable to pay for national grid electricity, even at a highly subsidized rate.

Expecting a large segment of the KRI’s population to change their behaviors overnight remains an understudied aspect of the Runaki Project [29]. If KRG authorities can clarify and effectively implement subsidies for vulnerable citizens, Runaki’s substantial public benefits should help build popular support and sustain momentum in the face of implementation challenges.

Its environmental and social gains—such as reduced pollution, improved public health, and more reliable electricity—can serve as powerful selling points to counter political, fiscal, and technical obstacles that risk slowing progress.

This article will be included in the eleventh edition of the Iraq Economic Review.

By Mohammed Hussein

Mohammed Hussein is research contributor at IRIS, contributing to the Iraq Economic Review with a focus on Iraq’s energy sector and private sector development.

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Iraq’s Power Conundrum: A multifactorial approach to ensuring reliable electricity supply and achieving energy security

saya.abdalsattar — Sun, 03 Aug 2025 12:07:29 +0000

Sources: Ministry of Electricity annual reports 2010-2023, available at: For consumers, the electricity supply-demand gap is mostly met by a combination of demand suppression, and by electricity sourced from neighborhood generators [6] which have grown over the years, operate with subsidized fuel and are noisy, polluting, and expensive.

The grid’s structural deficiencies are compounded by its high costs and low revenue generation, with the gap between the two increasing, which places increasingly high demands on the federal budget and in the process risks the grid and the budget’s fiscal sustainability. Direct operating costs [7], such as MoE’s operating budget, electricity purchases from independent power producers (IPP), electricity and gas imports, domestic fuel usage, and so on, are often more than 10-times larger than revenues generated from electricity sales. These costs are increased further by non-direct costs arising from the provision of domestic gas, crude, and fuel oil at highly subsidized fixed prices. The substantial losses during the transmission and distribution stages (Figure 1), mean that only a small portion of the electricity generated is billed, 40.6% in 2023; and the sector’s poor collection history means that about half of what is billed is collected. Therefore, collected revenues based on electricity consumption tariffs, that are uncommercial to start with, do not cover the grid’s costs. As such the generation and delivery of electricity needs continued financing to cover the revenue-cost shortfall, as well as for needed investment in the grid, both of which are covered by the federal budget, in the process increasing federal expenditures.

Finally, the gird’s structural and financing deficiencies are amplified by long-term demand drivers. The first of which is population growth of 2.3%, followed by increased demand for electricity stemming from the reconstruction activity following decades of conflict, in particular the current large-scale housing developments encompassing new communities, mixed-use developments, and high-rise buildings. While, the third driver is increased electricity consumption as the country’s stability takes hold and domestic consumption patterns begin to catch up with those of peers in the region. The delivery of electricity to end users, as measured by kilowatt hours (KWh) per capita [8], shows that domestic consumption in 2022 recovered to 1995 levels, and is about a half the average of peers in 2022 (Figure 2) underscoring the potential catch-up over-time and thus increased long-term electricity demand.

Figure 2: Delivery of electricity per-capita

Source: World Bank, data as of 2022, available at: The growing electricity supply-demand gap means that the goal posts are continuously moving for bridging this gap and, as such, ensuring reliable electricity supply and achieving energy security, is a long-term process based on a multifactorial approach to the power conundrum. Such an approach should encompass power generation, transmission and distribution, as well as their fiscal sustainability by addressing the structural and financing deficiencies of the power grid. These should take place along three broad areas: the first and the one that receives most attention is power generations, followed by power delivery, and the grid’s fiscal sustainability.

Power generation covers direct electricity imports, installing additional generating capacity, upgrading existing generating capacity, and securing fuel sources for electricity generation- especially gas, followed by solar energy. Direct electricity imports include those from neighboring countries, and within Iraq from the KRI. In the early 2000s, these were predominately from Iran, followed by small amounts from Turkey and the KRI. Imports from Iran started in 2004, peaked at 0.94 GW in 2012, and by the end of 2023 declined to 0.36 GW as a consequence of Iran’s shortcomings [9] in meeting its domestic demand [10].

Imports from the KRI started in 2013 at 0.29 GW and by 2023 were 0.42 GW; however they have been uneven. Imports from Turkey ended in 2016 at 0.27 GW. Diversification into other regional suppliers, started in late 2018, with the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Jordan to establish an electrical interconnection network for the import of 0.15-0.20 GW beginning in September 2020 [11]. In early March 2024 imports began starting with 0.04 GW that eventually would grow to 0.15-0.20 GW. Additionally, an agreement was signed in late-2019 with the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) for an initial 0.50 GW to be imported from Kuwait rising to 1.90 GW over subsequent years through building a common power grid, with implementation expected in 2025 [12].

Other agreements signed, but not implemented yet, are with Turkey [13] for the supply of 0.60 GW, and with Saudi Arabia for initial imports of 0.40 GW that will eventually reach 2.00 GW [14]. This collection of separate projects should be developed into an integrated project that links Iraq’s power grid into the GCC’s regional power grid [15] by addressing the considerable technical challenges involved in integrating national grids.

Electricity imports from the KRI should be combined with gas imports from the KRI, as part of a long-term resolution to the twin interlinked conflicts over the KRI’s share of the federal budget, and over the development of the country’s oil and gas resources through a federal oil and gas law. Ultimately electricity imports from the region have a ceiling on potential supply, as all these countries share the same peak-demand during summer months, thus limiting export availability.

The government’s plans for generating capacity include 15 GW in new capacity, and 13 GW from current capacity through efficiency enhancements [16]. However, considerable work needs to be undertaken to move these plans beyond the aspirational stage, to secure sustainable funding, and crucially to secure the needed fuel, in particular gas, for power generation. Domestic sourcing of additional gas supplies falls into three categories. The first is capturing all flared gas such as the expansion plans of the Basra Gas Company, and the deal with Total Energies which includes capturing flared gas [17]. The second is accelerating the development of gas focused fields, by resolving the chromic delays in developing these untapped sources [18]. The third is realizing the KRI’s gas potential through a resolution of the issues hindering its development through a federal oil and gas law (above), for the KRI to be in a position to exports about 5.4 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas a year starting in 2030 [19].

Electricity imports from the KRI should be combined with gas imports from the KRI, as part of a long-term resolution to the twin interlinked conflicts over the KRI’s share of the federal budget, and over the development of the country’s oil and gas resources through a federal oil and gas law.

International sourcing of additional gas supplies takes the form of pipeline gas imports, and LNG imports. Gas pipeline imports started from Iran in 2017[20], which steadily increased until 2020 peaking at 10.3 BCM, before decreasing to 7.9 BCM by the end of 2024 due to Iran’s shortcomings in meeting its domestic demand. This was followed in 2024 with a deal for pipeline gas imports from Turkmenistan for about 5.5 BCM annually, which is dependent on overcoming geographical and other challenges –as this gas would be exported to Iran [21], after which Iran releases the equivalent amount of gas from its production, to Iraq. Other than Iran, Turkmenistan was the only viable pipeline exporter that had the production and spare capacity to export gas to Iraq, but the geographic and other challenges encountered underscore the difficulty of any other potential pipeline exporter such as Russia or Azerbaijan. Thus, an alternative is LNG imports from Qatar, the U.S., or Australia assuming that they have the spare capacity to meet Iraq’s needs, or from Russia which has spare capacity, but importing and using LNG require significant infrastructure developments[22].

It should be pointed out that securing these alternative gas sources does not negate the need for Iranian gas even though it is declining. Iran’s gas exports of 8.8 BCM in 2023 accounted for 29.0% of generated electricity, while gas imports from the KRI and Turkmenistan, under ideal conditions, could be 10.9 BCM by 2030, or about 23.8% more than imports from Iran in 2023. But by 2030, the supply-demand gap would have increased meaningfully, thus underscoring the need for all sources of gas, including from Iran.

Figure 3: Iranian contributions vs generated electricity

Sources: MoE annual reports 2010-2023: Increased domestic and international gas supplies should be complemented by upgrading MoE’s current gas power generating plants from mostly simple-cycle combustion turbines (SCCT) to combined-cycle combustion turbines (CCCT) thereby generating significantly more electricity from the same quantities of gas. While such an upgrade is included in the government’s 13 GW planned current capacity increases, however, this needs to move beyond the planning stages to implementation.

Also needing a move to implementation is solar energy fueled power generation, which is planned to contribute 3.5 GW of the planned 15 GW in new generating capacity [23]. Meanwhile, TotalEnergies, has started building the first phase of a 1.0 GW solar energy plant, with an initial 0.25 GW that would be fully operational by 2028 [24].

Complementing the power generation area is the second area, which receives less attention but is just as essential, which is ensuring the maximum utilization of the power generation provided in the first area. In other words, utilizing the power delivered by new generating capacity, by enhanced existing generating capacity, by new sources of gas and solar energy, and by electricity imports; in order to minimize the losses of up 60% from current transmission systems and distribution grids (Figure 1). However, this requires the government’s planned $11.5 billion medium-term investment in transmission and distribution to move to the immediate term, and implementation, to increase its scope, and to secure sustainable funding[25].

However, implementing the first and second areas would not ensure the sector’s fiscal sustainability, nor would they remove the drain on the budget without embarking on comprehensive reforms of both electricity tariffs, and of the system of fuel and power subsidies. However, this third area, vital as it is, follows on from the country’s post-2003 political economy, and thus is the most difficult to implement[26].

Conclusion

The analysis of the power gird’s structural and financing deficiencies argues that Iraq’s power conundrum is real, and could develop into a full-blown crisis over the coming years if the underlying causes are not addressed with urgency. However, the usual framing of the conundrum, both in diagnosis and in proposed solutions, has been overly simplistic and has not addressed, nor can it address its root causes. The paper argues for a multifactorial approach that encompass the power grid’s spectrum of generation, transmission and distribution, as well as the grid’s fiscal sustainability. However, this is a long-term process with many moving parts, requiring a dedicated, persistent, and long-term commitment by Iraq’s political elite, irrespective of who emerges to form the new government post the upcoming parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the same scattershot set of solutions for electricity shortages will likely be championed by the political elite to further their chances in these elections. The paper aims to counterbalance any such solutions proposed during the elections, and to frame the public debate within the context of the multifactorial aspects of the conundrum and its solutions – even though the needed commitment from the elite has, so far, been lacking, and expecting it to happen is within the realms of fantasy.

This article will be included in the eleventh edition of the Iraq Economic Review.

By Ahmed Tabaqchali

Ahmed Tabaqchali is a senior research fellow at IRIS.

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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON FOOD SECURITY IN IRAQ: THE CASE OF DHI QAR

banu.omer — Sun, 09 Feb 2025 11:57:33 +0000

Introduction

Thi Qar province is a major center for agricultural production in Iraq.^[1] Farming plays a crucial role in local livelihoods, sustaining communities and providing 75% of all rural employment. The Iraqi government has initiated a number of policies to improve agricultural outputs. It has provided price support for wheat, subsidies and loans for essential equipment, and incentives for modern irrigation to increase output and promote sustainable water use.[2] Yet, data collected on crop production in Dhi Qar—especially for strategic grain crops like barley and wheat—suggest that these policies have not achieved their stated goal of improving food security.[3] Though wheat production has remained fairly stable, cultivation of barley, which is a key crop for livestock fodder, has plummeted and become increasingly unviable. This policy brief explores the causes of these uneven outcomes and charts a way forward.

Current agricultural policies are largely out of line with the realities faced by farmers on the ground in three respects: First, policies do not account either for the costs of agriculture or price instability. Second, they do not integrate the impacts of water scarcity and climate change. Third, there is insufficient attention paid to the interrelatedness between distinct grain crops. In other words, policies that benefit wheat may harm barley, and vice versa. Correcting these shortfalls will require inclusion of farmers and rural communities into the policymaking process to ensure greater alignment between policy and implementation.

The current cost of cultivating one dunam of wheat in Dhi Qar varies by region and farmers’ investment ranges from 250,000 to 435,000 Iraqi dinars. This cost is deemed equitable when compared to the state-specified price of 850,000 IQD per ton for first class wheat, with farmers earning no less than 350,000 dinars per ton, which is relatively advantageous for them.

- Dr. Hasan M. Ghubn, Ministry Official

This report takes a mixed methods approach, drawing both from agricultural statistics from various government sources (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), among others) and interviews and focus groups with both farmers and government officials in Dhi Qar.

Uneven Yields

Government data on the two main grain crops in Dhi Qar—wheat and barley—indicate a clear divergence. According to data on cultivated area, yield per cultivated area, and total production between 2008 and 2023, wheat outputs have gradually increased according to each metric, whereas barley production experienced a troubling decline. This divergence is most starkly exhibited in the overall production in tons: In 2008, Dhi Qar generated more than 104,533 tons of barley, which dropped to 6,084 tons in 2023. In contrast, wheat increased from 75,525 tons to 162,316 tons during the same period.[4]

Trends in Wheat and Barley Production: A Comparison from 2008 to 2023

Government Policies

T his decline in barley production occurred despite two major government initiatives designed to boost the growth of grain crops: the Iraqi Agricultural Initiative (2008–2015) and the Iraqi Government Initiatives to Support Modern Irrigation and Mechanization in Agriculture (2011-present). The policies falling under these programs include:

Price support for wheat: The government is a significant consumer of wheat, which it buys from farmers at pre-announced rates. This strategy provides a safety net for farmers, guaranteeing a minimum return on their investment and reducing the risk of price volatility on the private market.

Subsidies and loans for essential agricultural costs: To decrease the cost of production for farmers, the government provides loans and subsidies for seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment. This effort is designed to make wheat and barley cultivation more economically viable for farmers.

Supporting modern irrigation methods: Recognizing the role of technology in enhancing agricultural output and addressing water scarcity, the Iraqi government has established a number of initiatives to modernize irrigation infrastructure, with a focus on sustainable irrigation methods (e.g., center pivot irrigation systems) that consume less water. A total of 800 billion Iraqi dinars (approx. 612 million USD) was allocated to this program across Iraq in 2023-2024 alone.[5] To incentivize the use of these technologies, the government buys wheat from farmers who utilize modern methods at a slightly higher price than those who do not.

Taken together, the intention of these policies is to ensure price stability, lower the costs of agricultural production, and confront the growing challenge of water scarcity in the context of climate change.

Policy Deficits and Farmer Perspectives

D espite the intention behind them, these policies are not adequately aligned with the realities on the ground, especially in provinces like Dhi Qar where stresses on the agricultural economy and the growing problem of water scarcity are most acute. Interviews and focus groups with farmers in Dhi Qar painted a grim picture about the thin margins facing small and middle-sized farms. This means that government subsidies and loan schemes need to be carefully planned and implemented. Otherwise, the very policies intended to alleviate burdens on farmers might accomplish the opposite.

In a focus group in northern Dhi Qar, one farmer noted that loans for agricultural equipment “were inadequately implemented and failed to consider our perspectives, and we struggled with financial obligations [for repayment].” Moreover, subsidies have not kept pace with costs and, in fact, have been significantly reduced. While farming costs for core needs (e.g., seeds and pesticides) have continued to rise, the MoA’s subsidy rate for registered seeds has decreased from 70% to 30%.[6] Cuts of this kind inject excessive instability into the cost-benefit equation for small and middle-sized farms, who must plan upfront costs each season on razor thin margins.

Some of the same financing inconsistencies are also present in government attempts to promote the adoption of modern irrigation technologies, which require long-term financial support for maintenance, upkeep, and technical oversight. Without them, farmers on thin margins may be compelled to sell off these systems during periods of low production to help pay off debts. Dr. Salih Alsalim of the Dhi Qar Agriculture Directorate emphasized “the importance of counseling farmers on new irrigation techniques,” as well as “the need for continued help for maintenance and follow-up, particularly as many farmers [in Dhi Qar] have sold their irrigation systems to other farmers in the western and northern areas of Iraq.”[7]

Loans for agricultural equipment were inadequately implemented and failed to consider our perspectives, and we struggled with financial obligations [for repayment].

- A farmer from Northern Dhi Qar

The biggest problem in the government’s approach to agricultural support is the lack of attention paid to the interrelatedness of different grain crops. The MoA has touted the success of its wheat price support program. Ministry official Dr. Hasan M. Ghubn explained the net positive impact of this program on different regions in Iraq, including Dhi Qar: “The current cost of cultivating one dunam of wheat in Dhi Qar varies by region and farmers’ investment ranges from 250,000 to 435,000 Iraqi dinars. This cost is deemed equitable when compared to the state-specified price of 850,000 IQD per ton for first class wheat, with farmers earning no less than 350,000 dinars per ton, which is relatively advantageous for them”.[8]

This favorable pricing of wheat has likely contributed to the decline in barley production. Without government support, barley farmers facing price volatility have increasingly shifted to wheat cultivation. In focus groups, farmers expressed frustration about the lack of a fixed price for barley and the government's neglect of its cultivation, despite its critical role in livestock fodder. This has increased reliance on expensive fodder imports and poses a broader threat to Iraq’s food security—not just in grain crops, but also in livestock. These findings suggest the need for a pricing approach that accounts for the interconnectedness of grain crops. Supporting one at the expense of the other does not allow for a coherent and unified approach to food security.

While overall wheat production has increased, the data indicates problems below the surface, with other factors like climatic variability and market dynamics posing significant challenges. The total area for cultivated and harvested wheat has varied over time, but is trending lower. The reduction in cultivated land creates worries about the long-term viability of wheat production in Dhi Qar. It is likely that policy execution has been uneven or has not adequately addressed the demands of wheat producers, forcing some to cease farming altogether. Despite these hurdles, the strong connection between cultivated and harvested areas shows little crop loss. This means that farmers in Dhi Qar are using efficient techniques and benefiting from reasonably good growing circumstances.[9]

Centre-pivot Irrigation in a Wheat Farm in Al-Najaf Desert (Source: Ministry of Agriculture of Iraq)

A Way Forward

The Iraqi government's initiatives to enhance agricultural output in Dhi Qar have had mixed results. This underscores the need for a planned and integrated approach to agricultural development. While the increase in wheat production is positive, the concurrent decline in barley production highlights the need for a more balanced policy. Moving forward, this report makes the following suggestions:

Guarantee access to financial help for all farmers and focus on the requirements of small and medium-sized farms. Subsidy rates should be updated to keep pace with expanding agricultural expenditures. Additionally, financing schemes should be established with the unique limits experienced by small farmers in mind. Regarding pricing approach, the government should operate as a significant consumer of barley and purchase this grain from farmers at pre-announced prices. This approach offers a safety net for farmers, promotes barley cultivation, and delivers a minimum return on farmer’s investment by decreasing the risk linked with price fluctuation.

Ensure long-term success in modern irrigation through ongoing financial, technical, and advisory support for farmers. While the government's efforts to promote modern irrigation technology are commendable, sustained financial and technical support for farmers is essential. This includes assistance with maintenance and repair and professional advice about how to use these technologies.

Maintain food security through a balanced agricultural policy that considers the interconnectedness of all grain crops. Agricultural policy must acknowledge the interconnectedness of diverse grain crops. Promoting one crop at the expense of others could lead to unforeseen consequences and imbalances within the agricultural sector. A more holistic strategy is needed to ensure food security across all grain crops.

Ensure the effectiveness of government policies by allowing for greater input to decision-making from farmers. Engagement from farmers and local agricultural communities in the policy-making process is crucial. This ensures that policies are grounded in the realities faced by farmers and are more likely to be effective in achieving their intended goals.

This article will be included in the eleventh edition of the Iraq Economic Review.

By Dr. Hussein Mishbak

Dr. Hussein Mishbak is a non-resident research fellow at IRIS, contributing to the Iraq Economic Review with a focus on the local economy in Dhi Qar province.

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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON FOOD SECURITY IN IRAQ: THE CASE OF DHI QAR

Introduction

Uneven Yields

Government Policies

Policy Deficits and Farmer Perspectives

A Way Forward

By Dr. Hussein Mishbak

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