Third-wave, specialty coffee, and fine chocolate are part of high-end food movements, covering products ranging from beer to cheese, moving away from mass production and homogenous goods towards singularity and decommodification. These affluent markets reward high-quality and artisan skills and have an appreciation for a single origin, direct trade, and provenance.

High-end coffee and chocolate are morally infused products through which consumers exercise resistance by boycotting certain brands and choosing to buy others. Both products have been at the epicentre of Fair Trade campaigns. In fact, coffee was the first agricultural product to bring ethical issues, such as premium prices and sustainability, into its marketing campaigns, emulated later in chocolate.

Development agencies and governments have promoted these modes of production as a route to improving the lives of those at the tail-end of each supply chain. The main reason for encouraging these practices is the promise of better prices for these products, as they are more highly valued than conventional goods in the international market and rely on fewer intermediaries.

But how much of this gets to the producers? What are the implications of these models for small-scale farmers? How are cacao and coffee farmers adding value to their products? The report ‘Adding value to coffee and chocolate in Latin America’ analyses these forms of production to answer these questions in the context of Costa Rica and Peru, and it puts forward policy recommendations that could improve the current situation.

Both cases in this study suggest that, even though the route to fine cacao and third-wave coffee implies differentiation and upgrading pathways, which are generally recommended in the global value chain literature, there is no significant improvement in the lives of small-scale farmers.

The problem is that, despite upgrading in the value chain, there is no radical redistribution of value. Third-wave coffee and fine chocolate from a single origin have, in most cases, more transparent and shorter value chains; however, there is an ‘unidirectional’ flow of power from North to South. In the case of coffee, roasters are the dominant players in addition to retailers and traders (all situated in the importing countries), which leaves the exporting countries with the lowest percentage of the value. The situation for chocolate is more extreme, with only 18.6% of the value allocated to the exporting countries.

Actions to secure more control and value

Given that, even in the cases of specialised goods, the highest profit belongs to the last steps in the value chain, this report suggests actions that push for manufacturing in the place of origin to secure more control and value acquisition. These policy implications – though specific for each context, using successful case studies from the sample, which follow these examples – are based on the idea that by building a stronger manufacturing industry, exporting countries would have more bargaining power, thus improving returns. In addition, by setting regulations for raw materials within each country, a more equal distribution of profits would be possible.

The argument of manufacturing as the basis for development has been discussed for several decades, particularly regarding Latin American nations. This report indicates that there is a uniqueness to these trends, which makes this an opportunity for materialising this idea. Besides the emphasis on quality, consumers are also attracted to issues around terroir, artisanship, and direct trade. All three of these areas have more relevance if these goods are fabricated at origin, and they make this an advantage over the competition. In addition, third-wave coffee and fine chocolate consumers are inclined towards fairness, and they have proven to adapt their purchasing choices based on their moral compass. Campaigns uncovering unfair prices and exploitation in both value chains have brought significant changes, such as Fair Trade certification.

Despite the recognition by many that a degree of industrialisation of exporting goods is a key economic policy goal to generate added value for Latin American countries, Peruvian and Central American agro-industries have historically been dominated by raw material extraction. However, there are successful stories of Latin American agricultural, manufactured goods for export that fine chocolate and third wave coffee could see as examples to follow, like mezcal and tequila in Mexico or Chilean wine, which is a strongly export-oriented product (80% of wine produced is exported), is mainly vertically integrated, and owned by local investment. Wine is a product that, just like fine chocolate and third wave coffee, has a strong emphasis on quality, artisanship, and terroir. Third wave coffee and fine chocolate borrow ideas, language, and metrics from wine. Scholars explaining these trends often compare it to wine because of these similarities. But despite the comparisons, it would be unthinkable to consider a wine from Chile if it had been aged and bottled in Europe. In fact, it is inconceivable to think of any wine being manufactured anywhere other than the place of origin of its grapes.

My report highlights these tensions in the value chain of fine chocolate and third wave and speciality coffee, both at the discursive level and that of the growers’ realities. By exposing how the current model contradicts the vision that these trends are more just and transparent, it also reveals that manufacturing at origin would enable a fairer distribution of value, improving the lives of those in producing countries.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting.
• This post is based on the research project ‘Adding value to coffee and Cacao in Latin America’. The project will provide an anthropological study of the recent trends in Latin American export crops towards small-scale, high-quality production, using the examples of coffee micro-lots in Costa Rica and fine cacao production in Peru.
• You can find the report ‘Adding value to coffee and cocoa in Latin America here
• The Canning House Forum is a partnership between the LSE Latin American and Caribbean Centre and Canning House that aims to promote research and policy engagement around the overarching theme of “The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean”.
• Banner: Peruvian chocolate / Karol Moraes (Shutterstock)

The post Adding value to coffee and cocoa in Latin America first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

The second Spanish presidency of the European Union in 1995 brought some progress in the EU’s external relations with Latin America. In particular, the Europe-Mercosur Inter-regional Framework Cooperation Agreement signed at the end of the presidency (December). The agreement was passed in 1999 after the Rio Summit, the first between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean. The first attempt to sign it  failed in October 2004 during the Portuguese presidency.

After this disappointment, there was another step in the wrong direction when Brazil was offered a strategic partnership in 2007. This was seen by the other Mercosur countries as a way of engaging with one of their members over the rest of them. There was some progress during the Spanish Presidency in 2010 with the EU-Central American Common Market Association Agreement in relation to Mercosur, but the timing was not right.

A few years later, the international arena has changed dramatically. The shift towards populism and protectionism includes a very long Brexit process, a US administration prioritising unilateralism and a significant global presence of China while Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. In this environment, the EU and Mercosur signed the political agreement in 2019 -20 years exactly since the mentioned Rio Summit- and while the G-20 summit was taking place.

Externally, the pressure to promote deals that would be based on international norms and values that would be negotiated between countries and respected was exceptional, and at the very end of the cycle of the European Commission, and the European Parliament. The signing took place a few months before the Covid-19 pandemic started and a few months before the new Commissioner presented the EU Green Deal in December 2019.

The new green agenda has brought extra barriers to this agreement. A report commissioned by DG Trade to LSE on this particular matter was published in December 2020 (while Brexit negotiations were ongoing, weeks before the end of the transition period) and with the pandemic just about to reach the entire world with a reshape of relations among countries and a high pressure against public health services.

Agreement before the end of 2023?

Despite the context, the negotiations between Mercosur and the EU have continued, and ratifying the agreement before the end of the Spanish presidency in December 2023 is possible. The European Union and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit of July 2023 seemed to unblock the negotiations after a few months of stagnation.

This was Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva view:

“Europe played an aggressive card. The letter that Europe wrote to Mercosur was a letter that threatened punishment if we didn’t meet certain environmental requirements,” (…)”Two strategic partners do not discuss threats. We discuss proposals.” (…) “We do not accept the additional letter from the European Union. It is impossible to conceive among historical partners like us that someone would write such a threatening letter. For the first time, I’m very optimistic that we’re going to conclude this deal this year.”

As Lula pointed out, Brazil is already at a rate of production of renewable energy that many European countries still do not have. According to the International Energy Agency large hydropower plants account for around 80% of domestic electricity generation, making the Brazilian electricity mix “one of the cleanest in the world”.

The pressure from other parties, such as Friends of the Earth is evident. They filed a complaint in July against the European Commission because they wanted access to the documentation of the treaty.

At the same time, this Spanish presidency has had an extraordinary focus on Latin America and the Caribbean -before the change of European Commission and a new European Parliament and many national elections across Europe could mean a very different scenario for this type of agreement- could be the last opportunity to achieve consensus.

Losing the momentum created before many countries change their administrations with elections upcoming in various European and Latin American countries, adds extra difficulties to the negotiations. And ultimately, that could be catastrophic and potentially the last chance to reach an agreement between both regions.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner: EU-CELAC Summit in 2023 / European Union

The post The EU-Mercosur agreement: running out of time? first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

If you could see me when I am at my house, my country, you would see that I am human. If you could see me after a shower, a good meal… I am a human back home; here I am… less.

Rulo, a Central American migrant in Mexico.

In her book “Walking Together: Central American and Transit Migration Through Mexico,” Alejandra Díaz de León presents a compelling study of Central American migrants’ experiences as they navigate their way through Mexico, aiming to reach the United States. From the outset, Díaz de León challenges the predominant dichotomy that categorizes migrants as either deserving or undeserving, good or bad, leading readers to constantly recognise their inherent shared humanity throughout the book’s narrative. This significant contribution stems from Díaz de León’s doctoral research, involving interviews with hundreds of Central American men and women along their journey from Tenosique to Tijuana. Díaz de León’s research interest lies in identifying, through these interviews, why people facing danger and uncertainty while in transit decide to trust strangers and how these strangers form bonds and build cooperative networks among themselves.

Over the last two decades, Mexico openly aligned its migratory policies with the United States, evident through initiatives like Plan Sur and Programa Frontera Sur, designed to regulate and restrict Central American migrants’ flow. As a result, migration control measures grew stricter, adopting a securitised approach to human mobility. Predictably, these measures had adverse effects, making the journey significantly more perilous for migrants. The implementation of hardened controls forced migrants onto novel, unfamiliar routes, exposing them to heightened violence and exploitation. This intricate web of routes, strict controls, and obstacles encountered by migrants across diverse Mexican territory is often referred to as the Vertical Border.

The stricter measures implemented within Mexico have also led to a slower pace of migration through the country. Consequently, migrants now face a lengthier and riskier journey. However, Díaz de León observes that in the face of these extreme policies, migrants exhibit resilience and adaptability, forming new types of solidarity as a means of resistance. Díaz de León highlights the evolving nature of migration practices, which previously relied on networks abroad but now entail significant collaboration among individual migrants. As noted by previously by other scholars, this shift has given rise to fresh forms of strategic cooperation with the potential to transform into organized resistance, allowing migrants to actively demand respect for their human rights. A good example of this transformation is the formation of migrant caravans in 2018, where Central Americans crossed the Mexican territory in large and coordinated groups.

Despite the implementation of stricter measures, it is difficult to think that there will be a decrease in Central American migration through Mexico to the United States in the foreseeable future. Díaz de León identifies five distinct causes behind this phenomenon, all stemming from the rampant violence experienced in the region. These causes include economic inequality worsened by the collapse of the agro-export economic model since the 1980s, gang violence that targets the recruitment of young men into maras, gender-based violence mainly resulting from alarming levels of domestic abuse against women, state violence driven by a zero-tolerance approach towards the maras, and notably, the climate crisis. Remarkably, the author recognises the climate crisis as an act of violence from the Global North towards the most marginalised in society, as these countries continuously refuse to take effective action to reduce emissions and transition to greener economies. This fifth cause holds significant importance, particularly considering Central America’s vulnerability to extreme climate events. Despite this, migrants interviewed by Díaz de León did not recognise climate events as the primary reason for their decision to migrate, often failing to differentiate between the consequences of floods or hurricanes and those of striking poverty.

Bonds and solidarity among migrants

Building upon the factors previously identified as causes for Central American people to emigrate, Díaz de León’s research focuses on understanding how individuals in dire situations overcome their natural mistrust and form bonds of cooperation with total strangers. She introduces the concept of a “transient community” of migrants comprising all migrants in transit. This community provides a shared identity and a support network that compensates for the limitations of kinship ties, enabling migrants to engage in small camaraderie and extend solidarity beyond their immediate social groups.

Through her observations, Díaz de León challenges the assumption that families are the best-equipped units to navigate crises. Instead, she highlights the significance of weak ties and information exchange within the migrant community. She explores the “Road Families” concept – groups of migrants who quickly form strong bonds to make their journey more bearable. These road families offer emotional support and pool resources, fostering a sense of personhood and resilience among migrants. As Díaz de León presents migrants’ stories, the reader witnesses a migratory journey filled with tales of violence and injustice but also moments of joy, happiness, and compassion. As the author notes, emotional support becomes just as crucial as access to food, and these road families provide much-needed support, even if it means overcoming the inherent mistrust of forging temporary bonds with strangers.

Díaz de León’s research highlights the transformative power of building connections within the transient community. These bonds not only provide practical assistance but also contribute to the formation of personal identities and a sense of belonging. The migrants’ ability to establish cooperation networks and foster solidarity with fellow travellers illustrates their resilience and adaptability in challenging circumstances.

In a time where political discourses frequently oversimplify dilemmas surrounding human mobility, reducing them to catchy slogans like “Stop the Boats” or “Build the Wall,” Díaz de León’s book serves as a poignant reminder that these discussions involve real people with intricate stories, families, and dreams. Merely relying on stricter measures and enforcement will not effectively address migration challenges, particularly in regions already burdened by persistent violence and inequality. Moreover, with the looming spectre of climate change exacerbating the factors that force people to leave their countries. Díaz de León’s work emphasises the transformative potential of solidarity, makes evident the need for decision-makers and policymakers to approach migration issues with urgency and compassion. It calls for an inclusive and humane response that goes beyond simplistic mantras and considers the complex realities faced by individuals seeking a better life.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• This is a book review for Walking Together Central Americans and Transit Migration Through Mexico, published by Alejandra Díaz de León by the University of Arizona Press.
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner: Migrants courageously crossing the Rio Grande, David Peinado Romero (Shutterstock)

The post Walking Together: Central American and transit migration through Mexico first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

Chile, like most of Latin America, has historically been recognised as a nation with low social mobility due to its high levels of inequality. Indeed, the region has been extensively characterised by the world’s most extreme levels of inequality. Structurally rooted in an agrarian-based society, the institutional legacy of the colonial period, and the slow expansion of education, inequality in Chile has remained persistently high throughout the 20th century. This longstanding trend has consolidated the view that social mobility is negatively correlated with high levels of inequality—a general depiction popularised by Miles Corak’s ‘Great Gatsby curves’, both in the Global North and South.

My own research confirms the strong barriers to upward mobility in Latin America, particularly at the upper echelons. But, beyond the endorsement of this rather grim and conventional account, my work also opens up new avenues for research on class inequality and social mobility. In a recently published article, I examined the under-explored connection between upward mobility and romantic relationships among individuals experiencing long-range upward trajectories in contemporary Chile: those coming from working-class backgrounds and reaching high-status professions, such as law, medicine and engineering.

Against a backdrop characterised by a crucial reliance on family and couple life amid precarious welfare arrangements and very low levels of interpersonal trust, features shared across most Latin American nations, my findings reveal how romantic relationships, notably those forged among romantic partners sharing a similar class origin and upward trajectory, act as key intimate ties helping to mitigate the class dislocation—the persistent lack of sociocultural fit—very often entwined to long-range upward trajectories in highly unequal societies. Significantly, based on the common class trajectory and cultural dispositions shared by this specific type of romantic unions, these findings show how romantic partners play an important part in helping the upwardly mobile to negotiate ties with their class origins and adjust to their class destination, indeed providing multifaceted support throughout their mobility journeys. Thus, I further show, romantic bonds offer to their upwardly mobile couples a ‘refuge’ contributing to sustain a greater sense of ‘ontological security’, particularly for upwardly mobile women.

This research contributes to the scant literature connecting class, upward mobility and intimacy in Latin America and beyond. First, these findings confirm the proposition that upwardly mobile couples function as a ‘partnership of class migrants’, facing together the many challenges and dislocating effects of upward mobility. But my findings also refine this general statement as they show how the role played by romantic partners is highly significant for both the adjustment to their class destination (when navigating elite universities and in the workplace) and negotiating demands and ties with their class origins (especially kin ties) in the Chilean context. As such, they bring into sharper focus the specific institutional settings and ties in which romantic partners provide this support to their upwardly mobile couples.

The gender factor 

These findings draw greater attention to the gender dynamics at work in these processes. Compared with their male counterparts, upwardly mobile women are much more disposed to talk about their romantic relationships, and emotional lives more broadly, as part of their mobility journeys. Importantly, this may be a strong indication of their greater personal dependence on their romantic or marital partners, both in economic and emotional terms. While a considerable scholarship demonstrates the relevant role of gender in shaping the mobility experience, this specific gender imbalance remains strikingly under-studied. Future research should consistently probe this finding, alongside further scrutinising whether romantic relationships are experienced (or not) as a ‘refuge’, both for men and women.

My research charts novel ground to explore the role that romantic partners may have in smoothing the adjustment of the upwardly mobile to elite universities and professional workplaces. In this respect, although cross-class romantic unions are particularly scarce in my study, they show how romantic partners from privileged backgrounds can help their upwardly mobile partners to master the complex cultural cues that are crucial to success in high-status professions. Here future research might productively address how the upwardly mobile learn from their romantic ties a new set of dispositions, or habitus, more congruent or attuned to ‘the rules of the game’ of the occupational fields they are crossing or embedded in.

Although emerging from the Chilean case, these reflections call for a new and broad research agenda in the study of class, social mobility and intimacy. Significantly, this should acknowledge that intimate bonds include romantic partners, nuclear and extended kin, and friendships, and that these relationships can both alleviate or reinforce inequality along class, gender and ethnic lines. Importantly, too, this research agenda would gain substantially by the implementation of mixed-methods research and by paying much greater attention to the study of societies in the Global South, particularly in Latin America. To a considerable extent, as my own research attests, this can contribute to challenge or enrich existing knowledge on class inequality, the mobility experience and intimate ties beyond the Global North.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner: Couple in Chile / lovelypeace (Shutterstock)

The post Love, class, and climbing the social ladder in Latin America first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

Los presupuestos con enfoque de género (PEG) buscan incorporar una perspectiva de igualdad en las decisiones presupuestarias, pero su eficacia varía. Según Juan Pablo Martínez Guzmán (Universidad de Maryland), el celebrado sistema PEG en Ecuador aumentó la sensibilización sobre el tema, pero encontró resistencia por parte de algunos funcionarios.

Los presupuestos con enfoque de género (PEG) son un tipo de reforma que pretende introducir una perspectiva de género en las decisiones fiscales. Aunque su origen se remonta a los años 80, en las dos últimas décadas se ha dado una progresión exponencial de estas reformas, que han llegado a más de 80 países de todo el mundo. La expansión de los PEG ha sido especialmente significativa en América Latina, donde al menos 18 países han iniciado reformas.

Aunque no existe un modelo específico para estos presupuestos, hay ciertas herramientas que se utilizan habitualmente en la mayoría de los países. Un ejemplo es el uso de evaluaciones de impacto orientadas al género. Estas valoraciones pretenden determinar si las intervenciones gubernamentales tienen un efecto diferenciado en hombres y mujeres, ya sea a posteriori o a priori. Otro ejemplo es el uso de declaraciones presupuestarias desglosadas por género, que buscan mejorar la transparencia detallando cuántos recursos se han asignado a programas que potencialmente pueden reducir las disparidades de género y/o desglosar el total de beneficiarios de las intervenciones gubernamentales por género.

¿Pueden los presupuestos con enfoque de género influir en la elaboración de políticas?

En definitiva, el objetivo es que los PEG influyan en la creación de políticas para lograr una sociedad más igualitaria. Este efecto puede cambiar las intervenciones políticas al demostrar cómo las características específicas de los programas pueden llevar a resultados no equitativos o al ayudar a quienes defienden los derechos de las mujeres a presionar para que se realicen reformas con una mayor transparencia gubernamental en cuanto al género.

En un artículo reciente para la revista Public Administration, analicé el caso de Ecuador para comprender si los PEG han influido realmente a la hora de diseñar políticas. Planteé esta cuestión mediante un caso práctico en profundidad utilizando la metodología cualitativa de seguimiento de procesos y me basé principalmente en 22 entrevistas en profundidad.

Ecuador tiene un sistema de PEG reconocido en el plano internacional que recibió el Premio al Servicio Público de las Naciones Unidas en 2013. La reforma arrancó oficialmente en 2010 con la aprobación de una ley de planificación y presupuesto que exigía al Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF) incluir una declaración presupuestaria de género con el proyecto de presupuesto de cada año, explicando cómo el presupuesto reduciría las brechas de género. Este requisito llevó a crear una Dirección Nacional de Equidad Fiscal y a exigir a todos los departamentos ministeriales que informasen (utilizando un clasificador presupuestario de igualdad de género recién creado) de qué partes de sus presupuestos reducían las brechas de género.

El impacto práctico de los PEG en los departamentos ministeriales es que empujó a los gestores de programas y a los funcionarios responsables del presupuesto a analizar cada uno de sus programas desde una perspectiva de género para determinar si debía marcarse con el nuevo clasificador presupuestario de igualdad. La evidencia muestra que los PEG aumentaron la conciencia sobre cuestiones de género y motivaron a algunos ministerios sectoriales a pensar de forma crítica sobre sus programas. Por ejemplo, un departamento elaboró procesos internos para discutir los programas que se incluirían en el presupuesto y revisar cómo promoverían sus objetivos institucionales, incluidos los relacionados con la igualdad de género.

Sin embargo, para la mayoría de las secretarías de Estado, el impacto de los PEG no fue más allá de un cierto aumento de la concienciación. Muchos funcionarios simplemente percibieron los PEG como una carga administrativa adicional a la que no estaban dispuestos a dedicar mucha energía. Incluso dentro del MEF, los miembros de la Dirección Nacional de Equidad Fiscal a menudo se encontraban trabajando solos, mientras que los analistas presupuestarios y quienes ocupaban puestos de liderazgo desestimaban la importancia de los PEG. Las entrevistas con activistas por los derechos de las mujeres, miembros de la Asamblea Nacional y otras instituciones con funciones de rendición de cuentas sugieren que la declaración presupuestaria de género no se utilizó de forma sistemática para fomentar la rendición pública de cuentas.

¿Qué factores afectan a las probabilidades de éxito de los PEG?

Hay muchos factores que explican los pobres resultados de Ecuador. El factor más relevante es el liderazgo. Todos los casos exitosos de PEG que influyeron en la formulación de políticas ocurrieron en instituciones donde quienes ocupaban posiciones de poder promovieron activamente un análisis significativo orientado al género. En un departamento ministerial, una persona entrevistada recordó una experiencia que tuvo consecuencias porque los líderes institucionales autorizaron a los empleados a hacer viajes para ver de primera mano el impacto de género de sus intervenciones. Por el contrario, las personas entrevistadas en instituciones donde los PEG no generaron cambios en las políticas se sintieron frecuentemente frustradas por la forma en que sus líderes enterraron la reforma.

Otro factor importante es la capacidad de los funcionarios para analizar datos específicos de género. Muchas de las personas entrevistadas señalaron que la administración pública ecuatoriana sufre de machismo crónico. Aunque la asistencia técnica fue útil para que los servidores públicos entendieran el valor de los PEG, los conocimientos ganados en los talleres de capacitación se disiparon rápidamente por los altos niveles de rotación que caracterizan a la administración pública ecuatoriana.

En términos generales, el caso de Ecuador muestra los desafíos de instituir una perspectiva de igualdad de género en los procesos de formulación de políticas. Los profesionales deben elaborar planes de aplicación que no solo contemplen las dificultades técnicas, sino también la resistencia activa a la naturaleza de la reforma. Involucrar a quienes ocupan puestos de liderazgo no es solo un componente deseable, sino necesario. Las reformas orientadas a la igualdad no se limitan a cambios tecnocráticos, sino que requieren una reconfiguración progresiva de los valores que guían las decisiones políticas.

Notas:
• Este artículo representa las opiniones de la autora y no del Centro o de LSE
• Por favor lea nuestra política de comentarios antes de comentar
• Traducción de María Clara Montoya
• Encabezamiento: Mujeres en Zamora, Ecuador / Glenn R. Specht-grs photo (Shutterstock)

The post Los presupuestos con enfoque de género como herramienta para la igualdad: el caso de Ecuador first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

Gender-responsive budgeting (GRB) is a type of reform that aims to introduce a gendered perspective into fiscal decisions. While GRB dates back to the 1980s, the past two decades have seen an exponential proliferation of these reforms, reaching over 80 countries worldwide. The expansion of GRB has been particularly significant in Latin America, where at least 18 countries have initiated reforms.

While there is no specific template for GRB, there are certain tools that are commonly used in most countries. One example is the use of gender-oriented impact assessments. These assessments aim to determine whether government interventions have a differentiated effect on men and women, either ex-post or ex-ante. Another example is the use of gender-disaggregated budget statements, which seek to enhance transparency by detailing how much resources have been allocated to programs that can potentially reduce gender gaps and/or disaggregate the total beneficiaries of government interventions by gender.

Can Gender-responsive budgeting influence policymaking? 

Ultimately, the goal is for GRB to influence policymaking in a way that leads to a more equitable society. This influence can change policy interventions by evidencing how specific program characteristics can lead to inequitable outcomes or by helping women’s rights activists’ pressure for reforms through increased gender-oriented government transparency.

In a recent article for the journal Public Administration, I analysed the case of Ecuador to understand whether GRB has actually influenced policymaking. I approached this question through an in-depth case study using the qualitative process-tracing methodology and was informed mainly by 22 in-depth interviews.

Ecuador has an internationally celebrated GRB system that received the 2013 United Nations Public Service Award. The reform officially started in 2010 through the passage of a planning and budgeting law that required the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to include a gender budget statement with each year’s budget proposal explaining how the budget would reduce gender gaps. This requirement led to creating a National Directorate of Fiscal Equity and requiring all line ministries to report -using a newly created gender equality budget classifier- which portions of their budgets reduced gender gaps.

GRB’s practical impact to line ministries is that it pushed program managers and budget officials to analyse each of their programs through a gendered lens to determine whether it should be marked with the new gender equality budget classifier. Evidence shows that GRB raised awareness about gender issues and pushed some line ministries to think critically about their programs. For example, one line ministry developed internal processes to discuss the programs to be included in the budget and review how they would further their institutional objectives, including those related to gender equity.

However, for most line ministries, the impact of GRB did not go any further than some increase in awareness. Many officials just saw GRB as an additional administrative burden for which they were not willing to dedicate much energy. Even within the MEF, members of the National Directorate of Fiscal Equity often found themselves working alone, while budget analysts and those in leadership positions disregarded the importance of GRB. Interviews with women’s rights activists, members of the National Assembly, and other institutions with accountability roles suggest that the gender budget statement was not systematically used to foster public accountability.

What factors affect GRB’s odds of succeeding? 

Multiple factors explain why Ecuador’s GRB showcases lacklustre results. The most relevant factor is leadership support. All successful cases of GRB influencing policymaking happened in institutions where those in leadership positions actively promoted a meaningful gender-oriented analysis. In one line ministry, an interviewee recalled a consequential experience that came around because institutional leaders empowered employees to take trips to see first-hand the gender-differentiated impact of their interventions. By contrast, interviewees in institutions where GRB did not bring policy changes were often frustrated by how their leaders swept the reform under the rug.

Another important factor is the capacity of civil servants to analyse gender-specific data. Multiple interviewees provided accounts that showed that Ecuador’s civil service suffers from chronic ‘machismo’, or male chauvinism. While technical assistance was helpful in providing civil servants with an understanding of the value of GRB, the knowledge gained from training workshops quickly dissipated due to the high levels of turnover that characterise Ecuador’s civil service.

Overall, the case of Ecuador shows the challenges of instituting a gender-equality lens in policymaking processes. Practitioners need to develop implementation plans that not only account for technical difficulties but also for active resistance to the nature of the reform. Engaging those in leadership positions is not just a desirable component but a necessary one. Equity-oriented reforms are not limited to technocratic changes but require trickling down a reconfiguration of the values guiding policy decisions.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner image: Ecuadorian women in Otavalo / Anton_Ivanov (Shutterstock)

The post Gender-responsive budgeting as a tool for gender equity: the Ecuador case first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

El 20 de agosto, el reformista y diputado anticorrupción Bernardo Arévalo se impuso en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de Guatemala al derrotar a la exprimera dama Sandra Torres. Arévalo, candidato del Movimiento Semilla, triunfó con el 58% de los votos, frente al 37% de Torres. Arrasó en 17 de los 22 departamentos guatemaltecos y, en total, obtuvo el segundo mayor número de votos de un candidato presidencial en la historia de Guatemala.

Arévalo aseguró su victoria, pero el resultado distaba mucho de estar cantado. Casi nadie esperaba que estuviera entre los dos candidatos más votados en la primera vuelta del 25 de junio y que pasara a la segunda vuelta. El candidato ha defendido el legado inclusivo y prodemocrático de su padre, el presidente Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951), que inició la Primavera Democrática de Guatemala que duró una década. El golpe de Estado de 1954, apoyado por Estados Unidos, truncó este periodo reformista, y desembocó en 36 años de guerra civil (1960-1996). Pero a pesar del legado de su padre, el presidente electo Arévalo era poco conocido: solo el 27% de los guatemaltecos declararon saber quién era días antes de la primera vuelta. Y esto se notó en las encuestas. Se preveía que Arévalo recibiera un escaso 3% de los votos, pero superó estas expectativas multiplicándolas casi por cuatro.

Este avance también sorprendió a los observadores nacionales e internacionales porque el gobierno del presidente Alejandro Giammattei (2020-actualidad) maniobró para inhabilitar a los candidatos que prometieron desafiar el statu quo, el motivo central de la campaña de Arévalo. Funcionarios del Ministerio Público (MP), la Corte de Constitucionalidad y el Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) participaron en esta injerencia preelectoral. En la primera vuelta, Arévalo era prácticamente el último candidato antisistema en pie, lo que indicaba que el régimen no se tomaba en serio su candidatura y era una razón importante para que quedara en segundo lugar en la contienda del 25 de junio.

Después del éxito de Arévalo, el gobierno se ha valido de tácticas legales similares para disolver Semilla, criminalizando a los funcionarios electorales e intimidando a los funcionarios de las urnas. Sin embargo, la segunda vuelta siguió adelante, ya que la movilización nacional y la presión internacional llevaron a los anteriores aliados del régimen a afirmar la integridad de los resultados. Torres, una figura del establishment con un alto grado de desfavorabilidad, sufrió su tercera derrota consecutiva en la segunda vuelta. Fue una tormenta perfecta de circunstancias: errores estratégicos de la corrupta élite gobernante, una reacción nacional e internacional ante el intento de injerencia electoral y un adversario con un bajo techo de votos. Esto creó una oportunidad para lo que muchos esperan que sea la próxima “primavera democrática” de Guatemala.

Pero los retos a los que se enfrenta Arévalo, tanto para llegar al traspaso de poderes del 14 de enero de 2024, como para gobernar después, son enormes. A pesar del amplio margen de victoria y del reconocimiento nacional e internacional, los fiscales que intentaron desbaratar la segunda vuelta siguen a la ofensiva, continuando sus ataques legales contra los funcionarios electorales y los organizadores de Semilla. Aunque estas autoridades están más aisladas que nunca, es probable que la judicialización de la contienda de 2023 se prolongue hasta la toma de posesión de Arévalo e incluso podría persistir después.

Las tareas a las que se enfrenta Arévalo una vez en el cargo son también abrumadoras. Los alarmantes niveles de pobreza, desigualdad y desempleo reducen las oportunidades de vida de una gran parte de los guatemaltecos, especialmente en las zonas rurales indígenas del altiplano del país. Guatemala tiene la tasa de desnutrición infantil más alta de América Latina y la sexta más alta del mundo. Las infraestructuras del país están en ruinas, como el enorme socavón que paralizó una de las principales autopistas del metro de Ciudad de Guatemala apenas dos semanas antes de la segunda vuelta. La evasión fiscal y la corrupción rampantes, que privan al sector público de inversiones muy necesarias, merman la calidad de las infraestructuras, así como de la sanidad y la educación. Las condiciones meteorológicas extremas debidas al cambio climático también han causado estragos en la economía guatemalteca, principalmente agrícola, y han impulsado la migración.

Los retos de desarrollo de Guatemala son profundos y no pueden resolverse en un solo mandato presidencial. Y antes de que el presidente electo Arévalo y su equipo puedan empezar a abordar estos déficits, deben enfrentarse a un problema mucho más fundamental: deben transformar la forma de hacer política en Guatemala. Por mucho tiempo, el país ha sido rehén de una débil alianza de intereses elitistas que, si bien no están totalmente unificados, cierran filas con facilidad cuando su poder político y económico, sus esquemas rentistas y su capacidad para eludir el Estado de derecho se ven amenazados. Esta coalición ha diseñado un sistema político basado en el saqueo de las arcas del Estado, la cooptación de las instituciones para eludir las sanciones y la concesión de contratos públicos a una clase económica depredadora a cambio de comisiones ilegales. Estas prácticas socavan directamente las funciones básicas del Estado, como la recaudación de impuestos, la defensa del Estado de derecho y la provisión de bienes y servicios públicos que tanto se necesitan.

Un sistema corrupto con raíces profundas

Como explico en mi libro, Undermining the State from Within: The Institutional Legacies of Civil War in Central America (Cambridge University Press, 2023), este sistema corrupto tiene unas raíces muy arraigadas. La coalición de élite que lo orquesta se forjó en medio de la campaña contrainsurgente de Guatemala a finales de los setenta y principios de los ochenta. Cuando los oficiales de inteligencia militar de alto nivel tomaron el control con el pretexto de eliminar la insurgencia izquierdista, no solo fueron testigos abusos masivos de los derechos humanos, sino que modificaron las reglas del juego en los organismos públicos, fomentando la corrupción y el crimen organizado. Más que aberraciones, estas prácticas se integraron en las propias instituciones del Estado.

A medida que se disolvía la violencia y las partes enfrentadas entablaban negociaciones, los líderes contrainsurgentes trataron de consolidar el orden de la guerra forjando una red más amplia de aliados: empresarios que se beneficiaban de acuerdos fiscales y de contratación fraudulentos, jefes del crimen que necesitaban impunidad para proteger los flujos de beneficios ilícitos y autoridades civiles que veían en el Estado una fuente de enriquecimiento personal. Cuando Guatemala abandonó el régimen militar en 1986, esta coalición dominante utilizó el débil sistema de partidos políticos, la privatización de los activos estatales y la cooptación de las instituciones judiciales para preservar sus intereses comunes en el nuevo entorno nominalmente democrático. Desde entonces, el sistema depredador ha resistido de forma notable.

Arévalo no solo se enfrenta a unas necesidades internas abrumadoras, sino también a prácticas corruptas que tendrán que desaparecer para poder alcanzar los objetivos de sus políticas sociales y económicas. La buena noticia es que a la hora de construir nuevas formas de consenso político Guatemala no parte de cero. Hay experiencias recientes que pueden guiar a Arévalo y Semilla en su intento de rehacer la gobernabilidad.

A mediados de la pasada década, Guatemala fue testigo de un sólido movimiento anticorrupción que se aglutinó en torno a la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad de las Naciones Unidas (CICIG), que se asoció con fiscales nacionales para destapar la corrupción estatal y fortalecer las instituciones. La campaña puso al descubierto una serie de tramas delictivas encabezadas por el gobernante Partido Patriota, cuyo presidente y vicepresidente fueron destituidos y encarcelados en 2015. Aunque la CICIG se enfrentó a una reacción de rechazo por parte de las élites y fue destituida en 2019, la amplia movilización contra la corrupción atrajo a simpatizantes de todas las clases sociales, etnias e ideologías. También catalizó el movimiento Semilla, que más tarde se transformó en un partido político.

La élite depredadora que ha mantenido el poder en Guatemala desde la época del conflicto sigue teniendo un gran poder. No obstante, el movimiento de oposición que se unió para defender la democracia durante las elecciones de 2023 ha descubierto las grietas de su coraza y ha plantado las semillas de un nuevo consenso social. Es la esperanza de que las reglas del juego político puedan rehacerse en beneficio de la mayoría, en lugar de permanecer en manos de unos pocos. Y cuando se trata de afrontar los retos cotidianos más urgentes a los que se enfrentan los guatemaltecos, éste es un primer paso indispensable.

Notas:
• Este artículo representa las opiniones de la autora y no del Centro o de LSE
• Por favor lea nuestra política de comentarios antes de comentar
• Traducción de María Clara Montoya
• Encabezamiento:  Bernardo Arévalo in Santa María de Jesús, Guatemala. / Daniel Hernandez-Salazar (Shutterstock)

The post El candidato sorpresa ganó las elecciones de Guatemala pero, ¿podrá reformar sus políticas? first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

On August 20, anti-corruption reformer and Congressional deputy Bernardo Arévalo won Guatemala’s presidential runoff in a landslide, defeating former first lady Sandra Torres. Arévalo, the candidate of Movimiento Semilla [Seed Movement], triumphed with 58 percent to Torres’ 37 percent of the vote. He swept 17 of 22 Guatemalan provinces and, overall, earned the second-highest number of votes of any presidential candidate in Guatemalan history.

Arévalo secured his victory, but it was very far from a foregone conclusion. Almost no one expected him to be among the top-two vote-getters in the June 25 first round and to make it into the runoff. Arévalo has championed the inclusive, pro-democratic legacy of his father, President Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951), who initiated Guatemala’s decadelong Democratic Spring. The 1954 United States-backed coup cut short this reformist period, which devolved into 36 years of civil war (1960-1996). But despite his father’s legacy, President-elect Arévalo had little name recognition: only 27 per cent of Guatemalans reported that they knew who he was days before the first round. And this showed in the polls. Arévalo was projected to receive a mere three per cent of the vote yet exceeded these expectations nearly four-fold.

This breakthrough also stunned domestic and international observers because the ruling government of President Alejandro Giammattei (2020-present) maneuvered to disqualify candidates who vowed to challenge the status quo—the central motif of Arévalo’s campaign. Officials within the Attorney General’s Office (MP), Constitutional Court, and Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) were in on the pre-electoral interference. By the first-round vote, Arévalo was virtually the last anti-system candidate standing—both an indication that the regime did not take his candidacy seriously and an important reason for his second-place finish in the June 25 contest.

After Arévalo’s success, the government wielded similar legal tactics to disband Semilla, criminalise electoral officials, and intimidate poll workers. Yet the runoff proceeded, as domestic mobilisation and international pressure prompted previous regime allies to affirm the integrity of the results. Torres, an establishment figure with high unfavourability, was handed her third consecutive runoff defeat. The perfect storm of circumstances —strategic missteps by the corrupt ruling elite, a domestic and international backlash to attempted election interference, and an opponent with a low vote ceiling— created an opportunity for what many hope will be Guatemala’s next “democratic spring.”

But the challenges Arévalo faces—both in reaching the January 14, 2024 transfer of power and governing thereafter—are enormous. Despite the wide margin of victory and domestic and international recognition, the prosecutors that sought to derail the runoff vote remain on the offensive, continuing their legal attacks against election officials and Semilla organisers. Though these authorities are more isolated than ever, the judicialisation of the 2023 contest is likely to drag on until Arévalo’s inauguration and could even persist after.

The tasks facing Arévalo once in office are also daunting. Staggering levels of poverty, inequality, and unemployment diminish the life chances for a large swath of Guatemalans, particularly in the country’s rural indigenous highlands. Guatemala is home to the highest rate of child malnutrition in Latin America and the sixth highest in the entire world. The country suffers from crumbling infrastructure, including a massive sinkhole that paralysed a major Guatemala City metro highway just two weeks before the runoff. Rampant tax evasion and corruption, which deprive the public sector of much-need investment, diminish the quality of infrastructure, as well as healthcare and education. Extreme weather due to climate change has also wreaked havoc on Guatemala’s largely agricultural economy and fueled out-migration.

Guatemala’s developmental challenges are profound and cannot be resolved in one single presidential term. And before president-elect Arévalo and his team can begin to address these deficits, they must tackle a problem that is far more fundamental: they must transform the way politics is done in Guatemala. The country has long been held hostage by a loose alliance of elite interests, which, while not entirely unified, readily close ranks when their political and economic power, rent-seeking schemes, and ability to sidestep the rule of law come under threat. This coalition has engineered a political system premised on ransacking state coffers, co-opting institutions to evade sanction, and doling out public contracts to a predatory economic class in exchange for kickbacks. These practices directly undermine core state functions like collecting tax revenue, upholding the rule of law, and providing much-needed public goods and services.

A corrupt system with deep roots

As I detail in my recent book, Undermining the State from Within: The Institutional Legacies of Civil War in Central America (Cambridge University Press, 2023), this corrupt system has deep roots. The elite coalition that orchestrates it was forged amid Guatemala’s counterinsurgent campaign in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As high-level military intelligence officers seized control under the guise of eliminating the leftist insurgency, they not only oversaw massive human rights abuses but remade the rules of the game within public agencies, fomenting corruption and organised crime. Rather than aberrations, these practices became hardwired into state institutions themselves.

As violence dissipated and the warring parties entered negotiations, counterinsurgent leaders sought to cement the wartime order by forging a broader web of allies—business owners who benefitted from fraudulent tax and contracting arrangements, crime bosses who needed impunity to protect illicit profit streams, and civilian authorities who saw the state as a fount of personal enrichment. As Guatemala transitioned from military rule in 1986, this dominant coalition used the weak political party system, privatization of state assets, and co-optation of judicial institutions to preserve its shared interests within the new, nominally democratic setting. The predatory system has remained remarkably resilient since then.

Arévalo is not just up against overwhelming domestic needs, but also corrupt practices that must be dislodged if he hopes to achieve his social and economic policy goals. The good news, however, is that when it comes to building new forms of political consensus Guatemala is not starting from scratch. There are recent experiences that can guide Arévalo and Semilla as they seek to remake governance.

In the mid-2010s, Guatemala witnessed a robust anti-corruption movement that rallied around the United Nations International Commission against Impunity (CICIG), which partnered with domestic prosecutors to uncover state corruption and strengthen institutions. The campaign exposed a raft of criminal networks headed by the ruling Patriot Party, whose president and vice president were removed and imprisoned in 2015. Though the CICIG faced virulent elite backlash and was ousted in 2019, the broad anti-corruption mobilization drew supporters from across class, ethnic, and ideological lines. It also catalysed the Semilla movement, which later transformed into a political party.

Guatemalans need not even look back to the previous decade to find inspiration for a new kind of politics. Beyond Arévalo’s stunning electoral performance, his campaign itself broke the mold and signaled that Guatemalans are eager for leadership not beholden to wealthy, criminal interests. Illicit campaign finance is a routine feature of Guatemalan elections. State contractors, criminal interests, and other elite sectors fund parties and politicians with the expectation that they will reap economic rewards and enjoy impunity once their beneficiaries reach office. But Semilla refused to accept dirty contributions, instead relying, in part, on small donations—a first in Guatemala’s electoral history. Though many have been sceptical of Semilla’s reach because of its urban, educated base, the organic outpouring of support across rural campaign stops before the runoff illustrates that the party’s pro-democratic, anti-corruption message found wide resonance.

The predatory elite that has maintained a stranglehold on power in Guatemala since the conflict-era remains formidable. However, the opposition movement that coalesced to defend democracy during the 2023 election has revealed chinks in its armour and planted the seeds of a new societal consensus. It provides hope that the rules of the political game can be remade for the benefit of the many, rather than remain in the hands of the few. And when it comes to tackling the most pressing day-to-day challenges Guatemalans face, this is an indispensable first step.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner image: Bernardo Arévalo in Guatemala City. / Daniel Hernandez-Salazar (Shutterstock)

The post Guatemala’s underdog reformer won the presidency. Can he remake the country’s politics? first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

Many things did not sound new during the III EU-CELAC summit celebrated on July 17th and 18th in Brussels, the first bi-regional meeting in 8 years. From the official declarations of representatives referring to ‘old friends’ and a shared history to the calls for a renewal of the partnership and the need to push for a more sustainable, greener, and fairer development. “A new beginning for old friends” said Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, vouching for a fresh start between the two regions. After all, besides the concrete advancements in the modernisation of bi-regional trade deals, the Global Gateway measures and the various agreements signed during the summit, meeting and assessing each other’s credibility as reliable partners for cooperation was the real objective of these talks.

The European Union remains the top investor in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), bi-regional commerce increased by 40% since 2018, and various cooperation projects (EUROCLIMA+, EL PACcTO, EUROsociAL+ etc.) have been implemented. Yet, the EU’s external action in the region has been overshadowed by the penetration of China, both economically and diplomatically, and the relevance of the historical regional presence of the United States. This summit was crucial for the EU to regain relevance, establish the status of the EU as a credible ally for the region, and vice versa. There have always been doubts on both sides. On the one hand, LAC leaders rightfully criticized the EU’s swinging attention to the region, a point of self-criticism of many EU leaders as well. The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, acknowledged that the EU had “taken for granted or even neglected” Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade. On the other, the EU wanted to be reassured about the commitments of LAC countries to the UN charter, with clear referrals to the war in Ukraine.

Most LAC countries condemned the blatant Russian invasion of Ukraine in the UN General Assembly (with few exceptions), but the periodical statements on the war from some leaders, namely Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, left many doubts. In the end, there was a partial compromise. Though unsatisfactory and shy, 59 out of 60 countries signed the Final Communiqué, with the exception of Nicaragua, in which “deep concern” is expressed for the war against Ukraine. Concern, but not a condemnation of the aggression, and the absence of a specific mention of “Russia” must be noted. But ultimately, the EU and LAC regions agreed to move past the war and focus on the many issues concerning the bilateral partnership. This summit was not the ideal place to deal with LAC’s shy role in condemning Russia, except for Chile’s president Gabriel Boric, since lingering too much on it would have undermined the work pending.

Besides the war in Ukraine, the summit embraced topics that reflected both sides’ demands and interests. Climate change, sustainable development and the digital alliance were predictably the most prevalent themes but they are not conflict-free terrains. The differences concerning trade and environmental clauses kept coming up during press statements. Josep Borrell said during the summit that “there will be no breakthrough on the EU-MERCOSUR deal“. Still, both parties seemed very confident about the near future of the deal.

Addressing climate change and reinvigorating relations

The final bilateral declaration also contains important points for the Caribbean, including a mention of the particular effects of climate change and the reaching of a post-Cotonou agreement, which was many years in the making. There was also a specific EU-Caribbean leaders’ meeting together with a series of bilateral encounters with Caribbean prime ministers and presidents. Part of the merits of this has surely been due to the skilful mediation of the CELAC’s pro-tempore president and Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: Ralph Gonsalves. He managed to generate consensus among other LAC leaders by speaking for the region as a whole while also stressing the role of the Caribbean and its small-island states.

This summit’s main outcome is the agreement on establishing a permanent mechanism to meet every two years and the designation of Bogotá as the next host of the EU-CELAC summit in 2025. This is crucial for re-establishing close and periodical encounters between the two regions and will serve as the platform to launch concrete cooperation initiatives. The fact that meetings will be biannual and not every three or four years is also a strong sign of mutual interest. On the same note, a roadmap of bilateral meetings, both at the top political, ministerial, and civil society levels, has already been agreed upon.

The announcements related to the Global Gateway, a massive global infrastructure investment initiative of the EU, are favourable. It will represent €45 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean and will be spread among various projects following the three main priorities of climate action, digital infrastructures, and social development. Lastly, a series of important memoranda of understanding (MoU) was signed between the EU and Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador to advance towards the political cooperation pillar. The EU also signed another MoU with Chile, Uruguay and Argentina on clean energies and raw materials to work on climate action and establishing supply chains of critical commodities such as lithium.

After long years of ignoring each other, with responsibilities shared by both sides, the two regions met again, pushed by a global context that changed radically compared to pre-pandemic and pre-war times.

Not all demands were satisfied, and the concrete results are modest, but this meeting was a good starting point to reinvigorate the relations between regions. Although there was no breakthrough concerning the EU-MERCOSUR deal, this was a new way for partners to rebuild trust, assess common interests and make more room for cooperation. There is no denying that the EU-LAC relation has its natural limits compared to China and the US economic and diplomatic firepower in the region. Yet, in some areas, namely climate action, the digital alliance and sustainable trade, there is room for manoeuvre, and this summit in Brussels showed that the EU and CELAC states took a few (small) steps in this direction.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner image: President of Argentina, Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, President of the European Council and President of the European Commission in Brussels / European Union

The post The EU and Latin America and the Caribbean take a few (small) steps to renew a strategic partnership first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.

After taking power, President Gustavo Petro has been delivering a series of reto promoting the transformative agenda he advocated during his political campaign. Initially, he enjoyed a favourable political environment, with solid legislative backing and high approval ratings. Nonetheless, this honeymoon period was short-lived, and Petro now faces challenges from all sides. According to a recent survey, the president’s approval rating dropped by more than 21% between September 2022 and June 2023.

The governing alliance he initially consolidated has also run into problems. Several coalition parties have distanced themselves from the president, and Petro no longer enjoys an absolute majority in any of the two chambers. This has challenged the president’s ability to enact his ambitious legislative agenda. Only his tax proposal has become law out of the five major reforms brought to Congress. The other reforms introduced, namely health, pension, and labour, are stalled in Congress, while the ambitious ‘Total Peace’ agenda is faltering. The current legislative climate is likely to continue playing against the president’s interests for the remainder of his term.

With a weak coalition and low approval ratings, President Petro has decided to change his strategy and take his proposals to the streets. In a speech delivered to hundreds of supporters on Labour Day 2023, Petro warned that attempts to restrict his reforms could lead to a revolution. He also called on his supporters to “take the debate to the streets” to pressure Colombia’s institutions to embrace his reforms.

One year into his term, Petro’s conciliatory and unifying discourse has transformed into confrontation and popular mobilisation in favour of his proposals. The president replaced seven of his 19 cabinet ministers, some of whom represented centre-right and more moderate sectors. Furthermore, an alleged scandal within the government involving two former government aides, including the former ambassador to Venezuela, threatens to further undermine Petro’s political agenda and popularity during the remainder of his term.

Petro’s bureaucratic aversion  

During the presidential campaign, Petro promised to professionalise Colombia’s bureaucratic system to end the use of public office to pay political favours. He emphasised the foreign policy sector, which has traditionally been used as a bounty for political hacks. One year on, however, the president has failed to keep these promises and has continued to appoint political hacks to diplomatic posts, regardless of experience or diplomatic expertise.

Petro’s predecessor, Iván Duque, named 16 ambassadors during his first year in office, and only one was a career diplomat. Duque also appointed ten consuls, of which only four were career diplomats. This was heavily criticised by then-Senator and presidential candidate Gustavo Petro, who promised that at least half of the foreign policy bureaucracy would be made up of seasoned career diplomats in his government.

However, of the 23 ambassadors appointed in his first five months in office, only six were career diplomats. The remaining number are close allies of the president, such as Moises Ninco Daza, the ambassador to Mexico. Ninco Daza served as community manager for Gustavo Bolívar, a close ally of Petro, and does not have a bachelor’s degree, let alone diplomatic experience. Curiously, Ninco Daza presented his participation in a Model United Nations conference as proof of his aptness for the role, which Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva approved.

Beyond foreign policy choices, Petro has openly questioned experienced bureaucratic leadership, arguing that there is no one form of knowledge and that “it’s not about names or titles”. For Petro, professional experience is not necessary for senior government positions, such as the Ministry of Mines, led by Irene Velez, a philosopher and geographer with no experience in the mining sector. According to political scientist Juan David Velazco, Petro’s revolutionary nature demands fast changes, but experienced technocrats often favour gradual change. Additionally, Petro has openly stated that he believes that the greatest obstacle against his agenda for change comes within his government, a possible jab to the technocrats and bureaucrats within his administration. This mistrust of technocracy, and his revolutionary impetus, will likely cause tensions within his administration in the future.

“Twittercracy”? 

The final defining feature of this first year in office, and which will likely continue to be a central tenet of Gustavo Petro’s presidency, is his communication style. Even before he came to power, he has been an avid Twitter user and he considers the platform as an instrument of governance as much as communication. He was recently recognised by the BCW Twiplomacy 2022 Ranking as the fourth most influential world leader on Twitter, Tweeting an average of 13 to 15 times a day to his 6.5 million followers on both government affairs and personal views.

The president’s failure to separate his personal and institutional communications has, however, created a series of problems for his administration. His Twitter activity has added significant volatility to Colombian markets, according to a JP Morgan report issued in October 2022. The report highlights that those tweets have threatened the existing fiscal rule and created confusion around the possibility of establishing capital controls.

This communication strategy also undermined Petro’s proposed reforms. On December 31st, 2022, the president announced on Twitter that he had reached a ceasefire agreement with five of the country’s illegal armed groups, including the National Liberation Army (ELN). Though this was a promising start to his flagship policy of ‘Total Peace’, the ELN issued a statement shortly after refuting Petro’s claim while rejecting the government’s unilateral decree. After an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the ceasefire decree with the ELN was suspended.

Petro has similarly shown a preference for Twitter over institutional channels of governance. To illustrate, the Peruvian government withdrew its ambassador to Colombia in March 2023, arguing that Petro was interfering in Perú’s democratic processes after the president repeatedly tweeted in support of former president Pedro Castillo. Likewise, Petro has on two occasions engaged in a Twitter feud with Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele, who accused Petro of “attacking” not only himself but also the internal affairs of El Salvador. In both of these episodes, the president’s impulse to express personal opinions caused him to bypass traditional diplomatic channels, with important implications for Colombia’s foreign policy.

Gustavo Petro’s presidency has been marked by his communication strategy, bureaucratic decisions, and efforts to promote his agenda of change. However, his willingness to change structural problems in Colombia has been hindered by a decline in his popularity, the fragmentation within his government coalition, and a communication style that has undermined Petro’s proposed reforms.

With over three years remaining in his term, President Petro will have to correct what has so far prevented him from moving his agenda forward to deliver on the promises of transforming healthcare, education, pensions, and other key sectors that brought him to Colombia’s highest public position.

Notes:
• The views expressed here are of the author rather than the Centre or the LSE
• Please read our Comments Policy before commenting
• Banner image: Portrait of Gustavo Petro Urrego, Colombia’s President / Arturo Larrahondo (Shutterstock)

The post What we have learnt from Colombia’s Gustavo Petro first year in office? first appeared on LSE Latin America and Caribbean.