The proposal could become a major part of Ankara’s climate diplomacy in the weeks leading to the summit in the Mediterranean city of Antalya from Nov. 9 to 20.

Türkiye’s Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change Minister Murat Kurum, who is also COP31 president-designate, said governments need to start treating climate change with the same urgency they give to national defence.

Speaking at the Istanbul Climate Finance Summit on Friday, Kurum pointed to NATO countries’ commitment to increase defence and security-related spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product.

He argued that climate security requires a comparable level of political and financial commitment.

“We expect all countries around the world to allocate at least 5 percent of their national budgets to climate security,” Kurum said while responding to a question after the summit’s opening session.

He suggested that the figure may ultimately need to rise further, potentially reaching 7 percent or even 10 percent.

The proposal reflects Türkiye’s effort to broaden the definition of security ahead of COP31. Ankara argues that floods, droughts, extreme heat, water shortages, wildfires and other climate-related disasters increasingly pose threats to economies and societies comparable to more traditional security challenges.

Kurum questioned the logic of governments dramatically increasing military expenditure without making a similar effort to protect the environment in which their populations live.

“If we do not have a safe world to live in the future, what will be the meaning of the spending we are making to defend our countries?” he asked.

He said the world is already redefining security and that climate investment should become part of that discussion.

Kurum called on governments to devote greater resources to clean energy, electrification, water security, climate-resilient cities and green industries.

“The real issue is not just defending countries, but leaving a world for our children and future generations that is livable and worth defending,” he said.

Trillions Needed for Climate Action

The appeal comes as Türkiye seeks to place climate finance at the center of COP31.

Kurum said global climate finance requirements are now estimated at between $7.5 trillion and $9 trillion, while current financing stands at about $1.9 trillion.

He described the difference as a “huge gap” that governments, financial institutions and the private sector need to close together.

For Türkiye, the financing debate is also about changing the way governments and investors view climate spending.

Kurum argued that money spent today on climate resilience should not be regarded simply as another cost to national budgets. Instead, it should be treated as an investment that can prevent far greater economic and social losses in the future.

He said recent disasters in countries including Nepal and China showed how expensive the consequences of climate change can become when countries are insufficiently prepared.

Responding to a question about Nepal, Kurum said rebuilding after disasters can require enormous financial resources. Investing in resilience and preparedness before disasters strike, he argued, can substantially reduce those costs.

The Turkish minister also presented climate action as an emerging economic opportunity.

He said green transformation and efforts to combat climate change could become one of the world’s biggest new markets.

Countries and companies that invest early, he argued, could gain access to new industries, financing and employment opportunities, while some traditional sectors and business models could shrink or disappear.

Clean and sustainable investment, he said, is likely to become one of the most resilient areas of the global economy.

Turning Promises into Projects

Türkiye is also developing a mechanism designed to address one of the persistent problems in international climate negotiations: the gap between climate commitments announced by governments and projects that can actually attract financing.

Kurum announced that the COP31 presidency has established what it calls the Climate Implementation Bridge.

The initiative is intended to bring countries seeking climate finance together with institutions capable of providing capital and technical assistance.

The mechanism will seek to turn countries’ climate and development priorities into concrete portfolios of projects capable of attracting investment.

Türkiye is working with the United Nations Development Programme on the initiative.

The proposal fits into Ankara’s wider ambition to make COP31 what Kurum calls an “Implementation COP.”

Rather than producing another collection of declarations, Türkiye says it wants the Antalya conference to help convert existing climate commitments into measurable projects and investment.

“We made a promise to humanity as the COP31 Presidency,” Kurum said.

He said Türkiye wants COP31 to transform decisions and commitments made during previous climate conferences into investment and “concrete solutions.”

Türkiye has identified a series of priority areas for COP31, including clean energy, electrification, zero waste, green industrialization, resilient cities, food security and climate finance.

The presidency has also emphasized oceans and seas, education and young people, health, technology and the ability of vulnerable communities and ecosystems to withstand climate shocks.

Cities at Center of Climate Financing

Cities are expected to receive particular attention under Türkiye’s approach.

Kurum announced another initiative called Sustainable Urban Resilience Financing, or SURFF.

The mechanism brings together Türkiye’s Climate Change Presidency, the state-owned development bank İLBANK and the COP31 presidency.

Kurum stressed that SURFF is not intended to create another climate fund.

Instead, it aims to combine financing, project preparation and implementation so municipalities can turn local environmental and infrastructure needs into projects that investors and international financial institutions can finance.

The approach reflects a broader problem facing developing countries and municipalities. They may know what infrastructure they need but often lack the technical capacity or financing structures required to turn those needs into investment-ready projects.

Türkiye says the new mechanism could help bridge that divide.

One of the first examples is emerging close to Istanbul.

Türkiye and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank signed a cooperation agreement Friday covering environmental, climate and urban infrastructure projects.

The first phase is expected to include an investment of around 400 million euros for cleaning the Sea of Marmara, including improvements to advanced biological wastewater treatment facilities.

The Marmara Sea has suffered serious outbreaks of marine mucilage, commonly known as “sea snot,” which threatens marine ecosystems and fishing communities.

Türkiye hopes the financing model developed for its cities can eventually be adapted for use by municipalities in other countries.

Private Sector Brought Into COP31

Kurum also stressed that governments cannot close the climate financing gap alone.

He called for much greater participation by banks, institutional investors and businesses.

Türkiye has appointed the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye, or TOBB, as the COP31 presidency’s business representative.

TOBB is expected to host a Business Summit alongside the Leaders’ Summit and Finance Day in Antalya on Nov. 12 and 13.

The aim is to bring financial institutions, investors, companies and project developers into the same venue.

Türkiye hopes such meetings can shorten the distance between climate commitments, available finance and projects that are ready to be implemented.

Kurum said every climate-financing decision ultimately translates into something tangible: a city protected against disasters, a factory transformed, production preserved or lives saved.

Climate Justice Remains Key Issue

Climate justice is also expected to remain a major theme in Antalya.

Developing nations have long argued that they face a disproportionate share of climate damage despite contributing far less to the historical greenhouse gas emissions responsible for global warming.

Many also struggle with high borrowing costs and heavy debt burdens, limiting their ability to finance clean energy, adaptation and resilient infrastructure.

Kurum said Türkiye would keep climate justice and climate finance at the top of the COP31 agenda.

His comments follow months of Turkish diplomatic efforts to position the Antalya conference as a bridge between developed and developing countries.

The COP31 presidency says it wants to strengthen international cooperation while ensuring that the transition toward a lower-carbon economy does not leave vulnerable communities behind.

Türkiye will preside over COP31 while working closely with Australia, which has a major role in leading the negotiations.

The Turkish presidency has also been working with Azerbaijan, which hosted COP29, and Brazil, host of COP30, to maintain continuity between successive climate conferences.

Race Toward Antalya

COP31 will take place in Antalya from Nov. 9 to 20 and is expected to bring tens of thousands of government officials, negotiators, scientists, campaigners, businesses and journalists to Türkiye.

The World Leaders’ Summit is scheduled during the conference, providing a platform for heads of state and government to discuss national priorities and attempt to generate political momentum for climate action.

Türkiye says it wants the gathering to mark a shift from years of negotiating climate targets toward delivering them.

Kurum has repeatedly described the conference as both an “Implementation COP” and a “COP of the Future.”

That ambition will face a difficult global environment.

Wars, geopolitical tensions, debt pressures and growing defence expenditure are competing for government resources at precisely the moment when climate scientists and developing countries are calling for vastly greater investment in adaptation and the energy transition.

Kurum is seeking to turn that competition into the central argument behind Türkiye’s COP31 diplomacy.

If governments consider military spending an investment against threats that may emerge in the future, he argues, climate spending should be treated the same way.

He issued what he described as an open appeal to world leaders from Istanbul.

“It is time to demonstrate a stronger, bolder and more concrete political commitment to addressing climate change,” Kurum said.

For Türkiye, the message ahead of Antalya is that climate security should no longer remain a secondary environmental concern. It should become part of the way governments define national and global security itself.

The post Türkiye Pushes 5% Climate Spending Target Ahead of COP31 appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

A few days have passed now; the crowds have thinned, and the harder question arrives — what happens after a victory? To that whole generation, across every community, I offer my gratitude. But this letter is for one part of it in particular: you, the young Indian Muslims, who carried a heavier bag to the very same protest.

Be honest about the India you have grown up in. For more than a decade, under a BJP government and the Hindutva ecosystem that powers it, the hatred of Muslims has become the background noise of national life — in television studios, in forwarded messages, in the silence that too often follows a lynching. A whole generation has come of age as suspects in their own country. So, marching this summer was never simple for you. Your parents and elders remember Shaheen Bagh and the anti-CAA–NRC protests, and the crackdown that followed. And yet you came, in your thousands. Among those reported injured near Connaught Place were young men like Sahil Lochab, Irshad Shaikh and Sheikh Irshad Mansoori — some left fighting for their eyesight after pellet fire the Delhi Police deny ever using. You came knowing the cost might be higher for you, and there are already reports that Muslim participants were singled out for reprisal afterwards. You paid that price anyway.

There is a hard irony to name plainly. Because everyone — the Cockroach Janata Party and the wider opposition alike — was determined not to let the movement be branded a “Hindu–Muslim issue,” you were quietly asked to take part without being too visible: to lend your body to the cause while keeping your identity in the background. The instinct was protective, and understandable. But it leaves the real questions unanswered. How should Muslim youth now choose their route? Where do you join, and how; when do you act, and where? These are the questions no one has answered concretely — so let me try.

I owe you not comfort but a plan. A protest is a moment; a roadmap is what turns a moment into lasting power — and the courage you showed at Jantar Mantar now needs somewhere concrete to go. Here are five ways you can stop asking to be let into India’s future and start building it: not only for the next march, but for 2047, the centenary of independence, and the India we will hand to Generation Alpha.

1.  Keep your emotions in check — and learn from what came before

Let me begin with the hardest thing an elder is supposed to say: keep your emotions under control. Not because your anger is unjustified — it is completely justified — but because a cool head is a weapon, and you will need every weapon you have. Look at how this Gen Z movement carried itself: disciplined, largely peaceful, hard to caricature, impossible to dismiss. That is the posture to learn from.

And there is a harder lesson in our own recent past. Remember Shaheen Bagh — a movement led with astonishing dignity, overwhelmingly by Muslim women, and still slandered and crushed. These were not failures of character; the people in them were brave and peaceful. But they were allowed to become isolated — framed as a “Muslim issue,” walled off from the wider democratic public, and then picked off. That is the real lesson, and it is strategic. A grievance that stands alone is easy to crush; a grievance woven into the broader democratic conversation is not. So, place your concerns where they belong — inside the secular, liberal and democratic mainstream, as the shared business of an integrated society, not the separate complaint of an isolated minority. Argue patiently, build coalitions across communities, and refuse every invitation to be provoked into the very image the propagandists are waiting to broadcast.

Consider how Black and Asian minorities in the United States and Britain built power. The American civil-rights movement did not win on rage; it won on ferocious discipline — the sit-in trainees who let themselves be beaten without striking back — and on a patient institutional strategy: the NAACP spent decades litigating its way to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. Above all, it built a coalition so broad that segregation became an American problem, not a “Black problem.” In Britain, minorities learned to act as organised pressure groups and to convert their numbers into votes, institutions and representation. The lesson for you is the same: move from spontaneous protest to organised, verified, coalition-based pressure. Rethink your community’s position, sharpen your political chemistry, and count honestly how much support you can build — and from whom.

2.  Reclaim the story of the Muslim contribution to a free India

The right’s most effective weapon has been history — the endless conflation of India’s Muslims with a pre-colonial and colonial past, as though a teenager growing up in digital India were personally answerable for centuries she never lived. Part of why this has worked is that earlier generations of independent India’s Muslims never fully told their own side of the story: what Muslims have built, written, taught, farmed, healed, co-governed and defended in the seventy-eight years since 1947. That is the history your generation must write. You are not responsible for the past used against you; you are responsible — and gloriously equipped — to document the contribution of the Muslims of independent, secular, democratic India, and to claim your rightful place in its future.

This is slow, unglamorous work, and the right has a head start, because it has already claimed the terrain of history as its own. You will need a counter-narrative that is louder, better-sourced and more confident — case studies, books, articles, podcasts, blogs — on Muslim contributions in education, science and technology, defence, business and industry, public service, literature, the judiciary and public administration. And do not overlook the small stories: every city, village and neighbourhood holds an untold local history of Muslim belonging and contribution. Gather those, and connect your generation to them. That is how you build a defence that is ready before the debate arrives.

African Americans built the institutions to tell their own story rather than wait to be written into someone else’s. Carter G. Woodson’s Negro History Week, launched in 1926, grew into Black History Month; Harlem’s Schomburg Center became a great archive of Black life; and in 2016 the Smithsonian’s National Museum of African American History and Culture opened on the National Mall — a nation compelled to house, at its very centre, a history it had once erased. In Britain, the Black Cultural Archives in Brixton preserved a community’s own records of arrival and belonging. Indian Muslim Gen Z can do the same, and faster, with the digital and AI tools your elders never had.

3.  Demography is destiny — and the care economy is opportunity

India’s total fertility rate is falling fast, faster than most people realise. The demographic dividend we keep celebrating has a second act: an ageing society in which your generation, and Generation Alpha after you, will carry an enormous weight of care for the old, even as secure jobs grow scarcer and the cost of living presses harder on every household. This is not only a burden; it is an opening. The care economy — health, eldercare, community wellbeing — will be one of the largest sources of work and investment in the India of the coming decades. To meet it, you will need what I would call an integrated mindset: calm, adaptable, socially fluent, at ease across communities. And this crisis of care will fall on everyone, Hindu and Muslim alike — which is exactly why it is your opportunity: sit down with your non-Muslim peers, prepare for it together, and build both a livelihood and a bridge in the same act.

Be clear-eyed about the difference in circumstance, though. The West aged after it grew rich; China and Japan are ageing with high or rising incomes, strong healthcare systems and government support. India is ageing before it is wealthy, with thin public healthcare that is already out of reach for many, and a heavy burden on low-income and marginal families. That gap is precisely where preparation pays. Ask now what skills, what qualifications, what small enterprises the coming care economy will reward — and start acquiring them. Turn a looming national strain into your own opening, and make it a live topic of debate rather than a crisis you meet unprepared.

The Philippines read the global ageing curve early and turned it into national strategy, training nurses not only for home but for the world. Filipino nurses became indispensable across the United States, Britain and the Gulf — Filipinos are around one per cent of the US population but roughly four per cent of its nurses — and, tellingly, the pathway grew the profession at home too: research on one skills-partnership programme found that for every nurse who migrated, nine new ones were licensed. A community read a demographic trend a decade ahead and converted it into livelihood, dignity and quiet influence. Indian Muslim Gen Z can do the same with India’s own coming wave of care work.

4.  Learn AI faster than hatred can reach you

Artificial intelligence and the digital economy are reshaping the world faster than even the richest governments can legislate for; a developing economy like India is scrambling to keep up, and its most marginal young people risk being left furthest behind. You cannot afford to be a passive spectator in this race. Learn AI. Build a future inside it, not beside it. And rewrite the old script: do not burn year after year in exam preparation, waiting for a single government job to rescue you. In the new economy, education and work must run together — earn while you learn, set yourself a firm deadline to be in employment, and do not let it slip much past the age of twenty-five.

There is something quieter and more powerful here too. The digital fluency of Gen Z is itself a shared language — one the hate ecosystem has not yet fully colonised. The problems of majority and minority Gen Z are not, in the end, so different; you speak the same online language, you build the same digital spaces, and that language sits far outside the reach of the right wing’s propaganda. The way you stood shoulder to shoulder with your Hindu peers at Jantar Mantar can be repeated in classrooms, in start-ups, in open-source projects and group chats. Reach that common ground first, and reach it quickly — before the propagandists get there.

Digital fluency is power the hate machine has not captured. In 2013, three Black women turned a single hashtag — #BlackLivesMatter — into one of the largest movements in modern history: a minority’s native command of digital space became global political voice. And across the world, immigrant and minority founders have built much of the new technology economy from the outside in, precisely because it did not yet have gatekeepers to lock them out. That is your edge: the new economy has fewer closed doors than the old one. Walk through them first.

5.  Make the climate crisis a common cause

While Gen Z filled Jantar Mantar, other movements were rising alongside it — the long fight over the Ken–Betwa river-linking project across Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, forest protests in Uttarakhand, and determined environmental resistance in the Himalayan foothills of Himachal Pradesh. Often it is the most marginal communities who lead them, and they are telling us something the news cycle keeps missing: that climate change and disaster are the defining threats to India’s future economy and society. Even as Gen Z celebrated in Delhi, Assam was drowning — dozens dead and more than seven lakh people displaced across a dozen districts. Floods, heatwaves, landslides, drought, crop failure: this is the India you will inherit and live in.

The climate emergency is now intensely local, and that is where you can act. Engage with your own neighbourhood — not only in the relief that follows a disaster, but in the preparedness that comes before it, and in the everyday work of tackling local environmental harm. It is also an economy in the making. India’s transition to a net-zero economy, targeted for 2070, will reshape everything: renewable energy, grassroots green manufacturing, sustainable agriculture and water, green finance, nature-based solutions. Prepare for those fields now, or be left behind by them. And here lies the deeper opening: the climate is one of the very few arenas the hate machine has not yet poisoned. It is common ground by its very nature, because the flood does not check your religion before it takes your home. Step forward here, in open conversation with your majority-community peers, and help build a national understanding that disaster — not one’s neighbour — is the real enemy of our shared future.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Māori of the Whanganui — a colonised indigenous minority — waged a 140-year campaign that, in 2017, made their river the first in the world to be recognised as a legal person, with Māori appointed among its official guardians. An environmental cause became the very vehicle through which a marginalised people won recognition and a share of governance at the heart of the state. At Standing Rock, Native Americans turned a pipeline fight into one of the largest multi-nation coalitions in recent memory. Climate is uncolonised ground; lead on it locally, and it can carry you from the margin to the centre.

These five — a cooler head and a wiser strategy, a reclaimed history, demography and care, AI and work, and the climate — are not a checklist. They are a language: the beginnings of a common vocabulary through which you can meet the rest of your generation as equals, not as petitioners. Notice what runs through every example from abroad: none of these minorities won by shrinking, and none won by standing alone. They organised, they documented, they prepared, and they built coalitions on ground the majority also had to stand on. Use this new decade the same way — to educate, to agitate and to debate, in the digital space that is now yours. It is a hard task. But it is your task, and you must complete it carefully.

So, to the young Indian Muslims who marched this summer, and to those who wanted to but were told to stay home: the India of 2047 has room for you at its very centre. Do not wait to be invited into it. Build it. And know that some of us, a little older and a little more tired, are cheering you on — and trusting you to finish what our generation could not.

Mehebub Sahana is an academic based at the University of Manchester, UK. He grew up in a subaltern Muslim family in Purba Bardhaman district, West Bengal. The views expressed here are his own.

The post After the Victory of the Cockroach Janata Party, a Message to Indian Muslim Gen Z appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

For these children, this was more than a legal intervention. It was their first direct encounter with the state and its institutions, and instead of inspiring trust, it left them frightened.

Muhammad Furqan, one of the children, remembers that day vividly. “The police took us off the train as if we were dangerous criminals,” he says. “They started asking us, ‘Are you a terrorist?’ We told them we were going to study the Quran, but they kept threatening us. We were so scared that we thought we would never be able to return home. Now my father won’t let me travel again. I’ll study near our village instead. What if something happens to me outside?”

Furqan’s story is not an isolated one. Thousands of children from Bihar who leave home to pursue religious or secular education in other states begin their journeys with the same fear and uncertainty.

Fifteen-year-old Muhammad Tasleem (name changed), from Pandol village in Bihar’s Madhubani district, is one of them. He was traveling to Uttar Pradesh to continue his education. His words reflect not only the fear of travel but also the deep sense of identity-based anxiety that many Muslim children experience today.

“We are afraid to wear kurta-pyjamas,” he says. “We had heard about a Maulana who was beaten on a train and thrown off. Whenever we travel, we are afraid that people will think we are criminals.”

After a brief silence, he asked a question that no official report is likely to answer.

“Why do people hate us so much?”

The experiences of Furqan and Tasleem are not isolated cases. A research report by Scroll points to a broader pattern. According to the report, 375 children were removed from trains in nine separate incidents this year alone on suspicion of human trafficking. In eight of those cases, all of the children were Muslim, and in seven they were traveling to madrasas. Subsequent investigations by the police and child welfare committees in Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and Karnataka found no evidence of human trafficking in any of these cases.

On April 27, Ashish Ranjan of Jan Jagran Shakti Sangathan, an organization based in Araria, alleged at a press conference that Muslim children traveling to madrasas were being systematically targeted. Muhammad Zakir, the head of Darul Uloom Imamia in Bidar, along with officials from other madrasas, said that police investigations found no evidence of forced labor or any other wrongdoing. According to them, the most lasting impact of these actions has been the fear they have instilled in parents and children, while also deepening public suspicion toward madrasa education.

This raises a larger question: Why are so many children from Bihar’s poorer districts compelled to travel hundreds of miles to other states in search of an education?

When Leaving Home for Education Becomes a Necessity

If fear and uncertainty have become part of these children’s journeys, an earlier question must first be answered: Why do children from poor families in Araria, Kishanganj, Purnea, and the wider Seemanchal region of Bihar travel hundreds of miles to states such as Maharashtra and Karnataka in search of an education?

According to Akhtarul Iman, chairman of the Minority Welfare Committee of the Bihar Legislative Assembly and an MLA from AIMIM, there are two main reasons. “Our children leave the state for only two reasons,” he says. “First, extreme poverty, and second, the lack of quality educational institutions close to home. Nearly 90 percent of the children who travel to other states come from extremely poor families.”

At first glance, this may seem surprising. Bihar has one of the largest networks of Urdu-medium schools and madrasas in India. According to a 2015 report by the Milli Gazette, of the country’s 28,276 Urdu-medium schools, 3,624 are in Bihar, including 2,597 government-run schools.

Similarly, according to the latest figures compiled by educationist Maulana Abul Kalam Qasmi Shamsi, Bihar has a total of 6,409 madrasas. Of these, 2,822 are independent (privately run), while 3,587 are affiliated with the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board. The affiliated institutions include 1,128 older madrasas and 2,459 categorized as modern madrasas.

According to Mufti Sana-ul-Huda Qasmi, general secretary (Nazim) of the Federation of Islamic Schools of Bihar, only about 2,000 of these institutions receive government funding. The more pressing challenge, he says, is faced by the madrasas that have official government recognition but receive no financial support.

“There are 1,646 such madrasas,” Mufti Sana-ul-Huda Qasmi says. “At the centenary meeting organized by Saleem Pervaiz, the government promised that grants would be extended to all of them and that a formal announcement would be made. But Chief Minister Nitish Kumar made no such announcement. The meeting ended in a major uproar, and government representatives had to leave the stage.”

According to him, only about 600 of the 1,646 madrasas were later able to submit their files to the state secretariat. Even those cases did not move forward, with officials citing administrative hurdles and the election code of conduct. In his view, the issue is not only a lack of financial resources but also one of political priorities.

Despite repeated changes in government and shifting political alliances in Bihar, no major political party has presented a clear plan in its election manifesto to improve the financial condition of these madrasas or place them on a sustainable footing.

The consequences are felt most sharply by poor families, whose options for quality residential education close to home remain limited. Many are compelled to send their children to schools in other states. Along the way, what begins as a search for education can become a journey marked by suspicion, interrogation, and, in some cases, detention by law enforcement agencies.

From Legal Autonomy to Bureaucratic Control

Recent incidents alone do not fully explain the current state of madrasas in Bihar. They are also rooted in a series of legal and administrative changes over the past several years that have gradually reshaped the governance of the madrasa system.

Historically, madrasas in Bihar enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy in managing their internal affairs. This tradition continued after the establishment of Madrasa Islamia Shamsul Huda in 1912 and the creation of the Madrasa Examination Board in 1922. In 1981, the formation of the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board gave additional legal protection to the autonomy of minority educational institutions under Articles 29 and 30 of India’s Constitution.

Around the same period, the prominent Islamic scholar Qazi Mujahidul Islam Qasmi opposed proposals to nationalize madrasas. He argued that these institutions had been built through community support and charitable endowments, and that placing their administration directly under government control would undermine their fundamental character.

Over time, however, the administrative framework began to change. Media reports and several controversial sting operations involving a small number of madrasas in districts bordering Nepal, particularly Sitamarhi, Muzaffarpur, and Araria, led to growing demands for tighter government oversight. In this context, litigation concerning madrasas in Sitamarhi reached the courts, resulting in an order for the physical inspection of 1,637 madrasas.

A few months later, on April 22, 2022, the Bihar government issued Notifications No. 395 and 396. These transferred several key powers, including those related to the formation of madrasa governing bodies and the appointment of teachers, from the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board to District Education Officers (DEOs) and the Education Department’s online administrative system.

Speaking at his residence in Patna, Maulana Abul Kalam Qasmi expressed concern over these changes.

“Affiliated madrasas are minority educational institutions,” he said. “Under the 1981 Act, the Madrasa Board had the authority to frame its own rules. When that authority is transferred to the Education Department, institutional autonomy is affected. The district residency requirement and a recruitment process based solely on examination marks also reduce our ability to appoint the most suitable teachers.”

He added that several practical issues surrounding the recruitment of teachers for modern academic subjects remain unresolved.

“The curriculum has expanded continuously, but there has been no clear plan to increase the number of teachers.”

These administrative changes were later formalized through the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board (Amendment) Act, 2024. The legislation gives the government the authority, under certain circumstances, to dissolve the board and place its administration under a government-appointed administrator. It also revises the eligibility criteria for the board’s chairperson.

The impact of these decisions was not confined to policy documents. During my field reporting in Darbhanga, I met a science teacher at a government-run madrasa. He asked not to be identified, fearing it could affect his job. After a long conversation, he said:

“We live with a constant sense of uncertainty. We never know when another government order will be issued. We have seen what happened in Assam and Uttarakhand. Our fear is that the same thing could happen in Bihar at any time. We teach science and try to give our students a better future, but we ourselves feel uncertain about our own.”

The unease on his face was unmistakable. His concerns were not unique. Similar feelings surfaced repeatedly in conversations with madrasa administrators and teachers across different districts. The legal and administrative changes remain the subject of public debate, but on the ground, their most visible effect has been an atmosphere of uncertainty.

Transparency Claims, Questions on the Ground

Recently, Bihar’s Education Minister, Mithilesh Kumar Tiwari, announced a physical audit of all government-aided madrasas and Sanskrit schools in the state. The government says the exercise is intended to improve transparency, identify fraudulent institutions, and ensure that public funds are being used properly. But visits to madrasas across several districts after the announcement revealed a more complex picture.

The principal of a madrasa in a village in Darbhanga district, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said he did not see the audit as merely an administrative exercise.

“Two years ago, newly recognized madrasas and those in the 1,228 category were also audited. Many officials came at that time. Some of the madrasa administrators I spoke to said they were asked to pay large sums of money during the inspections. Some paid one lakh rupees, others two lakh. Now another audit is beginning, even though the government already has the previous report.”

It was not possible to independently verify these allegations.

After a brief pause, he pointed toward the madrasa building and continued: “The government provides no financial assistance beyond teachers’ salaries. We bought the land ourselves, built the school ourselves, and even pay for repairs. When a new inspection begins every few years under these circumstances, it is only natural that people become anxious.”

Although his allegations could not be independently confirmed, one theme emerged consistently in conversations with madrasa administrators across different districts: the inspection process has deepened a sense of uncertainty among school administrators and teachers alike. That anxiety extends beyond the inspections themselves.

The principal of another madrasa in Darbhanga, who also requested anonymity, said that teaching vacancies have remained unfilled for years, while decision-making within the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board has been slow. “Some madrasas are on the verge of shutting down simply because they no longer have enough teachers,” he said.

The shortage of teachers is reflected not only in such accounts but also in what can be observed on the ground. During visits and conversations with local residents at the government-run Madrasa Islahiya Namnagar Nabtolia in Darbhanga, it emerged that six sanctioned teaching positions have remained vacant for several years. According to residents, no new recruitment process has been initiated during that time. Although students attend classes every day, several subjects have no permanent teachers, directly affecting the quality of education.

This is an issue that madrasa administrators raised repeatedly. They argue that if the goal is genuinely to improve educational standards, then filling vacant teaching posts, strengthening basic infrastructure, and addressing financial constraints are just as important as conducting inspections. In their view, inspections alone cannot strengthen the education system unless its underlying problems are addressed at the same time.

Sanskrit Schools and Madrasas: Two Systems, Two Experiences

A key criticism raised by madrasa administrators and opposition parties is that, although the government says it is inspecting both madrasas and Sanskrit schools, the two systems do not appear to be treated equally.

This perception is shaped not only by official statements but also by recent administrative decisions. The Education Department has decided to relocate the office of the Bihar Sanskrit Education Board to the Intermediate Council building in Patna. It has also announced plans to recruit more teachers to address staffing shortages in Sanskrit schools. According to government officials, a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for these appointments is expected to be finalized by July 2026.

Madrasa administrators say they have seen no comparable progress. During field reporting in parts of Darbhanga, Madhubani, and the Seemanchal region, the heads of several madrasas repeated the same concern: teaching vacancies have remained unfilled for years, yet inspections and administrative reviews continue without any meaningful effort to address the shortage of teachers.

On June 11, 2026, after meeting a delegation of Sanskrit teachers, Bihar’s Education Minister, Mithilesh Kumar Tiwari, directed the Education Department to conduct audits of Sanskrit institutions in accordance with the 1976 and 1993 regulations so that, in his words, they would not face “injustice.”

People associated with madrasas point to this decision as evidence of what they see as unequal treatment. “If the government can rely on the older rules to support Sanskrit schools, then the same principle should apply to madrasas,” one madrasa administrator said. “Our objection is not to the audits themselves, but to what we see as different standards.”

The government rejects these allegations. It maintains that the physical audit is a standard process for all government-aided educational institutions and that its sole purpose is to ensure transparency.

However, conversations with stakeholders across different districts suggest a growing sense of distrust among those associated with madrasas. They argue that when long-standing problems such as teacher shortages, financial constraints, and inadequate infrastructure remain unresolved, while institutions continue to face repeated scrutiny, it becomes difficult to view these administrative actions as routine oversight alone.

Government Policy, Opposition Criticism, and a Long-Running Crisis

The Bihar government says that its inspections of madrasas and Sanskrit schools are intended to improve educational standards and bring greater transparency to the system. Opposition leaders, however, dispute that explanation. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) Member of the Legislative Council Qari Sohaib and Maulana Anisur Rehman Qasmi, working president of the All India Milli Council, argue that the campaign has disproportionately affected madrasas. According to them, including Sanskrit schools in the inspection process may create an appearance of balance, but the reality on the ground is different.

Akhtarul Iman, a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, said in a detailed interview that the current situation cannot be understood solely through the recent inspection campaign. In his view, it reflects the cumulative impact of government policies over many years.

“There has been no meaningful revival of the madrasa system since 2022,” he said. “Many institutions are struggling with severe teacher shortages, and in some places education has been seriously affected. The facilities available to teachers and students in regular government schools are not available in madrasas. From salaries to basic administrative support, the gap is evident.”

He also challenged the government’s characterization of madrasa education.

“It is incorrect to suggest that madrasas are disconnected from modern education,” he said. “Many have been teaching contemporary subjects for years. The real problem is that the government has never provided the resources needed to strengthen this system. Most of the children studying in these institutions come from poor families. If the state provided the same basic facilities and support that it gives to its regular schools, these children would benefit.”

However, Akhtarul Iman does not place the blame on the government alone. According to him, wherever local communities have supported these institutions, madrasas have continued to function well. “Madrasa Siddiquia Dagroh is an example of this. Even today, a large number of boys and girls study there in a residential setting. If both society and the government fulfill their responsibilities, the number of such institutions can increase.”

Referring to proceedings in the Bihar Legislative Assembly, he raises another question. “We asked several questions about madrasas in the Assembly, but the answers never became part of the public record. If the government has nothing to hide, why is this information being kept from the public?” This question is not only political but also one of administrative transparency.

During the past few weeks of reporting, I spoke to people across Araria, Darbhanga, Madhubani, and the Seemanchal region. Their concerns differed, but one feeling was almost universal: uncertainty. Some parents were anxious about sending their children to another state for education. Some teachers were worried about the security of their jobs. Madrasa administrators spoke of financial constraints, while others pointed to long-standing teacher vacancies.

All of these concerns are important in their own right. But perhaps the most fundamental question is the one asked by a young student who was taken off a train at Katni railway station: “Why do people hate us so much?”

The answer to that question cannot be found in any single police action, government order, or political statement. It is intertwined with the educational journeys of these children, state policy, institutional trust, and broader societal attitudes.

Perhaps that is why the story of Bihar’s madrasas is not just a story about madrasa education. It is also the story of why, when a child from one of the state’s most vulnerable communities leaves home in search of an education, the journey is accompanied by more fear than books.

The reporting for the story was supported by a grant from the Human Rights and Religious Freedom Journalism Grant Program.

The post From Classrooms to Suspicion: Why Bihar’s Muslim Children Face Fear on the Road to Education appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

We live in an age when political figures are routinely accused of corruption, nepotism, and treating public office like a family business. Against that backdrop, the image projected by Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stood apart. His supporters point to an austere lifestyle, a politics grounded in religious conviction, and a view of leadership as a trust before God rather than a privilege to be exploited.

Whatever one thinks of his politics, there is something worth noting about leaders who present themselves as answerable to a higher authority. Belief in God, in the Prophets, in a Day of Judgment, can instill a sense of accountability that outlasts election cycles and opinion polls. Genuinely held, that kind of faith tends to discourage the pursuit of personal wealth and unchecked power.

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, wrote on X that Khamenei left behind no palaces, no bank accounts, and no fortune after 47 years in power, no yachts, no hidden billions, no golden thrones, just a life spent serving people. Analysts who study Iran told the Financial Times that Khamenei had spoken privately about the possibility of assassination and seemed to regard his own survival as secondary to that of the Islamic Republic.

That tension surfaced again in a striking detail shared at the India Today Conclave in New Delhi. Abdul Majid Hakeem Ilahi, described as a representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader, said Khamenei refused to leave his Tehran residence for a bunker even as tensions with Washington and Tel Aviv escalated. He would only do so, Khamenei reportedly insisted, if safe shelter could be guaranteed for all 19 million residents of the city. Read it as moral symbolism or as political theatre, either way it reinforces the image he wanted projected: a leader unwilling to be seen as separate from the people he governed.

Modern politics, more often than not, tells a different story. Across democracies and authoritarian states alike, political dynasties keep flourishing. Leaders talk endlessly about “country first” while allegations of corruption, conflicts of interest, and family enrichment become almost routine. Public office, too often, is treated as an inheritance rather than a trust.

Israel offers its own version of this contrast. The country has weathered repeated corruption scandals, and its own attorney general has indicted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on bribery, fraud, and breach of trust across three separate cases, according to the BBC. Separately, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants tied to the broader war, concerning allegations of war crimes rather than domestic corruption. Many analysts have argued, publicly and pointedly, that prolonging the war serves Netanyahu’s own political survival, with ordinary Israelis absorbing the consequences of decisions shaped by personal calculation.

The United States is not exempt from similar questions. During the Iran conflict, market analysts and journalists pointed to unusually well-timed bets on oil prices, stock indexes, and prediction markets, prompting scrutiny over who may have profited from the crisis. At the same time, Representative Jamie Raskin launched a House Judiciary investigation into potential conflicts of interest involving Jared Kushner, whose investment firm, backed largely by Gulf sovereign wealth funds, continued to expand while he served as a senior adviser. The fact that Kushner is President Donald Trump’s son-in-law only deepened concerns about the blurred lines between public office and private gain.

For ordinary Americans, the issue is straightforward: when diplomacy, political power, and financial interests become intertwined, public trust inevitably suffers. The line between serving the national interest and serving personal interests becomes dangerously thin.

The contrast sharpens further when one looks at several Gulf monarchies, where immense personal wealth, dynastic privilege, and global investment portfolios coexist with a heavy reliance on foreign powers for national security. Palaces, offshore assets, and elite lifestyles project an image of strength, yet the survival of these regimes has long depended on foreign military bases, strategic partnerships, and external security guarantees. That dependence raises an uncomfortable question about sovereignty: when a nation’s defence is largely outsourced, how much of its power is truly independent? The recent U.S.-Israel-Iran confrontation, which exposed the vulnerabilities and strategic constraints of the region despite decades of security partnerships, served as a reminder that wealth and external patronage cannot by themselves guarantee either security or genuine sovereignty.

And yet, we keep splitting the world into two competing moralities. In the West, and among its allies, American and Israeli leadership is treated as inherently legitimate simply because it wears the label of democracy. Across much of the Global South, that same leadership looks like injustice dressed up in democratic language, and Iran’s defiance reads, to many, as the more principled stand. Both camps are certain they hold the moral high ground. Both are, in their own way, right and wrong at once.

An independent reading doesn’t have to choose a side in that binary. It can step outside it entirely. This is the post-truth era, where narrative often outruns fact, and where “good” and “bad” have become less a matter of evidence than of which side of the map you’re standing on.

Understanding Khamenei’s leadership honestly, at a moment when Iran is mourning his death, is itself a kind of tribute, not necessarily to agreement, but to the seriousness with which his life and choices deserve to be examined.

The post The Poor Man’s Power: What Khamenei’s Death Says About Wealth, War, and Who Really Answers to Anyone appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

This pattern begins every year just days before Eid al-Adha (Bakrid). Disputes arise over bringing goats into housing societies, temporary structures erected for the ritual sacrifice are dismantled, and protests erupt over prayers or the sacrifice itself. In many places, ‘cow terrorists’ take the law into their own hands, while in other instances, Hindus themselves attempt to vitiate the atmosphere by discarding meat. Meanwhile, the administration often imposes restrictions in the name of maintaining peace, restrictions that disproportionately affect Muslims.

Amid this shift, Eid al-Adha is no longer merely a religious festival. It has become an occasion marked by a surge in incidents of hatred, surveillance, and violence against Muslims in the name of cow and animal protection. It has turned into an event exploited for communal polarization and is increasingly becoming an opportunity to display hatred towards Muslims under the guise of professed love for animals. Year after year, there has been a visible rise in the activities of cow vigilantes linked to Hindutva organizations, along with associated hate crimes around the time of Eid al-Adha.

‘Cow Terrorists’ Aren’t Acting Alone

As Eid al-Adha approached, it is not just ‘cow terrorists’ who become active in the name of cow protection; the police also go into overdrive. According to reports, the Hyderabad Police held a high-level coordination meeting involving various departments on April 22 to ensure the peaceful observance of Eid al-Adha. Held at the Madhura Nagar Community Hall, the meeting was attended by around 200 people, and similar meetings were organized across the state. Officials announced that mandatory check-posts would operate in three shifts to monitor the movement of animals and ensure compliance with all legal regulations. Strict warnings were also issued against the illegal transport, sale, or slaughter of cows and calves.

The question arises, why is all this activity centered around Eid al-Adha? Is there no need for such check-posts on other days? Does the terror unleashed by ‘cow terrorists’ in the name of cow protection continue with the police’s tacit approval? Even after these check-posts were established, ‘cow terrorists’ in Hyderabad continued their activities, details of which follow below. So why does this persist?

It is also worth noting that the Majlis Bachao Tehreek (MBT) in Hyderabad has alleged that the Telangana Police are treating cattle traders harshly and arbitrarily. The organization claimed that, within a single week, bulls worth approximately ₹1 crore belonging to Muslim traders were illegally seized by various police stations. It also asked, “Is there any government ban on the transport or slaughter of bulls in Telangana? If not, on what grounds is action being taken against Muslim traders?”

Moreover, media reports begin to appear with headlines such as, “Tight security: Drones to monitor mosques and Eidgahs.” For instance, in Basti, Uttar Pradesh, the police announced that 414 mosques and 158 Eidgahs would be monitored using drones and CCTV cameras, while police teams would keep watch over sites designated for ritual animal sacrifice.

In some areas, authorities detain individuals or issue externment orders, banishing them from the district, to maintain law and order and prevent potential communal tensions. In Nagpur, for example, the city police issued temporary externment orders against individuals with criminal backgrounds. According to the police, the action was taken under Section 163(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). The individuals targeted were suspected of potentially inciting communal tension through activities such as the illegal transport of restricted cattle and the sale of banned beef. Under these orders, they were barred from entering the limits of Nagpur city and Nagpur rural district from May 21, 2026, to May 31, 2026.

While the Muslim community generally views these police measures positively, the prevailing narrative often creates the impression that Muslims step out of their homes on Eid al-Adha not merely to offer prayers, but to disrupt the city’s peace. It is worth noting, however, that the police issue similar statements during Hindu festivals as well, yet the underlying implication often remains directed at the Muslim community.

Tensions flared in Jahangirabad, in Uttar Pradesh’s Bulandshahr district, during Eid prayers following a dispute between the police and worshippers outside the Eidgah. According to reports, the Eid prayers were scheduled to begin at around 7:00 AM, and a large number of people were making their way to the Eidgah. However, locals complained that the police had set up barricades outside the Eidgah even before 7:00 AM. Former MLA Hoshiyar Singh alleged that the Circle Officer (CO) was acting arbitrarily and preventing people from offering prayers.

The case from Seoni, Madhya Pradesh, is particularly intriguing. On May 29, the day after Eid al-Adha, the police arrested five individuals. Three more people were arrested on May 30 and 31. These eight individuals were accused of conspiring to disrupt public order in the district during Bakrid. The police claimed that plans were being made to incite tension by arranging for the ritual slaughter of cattle.

According to the police, “This entire network was operating in an organized manner, and efforts were underway to mobilize funds and resources. Investigators uncovered several crucial leads. They had collected donations from certain individuals for the purpose of the sacrifice. An examination of mobile phones revealed that approximately ₹27,500 had been gathered from various people, with plans to use the money to purchase cattle. It also came to light that a deal had been struck with another individual to procure 48 head of cattle for ₹80,000.”

It is worth considering how anyone could purchase 48 head of cattle for ₹80,000, meaning a single animal for roughly ₹1,700 (18 USD). Nevertheless, among the eight detained individuals, Mohammad Hamid was identified as the alleged mastermind. Action was taken against him under the National Security Act (NSA), and he was sent to Jabalpur Central Jail on June 16, 2026. The remaining seven accused were jailed under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Prohibition of Cow Slaughter Act and charges related to disturbing communal harmony.

It is noteworthy that while the NSA was invoked in connection with the alleged sacrifice during Bakrid, the Allahabad High Court, just two days earlier on May 26, had quashed an order detaining a man under the NSA over allegations of cow slaughter. The court observed that the government’s action was not legally justified, as the alleged incident did not take place in a public space and did not affect communal harmony or law and order.

Notably, in April of the previous year, the police in Shamli, Uttar Pradesh, arrested a man named Isham on charges of slaughtering a cow inside his home. Cow slaughter is legally prohibited in Uttar Pradesh, and the court acknowledged that fact. However, it also noted that the alleged incident occurred within a private home, not in a public place. Yet, around the time of Eid al-Adha, the police invoked the NSA even against individuals who had not slaughtered a cow, alleging instead that a conspiracy to sacrifice cattle was being planned.

A Platform for Hate Politics

Well before Eid al-Adha, the social media accounts of Hindutva organizations across India became highly active. They viewed the festival as an opportunity they did not want to miss. A stream of videos and reels appeared on social media, showing members of these organizations issuing warnings to Muslims, conducting so-called “raids,” and searching vehicles late at night. They claimed their actions were aimed at preventing Muslims from sacrificing cows.

However, there is little evidence to suggest that Muslims were sacrificing cows during Bakrid. Despite this, these groups repeatedly claimed they would not allow cow slaughter to take place. The issue was not limited to the act of sacrifice alone. They also used speeches and public actions to spread hatred whenever the opportunity arose.

In Indore, Madhya Pradesh, activists from the VHP and Bajrang Dal staged a protest on May 23, ahead of Eid al-Adha, and submitted a memorandum to the District Collector’s office. They demanded a ban on cow smuggling and cow slaughter. During the protest, some participants chanted the slogan: “Chop off the hands of those who slaughter cows.”

Speaking at a “Shaurya Training Camp” organized by the VHP and Durga Vahini in Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan, on May 21, VHP General Secretary Surendra Jain stated that offering namaz in public places is more a means of displaying strength than an act of worship. Describing this as a form of “terrorism,” he asserted that such “anti-national” activities would not be tolerated. Referring to Bakrid, he alleged that cows are slaughtered specifically to provoke Hindus. He declared that the VHP and Bajrang Dal would not allow this to happen, warning that if those involved in cow slaughter do not understand the “language of the law,” they would be addressed in a “different language.”

Amid this, hateful statements from political leaders also began to surface. On May 24, at a large Hindu gathering organized by the ‘Sakal Hindu Samaj’ in Neral, Raigad district (Maharashtra), BJP MLA and Maharashtra’s Fisheries Minister Nitesh Rane mocked Muslims in relation to Bakrid. Rane also suggested that Bakrid should be celebrated virtually by displaying a photo of a goat on a computer.

During a Shrimad Bhagwat Katha held on May 21 in the Sodala area of Jaipur, Rajasthan, BJP MLA Balmukund Acharya contrasted Sanatan traditions with those of “people of other faiths” (vidharmis). He stated that Hindus do not harm even an ant, whereas “people of other faiths” sacrifice animals during festivals. His remarks were made in the context of the upcoming Eid al-Adha, and he described the nature of such individuals as “demonic.”

Rajkumar Chahar, the BJP MP from Fatehpur Sikri, stated that if people can sleep in shifts, they can also offer namaz in shifts. Citing the example of Chandni Chowk, the MP noted that in many households, 30 to 40 people live in spaces meant for five and sleep in shifts. He appealed to the Muslim community to similarly adopt a shift system for offering namaz.

A tense situation arose in Pune on April 26, 2026, when several pro-Hindutva organizations staged a protest near Sarasbaug. The protesters expressed concern over large crowds gathering in the area and demanded the imposition of certain restrictions ahead of the upcoming Eid al-Adha. The organizations also called for a ban on large gatherings in the area during the festival. The organizers stated that if their concerns were not addressed, they might launch a larger democratic movement in the future.

The situation in Karnataka’s Hassan district became extremely tense after local Muslim organizations announced a boycott on purchasing livestock for Bakrid. This decision sparked anger among livestock rearers and dairy farmers. Frustrated by the absence of buyers at the weekly livestock fair, hundreds of farmers staged a protest and threatened to march directly to the Deputy Commissioner’s office with their cattle.

The reason behind the Muslim organizations’ decision was also alarming. Their representative, Anshad-e-Palya, stated that intimidating posters had been put up in several Muslim-majority areas, threatening the confiscation of homes and land if livestock were purchased. The police and administration denied having put up any such posters. Banners displayed in Hassan city had warned of the “permanent confiscation of all assets” in the event of animal slaughter.

While these Hindutva leaders took issue with the ritual sacrifice of animals during Eid al-Adha, not a single word was spoken after the recent discovery of hundreds of cow carcasses in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan. A similar incident had occurred a few years ago in Chhattisgarh, where a large number of cows died of starvation; yet in such cases, their sentiments appear to remain unaffected.

The media, too, made no effort to avoid fueling tensions, often using Eid al-Adha as a pretext. During our research, we found that some media websites had published reports claiming the discovery of beef before Eid al-Adha, only to delete those stories after the festival had passed. The reason behind such actions remains unclear. There were also coordinated attempts to disturb the atmosphere on social media by circulating old videos.

PETA India created a goat-like robot named “Awaaz.” Its objective was to encourage people to give up animal-based foods and adopt a vegan diet. According to PETA, this robot—which resembles a real goat—interacts with passersby, especially children and students, in both Hindi and English. It asks them questions such as, “Do you consider me a friend or food?” PETA India stated that “Awaaz” would visit colleges and prominent locations in cities across the country to interact with people and encourage them to choose food that does not involve the killing of animals. Notably, PETA India appears to carry out such campaigns mainly around the time of Eid al-Adha; similar initiatives are not seen during other festivals, and certainly not during Holi.

Targeting through government directives

State governments in UP, Delhi, MP, Tamil Nadu, Assam, and West Bengal issued strict guidelines for Bakrid. These guidelines prohibited public animal sacrifices, the use of drains for disposing of blood, and offering prayers on public roads. Maharashtra strictly enforced rules under the ‘Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act,’ which bans the slaughter of cows, bulls, and calves. Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat continued to implement some of the country’s strictest ‘anti-cow slaughter laws,’ which include provisions for life imprisonment in certain cases. Assam enforced rules under the ‘Assam Cattle Preservation Act,’ while Karnataka reiterated the regulations established under its strict 2020 ‘anti-cattle slaughter law.’

Meanwhile, the Maharashtra government issued an order stating that individuals found transporting cattle without necessary documentation could face action similar to that taken against organized criminals under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA). Maharashtra’s Revenue Minister and BJP leader Chandrashekhar Bawankule warned that cow slaughter would not be permitted in the state, stating that MCOCA would be invoked against anyone violating this rule.

The Assam government also claimed to have intensified action against cattle theft, smuggling, and the illegal beef trade. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma adopted a “zero-tolerance” policy. According to the Chief Minister, the Assam Police registered 425 cases related to cattle theft and smuggling between January 1 and May 19, 2026. During these operations, the police recovered 4,355 cattle linked to alleged theft and smuggling networks active across various districts of the state.

The Assam Chief Minister advised Muslims to perform the sacrifice in a “proper manner.” He appreciated voices within the Muslim community that had appealed against the sacrifice of cows. Himanta Biswa Sarma went so far as to say that Bakrid should eventually be made completely free of animal sacrifice. According to him, Muslims are respecting “Sanatan sentiments,” which will help maintain peace in society.

In Delhi, BJP leaders warned that both the sacrifice and the prayers must be conducted “within limits” and in accordance with established rules.

In West Bengal, Suvendu Adhikari stated that no one would be permitted to offer prayers on the streets. However, the very street in Kolkata where the government objected to Muslims offering Eid prayers, a process that takes no more than half an hour, was kept closed on the morning of June 21 for the celebration of International Yoga Day.

Uttarakhand Chief Minister Pushkar Singh Dhami adopted a strict stance against offering prayers on public roads. He stated that offering prayers on the streets would not be permitted in the state and warned that strict action would be taken against those who obstruct traffic or disrupt law and order.

Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath had already issued a directive prior to Eid al-Adha prohibiting prayers on the streets. He even threatened, “If you want to offer prayers, do it in shifts… If you agree amicably, fine; if not, we will adopt a different approach…” Later, while defending his government’s policy, he stated that public spaces cannot be obstructed in the name of religious activities and that the law applies equally to everyone. Every citizen of the country is well aware of how the law regarding the use of roads is applied equally to all.

Attempts to Curtail the Eid al-Adha Holiday

The newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in West Bengal reduced the government holiday for Eid al-Adha from two days to one. Before the change in government, the state’s holiday calendar for 2026 had designated two days off for Bakrid.

While Eid al-Adha is officially a national holiday, the Ghaziabad-based Sunder Deep Group of Institutions (SDGI) Global University scheduled practical examinations for first-year pharmacy students on the first day of Bakrid, June 28. The exam was set from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM. This was not the only university to do so; several others also scheduled annual examinations on the day of Bakrid. Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Rohilkhand University (MJPRU) in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, scheduled a law theory exam from 8:00 AM to 11:00 AM that day. Similarly, Gujarat University in Ahmedabad scheduled an English language exam during Bakrid.

Students from Delhi University (DU) have approached the Delhi High Court to challenge the university’s decision to hold an examination on June 28, the day of Bakrid (Eid al-Adha). The students allege that their repeated requests to reschedule the exam were ignored.

This decision has caused concern among Muslim students at the university, particularly those in the Faculty of Law. They state that holding an exam on an important religious festival makes it difficult for them to balance their academic and religious commitments.

During the hearing at the Delhi High Court, DU clarified that students wishing to celebrate the festival would be allowed to skip the exam, and a special examination would be conducted for them after July 4.

Slaughtering ‘Mother’ to Defame Muslims

While the cow is revered as ‘Mother’ by followers of the Hindu faith, some are capable of slaughtering this very ‘Mother’ just to defame Muslims. An incident that occurred on June 18, 2026, in Changipur village, under the jurisdiction of the Noorpur police station in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, clearly illustrates how a plot to slaughter a cow was allegedly hatched to vitiate the communal atmosphere and frame a Muslim man in a false case. According to the police, the prime accused in this conspiracy was Jagpal, the village head (Pradhan) of Changipur. Shockingly, preparations for a protest against the alleged cow slaughter had already been made in advance, with members of various local Hindu organizations mobilized for the purpose.

Furthermore, on June 23, a local resident named Aichon Chandra Das was arrested in Hojai, Assam. He was accused of calling a Muslim man named Riyazuddin to ask for a cow’s head, intending to place it inside a temple. Riyaz recorded the conversation and, along with members of the ‘All Assam Minority Students Union’ (AAMSU), handed it over to the police, leading to Das’s arrest. This gives an idea of the lengths to which members of Hindutva organizations may go.

Similar attempts were also reported during Eid al-Adha. In Bhilwara, Rajasthan, news spread quickly on the night of May 24, ahead of Eid al-Adha, that the carcass of an animal had been found outside a temple in Shastri Nagar. Upon learning of the incident, office-bearers from various Hindu organizations, including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, along with a large number of locals, gathered at the site. They blocked the road and staged a sit-in protest outside the temple. The matter soon took on a distinctly communal tone. However, when the police examined CCTV footage from nearby cameras, it was revealed that the act had been committed by two youths named Lokesh Khatik and Hemant Koli, who were Hindus, not Muslims.

Similarly, in the Brahmin Gali area of Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, a locality predominantly inhabited by the Brahmin community, the discovery of meat in a garbage pile on Eid al-Adha sparked anger and concern among locals. Some individuals attempted to inflame tensions over the incident, but prompt police action prevented the situation from escalating. Upon reviewing CCTV footage, police observed a woman wearing a burqa discarding meat near the garbage pile. However, the subsequent investigation revealed that the woman seen in the footage was not Muslim but Hindu; during questioning, she identified herself as Swati Vikram Bhosale.

You can also view a list of similar incidents below. Furthermore, regarding incidents that occurred before or after Eid al-Adha, an honest investigation would likely reveal a very different reality.

Just as in 2023, 2024, and 2025, I have attempted here to document certain incidents that took place across the country before, during, and after Eid al-Adha this year. These accounts are based entirely on reports from various credible websites. It is important to note that numerous videos, both old and new, circulated on social media (particularly Instagram) this year, raising questions about animal sacrifice during Eid al-Adha. Many of these posts appeared intended to disrupt communal harmony. I have deliberately excluded such social media content from this compilation, as verifying its authenticity has become extremely difficult in the age of artificial intelligence.

Just before Eid al-Adha

— Aurangabad (Bihar): Authorities seized 46 cattle intended for sacrifice ahead of Eid al-Adha. Police said the action was taken to prevent illegal transportation and enforce the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. The animals were later sent to local gaushalas (cow shelters).

— Bhilwara (Rajasthan): On the night of May 24, ahead of Eid al-Adha, reports emerged that remains of an animal had been found outside a temple in Shastri Nagar. After learning of the incident, representatives of several Hindu organizations, including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, along with a large number of locals, gathered at the site. They blocked the road and held a sit-in protest outside the temple. Tensions at the scene escalated. However, when police reviewed CCTV footage from nearby cameras, they found that the act had been carried out by two youths, Lokesh Khatik and Hemant Koli, both of whom are Hindu. Following the investigation, police said the incident was not a deliberate act of mischief but an accident. According to police, Lokesh Khatik works in the business of buying and selling animal hides. On Sunday night, he and his associate Hemant were transporting hides in a sack on a scooter from the Kanvakheda area. During the journey, the sack reportedly remained open, and two hides fell onto the road in front of the Baba Ramdev temple, leading to the misunderstanding.

— Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar (Maharashtra): On May 27, a day before Eid al-Adha, members of the Pranian Foundation, along with police personnel, seized animals from the homes of several Muslims. They alleged that the animals were being taken for slaughter in connection with Eid al-Adha.

— Dehradun (Uttarakhand): On May 27, a day before Eid al-Adha, animal rights activist Puja Bahukhandi intercepted two buffaloes that were being transported for ritual slaughter. She alleged that Muslim men who opposed her intervention were challenging her religious beliefs. She later called in members of Hindu nationalist organizations, including Radha Semwal Dhoni, a leader associated with Sanatan culture. Supporters of her group arrived at the scene, leading to a disturbance. It is important to note that buffalo slaughter is not prohibited in India.

— Fatehpur (Uttar Pradesh): Ahead of Eid al-Adha, police detained two Muslim youths for allegedly posting a WhatsApp status that included an image of a cow. The incident took place under the jurisdiction of the Lalauli police station. Officials said the action was taken on concerns that the post could disturb communal harmony ahead of the festival.

— Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh): On May 24, ahead of Eid al-Adha, BJP MLA Nand Kishore Gurjar directed police officials not to allow any meat shops to operate in the area. He also warned members of the Muslim community, stating, “Those who wish to sacrifice goats on Bakrid should go outside the city to do so.”

— Hyderabad (Telangana): On the night of May 11, ahead of Eid al-Adha, a tense atmosphere was reported in parts of Hyderabad after activists associated with Bajrang Dal intercepted vehicles transporting oxen near the Chaitanyapuri Metro Station and questioned the drivers on the road. There is no legal ban in Telangana on the transportation of oxen or the sacrifice of animals for Bakrid. Representatives of Muslim organizations expressed concern that such incidents tend to increase ahead of the festival, creating a sense of insecurity among Muslim families preparing for Eid al-Adha.

— Hyderabad (Telangana): Before Eid al-Adha, around midnight on May 16, a group of ‘cow terrorists’ stopped a truck in Gudimalkapur. Although the truck was reportedly carrying only plywood sheets, the group allegedly vandalized the vehicle and pelted it with stones. At least three people, including the truck driver, Rasool Shaikh, his brother, and a police officer, were injured in the incident. Police registered a case against five individuals on charges including attempted murder, unlawful assembly, rioting, assault on a public servant, causing hurt, and obstructing a public road.

— Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh): Late on May 27, a day before Eid al-Adha, reports emerged that the severed head and other remains of a bovine animal had been found in the Katanga area under the jurisdiction of the Cantt police station. The incident triggered tensions in the locality as news spread. Activists associated with the Hindu Dharma Sena gathered at the scene and staged a protest. Police took custody of the animal remains and sent them for a post-mortem examination as part of their investigation into the incident.

— Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh): Ahead of Eid al-Adha, tensions arose in the Malihabad area after Hindu organizations announced plans to hold a Sunderkand recitation at the old fort in Kasmandi Kala. In response, the district administration prohibited Eid al-Adha prayers and Friday congregational prayers at the site, stating that the restrictions were imposed as a precautionary measure to prevent communal unrest. The site is claimed by Hindu organizations to be the historic fort of the 11th-century Nagvanshi ruler Maharaja Kansa Pasi and the location of an ancient Shiva temple. Members of the Muslim community, however, maintain that it is a centuries-old mosque and mazar (shrine) that has long been used for religious worship.

— Mumbai (Maharashtra): On May 26, ahead of Eid al-Adha, the administration removed a temporary shed that had been erected for Bakrid at Poonam Cluster Society in Mira Road following complaints from Hindutva organizations. According to reports, some residents later attempted to rebuild the structure during the night, leading to a heated argument and a scuffle. In response, supporters of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal gathered outside the society. They described the activity as “Bakra Jihad” allegedly being carried out by Muslims. The group recited the Hanuman Chalisa and also brought a piglet to the site, saying it was for “Varaha Puja.” They claimed the act was intended as a counter to the goats brought for sacrifice during Eid al-Adha.

— Mumbai (Maharashtra): Ahead of Eid al-Adha, permission had been granted for ritual animal sacrifice (qurbani) within the Satellite Garden Society complex in the Gokuldham area of Goregaon, Mumbai. However, the permission was later revoked following objections from individuals associated with Hindutva organizations. The administration subsequently directed that the sacrifice could be carried out only at an authorized slaughterhouse outside the residential complex. The dispute escalated when representatives of both sides confronted each other in front of the media, leading to a heated exchange. Police intervened to bring the situation under control.

— Mumbai (Maharashtra): Ahead of Eid al-Adha, a dispute arose at Sagar Park Housing Society in Ghatkopar West after some residents brought goats into the residential complex. Police arrived at the scene, brought the situation under control, and arranged for the goats to be removed from the premises.

— Mumbai (Maharashtra): Ahead of Eid al-Adha, Muslim families in Azad Nagar Society in Dindoshi erected a temporary shed to house goats for Bakrid. Some local residents objected to the structure, after which local BJP corporator Priti Satam visited the site and called for its removal. As the dispute escalated, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) ordered the shed to be dismantled, despite the fact that permission for ritual animal sacrifice during Eid al-Adha had previously been granted.

— Mumbai (Maharashtra): According to reports, Muslim residents of Sumer Nagar Society in Borivali, Mumbai, brought six goats into the housing complex ahead of Eid al-Adha. The move was opposed by some residents associated with Hindutva ideology, leading to a dispute within the society.

— Muzaffarnagar (Uttar Pradesh): On the night of Eid al-Adha (May 27, 2026), in a Muslim-majority area under the jurisdiction of the Budhana police station, some youths riding motorcycles allegedly chanted “Jai Shri Ram,” leading to concerns about communal tensions. According to police, an investigation into a viral video identified three youths, Vijay, Mani, and Vansh. Police said action was taken against them because the incident had the potential to disrupt peace and escalate tensions in the area.

— Sonitpur (Assam): Ahead of Eid al-Adha, on May 22, two people were allegedly beaten to death by a mob in the Bhalukpung area on suspicion of cattle theft. A third person sustained critical injuries in the incident.

— Srinagar (Kashmir): For the eighth consecutive year, authorities did not grant permission for congregational Eid al-Adha prayers at the historic Jamia Masjid Srinagar and Eidgah Srinagar. Amid tightened security arrangements, Kashmiri religious leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was also placed under house arrest.

— Vadodara (Gujarat): On May 21, ahead of Eid al-Adha, ‘cow terrorists’ associated with the Hindu Dharma Sena intercepted five trucks transporting goats for the festival. It is alleged that the truck drivers were assaulted during the incident. Tensions escalated when the these ‘terrorists’ attempted to take the trucks to a gaushala (cow shelter). Workers of AIMIM later arrived at the scene and opposed the move, resulting in a commotion.

— Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh): The goat market at Beniyabag Park, which was set up ahead of Eid al-Adha, was shut down shortly before the festival. According to local residents, the market had been operating for around three decades but was not allowed to function this year. The Municipal Commissioner stated that the area falls within a two-kilometer radius of the Kashi Vishwanath Temple complex, and the decision to close the market was taken in view of that proximity. Reports also said that while permission had initially been granted for the market to operate from May 18 to May 27, the Smart City administration cancelled the allotment on May 23.

During the three days of Eid al-Adha

— Agra (Uttar Pradesh): On May 28, the first day of Eid al-Adha, the Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha held a protest over Eid al-Adha prayers at the mosque within the Taj Mahal complex. Police intervened promptly and prevented the situation from escalating.

— Ahmednagar (Maharashtra): On the day of Eid al-Adha, the discovery of meat in a garbage heap in the Brahmin Gali area, which is predominantly inhabited by members of the Brahmin community, led to concern among local residents. Some individuals attempted to raise tensions over the incident, but prompt police action helped prevent escalation. Police, after reviewing CCTV footage from the area, noted that a woman wearing a burqa was seen discarding meat near the garbage pile. During the investigation, she was identified as Swati Vikram Bhosale.

— Amroha (Uttar Pradesh): On the first day of Eid al-Adha, a piece of meat was found on the steps of the pond within the premises of the Shri Vasudev Temple in the city. The following day, an animal horn was discovered hanging from a tree in the temple park. The incidents led to protests and concern among activists from the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad, creating tension in the area. Police arrived at the scene and brought the situation under control. Hindutva activists have warned that they may launch a larger protest if action is not taken against those responsible.

— Ballari (Karnataka): Tension increased on the third day of Eid al-Adha after the severed heads of two cows were found by the roadside near the 9th Cross of Kappagallu Road. Following the discovery, BJP workers, members of Hindu organizations, and local residents staged a protest, blocking the road and holding a sit-in at the site. A Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) team later arrived, inspected the scene, and collected evidence and other materials for investigation.

— Bhagalpur (Bihar): On the day of Eid al-Adha, a tense situation was reported in Radhanagar village, under the jurisdiction of the Sajaur police station in Shahkund block, after individuals were seen passing in front of a temple with allegedly objectionable material. According to reports, the dispute began late on May 27 when a group was transporting the material in a pickup truck. Residents of Dakshin Tola intercepted the vehicle, which led to tensions in the area.

— Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh): On the first day of Eid al-Adha, a rumor spread in Dharmara village that a cow had been slaughtered and consumed. The claim led to tensions in the area, with some villagers gathering on the streets carrying sticks. Police reached the scene after being informed and worked to bring the situation under control. During the subsequent investigation, the police clarified that the report of cow slaughter was entirely baseless.

— Bijnor (Uttar Pradesh): A case has been registered against 40 individuals for offering prayers on a public road outside an Eidgah on the Mahmoodpur route on the occasion of Eid al-Adha, with 15 of them named in the FIR. Police said the action was taken for the alleged violation of government restrictions and directives against offering prayers on public roads.

— Dhandbad (Jharkhand): On the second day of Eid al-Adha, reports emerged of the discovery of prohibited meat in Mohanad village in the Tundi area. Following the report, a crowd gathered at the site, and tensions developed in the surrounding areas. Stones were also reportedly thrown at police. According to officials, the meat was seized from the scene, and three individuals have been arrested in connection with the incident.

— Fatehpur (Uttar Pradesh): A commotion broke out on the second day of Eid al-Adha after reports that a goat’s head had been found in the kitchen of the Hanuman temple complex at Chowk Bazaar in the city. Traders and office-bearers of Hindu organizations shut down the market for nearly three hours and raised slogans. Police later reviewed CCTV footage, which showed a dog carrying a goat’s head toward the temple complex. The situation calmed after the footage was made public. The temple area was subsequently cleaned, and traders recited the Hanuman Chalisa on the road outside the temple.

— Haridwar (Uttarakhand): On the first day of Eid al-Adha, the severed head of a bovine animal was allegedly found along a major highway in the Bhagwanpur area. The report quickly spread in the locality. Activists from several Hindu organizations, including the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, gathered in large numbers, leading to heightened tension in Bhagwanpur and nearby areas. According to reports, police sent the remains for forensic examination and post-mortem analysis. An FIR has been registered against unidentified persons for allegedly inciting religious sentiments and violating the anti-cow slaughter law. Police are reviewing CCTV footage and questioning individuals as part of the investigation to identify those involved.

— Indore (Madhya Pradesh): On the second day of Eid al-Adha, reports emerged of the alleged slaughter of cattle in an illegal enclosure in the Banda Basti area under the jurisdiction of the Mhow Kotwali police station. Following the information, Bajrang Dal activists and a police team reached the site. The situation reportedly turned tense, and stones were thrown at police personnel, prompting the deployment of additional forces to restore order. Bajrang Dal activists also demanded strict action, including demolition of the accused persons’ houses. In connection with the case, police have invoked the National Security Act (NSA) against two individuals, while a case has been registered against four others. Officials also said provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Cow Slaughter Prohibition Act and the Arms Act have been applied in the investigation.

— Itanagar (Arunachal Pradesh): A local youth organization, the Arunachal Pradesh Indigenous Youth Organization (APIYO), called for a 24-hour shutdown on the day of Eid al-Adha, stating it was a protest against alleged “illegal immigrants.” Citing Supreme Court rulings, the local administration declared the shutdown illegal under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Despite this, the shutdown led to disruptions, with many Muslim families performing Eid prayers and observances indoors. Reports also said that several Muslims traveling from other parts of the state and neighboring Assam were unable to celebrate the festival in the usual manner.

— Jahangirpuri (Delhi): On the night of May 28, the first day of Eid al-Adha, 26-year-old Arbaz was allegedly stabbed to death following a dispute over a cigarette. According to media reports, he worked at a local jewellery shop. He was standing near his home when a group of youths confronted him. What began as a minor argument reportedly escalated into violence, and he was allegedly attacked with knives, sustaining multiple injuries. He was taken to Babu Jagjivan Ram Memorial Hospital in critical condition but later died during treatment.

— Khandwa (Madhya Pradesh): A disturbance was reported at midnight on the second day of Eid al-Adha in Sinhada village, near the city, after the severed head and meat of an animal were found in three sacks placed outside a house. Activists from Hindutva organizations alleged that the remains belonged to a cow. Police have registered a case against eight named individuals, four of whom have been taken into custody, while a search is underway for the remaining accused. Samples of the meat have been sent for forensic examination.

— Meerut (Uttar Pradesh): On the first day of Eid al-Adha, members of Hindu organizations raised objections and created a disturbance, alleging that a goat had been sacrificed and the meat cooked at the Durga temple located within the Nauchandi Mela complex. However, a police investigation found the claim of sacrifice to be baseless. Despite this, a ride operator was taken into custody on allegations that he had brought meat from outside and was preparing to cook it.

— Meerut (Uttar Pradesh): On the first day of Eid al-Adha, after Eid prayers, a YouTuber was reportedly questioning people returning from the prayer area, allegedly attempting to elicit provocative responses for a viral video. During this interaction, he met a 70-year-old man who referred to Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath as a “goon.” A young man present at the scene immediately objected, saying the remark was inappropriate and referring to the Chief Minister respectfully. Following the video’s circulation, police detained the elderly man and registered a case against him under relevant legal provisions. After his arrest, a separate video surfaced on social media showing the man apologizing while being escorted by police outside the Railway Road police station.

— Meerut (Uttar Pradesh): On May 29, the second day of Eid al-Adha, Puneet reported to the police assistance booth in Mavi-Meera village under the Daurala police station area that a bag containing meat had been found outside his house. Police reached the spot and began an investigation. As the information spread, a crowd gathered in the village, leading to brief tension in the area. Police subsequently reviewed CCTV footage from nearby locations. The investigation found that a 12-year-old boy, Mayank, was seen cycling with a sack containing packets of meat. According to police, one packet of spoiled meat accidentally fell from his bicycle while he was turning a corner, and he continued on without noticing. Further inquiry indicated that Puneet had picked up the packet from the road and placed it outside his house before contacting the police to report that a bag of meat had been dumped there.

— Panipat (Haryana): A boy named Junaid was reportedly heading towards Chhoti Masjid with his friends when a group of youths, said to have emerged from a shop and arrived on a motorcycle, allegedly attacked them. It is alleged that Junaid was stabbed in the back, while the other youths sustained injuries to the stomach. One of the injured boys stated that one of the accused is named Sunil, while the remaining attackers are unidentified. Police said the incident is not linked to Eid and appears to be related to an old rivalry, though it led to tension in the area.

— Pilibhit (Uttar Pradesh): A man named Nafees carried out the ritual sacrifice of a goat in KGN Colony. A video of the incident was recorded and circulated on social media, after which it went viral. Following this, organizations aligned with Hindutva ideology raised objections, alleging that goats were being openly sacrificed without permission at the premises of a temporary Samajwadi Party office. The Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha submitted a complaint to the District Magistrate and police, demanding action. Based on a complaint filed by the in-charge of the Civil Lines police outpost, Kotwali police registered an FIR against a Samajwadi Party leader under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act and relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Nafees, however, has denied the allegations, stating that the sacrifice took place on a separate property he owns, which he uses for parking vehicles and storing scrap material. He maintains that the location is not a Samajwadi Party office, though he occasionally holds meetings there with party workers.

— Ratlam (Madhya Pradesh): The atmosphere in the city turned tense after reports emerged on the first day of Eid al-Adha that a severed cow head had been found. Activists from a Hindutva organization placed the remains on the road and staged a blockade for nearly five hours.

—Rudrapur (Uttarakhand): On the second day of Eid al-Adha, tensions were reported in Bhootbangla Ward No. 20 over allegations of hurting religious sentiments. Members of the Valmiki community accused an individual of throwing the remains of a sacrificed goat in front of a temple gate and of using abusive language and issuing death threats when confronted. Police registered a case based on the complaint and arrested the accused. The accused was identified as a constable with the Uttarakhand Police.

— Seoni (Madhya Pradesh): On May 29, the second day of Eid al-Adha, police arrested five individuals. Three more arrests were made on May 30 and 31, bringing the total to eight. The accused were allegedly involved in a plan to disturb public order in the district during the festival. According to police, the group was suspected of attempting to incite communal tension through arrangements related to the ritual slaughter of cattle. Authorities said the network was operating in an organized manner and that efforts were underway to mobilize funds and resources. They added that the investigation had uncovered several leads, including alleged donations collected from individuals for the purpose of the sacrifice. Police further stated that analysis of mobile phones indicated that around ₹27,500 had been collected from various people, which was intended to be used to purchase cattle. They also said evidence suggested a deal had been made to procure 48 head of cattle for ₹80,000. Among the eight accused, Mohammad Hamid was identified by police as the alleged mastermind. He was detained under the National Security Act (NSA) and sent to Jabalpur Central Jail on June 16, 2026. The remaining seven accused were remanded to jail under provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Prohibition of Cow Slaughter Act and charges related to disturbing communal harmony.

— Thane (Maharashtra): Members of Hindu organizations, along with activists from both the Shinde and Uddhav factions of the Shiv Sena, staged a “bell-ringing protest” against the administration’s decision to allow Eid al-Adha prayers at the Idgah near the historic Durgadi Fort in Kalyan, while temporarily restricting Hindu devotees from entering the temple located inside the fort during the Eid al-Adha prayers. According to reports, as Eid al-Adha prayers began inside the fort, some groups present at the site raised slogans. In response, Hindu devotees and activists who had been stopped at barricades outside the fort sat on the ground and recited the Hanuman Chalisa loudly.

— Ujjain (Madhya Pradesh): On May 28, the first day of Eid al-Adha, tensions were reported after a piece of meat was found outside the house of a Hindu family in the Gandhinagar area. Following the incident, locals gathered at the spot and demanded action. Police reached the area, brought the situation under control, and reviewed CCTV footage from nearby cameras. After the initial investigation, officials said there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the meat had been deliberately placed there to disturb communal harmony. Police also noted that, based on preliminary assessment, the possibility that the meat may have been carried to the location by a bird or animal could not be ruled out.

After Eid al-Adha

— Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh): On the morning of June 2, reports emerged that the remains of three protected animals had been found in a canal near the Greenfield Expressway in Kurana village. The news led to anger among local residents. Police and a team from the Veterinary Department reached the spot soon after receiving the information. After collecting samples for examination, the remaining remains were buried in a pit by the authorities.

— Goalpara (Assam): According to allegations, on June 5, a student from a government higher secondary school reportedly brought beef in his lunchbox and allegedly attempted to share it with two Hindu classmates. A minor student was detained in connection with the incident, and his mother was also arrested. Police said a case has been registered against both under charges related to hurting religious sentiments, based on a complaint filed by the parents of the two Hindu students. However, questions have also been raised regarding the allegations.

— Thane (Maharashtra): Even after Eid al-Adha, tensions persisted in Poonam Cluster Society in Mira Road, with a sense of unease still reported among some Muslim residents. In this context, a resident wrote in an article that the Poonam Estate Cluster Management Committee, comprising 12 non-Muslim and 5 Muslim members, had granted formal written approval on May 28 this year for the construction of a temporary goat shed for Eid al-Adha, along with certain conditions. The approval, he noted, was a collective decision of the committee. Despite this, members of Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad allegedly gathered outside the society gate within a few days. The resident said he informed the police about the growing crowd inside the society in the evening, but was told that people were allowed to stand on the road. He further alleged that instead of dispersing the gathering, it was allowed to grow into an organized protest. The committee issued a clarification on June 10, 2026, but according to the account, no action was taken against those who escalated the matter and involved other organizations, including Bajrang Dal. The resident also claimed that on June 14, 2026, a non-Muslim resident shared a photo of a Muslim child wearing a cap in the society’s WhatsApp group of 348 members, which further added to concerns among residents.

Here is another story…

Consider the large-heartedness of the Muslim community in Pandharpur, Maharashtra. Whenever Bakrid coincides with the Hindu festival of Ekadashi, the community here voluntarily postpones the ritual sacrifice of goats—a practice followed this year as well. The Muslim community of Pandharpur decided not to perform the sacrifice on the first day of Bakrid as it clashed with Ekadashi according to the Hindu calendar.

A similar example was seen in Govardhan, Mathura. There, the Muslim community chose not to perform the sacrifice in order to respect the sanctity of the holy town and maintain social harmony. Additionally, prayers were offered during Eid al-Adha for the country’s peace and prosperity.

Despite this, it is not just about Eid al-Adha, in some places, the situation has reached a point where a Muslim cannot even keep a goat in their own home. This is illustrated by an incident in the Shalimar Garden area of Ghaziabad. In February, a Muslim family in Vikram Enclave brought a goat into their home. News of the goat quickly spread, and objections were raised. Those protesting claimed the goat had been brought for sacrifice and that it could disturb the religious atmosphere.

The post Eid al-Adha in India: Around 50 Incidents Reported Amid Security Measures, Restrictions, and Rising Tensions appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

“My daughter wanted to become a doctor, but now she doesn’t even have a place to study.”

These are the words of a homeless mother from Bandar Matha in Assam’s Goalpara district, whose house was demolished in a recent administrative action. Today, this Muslim-majority settlement presents a scene of ruin. Broken walls, scattered belongings, and families immersed in uncertainty testify to the fact that the administration’s action, carried out in the name of an “anti-encroachment campaign,” has left thousands homeless and hundreds of students deprived of education.

The story of Goalpara is not just the story of one hamlet. It reflects a larger and more complex crisis in Assam over citizenship, land rights, and the exercise of state power. At a time when the state is grappling with controversial issues such as the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the “de-voter” (doubtful voter) category, these land clearance campaigns are not merely administrative actions in the eyes of human rights activists and observers. According to them, these measures have specifically affected the educational, social, and religious structures of a particular community, with far-reaching consequences for an entire generation.

Questions of Double Standards

The most striking thing about entering Bandar Matha was the apparent disparity in law enforcement. In one part of the settlement, the houses of the majority Hindu community stood intact, while the homes of several Muslim families nearby had been completely razed to the ground.

An elderly woman stood holding tattered citizenship and land documents in her hands. Local translator Maqbool Hussain Qasmi translated her words, saying that she was asking, “If this land is illegal, how did my neighbor’s house become legal and mine illegal?”

Maqbool Hussain also pointed to an educational tragedy hidden behind the devastation. A daughter from the same demolished household had been preparing for the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET), India’s medical entrance examination. The family’s only source of income was her father’s small shop, which was bulldozed along with the house. Apart from losing access to coaching resources, the student is now forced to search for her textbooks among the rubble of collapsed walls alongside her father.

Legal Requirements and Ground Realities

The administration claims these operations are legal under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, and the Indian Forest Act, 1927, but legal experts and human rights activists are raising serious questions about the process.

According to a report by Land Conflict Watch, on December 13, 2024, 44 families were evicted from the Panchartan area of the Balijana Revenue Circle in the presence of heavy machinery and security forces. Under Section 165(3) of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation and Rule 18(3) of the Settlement Rules, at least 15 to 30 days’ notice must be given before an eviction so that affected people can pursue legal remedies or make alternative arrangements.

But the facts on the ground suggest that notices are either not issued at all or are delivered just 24 hours before the action. A 65-year-old local resident claims that he has lived there for three generations and has been paying land tax since the 1970s. According to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing (A/HRC/RES/43/14, dated 6 July 2020), governments are obliged to provide evicted people with adequate compensation, alternative housing, and basic necessities such as food. However, Goalpara appears to be in blatant violation of these international norms.

Educational and Religious Institutions Also Under Attack

The most worrying aspect of my field reporting was the allegations regarding the demolition of educational and religious institutions. Girls from poor families used to study at the “Madrasat al-Banat Bidya Para Krishnai” adjacent to Bandar Matha. Today, only piles of bricks remain. The head of the madrasa, Mufti Muqibur Rehman, said that the demolition has affected the education of about 400 girls, as there is no other educational institution for girls in the entire area.

The administration claims that the madrasa was built on land belonging to the Forest Department. However, on the same disputed land, there is a large temple spread across several acres adjacent to the madrasa, against which no action has been taken. The same alleged double standard was also seen in the Panj Ratna area, where half of an old mosque was demolished while the construction of a new temple continues uninterrupted right next to it.

According to documents provided by Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind General Secretary Maulana Hakimuddin Qasmi and Assam-based cleric Maulana Abdul Qadir Qasmi, a total of 11,183 families were evicted in Assam between November 2023 and July 2025, directly affecting 77,379 people. During this period, 48 mosques, 86 educational institutions (including 75 schools and 11 madrasas), and 37 other sites (including 22 Eidgahs and 15 graveyards) were demolished. The state’s Chief Minister, Himanta Biswa Sarma, himself confirmed in the Assembly that 4,449 bighas of land occupied by mosques, schools, and madrasas had been cleared so far.

This alleged administrative arbitrariness also includes what critics describe as a blatant violation of court orders. Local resident Chafa Begum had filed a petition in the Gauhati High Court before the evictions. The court did not completely halt the eviction process, but declared the notice issued by the Balijana Revenue Circle null and void because it did not clearly identify the disputed land and because the officer concerned lacked the authority to issue the notice. Despite these court observations, forest officials carried out the operation using bulldozers.

According to Animul Haque, president of the All Assam Minority Students’ Organisation (AAMSU), the Balijana Circle Officer had assured residents that there would be no action in the revenue areas, but the Divisional Forest Officer proceeded with the operation.

The State’s Position and Contradictions on the Ground

The state government and the Forest Department defend all these actions in the name of environmental protection. In July 2025, Goalpara District Forest Officer (DFO) Tejas Mariswamy told NDTV about the operation in the Paikan Reserve Forest: “Goalpara district has recorded the highest number of incidents of human-elephant conflict. That is why the High Court has ordered the removal of all encroachments from forest land.”

However, the district administration has yet to provide any official explanation for the alleged double standards in the demolition of religious structures, the lack of rehabilitation measures, and the disregard for court orders. Hafiz Rafiqul Islam, a legislator from the opposition All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), rejects the claim that these areas constitute “forest land,” saying: “These villages are listed in the 1951 Assam NRC. There are electricity connections, roads, water projects, and government schools here. If this is forest land, then how did the state government provide all these facilities?”

According to Wajid Ali, a lawyer with the Goalpara Lawyers Association, only 25.67% of the district’s forest area is under encroachment, including by tribal communities engaged in rubber and tea cultivation. However, he argues that the recent operations have targeted only settlements inhabited by Bengali Muslims.

Hasilapara: A Story Beyond the Rubble

Hasilapara, one of the affected areas in Goalpara, presents perhaps the most heartbreaking picture of the crisis. Here, families displaced from Panj Ratna are living in makeshift shelters made of tarpaulin, bamboo, and plastic sheets. It was here that I met Ayesha, a Class 10 student. One cold evening, she sat inside her temporary shelter. Fear and uncertainty were evident in her eyes. Crying, she said, “All my books got soaked in the rain. How will I study now? How will I take my exams?”

This question is not Ayesha’s alone. It is the question of hundreds of children whose education has been directly affected by the evictions. And in these questions lies the full weight of the structural violence that Assam’s minority community says it is experiencing today.

This educational crisis is not limited to the loss of books. Following the eviction in the Jaleswar Betbari area, the existing government school building was converted into an office of the Forest Department. Converting schools into administrative offices is, critics argue, a clear violation of the state’s constitutional obligations under the Right to Education (RTE) Act. When alternative avenues of education are blocked for children in affected areas, it effectively means that the state is cutting off an entire generation from the path of social progress.

The reporting for the story was supported by a grant from the Human Rights and Religious Freedom Journalism Grant Program.

The post Bulldozed Dreams: How Assam’s Eviction Drives Are Leaving Thousands Homeless and a Generation Without Education appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

To understand the impact of this decision, we visited several schools across Assam that had previously operated as madrasas. Moving beyond official documents and political debates, we spent time in classrooms, spoke with teachers who experienced the transition firsthand, and listened to students who had been part of the system before and after the changes. Our central question was simple: What changed within these institutions following the conversion of the madrasas, and was anything lost beyond their names and official status?

One such institution is Bardaloni Sasra Senior Madrasa in Assam’s Barpeta district, which now operates as a regular government school. Umar (Name changed due to fears that being identified in the report could lead to harassment), a 15-year-old student, does not see the transformation as merely a change in curriculum or administration.

“Earlier, we came here because we received religious and moral instruction alongside modern subjects such as science,” he said. “Now everything has changed. The books and syllabus are the same as those in other government schools, but the training and identity for which our elders dedicated this land have disappeared. Sometimes it feels like we are studying in a place that is no longer familiar to us.”

Umar’s comments reflect a broader debate that continues in many Muslim communities across Assam. A large number of these madrasas were established on waqf land or land donated by local residents, with the goal of combining modern education and religious instruction. Local education advocates argue that the changes have had a particular impact on children from low-income and remote communities, many of whom chose these institutions because of this dual approach. According to them, some students have since sought alternative educational options, while others have left the education system altogether.

The Impact on Muslim Girls

The most significant impact of this structural change has been felt by female students living in Assam’s Muslim-majority riverine islands, locally known as char.

The father of Zainab (name changed), a 13-year-old student from a remote village in Barpeta district, works as a daily wage labourer along the banks of the Brahmaputra River. He is no longer willing to continue his daughter’s education.

“We sent her to the madrasa so that she could receive a basic understanding of the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence alongside modern education. Now that this educational identity has been removed, we cannot take the risk of sending her to a regular school,” he said, explaining the family’s decision.

For many low-income Muslim families, these madrasas served not only as educational institutions but also as spaces of social and cultural security, where they felt their daughters’ religious identity would be respected. According to local educators, the closure and conversion of madrasas have contributed to a growing number of Muslim girls leaving the education system.

Teachers also point to the strict implementation of school uniform policies. They say that in some schools, the wearing of the niqab or hijab has been treated as a violation of uniform rules, prompting some religious families to withdraw their daughters from school. In addition, practices that were common in traditional madrasas, including specific school schedules, religious recitations, and prayers, have been discontinued.

These concerns are also reflected in the report of the International Panel of Independent Experts (PIIE). On page 325, the report states that the closure of Assam’s state-run madrasas directly affected approximately 98,000 students, the majority of whom were girls, and examines these developments within the framework of international human rights law.

According to the report, the removal of religious instruction has had a disproportionate impact on Muslim girls. It argues that in more conservative households, the absence of educational environments perceived as culturally and religiously acceptable makes girls significantly more likely than boys to be withdrawn from school altogether.

The PIIE’s analysis contends that these consequences raise concerns under international human rights standards, particularly the principles of equal access to education enshrined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The report argues that these treaties require states to address cultural, economic, and institutional barriers that restrict girls’ access to education and to ensure that educational policies do not result in their exclusion.

Debate Over Educational Restructuring

Siddiq Hasan, the founder of a government madrasa (now a government school) in the Dhakalia Para area of Assam’s Goalpara district and a former high school teacher, criticized what he described as the administration’s one-sided approach to the conversion process.

“When this madrasa was turned into a school, the entire village was shocked,” he said. “People across the village came together and submitted a signed petition to the Deputy Commissioner and our local MLA, requesting that the madrasa not be closed. But the authorities did not listen to our concerns.”

Hasan also challenged what he described as widespread misconceptions about these institutions. He argued that government-run madrasas did not provide only religious education, as some officials and public narratives suggested.

“These were government madrasas,” he said. “Alongside Arabic and Islamic studies, students were taught the full government curriculum, just like in other public schools. The goal was to ensure that children received modern education while remaining connected to their religious and cultural traditions.”

According to Hasan, the conversion of these institutions into regular schools disrupted that model. He believes that while the schools continue to operate, the original educational mission that combined modern and religious learning has largely been removed.

A senior teacher at a former government-run madrasa in Goalpara district, now operating as a Middle English (ME) School, described the transition as little more than a “renaming exercise.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, he argued that instead of reforming or strengthening the educational model of the madrasas, the government had simply removed their religious identity.

Throughout the conversation, the teacher remained cautious and repeatedly requested that his name not be disclosed.

“People outside the community may assume that a major educational reform has taken place,” he said. “But the reality is that the building is the same, the classrooms are the same, and most of the teachers are the same. The main changes are that the institution has been given a new name and religious instruction has been removed.”

According to a teacher, if the government’s objective had been to improve educational outcomes, it could have strengthened and modernized the existing madrasa model rather than eliminating a key part of its identity.

“Mathematics, science, English, and the state curriculum were already being taught here,” he said. “Students received modern education alongside religious studies. If the government can invest in and upgrade Sanskrit institutions into specialized educational and research centers, a similar approach could have been adopted for madrasas. Instead, only the religious component was removed.”

For critics of the policy, this distinction remains central to the debate. They argue that the issue was not whether modern subjects were taught, but whether an educational model that combined secular and religious learning could have been preserved while pursuing broader reforms.

He said the changes had significantly weakened the confidence of Muslim parents, particularly those who had chosen these institutions because they combined modern education with a religious environment.

“Earlier, parents were reassured that their children were learning about both religion and the wider world,” he said. “Now they feel that the spirit of the madrasa has disappeared. That is why many children, especially girls, have not returned.”

He added that the policy had created a growing sense among Muslim teachers that their cultural and religious identity was being gradually removed from the formal education system.

“We feel that the issue is no longer about education alone, but also about identity,” he said. “If modernization had truly been the goal, the madrasas could have been strengthened and improved rather than stripped of their identity.”

Similar concerns were expressed by Faizanul Haque, a retired army officer and member of Assam’s Bengali Muslim community. Reflecting on the changes, he said he felt a deep sense of disappointment and alienation.

“If the government’s objective was to expand modern education among Muslims, it could have invested in better infrastructure and provided greater support to teachers instead of dismantling institutions that had served these communities for decades,” he said.

Female students at Katarihara High School in Goalpara also told us that recent administrative measures had not improved the quality of education from their perspective. Instead, they said, some of the changes had made it more difficult for students to continue their studies, raising further concerns about the long-term impact of the policy on educational access and participation.

Questions of Equality

Critics argue that the Assam government’s policy raises important questions about consistency and equal treatment in educational reform.

According to the report of the International Panel of Independent Experts (PIIE) (page 87), the Assam government enacted legislation in 2021 that led to the closure of 620 government-aided madrasas, converting them into general schools without a religious education component. The report notes that during the same period, 97 government-run Sanskrit institutions were upgraded, a contrast that, according to its authors, highlights concerns about unequal treatment of different educational traditions.

The report further argues that the policy has since expanded beyond government-funded madrasas to include greater scrutiny of privately managed Islamic educational institutions. It cites a statement made by Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma in March 2023 expressing his intention to eventually close all madrasas in the state.

According to the PIIE, these developments call into question the government’s characterization of the policy as a purely educational modernization initiative. The report contends that the measures reflect a pattern of unequal treatment and indirect discrimination affecting Muslim educational institutions.

Drawing on international human rights frameworks, the report argues that such policies should be assessed against the principles of equality and non-discrimination contained in international treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which prohibits discriminatory policies and practices based on race, ethnicity, or religion.

Concerns Over Cultural Identity

The impact of the transformation of educational institutions is also being felt beyond the classroom in areas such as Anand Nagar and Bansar in Dhubri district. Local Islamic scholar Maulana Abdul Majid said that the changes have had broader social consequences, arguing that they have disrupted long-standing community relationships and created a climate of uncertainty that affects both Muslim and Hindu residents.

According to Majid, the sense of anxiety is particularly visible among teachers. One local educator, who requested anonymity because of fears of professional repercussions, expressed concern about the long-term implications of recent recruitment policies.

“As long as the older generation of teachers remains in service, you will continue to see people here who reflect the community’s cultural traditions,” he said. “But new recruitment rules have become so restrictive and selective that, over time, the cultural representation of the minority community may gradually disappear from the education system. Those who replace them may have little connection to the social and cultural background of the communities these schools were originally established to serve.”

Throughout the reporting process, one recurring theme was the reluctance of teachers and community activists to speak openly. Many requested anonymity and described an atmosphere of fear and caution when discussing government policies.

One social worker, speaking quietly and on condition of anonymity, said, “People worry that if the authorities learn they are sharing information about conditions on the ground, there could be consequences. Teachers often feel pressure to remain silent to protect their jobs. Many also fear being drawn into citizenship-related disputes or administrative scrutiny. As a result, people are often reluctant to speak openly.”

Whether these fears reflect actual policy outcomes or perceptions within affected communities remains a matter of debate. However, the widespread concern expressed by educators and community members highlights the extent to which questions of identity, representation, and security have become intertwined with the broader discussion surrounding educational reform in Assam.

In its discussion of Assam’s education policies, the International Panel of Independent Experts (PIIE) argues that the measures extend beyond educational reform and should be understood within a broader framework of state policy toward Muslim communities. On pages 145-146 of its report, the panel describes these developments as part of a process of “securitizing Muslim social and educational presence.”

According to the report, the impact is not limited to formal education but also affects cultural expression, particularly among Assam’s Bengali-origin Muslim communities, often referred to as “Miya” Muslims. The report cites several examples, including the sealing of the privately operated Miya Museum in Goalpara shortly after its inauguration, the arrest of its organizers under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), and public statements that characterized Miya language and culture as “foreign.”

The report argues that these incidents should be viewed alongside policies affecting madrasas and other Muslim institutions, as part of a wider pattern influencing both educational and cultural life.

Concerns about these developments have also been raised at the international level. In its Early Warning and Urgent Action Letter issued in May 2025, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern over the closure of religious schools serving Bengali-origin Muslim communities in Assam. The committee warned that such measures could have a significant negative impact on access to education, particularly for Bengali-origin Muslim girls in the state.

Together, these findings have contributed to a broader debate over whether the changes in Assam’s educational landscape should be viewed solely as administrative reforms or as part of a wider set of policies affecting the cultural, religious, and educational rights of minority communities.

“This Is Not Just Educational Reform”

Abdul Qadir Qasmi, General Secretary of the All Assam Tanzeem Madrasa Qaumia and Additional General Secretary of Jamiat Ulema-e-Assam, rejects the characterization of the madrasa conversions as a simple educational reform.

“This is fundamentally a political issue,” he said. “There was a great deal of rhetoric around madrasas during election campaigns. Now that the elections are over, that debate has largely faded from public discussion.”

Qasmi argued that public perceptions of madrasas have been shaped by narratives that portray them as institutions outside the educational mainstream. In his view, this characterization does not reflect reality.

When asked whether the government could eventually move against privately managed madrasas, he responded with confidence.

“That is not possible,” he said. “The existence of madrasas does not depend on the government. They cannot simply abolish them.”

He further argued that any attempt to restrict or close private madrasas would face significant legal challenges and social opposition across Assam.

Qasmi also expressed concern about the impact of the policy on the education of Muslim girls. According to him, many families stopped sending their daughters to the converted institutions after government madrasas were transformed into regular schools.

“After these institutions became schools, many girls did not return,” he said. “A large number of parents now keep their daughters at home because they believed the madrasa environment was safer and more compatible with their religious values.”

Looking ahead, Qasmi said that religious educational institutions should continue to operate within both the constitutional framework of India and the principles of Islamic law.

“We are committed to following the requirements of Sharia while also respecting the Constitution of India,” he said. “There is no contradiction between the two. If our institutions face unjust restrictions, we will seek legal remedies through the courts. We have faith in the judiciary.”

For Qasmi and others who oppose the policy, the debate is about more than educational administration. It concerns the future of institutions that they view as integral to the religious, cultural, and social life of Assam’s Muslim communities.

Critics of Assam’s madrasa conversion policy argue that the transfer of 1,281 government-run madrasas into general schools should not be viewed merely as an educational reform. In their view, it forms part of a broader process of social engineering that has weakened the religious, cultural, and educational institutions of a significant minority community.

According to this perspective, state authorities in Assam have relied on a range of legislative and administrative measures that, while presented as regulatory or developmental initiatives, have had the effect of restricting access to education, welfare programs, cultural expression, employment opportunities, and other aspects of public life for sections of the Muslim population.

Critics further contend that these measures have been implemented selectively and have had a disproportionate impact on Bengali-origin Muslims, a religious and linguistic minority in the state. They argue that the cumulative effect of these policies has been to undermine the community’s ability to preserve its educational traditions, cultural institutions, and collective social life on equal terms with other groups.

Human rights advocates and international observers cited in various reports have raised concerns that such outcomes may conflict with India’s obligations under international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). These frameworks require states to ensure equality, prevent discrimination, and protect the cultural and educational rights of minority communities.

For those who oppose the policy, the central issue is not simply the restructuring of schools. Rather, they argue that a process presented as administrative modernization has, in practice, contributed to the erosion of an important element of a marginalized community’s cultural and educational identity.

The Ground Reality of Assam’s Education Reform

The policy of converting government-aided madrasas into regular schools in Assam has, according to critics and local educators, resulted in serious institutional challenges on the ground. During field visits in Barpeta district, we found that two former madrasas had become largely non-functional after the transition. One abandoned school building had even fallen into such disuse that local residents were using the premises for purposes unrelated to education.

One of the most pressing problems reported by teachers and community members is the shortage of qualified staff. Positions for English and other modern subject teachers remain vacant in several converted institutions, while many of the remaining teachers were originally appointed to teach religious subjects.

As a result, educators without formal training in these disciplines have been required to teach subjects outside their areas of expertise. Teachers and local residents argue that this staffing imbalance has severely affected educational standards and undermined the government’s stated goal of improving the quality of education.

It is also important to note that many of the 1,281 madrasas converted into government schools by the Assam government are now facing serious challenges, in some cases leaving them in a weaker position than before.

A number of these schools have experienced a sharp decline in student enrollment. In some cases, the number of students became so low that authorities decided to merge them with nearby schools.

According to an order issued by Assam’s Directorate of Elementary Education (DEE) in January 2026, 91 Lower Primary (LP) and Middle English (ME) schools across different districts of the state were slated for merger. This was part of a broader trend in Assam’s education system. Over the past five years, a total of 2,980 schools, ranging from primary to secondary level, have been merged across the state. Of these, 206 secondary schools from 21 districts were integrated into nearby high, higher secondary, or senior secondary schools. In addition, 2,774 primary schools were merged under the Department of Elementary Education.

The reporting for the story was supported by a grant from the Human Rights and Religious Freedom Journalism Grant Program.

The post What Happened After Assam Converted Madrasas into Schools? A Ground Report on Education, Identity, and Community Impact appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

According to Moizuddin’s son, advocate Sanaullah Farhan, it was a targeted killing by the Waqf Mafia. He accused industrialist and educationist Nawab Mahbub Alam Khan and his son, Mujahid Alam Khan, of being the masterminds behind Moizuddin’s murder. He disclosed that six months ago, Mujahid Alam had visited his office in Himayatnagar and warned of dire consequences if his father did not stop pursuing Waqf cases against them. He allegedly told Farhan that he was giving a last chance and asked him not to blame him (Mujahid) for the consequences later.

As per Telangana State Waqf Board records, Anwar-ul-Uloom High School at Habeebnagar is built on 2,826 square yards. A two-storey Anwar-ul-Uloom College at Mallepally has been built on 14,705 square yards. Madrasa Aiza, which houses the Nawab Shah Alam Engineering College in Malakpet, is spread across 6.5 acres, and Mumtaz College has been established on the same area spanning 23 acres. Sources disclosed that the society running these institutions on Waqf land had been paying the Waqf fund. These Waqf properties have reportedly been uploaded on the UMEED portal by the Waqf Board as they are notified Waqf properties.

The dispute between educational society members Mahbub Alam Khan, his son Mujahid Alam Khan, and the murdered Moizuddin arose over allegations that certain society guidelines were changed as per their convenience, according to sources. Moizuddin’s aged father-in-law, advocate Ghulam Yazdani, who is in his mid-nineties, was also once part of the society. The late advocate Moizuddin reportedly raised concerns over such changes and went on to win related legal cases, according to sources.

The two main accused, Mahbub Alam Khan and Mujahid Alam Khan, are now enjoying air-conditioned hospitality provided by the Hyderabad City Police, according to Farhan. The accused have access to mobile phones and are reportedly making calls on WhatsApp. They are being questioned, not interrogated. The alleged hit-and-run killers were also arrested. The judiciary has a task cut out to find out who the killers are and who the masterminds are, and punish them accordingly. But advocates fighting Waqf cases, activists working for the protection of Waqf properties in Telangana, and journalists covering the Waqf beat for the print and electronic media have become vulnerable and can be sitting ducks for the dangerous mafia.

The Central Waqf Council should take over the administration of the Telangana State Waqf Board and initiate inquiries into encroachments and frauds since 1995.  A forensic audit must be taken up, especially for dealings between 2014 and 2026. At the same time, honest social workers from the Muslim community in the province, who consider waqf properties as the property of Allah, should knock on the door of the court regarding the issue of encroachments and frauds.

The Moizuddin murder case must be handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Since the main accused are highly connected to top politicians from Congress, BJP, and Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS), the CBI must ensure that they are not unduly influenced. Mobile phones of the two main accused must be vetted for activities over the past six months, and cameras near their residence in Hyderabad and farmhouses in Ooty and Vikarabad must be scanned to check for suspicious visitors. Investigators must also check video footage of the lavish parties thrown by the main accused persons and question the political bosses who attended these parties.

Mujahid Alam Khan is vice president of the Telangana Pradesh Congress Committee (TPCC). Neither the State Congress nor the Central High Command has initiated any action against the murder accused till the filing of this report.

A fast-track court should be asked to conduct day-to-day hearings and conclude the case within three months.

Hyderabad has surely fallen on bad days if Nawabs are turning murderers!

The post Telangana Must Order CBI Inquiry into Alleged Murder of Advocate Moizuddin in Waqf Cases appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru personally forwarded the matter to the Home Ministry, writing: “I am sending you some papers which have been sent to me regarding the articles of the Al-Jamiat in which some incidents have been referred to. I hope that an inquiry will be made in this regard.”

From that point, a chain of official correspondence began. Reading these letters makes it clear that the mosque of Maulana Kamaluddin in Dhar had been desecrated. However, the government of the time, despite presenting itself as secular, appeared eager to downplay the matter as a minor incident, largely because those in power were treating the site as a temple on the basis of their own interpretation of the evidence.

The editorial published by Al-Jamiat stated:

“An isolated act of tyranny and misdeed can be bemoaned. But when every day tyranny is perpetrated and even the Government does not take any action (to check it), what are we to do? To whom should we go for redress?

At ‘Dhar’ in Madhya Bharat [Madhya Pradesh], there is an old and grand mosque known as Maulana Kamaluddin Chishti’s mosque. In this mosque were buried some religious leaders and the relations of Muslim Kings. Their tombs are still in evidence today.

Now, this mosque has been forcibly rechristened as Bhojshala and Saraswati Mandir.

This act was not single-handedly performed by the Hindu Mahasabha, but the police came ejected the Muslims and witnessed the worship Saraswati which was held in front of the ‘pulpit’.

This is a long-standing dispute and after intervention of the Jamait-ul-Ulema Hind, it was agreed that the mosque will be retained as a mosque.

Sometime ago the Muslims were stopped to offer their five daily prayers in it. Only the ‘Friday gatherings’ continued. But look at the brazen-facedness of the Hindu Mahasabha and its conceit of false superiority, that it completed its action – not surreptitiously, but with full pomp and show after announcing it for two days on the loudspeakers – with the assistance and in the presence of the police and after holding public meetings on the ground attached to the tomb of Maulana Kamaluddin Chishti.

The Muslims lodged a complaint before the Collector and other officials but all went in vain.

After all, in the presence of the police the place of worship for God was polluted with the filth of idol worship and in this way the heart of Islamic world was riddled through and thus new lustre was added to the name of the Secular and Democratic Government.

We have a fear that our plaint may in return be construed as an act of communalism. The test of nationalism is taken to be that one should not complain over this tyranny of the Government and communalists and after all these mishaps, it should be said that the star of secularism in the country is shining in all its glory.

Alas! the mosque which was spared by the English and even the Princely Hindu State did not let its sanctity be desecrated, has now been converted into a Saraswati Mandir.

We request the Indian Government to devote special attention to the happenings in the Madhya Bharat and to take the dispute of the mosque in its own hand, to assure justice to the Muslim minority and to bring to book the men who have hurt their feelings.”

The above mentioned parts of editorial directly questioned the secular credentials of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was widely regarded as a leading advocate of secularism in India. The editorial expressed a very important point that even those seen as champions of secular values appeared unwilling to take strong or meaningful action on the issue.

Telegram of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind

An office memorandum sent by the Prime Minister’s Secretariat to the Ministry of States reveals that Amiruddin Sahib, secretary of the Dhar district branch of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, sent a telegram to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on February 9, 1954.

In the telegram, he alleged that after announcements were made over loudspeakers, Hindu Sabha leaders Kale Pradhan and Dwarkaprasad, along with a crowd of around 200 Harijans, entered Maulana Kamaluddin’s mosque on February 8.

According to the complaint, a picture of Saraswati was placed inside the mosque, the words Jai Shiv were written where Allah had previously appeared, and provocative slogans were raised. The telegram further claimed that police officers present at the scene failed to intervene, no action was taken, Muslim religious sentiments were deeply hurt, and inflammatory speeches and activities continued despite repeated reports to the police and district authorities.

Chief Minister’s Reply to Maulana Azad

An important letter regarding this matter was also written by Abul Kalam Azad, who was then India’s Education Minister. On February 22, 1954, he wrote to the then Chief Minister of Madhya Bharat, Mishrilal Gangwal, seeking full details of the incident.

In response, the Chief Minister sent a detailed letter on March 23, 1954. The letter stated: “The Nagar Hindu Sabha of Dhar decided to celebrate Bhoj Diwas on 8th February, and gave publicity to their programme for the celebration through loudspeakers. With the permission of the local Municipality, they pitched a tent in the open ground near the Bhojshala, which is an ancient monument, and performed Saraswati Puja in the tent in which about 200-250 persons participated. The same day, some of the spectators, who had visited the Bhojshala, placed some garlands there and wrote the words “Om Sarasvatyai Namaha” in chalk over the Arabic writings in the building. No puja was performed in the building but the above incident was magnified by rumour and it was alleged that the Hindus had installed an idol in the building. Apprehending that the circulation of this rumour might lead to a breach o the peace, the police took additional precautions and made adequate arrangement. Nothing untoward happened.”

This was the response of a Chief Minister who was widely regarded as secular, a committed Congress leader of that era, and someone considered close to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Yet in this letter, he himself referred to the historic Kamal Maula Masjid as Bhojshala and an ancient monument under the protection of the Archaeological Survey of India. He acknowledged that members of the Hindu Mahasabha had performed Saraswati Puja near the mosque with municipal permission and that some visitors entered the mosque, placed garlands there, and wrote ‘Om Saraswati Nama’ in chalk over Arabic inscriptions inside the building. Still, according to the Chief Minister, none of this amounted to an ‘untoward incident.’

The Government’s Position on Kamal Maula Masjid

Earlier, on December 3, 1952, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had written to Mishrilal Gangwal seeking information about the Kamal Maula Mosque after receiving a telegram from residents of Dhar alleging that the mosque was being desecrated.

The Chief Minister replied on January 15, 1953, and wrote: “I must state at the outset that the building in question is not known as Jama Masjid. It is popularly known as Bhojshala and has been officially described in the records as Bhojshala Masjid Kamal Maulana, and is an important archaeological monument of Madhya Bharat. There is evidence in hand that originally there was a Hindu temple at this site built and dedicated to Goddess Saraswati in the 11th century A.D. by the Parmar King Bhoj of Dhar. The Saraswati image which was installed in this temple is now in the British Museum, London, having been salvaged from the site and removed to England by some British officers in the old days. The temple was destroyed sometime, it is believed, in the 13th or 14th century by Muslims to create a mosque on the site entirely out of the material of the original temple.”

The Chief Minister viewed the Kamal Maula Masjid not as a mosque, but primarily as a former temple site. He also stated that official records referred to the structure as Bhojshala Masjid Kamal Maulana, although historical records indicate that the term Bhojshala was only added in 1935; an issue we will discuss later in this article.

At the same time, the Chief Minister acknowledged in the same letter that disputes over Muslim rights at the site had intensified in 1935. He wrote: “The dispute regarding the rights of Muslims over the building came to a head in 1935 when the former Dhar Government in view of the existing character of this building, had to declare by a notification in the Dhar Darbar Gazette dated 24.8.1935 that the building was a mosque, and give the assurance that the right of prayer by Muslims in that building would be duly respected. From time to time, however, the Dhar Darbar made it clear to Muslims that the building was, nevertheless, Government property in all respects, and that no new rights could be allowed to accrue on it in favour of the Muslim community.”

Notification in the Dhar Darbar Gazette

The letter further noted, “Hindu agitation against the use of this building for prayers by Muslims, reached its climax in 1944 during the time of the Hindu-Muslim disturbances in Dhar. These disturbances were promptly put down by the Dhar Administration, but concession allowed to Muslims has always remained an irritant to the communal-minded Hindus. The building has however always been maintained by the Government and a full-time caretaker is posted there by the Archaeological Department. The policy of the Archaeological Department in regard to the right of worship in Archaeological monuments has been that as far as possible no new rights should be allowed to be created in favour of any community, although existing usages and rights must be respected.”

The Chief Minister further stated that, after considering the matter in its entirety, the Government of Madhya Bharat had taken three decisions: (1) to inform the Hindu Maha Sabha that the building cannot be given to either community for conversion into a temple or a full fledged mosque, and that the righto of entry to the bullding must be conceded to all sections of people for purposes of sight-seeing; (2) to inform the Muslim community that while Muslims may continue to say their Friday prayers in the building, no articles should be kept there and that no part of the building should be used for residential purposes; (3) to reject summarily the request of some Hindu organisations to celebrate the Bhoj Diwas in this building.

He also clearly stated that the Muslim community would continue to retain the right to offer Friday prayers there, in accordance with long-standing practice.

When Did Tensions Escalate?

In 2006, workers of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad allegedly attempted to disturb the situation at the Kamal Maula Mosque on a Friday. The administration had instructed that the Saraswati Puja should be concluded by 12:30 pm, but the group reportedly did not comply with the deadline.

When police and Rapid Action Force personnel tried to enter the mosque premises to clear the area, they were allegedly attacked with stones, leaving at least five policemen seriously injured. These incidents were reported in The Times of India on February 4, 2006.

The report also noted that until April 2003, access to the site was regulated: Hindus were allowed entry only on Basant Panchami, while Muslims were permitted to offer Friday prayers for two hours. However, in 2003, shortly before the state assembly elections, the NDA government expanded Hindu access by opening the site for weekly entry on Tuesdays, a decision that was also approved by the Archaeological Survey of India.

Parliamentary records from 2003 indicate that the District Magistrate had recommended allowing Hindu visitors entry between 9:00 am and 11:00 am every Tuesday, with restrictions on slogans, puja rituals, offerings, idols, or religious materials inside the premises.

However, the Archaeological Survey of India later allowed broader access, stating that Hindu visitors could enter freely throughout the day on Tuesdays, from sunrise to sunset and could carry minimal offerings such as flowers and grains of rice.

In contrast, Muslims were permitted access only on Fridays between 13:00 p.m. and 15:00 p.m., specifically for offering Friday prayers.

Did the Controversy Emerge Abruptly?

It is important to note that these developments did not happen overnight, but unfolded over time amid growing tensions and mobilisation by various Hindutva organisations.

The Times of India report dated May 10, 1995, noted that Sadhvi Rithambara, a leader of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, had reportedly declared from jail that she would return to Dhar to take part in what she described as a movement for the ‘liberation of Bhojshala.’ She had been arrested for allegedly delivering provocative speeches in Uday Nagar and was later released following an order of the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

Another The Times of India report dated February 18, 2003, stated that the Hindu Jagran Manch had issued a warning on February 6 that if the site was not opened to the majority community by February 18, it would be forcibly opened. The report also mentioned that around 5,000 workers were planning to break the locks and enter the Bhojshala complex in Dhar on that day.

At the time, the state BJP reportedly stated that it supported the demand raised by the Hindu Jagran Manch on the issue, but would not take part in any forced entry.

The same report also noted that Union Minister for Culture and Tourism Jagmohan had written to the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Digvijaya Singh, stating that the central government had no objection to lifting restrictions on Hindu entry into the complex, and that the final decision rested with the state government, as the restrictions had originally been imposed by it.

In response, the Chief Minister stated that his government was not opposed to Hindu entry at the site, but that the matter required the central government to lift restrictions imposed through the Archaeological Survey of India, since the site fell under its regulatory framework.

The Times of India reported that on February 19, 2003, clashes broke out in which two policemen and 22 members of the Hindu Jagran Manch were seriously injured. According to the report, protesters set several shops in the town on fire.

Police used tear gas and lathi-charge to disperse the crowd, while also coming under attack from stone-pelting from rooftops. The state administration cordoned off the entire temple area and deployed multiple layers of security, which the protesters were unable to breach. Around 150 members of the Hindu Jargon Manch, including nearly 50 women, were arrested.

Following the violence, the Hindu Jagran Manch called for a bandh (shutdown) the next day, alleging police excesses. At the same time, the district administration convened an all-community meeting to address the issue of restrictions at Bhojshala, but Hindu organisations chose to boycott the talks.

The report also noted a significant shift in terminology in media coverage, with references to the ‘mosque’ largely disappearing and the site increasingly being referred to only as a temple or Bhojshala.

It is also important to note that this period coincided with the 2003 state elections, in which the Bharatiya Janata Party won a majority, and Uma Bharti was sworn in as Chief Minister.

In the years that followed; 2006, 2013, and 2016, the Basant Panchami festival, marking the arrival of spring and traditionally associated with the worship of Goddess Saraswati, again coincided with Friday. On these occasions, tensions reportedly flared during celebrations at the site. A similar communal atmosphere was disrupted this year on February 12, as Basant Panchami fell on a Friday.

‘Bhojshala’ Added to the Mosque Name in 1935

Records indicate that in 1935, the Archaeological Survey of India placed a notice board inside the courtyard of the Kamal Maula Mosque that included the term Bhojshala. This move was reportedly objected to by members of the Muslim community in Dhar. The related documents are preserved in the National Archives and are available for reference.

Truth about the statue in the London Museum

It is often claimed by some Hindu nationalist organisations that a statue of Goddess Saraswati from the Kamal Maula Mosque is kept in the British Museum in London. However, this claim is disputed.

In her book Negotiating Mughal Law: A Family of Landlords Across Three Indian Empires, scholar Nandini Chatterjee notes, based on the British Museum’s own records, that the statue is identified as Ambika, a deity revered in both Hindu and Jain traditions. The Sanskrit inscription beneath the statue states that it was commissioned and dedicated by a person named Vararochi. Historical context links Vararochi with Jain traditions during the reign of Raja Bhoj. The same patron is also credited with dedicating statues of Vag Devi (a form associated with knowledge) and three Jain elders.

In addition, a letter attributed to Sir Rob Young, who was posted in New Delhi in February 2003, has circulated in public discussions. In this letter to the then Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh Digvijaya Singh, he clarified that the British Museum statue is not actually the Saraswati image associated with Bhojshala.

According to the letter, the confusion originated from a 1920s article in the journal Rupam, where an incomplete inscription was misinterpreted, leading to the identification of the statue as Saraswati. Sir Rob Young further explained that in the 1980s, Dr. Kirit Mankodi published a fuller reading of the inscription, which showed that the figure is actually the Jain goddess Ambika. The statue is also depicted with a child and a lion, iconographic features traditionally associated with Ambika Devi.

The Viceroy’s Visit to the Mosque

Historical records show that the site has also been referred to in older documents as the Juma Masjid or Jama Masjid.

For example, a report in The Times of India dated November 5, 1902, notes that the Viceroy of India visited the mosque on November 1, 1902. The report also mentions that the mosque was believed to have been built around 1400 CE.

Earlier, in 1871, James Macaulay, editor of the London-based family journal The Leisure Hour, also visited the site. In his travelogue The Ruins of Mandu, he described his observations of the monument:

“As the sun was setting, we arrived at the singular building which was to be our inn for two days, namely, the Jumma Masjid, the ruin of the great or ‘Friday Mosque.’ The builder of this mosque was Mahmud Khilji, the fourth King of Malwa, who reigned from 1435 to 1468 A.D. …We abode in the great entrance chamber of the mosque aforesaid. A lofty flight of sixteen steps led up to it. The interior is a square of forty-four feet, surmounted by a spacious dome, which is ornamented by carving and blue enamel. The eight windows of this apartment are filled with beautiful screen work. In a corner we deposited our traps, and made our bedroom and dining-room. Passing out of this entrance-chamber at the back we found ourselves in a great court-yard, which in ancient days was surrounded by beautiful colonnades three rows deep. Many of these have fallen, and one side of the court-yard is filled with rubbish; but the colonnades opposite the entrance, or on the west side of the mosque, are in fair preservation. This, being the side of the building next [towards] Mecca, was the portion devoted to worship. Under a fine dome stands almost uninjured the marble mimbar, or pulpit, facing the marble slab which indicates the direction of Mecca, towards which every true Mussulman must turn when he prays. There are many little marble stalls in the walls near the pulpit, which used to be the private chapels of the nobles of Mandoo; and the marble throne used by the king when he came to pray is still uninjured. On the opposite of the street from this mosque is the ruined college, which also owed its origin to Mahmud Khilji, and behind it a mound of ruin —all that remains of the famous minaret which was once seven stories high.”

His travelogue was published in the November 4, 1871 issue of The Leisure Hour. The excerpt mentioned above is from that account. From his description, it appears that in front of the mosque, across the road, there stood the ruins of a college said to have been built by Mahmud Khilji. Behind it, he also describes a large mound of ruins, identified as the remains of a seven-storey minaret. This minaret was reportedly constructed to commemorate the Malwa ruler’s victory over the Rana of Chittor.

Looking back, it is unfortunate that many of these historical structures have not survived. Macaulay does not mention any temple or college associated with Raja Bhoj in this account. From this brief passage of a much longer travelogue, it can be understood that at that time there appears to have been no recorded dispute surrounding the mosque.

When did the controversy begin?

In reality, the controversy began to take shape in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly after the 1890s.

One early figure often mentioned in this context is Dr. Alois Anton Führer, an archaeologist associated with the Archaeological Survey of India. During his 1892–93 visit to central India, he published observations in the Annual Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey, North-Western Provinces and Oudh. He suggested, without firm evidence, that certain Sanskrit inscriptions found at the site might be linked to an ‘educational institution.’ His work later came under serious academic criticism, was considered unreliable, and he was eventually dismissed from the ASI.

In the early 1900s, K. K. Lele, then Superintendent of the State Education Department and later associated with archaeological work in Dhar, advanced a similar interpretation. He referred to the mosque as ‘Raja Bhoj’s school.’ In 1903, Lele published a report titled The Summary of the Dramatic Inscription found at the Bhoja Shala (Kamal Maula Mosque), Dhar. This is widely noted as one of the earliest instances in which the term Bhojshala appeared in written form, and from then onward the name gradually became associated with the site.

Some scholars, including Michael Willis in his research Dhar, Bhoja and Sarasvati: from Indology to Political Mythology and Back have examined how this interpretation developed over time. According to this line of scholarship, the idea of Bhojshala was not an ancient or widely established local tradition, but rather a later interpretive framework shaped through colonial-era archaeological readings, administrative records, and subsequent political narratives.

Early British accounts from the 19th century, including those of writers such as John Malcolm, William Kincaid and others who described Dhar and the Kamal Maula Mosque, do not mention the term Bhojshala or any related public tradition. This absence is sometimes highlighted to suggest that the term gained prominence only later, rather than being an established historical name.

In this view, Bhojshala is understood not as an ancient designation, but as a term that emerged through early 20th-century scholarly and administrative interpretation, later entering broader public and political discourse.

Another research paper by Michael Willis, co-authored with Saarthak Singh, Vishwa Mohan Jha, and Muntazir Ali, describes the site as a broader religious and social complex, not limited to a mosque alone. According to this study, the area included a mosque along with a monastery, courtyard, well, lodging facilities for pilgrims and visitors, and arrangements for feeding the poor and travelers.

The paper also notes that Persian sources refer to the site using names such as rawz̤ah-i riz̤wān and a dome full of the saint’s light (qubba-yi pur-nūr). Importantly, it records that during the reign of Sultan Mahmud Shah Khilji (1456–57), the shrine and mosque complex underwent significant renovation and expansion, as documented in these Persian texts. This interpretation presents the site in Dhar as an active Sufi and Islamic religious and charitable center, whose historical character was later reinterpreted through different narratives over time.

An important point raised in this discussion is that the site was initially referred to only as ‘Raja Bhoj’s madrasa,’ and at that stage there was no reference to Goddess Saraswati. Early writers such as Führer and Lele did not describe it as a Saraswati temple within the mosque complex. The association with Saraswati and the idea of a Hindu educational institution emerged later in the early 20th century.

Michael Willis describes this evolving narrative as a form of ‘political mythology,’ suggesting that the interpretation of the site developed gradually; from ‘Raja Bhoj’s school,’ to ‘Bhojshala,’ and eventually, in later discourse, to a ‘temple.’ In more recent times, it is also noted that legal and administrative interpretations have further influenced how the site is formally described.

The question is not only ‘What was this place?’ but also ‘Why and how has history been interpreted (an appropriated) in different ways over time?’

At its core, the issue is not simply whether a historical structure in Dhar is a mosque or a temple. The deeper concern lies in the growing tendency for courts and state institutions to accept long-standing claims rooted in belief, tradition, or mythology as historical fact. If such a precedent is established (as happened in the case of the Babri masjid), it could open the door to similar claims over countless sites in the future; where any group might assert that a place of worship once stood wherever they now seek recognition.

In that scenario, history risks being shaped more by collective sentiment than by evidence, and this raises important questions about the purpose of laws such as the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. One must ask why such a law exists in the first place if historical claims alone are allowed to override settled status.

Taken further, this logic could extend far beyond any single site. By the same reasoning, disputes could arise over private homes, public buildings, or entire neighbourhoods based on ancestral claims stretching back generations. Would such assertions be accepted as sufficient grounds to alter present-day rights? Would courts be expected to adjudicate solely on belief or inherited narratives?

Similar arguments could be made in reverse as well, with different communities pointing to historical destruction of their places of worship and seeking restoration or recognition. If every such claim were reopened, it could turn state institutions into arenas of ongoing religious contestation, where no site, sacred or secular, remains settled.

Afroz Alam Sahil is an Independent journalist and author. He can be contacted at @afrozsahil on X (Twitter). Afshan Khan is doing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University.

The post Kamal Maula Mosque Controversy Explained: How History, Politics, and Faith Collided Over a Single Monument appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.

On April 19, 2026, in the city of Haridwar, Chief Minister Pushkar Singh Dhami announced the abolition of the Madrasa Board and said that all madrasas would be required to adopt the state education curriculum beginning in July 2026.

The move is being described by the government as an effort to modernize the education system and bring students into the “national mainstream.” However, many Muslim scholars and madrasa representatives view the decision differently. They argue that it marks the beginning of increased state control over minority educational institutions and threatens their educational autonomy and cultural identity.

Speaking at the event in Haridwar, the Chief Minister stated that institutions failing to follow the state education board’s curriculum after July 2026 would face closure.

The announcement was welcomed by several Hindutva religious leaders present at the gathering, who described the decision as a step toward integrating madrasas into the national mainstream.

Claim of “Equality” or Something Else?

Despite the government’s assurances, many madrasa administrators remain skeptical about the entire process. In Uttarakhand, madrasa administrators and social activist Taufiq Elahi Qasmi described the move as a “political deception.”

“The claim that Muslims are being brought to a level of equality is misleading,” he said. “Under the new system, a madrasa seeking official recognition must first obtain approval from the education department and then register with the new authority. But there is a clear contradiction here. According to Section 1, Sub-section 4 of the Act, certificates issued by madrasas will still not be considered equivalent to those issued by regular schools.”

He questioned the government’s intentions, asking, “If the goal is truly progress and equality, then why are madrasa certificates not being granted the same status as school certificates?”

Legal Contradictions and the Right to Education Act

Another major concern being raised within madrasa circles is the implementation of India’s Right to Education (RTE) Act.

According to Taufiq Elahi Qasmi, there is a legal contradiction in the government’s approach.

“The government is pressuring madrasas to come under the education department,” he said. “However, the 2012 amendment to the RTE Act clearly states that the law does not apply to madrasas or Vedic schools. If the law itself is not applicable to these institutions, then how can authorities operating under that law require us to seek approval from them?”

New Authority Raises Concerns Over Lack of Religious Representation

The government of Uttarakhand has established the “Uttarakhand State Authority for Minority Education” under the Minority Education Act 2025, transferring to it broad administrative and curriculum-related powers over minority educational institutions.

However, the structure of the new authority has drawn criticism from madrasa circles. The body includes experts from fields such as psychology, law, economics, and literature, led by Chairman Dr. Surjit Singh Gandhi. Critics point out that no Islamic scholars, religious education specialists, or experienced madrasa teachers have been included in the authority.

Madrasa education is deeply rooted in a centuries-old academic tradition that includes Islamic jurisprudence, Hadith studies, Quranic commentary, and the Arabic language. Many educators argue that any attempt to redesign the curriculum without understanding this historical and intellectual foundation risks weakening the distinct identity of madrasas.

Minority Welfare Secretary Prag Madhokar Dhakate has stated that experts from all communities are involved in developing the curriculum. However, critics say the absence of direct madrasa representation undermines that claim in practice.

Crackdown on Madrasas

The introduction of this new legal framework comes amid an ongoing crackdown on madrasas in Uttarakhand. Earlier reports highlighted action taken against 217 madrasas across the state.

According to information obtained through the Right to Information (RTI) Act, many of these institutions were reportedly shut down without a clear legal basis. Critics now argue that the new law is being used to provide legal justification for those earlier actions while also increasing government control over the remaining madrasa institutions.

Strict Surveillance and Verification Drive

The government has ordered a “mass verification” exercise for madrasa students across the plains of four districts in Uttarakhand —Dehradun, Haridwar, Udham Singh Nagar, and Nainital.

While authorities describe the initiative as a major enforcement and monitoring drive, local madrasa administrators view it differently, calling it a politically driven exercise.

A local scholar criticized the move, saying, “The government is exaggerating these measures to create the impression that Muslims are being placed under stricter control. In reality, madrasas already submit detailed student records — including names, addresses, Aadhaar numbers, and mobile numbers — to the local administration at the beginning of every academic year. This is a routine process, but it is now being portrayed as a special campaign.”

Amid ongoing administrative and legal tensions, on April 27, 2026, several major national Muslim organizations in India — including the All India Muslim Personal Law Board — strongly rejected the Uttarakhand government’s newly formed “Minority Education Authority” and the requirement for mandatory affiliation of madrasas. They argue that the move violates Article 30 of the Constitution of India, which protects the rights of minorities to establish and manage their own educational institutions.

In a joint statement, prominent religious leaders such as Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani, Maulana Arshad Madani, Maulana Mahmood Madani, and Syed Sadatullah Hussaini advised madrasa administrators to refrain from affiliating with the new authority for the time being. They expressed concern that increased state control over curriculum and religious instruction could undermine the identity and autonomy of madrasas.

Taufiq Elahi Qasmi also described the legislation as an attempt to “administratively weaken and paralyze” madrasa institutions.

Meanwhile, state officials maintain that the reforms are intended to improve “transparency” and promote “modernization” in the education system. National-level leadership, however, has indicated that the matter will be challenged in the High Court and, if necessary, the Supreme Court, calling it a violation of constitutional rights.

The recent developments in Uttarakhand suggest a major shift toward stronger state oversight of minority educational institutions. The planned repeal of the Madrasa Education Board Act, 2016, set to take effect on July 1, 2026, is being described by critics as a decisive turning point.

The government has framed these reforms as steps toward “standardization” and “innovation” in education. However, many minority groups see them very differently, viewing the changes as a challenge to their educational autonomy and religious identity.

Ultimately, it will become clearer in the coming years whether these reforms genuinely improve learning outcomes for students or whether they serve broader political objectives.

The post Uttarakhand’s New Minority Education Overhaul: End of Madrasa Board, Curriculum Shift, and Rising State Control Explained appeared first on BeyondHeadlines.