Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for June can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in June
– Yamal LNG
– Arctic LNG 2
– Arctic oil projects
– Norilsk Nickel
2. In July, nuclear-powered icebreakers provided escorts along the Northern Sea Route and took part in high-latitude operations

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. On July 23, the EU adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia
4. In July, South Korea continued preparations to use the Arctic shipping route

Commentary by Bellona

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
5. Modules for the third Arctic LNG 2 train delivered to the Belokamenka yard
6. Main construction of the Chernogorsky mining and processing plant completed
7. Development of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in Taymyr put on hold
8. NOVATEK increased gas production in the second quarter and first half of 2026

Commentary by Bellona

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
9. Large-scale wildfires recorded in northern Russia, including Arctic territories

Commentary by Bellona

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in July ↑

In July, ice cover in the Kara Sea decreased. By mid-month, open water prevailed in the Gulf of Ob, while in the second half of July, the central part of the Kara Sea and a significant portion of the coastal waters from Baydaratskaya Bay to Pyasina Bay were largely ice-free.

Due to favorable climatic conditions and the clearing of ice from the waters, seasonal navigation restrictions were gradually lifted. From July 6, icebreaker escort operations ended in Section No. 2 of the port of Dikson, while in Section No. 1 navigation was opened and vessels without ice strengthening were permitted to operate. In Sabetta, ice navigation restrictions were eased from July 9, and on July 13 – 16 days earlier than in 2025 – the icebreaker escort period ended.

By the end of July, ice conditions allowed vessels without a high ice class to operate on the approaches to the Utrenny terminal in the Gulf of Ob. On July 29, the LNG carrier Arctic Pioneer became the first vessel without an ice class to arrive at Arctic LNG 2 this year.

At the same time, close pack ice persisted in the Vilkitsky Strait in July, complicating and restricting eastbound vessel traffic along the Northern Sea Route.

The first convoy of the summer-autumn navigation season to transit the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route as part of the Northern Supply deliveries had to take a high-latitude route due to difficult ice conditions, as ice fields in the East Siberian Sea near the New Siberian Islands blocked the traditional route. The convoy, consisting of the dry cargo vessels Mys Manorsky and Mys Flora and escorted by the nuclear-powered icebreaker Yakutia, departed Arkhangelsk in late June and arrived in Pevek on July 8, delivering 17,000 tonnes of food, equipment, construction materials and machinery.

A later voyage by the oil tanker SP Dikson, escorted by the nuclear-powered icebreaker Taymyr from Kandalaksha to Pevek and completed on July 17, followed the traditional route through the Vilkitsky Strait. The tanker delivered almost 21,500 tonnes of diesel fuel.

In late July, a group formed in the eastern Kara Sea of at least seven oil tankers preparing to transit the Northern Sea Route eastbound. Six of them (Viktor Bakaev, Vostochny Prospekt, Liteyny Prospekt, Jagger, Ligovsky Prospekt and Hyperion) were waiting in the eastern Kara Sea, while Breeze was already proceeding east along the route. According to gCaptain, the vessels were waiting for further improvement in ice conditions and icebreaker escort to transit the eastern sections of the Northern Sea Route.

On July 2, transport company A-Service announced that it had decided to postpone the departure of chartered vessels on the Arkhangelsk-Pevek route due to difficult ice conditions near the Vilkitsky Strait. The company decided to wait until ice conditions allowed passage without mandatory paid icebreaker escort. The first voyage of the season on the route was made by the vessel Taymyr, which departed Arkhangelsk on July 24.

As usual, the main cargo flow along the Northern Sea Route in July consisted of shipments from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 plants, oil shipments from the Varandey, Prirazlomnoye and Novoportovskoye fields, as well as maritime shipments by Norilsk Nickel.

Yamal LNG

In July, 20 LNG cargoes were shipped from the Sabetta terminal. Sixteen voyages were made by 11 Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers, while another four voyages were made by Arc4 ice-class LNG carriers

Twelve voyages were made directly from Sabetta to European ports, while another eight LNG carriers sailed to Asia. The vessels that traveled eastbound were Georgiy Ushakov, Fedor Litke, Yakov Gakkel, Vladimir Voronin, Nikolay Urvantsev, Nikolay Zubov, Vladimir Rusanov and Vladimir Vize.

On July 13, the remaining ice navigation restrictions at the port of Sabetta were lifted, and the period of icebreaker escorts ended. After that, four Arc4 LNG carriers linked to Dynagas – Clean Planet, Clean Vision, Clean Ocean and Clean Horizon – joined direct shipments from Sabetta. They loaded at the terminal between July 16 and 24 and headed to European countries. Clean Planet, which departed Sabetta on July 16, became the first LNG carrier without an Arc7 ice class to load at Yamal LNG during the 2026 summer navigation season. Three of the four vessels are included in the UK sanctions list, with Clean Horizon being the exception and not subject to UK sanctions.

Maintenance of Arc7 LNG carriers continued at the Danish Fayard shipyard. Rudolf Samoylovich, which arrived there on June 30, spent most of July at the shipyard and departed on July 23. On the same day, Georgiy Brusilov arrived at Fayard.

On July 17, investigative organization Urgewald reported on an open letter from parliamentarians from 17 European countries calling on Fayard to stop servicing specialized icebreaking tankers used to export LNG from the Yamal LNG plant.

Arctic LNG 2

In July, shipments from Arctic LNG 2 continued both via the floating storage units Saam FSU near Murmansk and Koryak FSU off Kamchatka, and directly to Asia via the Cape of Good Hope.

A total of six LNG cargoes were shipped from the plant. The tanker Alexey Kosygin delivered the first July cargo to the Saam FSU floating storage unit in Murmansk, and the second to China via the Cape of Good Hope. Iris also first delivered a cargo to Saam FSU and, after its second loading, headed towards Asia via the same route as Alexey Kosygin. Christophe de Margerie transported its cargo along the Northern Sea Route to Koryak FSU off Kamchatka, while Arctic Pioneer headed towards Asia around Africa. gCaptain notes that Arctic Pioneer became the first LNG carrier without a high ice class to reach Arctic LNG 2 directly in 2026.

In July, three LNG cargoes were shipped from the Saam FSU floating storage unit and loaded onto the tankers Arctic Vostok, La Perouse and Merkuriy. All three vessels headed towards Asia via the Cape of Good Hope.

In July, two LNG cargoes were shipped from the Koryak FSU floating storage unit. They were loaded onto the tankers Arctic Mulan and Luch, which delivered the cargoes to the Beihai LNG terminal in China.

Industry publications report that two more LNG carriers, Avacha and Chaivo, are being prepared for operation. Both vessels will likely be used for the Arctic LNG 2 project. Avacha (formerly T Handan), built in 2008, was renamed in June and switched from the Panamanian to the Russian flag. Chaivo (formerly T Halime), built in 2007, was also renamed in July and reflagged from Panama to Russia.

In addition, on July 28-29, the tanker Mikhail Ulyanov (IMO 9333670), which services the Prirazlomnoye field, was at the Utrenny terminal. The vessel likely loaded gas condensate there.

Arctic oil projects

In July, eight voyages were made from the Varandey terminal, which is owned by Lukoil. Oil shipments were carried out by three Arc6 ice-class shuttle tankers: Vasily Dinkov, Kapitan Gotsky and Timofey Guzhenko.

From the Prirazlomnaya platform (Gazprom Neft), the tankers Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov carried out five oil shipments.

Thirteen voyages from the Novoportovskoye field (Gazprom Neft) were recorded, carried out by the tankers Shturman Malygin, Shturman Ovtsyn, Shturman Skuratov, Shturman Shcherbinin, Shturman Koshelev and Mikhail Lazarev. The tanker Shturman Albanov, which also operates at the Novoportovskoye field, sailed to the Baltic Sea and on July 25 was spotted near the Kanonersky Shiprepairing Yard.

Norilsk Nickel

In July, nine calls by seagoing vessels serving the metals company Norilsk Nickel were recorded at the port of Dudinka. Five calls were made by vessels from Norilsk Nickel’s own fleet: Talnakh, Norilskiy Nickel, Monchegorsk and Nadezhda, which called at the port twice. Another four calls were made by vessels operated by transport company Severny Proekt: Taybola, Tambey and Utrenniy.

The Arctic tanker Yenisey, which specializes in transporting petroleum products to meet the needs of the Norilsk industrial region, made one voyage from Arkhangelsk to Dudinka.

In July, nuclear-powered icebreakers provided escorts along the Northern Sea Route and took part in high-latitude operations ↑

On July 8, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Yakutia completed the escort of the first convoy of the summer-autumn navigation season (Mys Manorsky and Mys Flora) to Pevek from the west. The icebreaker then took over the escort of a new convoy (FESCO Ulis, Mys Shmidta and the tug Kapitan Belomestnov), after which it continued operations in the eastern sector near the Chukchi Sea.

In July, Taymyr provided icebreaker escorts in the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route. On July 17, the icebreaker escorted a convoy to Pevek consisting of the tanker SP Dikson and the dry cargo vessels Sabetta and Mekhanik Brilin. The icebreaker then escorted the motor vessel Mys Flora westward. By the end of July, Taymyr had set course for Murmansk, where it arrived by August 1.

In July, Arktika made a high-latitude transit to the Greenland sector of the Arctic Ocean, where on July 10-12 it provided icebreaker escort for the ice-resistant scientific expedition platform Severny Polyus out of the ice. Atomflot Director Yakov Antonov noted that there is virtually no shipping in this area due to severe ice conditions.

In July, the icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy made two voyages (1, 2) as part of Polar Travel Club expedition cruises from Murmansk to the North Pole and Franz Josef Land.

In July, the icebreaker Yamal was undergoing scheduled dry-dock repairs, the Atomflot press service reported on July 9.

For most of July, Sibir provided icebreaker escorts in the Vilkitsky Strait area, where difficult ice conditions persisted. From July 20 to 24, the icebreaker proceeded farther east to the Anzhu Islands, escorting the dry cargo vessel Yamal Orlan and the LNG carrier Vladimir Rusanov.

From July 4 to 18, the icebreaker Ural was in Murmansk. After leaving the port, it returned to the Northern Sea Route and operated in the Vilkitsky Strait area in the second half of the month. From July 29, Ural continued operations in the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route.

Commentary by Bellona:

The International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

On July 23, the EU adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia ↑

On July 23, the Council of the European Union adopted the 21st package of sanctions against Russia. Information on the new restrictive measures was published on the official website of the Council of the EU.

Under the new package, the EU introduced a requirement to notify the competent authorities of the sale or transfer of LNG tankers to third countries. In addition, the EU provided for the possibility of introducing further restrictions, under which sellers would be required to assess the risk of subsequent resale of the vessels and include contractual provisions prohibiting their transfer to Russian persons or for use in Russia.

Following an assessment by the European Commission, which is expected to be completed within three months, the Council of the EU must decide by October 25, 2026 whether to impose a full ban on the sale of LNG tankers to Russian companies.

When adopting its 21st sanctions package, the EU eased restrictions on the transport of Russian LNG to third countries by introducing a temporary exemption for long-term contracts concluded before February 24, 2022. The volume of such shipments may not exceed the 2025 level, and operators are required to report regularly on deliveries. The exemption will remain in force until July 25, 2027, after which the Council of the EU will review it annually.

This followed objections from Greece, which, according to the Financial Times, cited the impact of the ban on Greek shipping company Dynagas. Dynagas, owned by shipowner Georgios Prokopiou, operates 27 LNG carriers. Its fleet includes seven Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers serving Yamal LNG, including Boris Vilkitsky, Fedor Litke, Georgiy Brusilov, Boris Davydov and Nikolay Zubov, as well as four Arc4 LNG carriers.

Sanctions were also imposed on 41 shadow fleet vessels. They will be subject to bans on access to EU ports and on the provision of services. A total of 673 vessels are now subject to such EU restrictions. Of the newly sanctioned vessels, at least nine operated in the Russian Arctic in 2024-2026.

• Two LNG carriers are linked to the Arctic LNG 2 project: the Arc7 ice-class LNG carrier Alexey Kosygin (IMO 9904546) and the LNG carrier Luch (IMO 9317315). Both vessels became involved in the project’s logistics in 2026.
• Several other vessels operate regularly on Arctic routes: the oil/chemical tankers Pioneer (IMO 9255282), Andrey Pervozvanniy (IMO 9255268) and Aleksander Nevskiy (IMO 9356610); the Arc4 ice-class oil tanker Kord Arctic (IMO 9036272), with Murmansk as its port of registry; and the oil/chemical tanker Solstraum (IMO 9157014), which regularly called at Murmansk in 2025.
• The Aframax-class oil tanker Tavian (IMO 9147447) was in Murmansk in January 2026 and was spotted using a false IMO number to conceal its identity. Dakar (IMO 9251743), an oil/chemical tanker that also does not operate regularly in the Arctic, entered the Kola Peninsula area in 2026.

The new package introduces additional restrictions on imports of goods that generate significant revenues for Russia and enable it to continue its war against Ukraine, including restrictions on copper, nickel and lead ores, precious metal ores, unwrought zinc, zinc and chromium oxides, as well as a number of other goods. The new restrictions also affect Norilsk Nickel products: in the Arctic, the Russian company mines copper, nickel and platinum-group metals.

In July, South Korea continued preparations to use the Arctic shipping route ↑

Throughout the month, the authorities and businesses were preparing the first South Korean trial container voyage from Busan to Europe via the Arctic route. 

At the beginning of the month, Vice Minister of Oceans and Fisheries Nam Jae- heon said that the vessel selection process was nearing completion and that around 1,300 TEU of cargo had already been secured for the voyage. (However, the actual load was lower: when PanStar Acro departed Busan on August 22, it was carrying 837 TEU, including around 100 empty containers.)

On July 22, South Korean shipping company PanStar opened a cargo booking platform for its first trial container voyage via the Northern Sea Route, scheduled to depart Busan on August 22.

On July 8, the third Arctic Shipping Forum was held in Busan, organized by the Korea Maritime Institute, the Busan Port Authority, the Korea Polar Research Institute and the Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering. Participants discussed the technologies and infrastructure required for Arctic shipping, as well as its economic viability.

In July, a new expedition by the South Korean research icebreaker Araon began, intended to provide a scientific basis for future Arctic shipping. On July 11, the vessel departed Gwangyang on an 83-day Arctic voyage. During the expedition, Araon plans to conduct research in the Bering Sea, East Siberian Sea, Chukchi Sea and the central Arctic. In addition to climate and oceanographic research, specialists plan to collect sea ice and weather data needed for safe navigation and use them as a basis for developing AI-based risk forecasting technology. The goal is to create South Korea’s own system for supporting Arctic shipping.

Commentary by Bellona:

Heightened Industrial Activity in the Russian Arctic

Modules for the third Arctic LNG 2 train delivered to the Belokamenka yard ↑

The first two topsides modules, TMR-001 and TMR-002, intended for the third liquefaction train of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, were offloaded at NOVATEK’s yard in Belokamenka, Murmansk Region. This was reported by gCaptain in late July based on satellite imagery from Synmax.

The modules were manufactured in China, from where they took two and a half months to reach the Center for the Construction of Large-Tonnage Marine Structures (CCLTMS) in Belokamenka.

One of the modules is being offloaded directly next to the unfinished gravity-based structure (GBS) for the third train. The second module was positioned closer to the assembly complex. This arrangement may indicate preparations to install the equipment directly on the GBS, potentially signaling the resumption of construction work that was suspended in July 2024 due to sanctions.

At the same time, more recent imagery indicates that assembly work on the third train remains largely idle. The cranes positioned over the GBS remain in the same locations as in earlier images. Elsewhere at the yard, there is also no significant increase in the amount of equipment or any visible work on the modules.

In addition, TMR-001 and TMR-002 represent only part of the equipment required for construction of the third train. Another seven modules for various purposes are due to be delivered from China, while some of them remain unfinished because of Western sanctions.

Construction of the second Arctic LNG 2 train has faced similar problems. Two of the four power plant modules for the second train are still in China, where they have been stored at the port of Maojian since mid-April. The first two modules have been at the Arctic LNG 2 site since November 2024, but they can support operation of the second train at only half of its production capacity.

As a reminder, the CCLTMS, formerly known as the Kola Yard, is a partially completed shipyard in Belokamenka, Murmansk Region, owned by Novatek Murmansk, a subsidiary of NOVATEK.

The CCLTMS primarily produces gravity-based structures on which LNG plant equipment is installed. They are built and outfitted in Belokamenka, then towed by sea to their operating site and installed on the seabed. In addition to the structures themselves, the yard is designed for the fabrication and integration of process equipment modules and gas liquefaction trains.

The main purpose of building the CCLTMS was to establish domestic production of such equipment in Russia and eliminate dependence on external suppliers. However, as the second and third Arctic LNG 2 trains demonstrate, this has yet to be achieved.

It was initially planned that the Belokamenka yard would not only manufacture equipment for LNG projects, but also build drilling and production platforms for offshore oil production in the western sector of the Arctic and, together with Russian shipbuilding corporations, construct and service large-capacity offshore structures needed to support operations along the Northern Sea Route.

Main construction of the Chernogorsky mining and processing plant completed ↑

RT-Engineering, a holding company within the Rostec State Corporation, has completed the main construction phase of a mining and processing plant at the Chernogorskoye deposit near Norilsk, where platinum and palladium are to be mined. On July 10, the ore preparation section, which includes crushing, transportation and ore storage, was successfully test-launched. During the tests, the facility processed more than 300 tonnes of overburden containing no target metals. Commissioning work is now underway.

The plant is expected to enter industrial operation at the end of 2026. The Chernogorsky mining and processing plant has a design capacity of 7 million tonnes per year.

“Construction was completed within a short timeframe, while sanctions forced us to redesign the processing plant and completely replace the equipment. All materials and equipment were delivered primarily via the Northern Sea Route year-round. Commissioning work is now underway. We have carried out the technical launch of the first part of the processing complex. The next steps are comprehensive testing and commissioning of the entire facility,” said Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov.

Development of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in Taymyr put on hold ↑

Severnaya Zvezda has suspended construction work at the Syradasayskoye deposit until July 2028. The reasons include falling coal prices, high interest rates and logistical difficulties. Severnaya Zvezda informed the Krasnoyarsk Region government of the decision as early as last summer, but it has only now become widely known.

The project to develop the Syradasayskoye coking coal deposit is intended to become the largest coal mining enterprise in the Russian Arctic. Coal reserves at the deposit are estimated at 5.7 billion tonnes.

Production was supposed to begin as early as 2022, and in 2026, according to the Northern Sea Route development plan through 2035, the project was expected to ship 7 million tonnes of products. However, the project faced numerous delays at virtually every stage. The most significant were related to a shortage of vessels for exporting its products – coal and marketable coal concentrate, for which the beneficiation plant was never built due to sanctions.

Nevertheless, the deposit was partially launched. It was reported that the first 100,000 tonnes of coal were shipped from the deposit to China in October 2022. The Russian Ministry of Energy later stated in its report that 574,000 tonnes of coal were shipped from the deposit in 2023 and subsequently exported to China as well.

However, no further production at Syradasayskoye was reported in subsequent years.

NOVATEK increased gas production in the second quarter and first half of 2026 ↑

In the first half of 2026, NOVATEK produced 43.68 billion cubic metres of natural gas, including 21.65 billion cubic metres in the second quarter, up 2.7% from the same period in 2025, when production amounted to 42.53 billion cubic metres. This was reported on the company’s website.

NOVATEK’s total hydrocarbon production in the first half of the year amounted to 346.2 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe), including 7.14 million tonnes of liquid hydrocarbons. Compared with the first half of 2025, hydrocarbon production increased by 9.5 million boe, or 2.8%.

At the same time, the company does not provide a breakdown of its statistics by region or individual production facility. However, Yamal LNG is known to be operating at close to its design capacity, meaning that it produced around 9.5-10 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas in the first half of 2026. This corresponds to approximately 13.8 billion cubic metres of extracted natural gas. According to analytics firm Kpler, 10.25 million tonnes of LNG were shipped from the plant for export during this period.

As for Arctic LNG 2, around 1.6 million tonnes of LNG are known to have been shipped from the project in the first half of the year, corresponding to approximately 2.2 billion cubic metres of extracted natural gas. However, no figures have been reported for how much LNG was actually produced during this period.

NOVATEK’s other major hydrocarbon production assets are also located in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District. Some of the gas condensate produced there is stabilized at the Purovsky processing plant, also in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, after which the stable gas condensate is sent for further processing to the plant in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Region.

Commentary by Bellona:

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

Large-scale wildfires recorded in northern Russia, including Arctic territories ↑

The scale of wildfires in Krasnoyarsk Krai was almost 30 times greater than during the same period in 2025, reportsSibirsky Express. Since the beginning of 2026, 1,112 wildfires have been recorded, covering a total area of more than 600,000 hectares, compared with 522 wildfires covering 22,500 hectares in 2025. Ninety-seven percent of all fires occurred in three municipalities – the Yeniseysky, Turukhansky and Evenki districts. The Turukhansky District lies entirely within Russia’s Arctic Zone, while the Evenki District is partially included in it.

By the end of July, efforts were underway to extinguish 78 fires covering a total area of 86,600 hectares in the north of the region. The fires were located in the Evenki, Turukhansky, Taymyr Dolgan-Nenets and Yeniseysky districts.

The fires are caused by hot, windy weather combined with high thunderstorm activity.

Wildfires were also recorded in other regions.

In Yakutia, as of the morning of July 31, 43 wildfires were active in seven districts of the republic. The fires had spread across 190,930 hectares, while the area of active burning stood at 286.4 hectares. In particular, fires were burning in the Arctic Anabar District, where two landscape fires covering a total of 1,451 hectares were recorded.

Among other Arctic regions, wildfires were also reported in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District on the Yamal Peninsula in July. In the middle of the month, local media reported that the “fire was under control”, but the fires were not fully extinguished and later flared up again. By the end of August, the area of natural landscapes affected by fire in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District had reached 437,000 hectares (read more in Bellona’s next Arctic Digest, covering August).

Two more wildfires and one landscape fire were recorded in Chukotka.

Commentary by Bellona:

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, July 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for May can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in June
– Yamal LNG
– Arctic LNG 2
– Arctic oil projects
– Norilsk Nickel
2. Seven nuclear-powered icebreakers operated on the Northern Sea Route in June; by the end of the month, three had departed for Murmansk
3. Cargo throughput at Arctic seaports increased by 15% in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period in 2025
4. Second Arc7 LNG carrier built at Zvezda, Konstantin Posyet, enters service after a lengthy delay
5. Commissioning of the nuclear-powered icebreaker Chukotka postponed until 2027
6. Shipping companies announce plans for the 2026 summer–autumn navigation season on the Northern Sea Route
6.1. Two transport companies have announced plans to launch their own cargo services between Arkhangelsk and Pevek via the Northern Sea Route
6.2. Sea Legend announces regular container service from China to Europe via the Arctic
6.3. EcoShipping schedules eight voyages between China and Pevek, but vessels are not operating to schedule
6.4. NewNew Shipping announces expansion of Northern Sea Route services and plans to invest in Arkhangelsk deepwater port

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
7. UK imposes sanctions on four LNG carriers linked to Arctic LNG 2 project
8. Putin signs order allowing TotalEnergies’ stake in Arctic LNG 2 to be sold to a NOVATEK entity
9. China completes second terminal to receive LNG from Arctic LNG 2, with launch expected before October
10. South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean incurs costs over Arc7 LNG carriers built for Arctic LNG 2
11. In June, NATO held its largest air exercise and began testing uncrewed systems in the Arctic

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
12. First phase of Bukhta Sever oil terminal under Vostok Oil project scheduled for commissioning in September 2026

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
13. Arctic Ocean ecosystem passed a point of no return in 2009, scientists warn
14. Increase in hazardous low-visibility events recorded on the Northern Sea Route
15. Bowhead whale migration routes in the eastern Arctic are changing due to shipping and declining sea ice

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in June ↑

Shipping activity in the eastern part of the Northern Sea Route increased in June. At the beginning of the month, the Arc7 ice-class LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie completed the season’s first eastbound voyage, transporting a cargo of LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project to the Koryak floating storage unit off Kamchatka. On June 25, the vessel returned to the Arctic LNG 2 terminal, where it loaded another cargo, and on June 27 set off eastward again, escorted by the nuclear-powered icebreaker Arktika. At the end of the month, the Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers Eduard Toll and Boris Vilkitsky departed eastward with cargoes from Yamal LNG: Eduard Toll followed the nuclear-powered icebreaker Sibir, while Boris Vilkitsky sailed without icebreaker escort.

At the same time, the seasonal delivery of fuel, coal, food and other supplies to Arctic settlements began. A new northern supply scheme managed by the single maritime operator Rosatom Arctic was launched in Chukotka. The first tankers and dry cargo vessels arrived in Anadyr and other settlements. In late June, the first convoy departed Arkhangelsk for Pevek, escorted by the nuclear-powered icebreaker Yakutia. The convoy included two dry cargo vessels, Mys Manorsky and Mys Flora.

Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in June consisted of shipments from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, oil exports from the Varandey, Prirazlomnoye and Novoportovskoye fields, as well as maritime shipments by Norilsk Nickel.

Yamal LNG

In June, 22 LNG cargoes were shipped from the terminal in Sabetta. Fourteen Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers handled the bulk of these shipments.

Fifteen voyages were made directly from Sabetta to European ports in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain. The LNG carriers Eduard Toll and Boris Vilkitsky made two additional direct voyages to Asia via the Northern Sea Route.

Five voyages were made to the area off Kildin Island, where LNG is transshipped to non-ice-class carriers. Four voyages from the Kildin area to Belgium were made by LNG Phecda, LNG Dubhe and LNG Megrez. Two other LNG carriers, Seapeak Yamal and LNG Merak, loaded off Kildin and headed to Asia via the route around Africa.

On June 30, the LNG carrier Rudolf Samoylovich arrived at the Danish Fayard shipyard for maintenance.

Fayard remains the last shipyard in the European Union that continues to service Russian Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers, after Damen Shiprepair Brest, located in France, stopped servicing Russia-affiliated vessels in 2024. In the summer and fall of 2025, Fayard carried out maintenance on five Russian Arc7 LNG carriers. According to estimates by the Urgewald research group, another six Russian Arc7 vessels may require maintenance in the summer of 2026.

New EU restrictions prohibiting the maintenance of LNG carriers operating in Russia will take effect on January 1, 2027.

Arctic LNG 2

In June, LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project was delivered both to the Saam FSU floating storage unit near Murmansk and to the Koryak FSU off Kamchatka. 

Another tanker, Arctic Express, joined the LNG transportation operations. The vessel was built in 2007 and recently reflagged to Russia.

A total of five LNG cargoes were shipped from the Arctic LNG 2 plant in June. The Arc7 ice-class tanker Alexey Kosygin loaded four cargoes and delivered the LNG to the Saam FSU floating storage unit near Murmansk. The LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie loaded one cargo and headed east along the Northern Sea Route.

In June, two LNG cargoes were shipped from the Saam FSU floating storage unit and loaded by the tankers Zarya and Arctic Express. The tankers that had loaded at the storage unit in May were either sailing to China in June or returning from there via the Cape of Good Hope.

The tanker Arctic Mulan loaded one LNG cargo at the Koryak FSU floating storage unit and delivered it to China.

Arctic oil projects

In June, eight voyages were made from the Varandey terminal operated by Lukoil. Oil was transported by three Arc6 ice-class shuttle tankers: Vasily Dinkov, Kapitan Gotsky and Timofey Guzhenko.

The tankers Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov carried out five oil shipments from Gazprom Neft’s Prirazlomnaya platform.

Sixteen oil shipments were recorded from Gazprom Neft’s Novoportovskoye field, carried out by the tankers Shturman Albanov, Shturman Malygin, Shturman Ovtsyn, Shturman Skuratov, Shturman Shcherbinin, Shturman Koshelev and Mikhail Lazarev.

Norilsk Nickel

In June, the port of Dudinka, which serves the metals company Norilsk Nickel, resumed operations that had been suspended in May due to spring flooding on the Yenisei River. Five port calls were recorded, made by vessels from the company’s own fleet of Arc7 ice-class Arctic container ships: Norilsk Nickel, Talnakh, Nadezhda and Monchegorsk.

The vessels operate between Dudinka and Murmansk. They carry finished metal products from Dudinka and transport general cargo, equipment and materials for the Norilsk industrial district on the return voyage.

Seven nuclear-powered icebreakers operated on the Northern Sea Route in June; by the end of the month, three had departed for Murmansk ↑

In June, the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet provided icebreaker escort in the Gulf of Ob, the Kara Sea and the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route.

The icebreaker Ural escorted Christophe de Margerie on a voyage that began in late May with a cargo of LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project. Ural then headed to Murmansk.

The icebreaker Yakutia escorted Christophe de Margerie during its westbound return voyage. At the end of the month, Yakutia began escorting the vessels Mys Manorsky and Mys Flora, which had departed Arkhangelsk in a convoy bound for Pevek.

50 Let Pobedy provided icebreaker escort in the Kara Sea and on the approaches to Sabetta. On June 15, it returned to Murmansk after completing the winter–spring navigation season, during which it escorted 90 vessels, and began preparations for summer expeditions to the North Pole.

The nuclear-powered icebreakers Taymyr, Vaygach, Arktika and Sibir operated in the Gulf of Ob and on the approaches to Sabetta. After June 17, Vaygach headed to Murmansk.

Yamal also remained in the Murmansk area in June. On July 9, Atomflot reported that the icebreaker was undergoing scheduled dry-dock repairs.

Cargo throughput at Arctic seaports increased by 15% in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period in 2025 ↑

In January–June 2026, cargo throughput at seaports in the Arctic Basin reached 51.2 million tonnes, an increase of 15% compared with the same period in 2025. The data were published by the Association of Commercial Seaports based on statistics from Morcenter.

Detailed statistics for individual ports are not yet available. However, data for the first five months indicate that oil and LNG accounted for most of the increase in cargo traffic. According to calculations based on reports by SeaNews, LNG throughput amounted to approximately 13.8 million tonnes, around 30% more than in the same period of 2025, while oil throughput reached about 18.2 million tonnes, an increase of approximately 17%.

The largest contributions to the increase over these five months came from the port of Murmansk, where cargo throughput rose by approximately 2.5 million tonnes to 23.5 million tonnes, around 12% more than in 2025; Sabetta, where it increased by 2 million tonnes to 14 million tonnes, around 17% more; and Varandey, where it grew by 0.6 million tonnes to 2.3 million tonnes, around 40.6% more.

Commentary by Bellona:

Second Arc7 LNG carrier built at Zvezda, Konstantin Posyet, enters service after a lengthy delay ↑

On June 18, 2026, a naming and commissioning ceremony for the Arctic LNG carrier Konstantin Posyet was held at the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex, according to the Russian government’s website.

Konstantin Posyet became the second vessel in a series of Arc7 Arctic LNG carriers built at Zvezda for Sovcomflot. The first vessel in the series, Alexey Kosygin, entered service in December 2025.

Konstantin Posyet will operate under the Russian flag under a long-term time charter agreement with Arctic LNG 2, the operator of NOVATEK’s project of the same name. The vessel’s port of registry is St Petersburg. It has an LNG cargo capacity of 172,600 m³, a length of 300 metres and a width of 48.8 metres.

The vessel was delivered significantly behind the original schedule. The first five of the 15 LNG carriers ordered from Zvezda were originally due to be delivered in 2023. The vessel actually entered service more than two years later.

The date of its first voyage has not yet been announced. AIS data show the vessel moored in Primorye with its destination listed as FOR ORDERS. Despite its affiliation with the Arctic LNG 2 project, the vessel is not currently subject to international sanctions.

Commentary by Bellona:

Commissioning of the nuclear-powered icebreaker Chukotka postponed until 2027 ↑

The commissioning of the Project 22220 multipurpose nuclear-powered icebreaker Chukotka has been postponed from December 2026 to 2027. The Russian government issued the relevant order on June 2, 2026.

Chukotka will be the fifth Project 22220 icebreaker and the fourth serial vessel of this type. The icebreaker is being built at United Shipbuilding Corporation’s Baltic Shipyard for Rosatom State Corporation. The vessel was laid down on December 16, 2020, and launched on November 6, 2024.

Several days before the order was published, Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev said that Chukotka was 85.5% complete, compared with the planned figure of 85.1%.

Commentary by Bellona:

Shipping companies announce plans for the 2026 summer–autumn navigation season on the Northern Sea Route

Two transport companies have announced plans to launch their own cargo services between Arkhangelsk and Pevek via the Northern Sea Route ↑

The transport company Severny Proekt is launching a cargo service between Arkhangelsk and Pevek. Its vessels were previously chartered to other carriers, but the company now intends to operate the service independently using its own fleet. Eight voyages are planned for the 2026 navigation season, at average intervals of around ten days. The first departure of the motor vessel Taymyr from Arkhangelsk is scheduled for July 27, while the final vessel is due to leave Pevek on October 21.

The transport company Eco Shipping has launched a container service on the existing Arkhangelsk–Pevek shipping route. The company offers cargo transport in its own containers aboard vessels operating according to the Pevek Lines schedule. The Pevek Lines schedule for the 2026 navigation season includes 11 voyages, with the first vessel having departed Arkhangelsk on June 18.

Sea Legend announces regular container service from China to Europe via the Arctic ↑

On June 29, Chinese operator Sea Legend announced the launch of the regular China-Europe Arctic Express container service between China’s Ningbo-Zhoushan Port and Felixstowe in the UK via the Northern Sea Route during the 2026 navigation season. The company plans to operate eight voyages between August and October 2026.

The new service will build on the 2025 pilot voyage, when Istanbul Bridge departed Ningbo-Zhoushan on September 23 and arrived in Felixstowe on October 13, before calling at the ports of Hamburg, Gdansk and Rotterdam.

Cargo collection and feeder shipments from Chinese ports will begin on August 12, and the container ship Dubai Towerwill depart Ningbo on the first voyage on August 15. The final departure is scheduled for October 3. The operator plans to deploy seven vessels on the route: Dubai Tower, Istanbul Bridge, Riyadh Mukaab, Athens Odeon, Tiger Maanshan, Tiger Bintulu and Tiger Lianyungang. Dubai Tower will make two voyages, the first and the final one.

Cargo will be collected at the ports of Dalian, Taicang, Qingdao, Fuzhou, Shanghai and Nanshi and transported to Ningbo-Zhoushan. From there, the container ships will proceed to the United Kingdom, after which the cargo is expected to be forwarded to other European countries, including the Netherlands, Germany and Poland.

EcoShipping schedules eight voyages between China and Pevek, but vessels are not operating to schedule ↑

EcoShipping has published the summer–autumn schedule for its Pevek Lines China shipping service. A total of eight voyages between Chinese ports and Pevek have been announced. The service is to be operated by the vessels Mys Shmidta, Mys Zhelaniya and Mys Dezhneva.

Actual vessel movements are already diverging from the published schedule. According to the timetable, Mys Shmidtaand Mys Zhelaniya were due to depart China on June 19. However, only Mys Shmidta set out on the route. The vessel departed Tianjin and arrived in Pevek on July 13 carrying equipment for field development and construction materials.

Mys Zhelaniya also departed on June 19, but from Vladivostok rather than China. According to AIS data, the vessel subsequently carried out operations in the Sea of Okhotsk.

In July, Mys Dezhneva headed for Pevek, but the dates of its voyage also did not match the published schedule.

EcoShipping and the vessels Mys Shmidta, Mys Zhelaniya and Mys Dezhneva are subject to US sanctions.

NewNew Shipping announces expansion of Northern Sea Route services and plans to invest in Arkhangelsk deepwater port ↑

At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, SPIEF 2026, the Arkhangelsk Region and China’s NewNew Shipping agreed to sign a memorandum on the development of a deepwater area at the port of Arkhangelsk. NewNew Shipping plans to invest up to RUB 200 billion in port infrastructure, develop a cargo base for the new port facilities and use the future bunkering terminal. The project, scheduled for completion by 2032, is designed to accommodate cargo vessels with a deadweight of up to 75,000 tonnes and a draught of up to 14.5 metres. The deepwater area of the port of Arkhangelsk is expected to include five terminals.

As we reported earlier, NewNew Shipping Line plans to operate up to 12 voyages along the Northern Sea Route between China and Arkhangelsk during the 2026 summer–autumn navigation season. The voyage dates have not been announced, but the company’s website indicates that the navigation window for the Arctic Express will run from late July to early November.

NewNew Shipping also announced plans to expand its operations along the Northern Sea Route. In 2027, the company expects to transport 1 million tonnes of containerised cargo between Russian and Chinese ports.

Vladimir Panov, deputy chairman of the State Commission for Arctic Development, said that Russia and China had agreed to increase cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route to 20 million tonnes by 2030.

The International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

UK imposes sanctions on four LNG carriers linked to Arctic LNG 2 project ↑

On June 16, the UK added four LNG carriers to its sanctions list: Merkuriy (IMO 9326689), Kosmos (IMO 9300817), Luch (IMO 9317315) and Orion (IMO 9294264).

All four loaded their first cargoes of LNG linked to the Arctic LNG 2 project in May 2026. The carriers took on LNG from the Saam FSU near Murmansk and subsequently transported it to China.

The same sanctions document also covered three other vessels previously observed in Murmansk or on the Northern Sea Route:

• Stormbringer (IMO 9290397) in 2023;
• Elbus (IMO 9290385) in 2026;
• Sakhalin (IMO 9249128) in 2025 and 2026.

All three vessels were listed for their involvement in transporting Russian-origin oil or petroleum products to third countries.

Putin signs order allowing TotalEnergies’ stake in Arctic LNG 2 to be sold to a NOVATEK entity ↑

On June 3, Vladimir Putin signed an order allowing NordLine LLC to acquire TotalEnergies’ 10% stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project. The seller is identified as TotalEnergies EP Salmanov, a subsidiary of the French group.

In May, NOVATEK established a subsidiary with the same name, registered in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area.

NOVATEK currently owns 60% of Arctic LNG 2. If TotalEnergies’ stake is transferred to the NOVATEK subsidiary, the group’s combined interest in the project will increase to 70%. China’s CNPC and CNOOC will retain 10% each, as will the Japan Arctic LNG consortium, owned by Mitsui and the Japanese state organisation JOGMEC.

On July 23, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne confirmed that the company intends to withdraw from the project. According to him, NOVATEK proposed transferring the stake to its subsidiary after the US imposed sanctions on Arctic LNG 2 in November 2023.

Pouyanne did not describe the transaction as a sale, while a TotalEnergies spokesperson declined to comment on whether the company would receive compensation or how the stake might be valued.

TotalEnergies acquired its stake in Arctic LNG 2 in 2019. As Reuters notes, the transfer of the direct 10% stake would not eliminate TotalEnergies’ indirect economic exposure to Arctic LNG 2, as the French company continues to hold a 19.4% stake in NOVATEK, which controls the project. Its 20% stake in Yamal LNG also remains an active Russian asset of TotalEnergies.

Arctida notes that TotalEnergies has steadily reduced its involvement in Russian projects since February 2022. The company withdrew its representatives from NOVATEK’s board of directors and deconsolidated its 19.4% stake, although the shares formally remained on its balance sheet. In 2022, TotalEnergies sold its 49% stake in Terneftegaz to NOVATEK, while its interest and operating role in the Kharyaga field were transferred to Zarubezhneft. In April 2023, the company also withdrew from the governing bodies of the Arctic Transshipment project and stopped financing it, while retaining its formal 10% stake.

China completes second terminal to receive LNG from Arctic LNG 2, with launch expected before October ↑

China is completing preparations for a second terminal that will receive LNG from the sanctioned Russian Arctic LNG 2 project, Reuters reports, citing its sources.

Installation of the main mechanical equipment at the new Longkou LNG terminal in Yantai, Shandong Province, has been completed. The terminal is expected to be commissioned by October 2026, in time for the start of the winter season and the anticipated increase in natural gas demand.

The new terminal will be operated by state-owned pipeline company PipeChina. It also operates the Beihai LNG terminal in Guangxi Province in southern China, which was commissioned in August 2025 and is currently the only terminal receiving cargoes from Arctic LNG 2. Its maximum capacity is 6 million tonnes per year.

From its launch through the end of June, the terminal received 41 LNG cargoes totalling 2.6 million tonnes, according to data from analytics firm Kpler cited by Reuters.

The addition of a second terminal, which is also located closer to the Northern Sea Route, will expand capacity to receive output from Arctic LNG 2. The first phase of the new Longkou LNG terminal has an annual capacity of a further 5 million tonnes of LNG.

In addition, another PipeChina-owned terminal in Dalian in northeastern China is being considered as a potential future destination for Arctic LNG 2 output, according to Reuters. China is currently the project’s only buyer. Arctic LNG 2 has a maximum annual capacity of 19.8 million tonnes of LNG.

Commentary by Bellona:

South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean incurs costs over Arc7 LNG carriers built for Arctic LNG 2 ↑

According to The Korea Times, six Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers built for the Arctic LNG 2 project remain at the Hanwha Ocean shipyard in South Korea. Three vessels were intended for Sovcomflot and another three for Japan’s Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. They were due to be delivered to the customers by the end of July 2023, but the deliveries did not take place because of sanctions.

Industry sources estimate the combined value of the vessels at more than $1.56 billion. According to the publication’s calculations, Hanwha Ocean has not received at least $780 million that was due upon delivery of the carriers. The company also continues to incur costs for maintenance, electronic monitoring, periodic system start-ups and keeping the vessels at offshore anchorages.

In June, NATO held its largest air exercise and began testing uncrewed systems in the Arctic ↑

In June, NATO held Ramstein Flag 2026, its largest annual air exercise. It involved 18 countries and more than 200 aircraft. The exercise focused on collective defence, interoperability between allied air forces and the conduct of large-scale operations in a crisis. More than 150 sorties were flown each day from bases across Europe, including in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, while air operations were directed by NATO’s centre in Bodø, northern Norway.

In addition, NATO launched Task Force X-Arctic in June, an 18-month programme to test uncrewed systems for continuous monitoring of the Arctic and the High North. For the first time, NATO will test the coordinated operation of uncrewed systems in Arctic conditions, with the systems operating under human supervision to provide continuous situational awareness across the region. The first three-week phase is taking place off the coast of Iceland using the research vessel Alliance. A full-scale demonstration of the systems and their interoperability is scheduled for summer 2027.

In June, The Independent published comments by Norwegian Defence Minister Tore Sandvik on the risks posed by Russia potentially gaining greater control over the Bear Gap, the maritime corridor between mainland Norway and Svalbard. According to Sandvik, Russian control of the area could allow it to deploy weapons capable of reaching targets in Norway, the United Kingdom, Denmark and other NATO countries.

Heightened Industrial Activity in the Russian Arctic

First phase of Bukhta Sever oil terminal under Vostok Oil project scheduled for commissioning in September 2026 ↑

Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin announced this at the company’s annual shareholders’ meeting, held at the Zvezda shipbuilding complex.

The Bukhta Sever terminal is located between the Northern Sea Route port of Dikson and the Yenisei port, which is being built as part of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit development project. The first phase of Bukhta Sever is expected to have a capacity of 28.36 million tonnes per year.

According to the Northern Sea Route Development Plan through 2035, production at Vostok Oil was due to begin in 2024 and reach its full capacity of 100 million tonnes per year by 2030, more than twice the NSR’s total cargo traffic. The entire volume was to be handled through the Bukhta Sever terminal.

Trial operations have now begun at the Peschany section of the Payakha field, which is being developed as part of the project. However, it has not yet been disclosed how much terminal throughput this production will support.

Vostok Oil is Rosneft’s project to develop oil fields in the north of the Krasnoyarsk region, which, according to Igor Sechin, is expected to become a “world-class” oil cluster.

Read the new joint article by Arctida and Bellona to learn about the environmental risks posed by the extensive Vostok Oil infrastructure being built in the tundra, an ecosystem that is extremely vulnerable to external impacts.

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

Arctic Ocean ecosystem passed a point of no return in 2009, scientists warn ↑

The authors of a study published in Communications Earth & Environment in late May 2026 analysed changes in the chemical composition of Arctic Ocean seawater between 1998 and 2023. They found that its marine ecosystem had crossed a critical resilience threshold, beyond which irreversible changes are expected. According to the researchers, this point of no return was passed around 2009.

The cause is the rapid loss of sea ice, which exposes vast shallow areas of the ocean to sunlight. Phytoplankton then proliferates excessively and absorbs nitrates. When it dies, the organic matter sinks to the seabed and is decomposed by microorganisms that consume large amounts of oxygen, leading to oxygen depletion in bottom sediments. In the resulting oxygen-free environment, bacteria that break down nitrates become more active, converting them into nitrogen gas, which is permanently lost from the water to the atmosphere.

The shallow shelf areas where this process occurs cover almost half of the Arctic Ocean, but scientists identified the Chukchi and East Siberian seas as the main regions of nitrogen loss. From there, nitrate-depleted water is carried by currents further into the Arctic.

As nutrients become scarce, phytoplankton abundance declines, while larger species that play a more important role in the food chain are replaced by smaller, less significant ones. Since phytoplankton forms the foundation of the ocean food chain, these changes affect most marine life in one way or another.

Phytoplankton also absorbs large amounts of carbon dioxide, and slower growth reduces the ocean’s capacity to store carbon, affecting marine ecosystems and further exacerbating the climate crisis.

Increase in hazardous low-visibility events recorded on the Northern Sea Route ↑

Scientists at the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute found that the frequency of hazardous reductions in visibility along the Northern Sea Route has increased since the 1990s. The study used data collected between 1966 and 2021 at weather stations on Dikson Island, where part of the settlement of the same name is located, and at Cape Chelyuskin.

After the late 1990s, the long-term trend reversed: instead of declining, the frequency of conditions with horizontal visibility of 200 metres or less began to increase, reaching a peak in the mid-2010s. Across the two Arctic weather stations, the frequency of such conditions rose by around 1.5–2 times compared with the low recorded in the 1990s. It subsequently began to decline but has not returned to the previous minimum levels.

According to the scientists’ observations, low-visibility conditions have two seasonal peaks: in winter, from January to February, and in summer, in July. In winter, the main cause is blowing snow, which occurs at wind speeds of 6 metres per second or more. In summer, it is fog, which is becoming increasingly frequent. The main reason for the rise in fog frequency is the climate-driven decline in sea ice extent, which allows increasing amounts of water vapour to enter the atmosphere.

At the Cape Chelyuskin station, the summer peak in reduced visibility exceeded the winter peak for the first time in the past three decades.

“The Kara Sea is the starting point of the Northern Sea Route, the main transport corridor between Europe and Asia through the Arctic. Today, giant Arc7-class tankers up to 300 metres long sail along the route. When visibility falls below 200 metres, the safe navigation of vessels of this size becomes significantly more difficult, while visibility of 50 metres or less is classified as a hazardous weather event,” the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute said.

Bowhead whale migration routes in the eastern Arctic are changing due to shipping and declining sea ice ↑

A group of scientists from the US and the United Kingdom found that the rapid decline in sea ice extent in the Pacific Arctic, the region where the Arctic and Pacific oceans meet, is altering bowhead whale migration routes and the shipping-related risks faced by the population. The study was published in Frontiers in Marine Science. The authors analysed data on changes in sea ice extent, whale migration and vessel traffic between 2008 and 2019, focusing particularly on the exceptionally warm 2017–2018 season, when winter sea ice cover reached a record low.

Before this period, the whales migrated south through the Chukchi Sea to wintering grounds in the western Bering Sea. Their winter migration area subsequently shifted considerably further north.

As a result, the number of vessel transits through the whales’ main habitat declined: before the 2017–2018 season, an average of 234 vessels passed through their core range, compared with only 62 during that season.

As sea ice conditions recovered, the whales began returning south. However, the average speed of vessels in the area had meanwhile increased from 7.2 to 8.7 knots, raising both the risk of collisions with whales and the likelihood of serious or even fatal injuries to the animals.

The study’s authors warn that shipping in the region will continue to increase as the Arctic warms and sea ice declines. This means that climate change may simultaneously alter marine mammal migration routes and increase human pressure on their populations, which should be taken into account when planning future Arctic shipping routes.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, June 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Nevertheless, we continue to systematically monitor and analyze developments related to Rosatom’s activities that we believe are of interest to an international audience. The aim of this review is to assess the scale of Russia’s international influence in the nuclear sector, as well as the associated political, economic, and environmental risks.

This digest covers events from June 2026.

You can follow the links to read the three most recent digests covering May, April and March 2026.

Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues. Download a PDF of this digest here.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1.  The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of June 2026
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.3. External power supply to the ZNPP
1.4. Operational status of the ZNPP
1.5. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
2. UK to provide loan guarantees for enriched uranium supplies to Ukraine
3. Investigations into possible corruption at Energoatom continue
4. Bulgarian prime minister proposes completing the Belene NPP jointly with Ukraine

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
5. Urenco announces second phase of expansion at US uranium enrichment facility
6. Modernization and operation of European VVER nuclear power plants
6.1. Kozloduy NPP: Russian supplies continue as European vendors modernize equipment
6.2. Modernization of the Armenian NPP sparks disagreements with Russia
6.3. Nuclear fuel loaded into Unit 4 of the Mochovce NPP

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. New Rosatom agreements in Asia and Africa
8. Rosatom research institutes involved in import substitution of materials and equipment for microelectronics
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of June 2026

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

At the June 8–12 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi presented report GOV/2026/32 on the situation in Ukraine regarding nuclear safety, security and safeguards, covering the period from February 21 to June 1, 2026.

The report summarizes the work of the IAEA’s permanent missions at five Ukrainian nuclear sites: the Zaporizhzhia, Khmelnytskyy, South Ukraine, Rivne NPPs, and the Chernobyl NPP site. It is based on information provided to and verified by the Agency during the reporting period.

It should be noted that, although the IAEA has not explicitly identified the ZNPP as a Ukrainian nuclear facility in its official updates on the situation in Ukraine since March 2026, the report continues to state that the Agency complies with the October 2022 UN General Assembly resolution declaring that Russia’s “attempted illegal annexation” of four regions of Ukraine has no validity under international law. The report identifies the ZNPP as a Ukrainian nuclear facility.

The report focuses primarily on the impact of the ongoing hostilities on the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities.

A separate section is devoted to the situation at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP, including issues related to the plant’s external power supply, compliance with the IAEA’s five concrete principles for ensuring nuclear safety and security at the site, and military activity in the vicinity of the ZNPP. As in previous reports, the IAEA notes that its ability to conduct an impartial and independent assessment remains constrained by the continued restrictions on access to areas of the site and to information.

Throughout the reporting period, the IAEA team at the site continued to be prevented from visiting the western part of the turbine halls on all levels of all units on the basis of an assessment by Russian security personnel. As a result, the team remained unable to independently confirm whether any issues or materials were present in these parts of the turbine halls, beyond those considered in the plant’s safety demonstration, that could potentially affect the nuclear safety or security of the plant.

The IAEA team also continued to observe the presence of armed personnel and military equipment at the plant, including armored personnel carriers. No heavy weapons were observed in the areas accessible to the team during its walkdowns; however, without timely and appropriate access to all relevant areas of the plant, the Agency cannot confirm their absence.

The report also examines the impact of Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on the safe operation of the country’s other nuclear power plants. It provides information on damage to transmission lines, incidents involving the loss of off-site power, and the operation of backup power supply systems.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

In June, as in the previous month, Russia continued to report intense military activity near the Zaporizhzhia NPP to the IAEA, including incidents affecting the nearby Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant, the ZNPP transport workshop on June 13 and 18, electrical substations, vehicles used to transport plant personnel, and Enerhodar, where most ZNPP employees live and where the power supply remained unstable. Casualties among plant personnel were also reported. More detailed information is available in the information circulars submitted by Russia’s Permanent Mission in Vienna:INFCIRC/1384, INFCIRC/1385, INFCIRC/1387, INFCIRC/1389, INFCIRC/1390, INFCIRC/1392.

External power supply to the ZNPP ↑

Throughout June, as in previous months, the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 backup line remained the ZNPP’s only source of off-site power. The main 750 kV Dniprovska line had been damaged on March 24, and throughout this period the IAEA was engaged in discussions with Ukraine and Russia to agree on a localized ceasefire to enable its repair. Planning the repair work was complicated by the fact that the damaged section of the power line was located directly on the front line, high above the Dnipro River, and that a large area had to be cleared of mines before work could begin, including sections of the old riverbed that still contained water.

Finally, on June 5, a localized ceasefire was declared. However, later that same day, Rosatom reported that a Russian demining team had been attacked by a drone, injuring several military personnel.

Grossi said that, in response, Agency experts had begun monitoring the demining operations as well. In similar cases in the past, the Agency team had observed only the repair work itself.

Work to restore the damaged section of the Dniprovska line was carried out from June 19 to 22. IAEA teams observed the work from both sides of the Dnipro River. During this period, team members reported seeing unidentified drones and were forced to leave the work area on several occasions. The Russian side claimed that the ceasefire had been violated by the Ukrainian armed forces. Ukraine, in turn, stated that Russian forces themselves had used drones for demining and to monitor the progress of the work.

Nevertheless, the Dniprovska line could not be returned to operation in June because the damage was not limited to the section along the front line. Ukraine reported that on May 22, Russian military activity had caused a fire at the 750 kV Dniprovska substation, located more than 100 km northwest of the ZNPP. This substation is connected to the line that provides off-site power to the plant. The substation sustained significant damage and had not yet been restored by the end of June.

Against this backdrop, the ZNPP switched to its emergency diesel generators on four occasions during the reporting period following the loss of the Ferosplavna-1 line: on June 3; for 15 hours on June 5; from June 10 to 13; and on June 20.

Operational status of the ZNPP ↑

In an information circular for IAEA member states dated June 4, Russia provided an update on the situation at the ZNPP. The document covers the period since February 14. As in similar circulars covering earlier periods, it describes the situation regarding the plant’s water supply, radiation monitoring, visits to plant facilities by IAEA personnel—the IAEA mission participated in 31 of the 77 regulatory oversight activities conducted by Rostechnadzor— and staffing at the plant. According to the circular, as of May 22, the plant had a total workforce of 4,376.

For comparison, similar circulars issued by Russia’s Permanent Mission in Vienna reported staffing levels of 4,414 in February 2026, 4,452 in November 2025, 4,817 in August 2025, 4,936 in June 2025, and 4,966 in February 2025. Some of the circulars specify that these figures refer to the number of employment contracts concluded.

The staffing situation was also addressed in the report presented by Grossi to the Board of Governors on June 8. According to the report, staffing levels have remained relatively stable over the past two years. Based on the information provided, the plant currently employs about 5,000 people, including 600 contractor personnel and between 90 and 100 employees from Russian nuclear power plants, primarily operating staff, including control room operators. Recruitment is also underway to fill an additional 120 positions.

Russian representatives at the plant consider the current staffing level sufficient to maintain the reactors safely in cold shutdown. At the same time, they estimate that operating the power units in power generation mode would require a total workforce of between 7,000 and 7,500 employees.

The report notes that the IAEA team at the ZNPP regularly discusses staffing levels, personnel training, and the plant’s technical status with staff. At the same time, the team observed that, in some cases, the presence of security personnel reduced employees’ willingness to speak openly.

Beginning May 12, the ZNPP switched from eight-hour to 12-hour shifts. Plant management told the IAEA team that the main reason for the change was to avoid personnel traveling at night because of increased drone activity in the vicinity of the plant.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

In June, as in previous months, the IAEA teams at Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants—the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne, and South Ukraine NPPs—as well as at the Chernobyl NPP site, reported drone overflights in the areas they monitor (Updates 353–356). At the Chernobyl NPP site, the team also reported fires in the exclusion zone at locations where drones had crashed.

On June 7, a drone strike damaged the container reception building at the Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF), located in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Although the building was not yet being used to store spent nuclear fuel, it is located only a few hundred meters from the site where spent fuel casks are stored. As a result of the strike, the southern part of the building sustained significant damage. On June 19, Energoatom announced that it planned to repair the damaged facilities using its own resources within six weeks.

The CSFSF had received its operating license on May 28, marking the completion of Ukraine’s own spent nuclear fuel management system, independent of Russia. Rumina Velshi, Chair of Energoatom’s Supervisory Board, said that Russia’s strike against a peaceful civilian nuclear facility constituted a violation of the UN Charter and the IAEA Statute.

Commentary by Bellona:

UK to provide loan guarantees for enriched uranium supplies to Ukraine ↑

On June 15, the UK government announced that its export credit agency, UK Export Finance, would provide £210 million in loan guarantees for Energoatom. The guarantees are intended to secure stable supplies of enriched uranium from Urenco to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants over the next two years.

The supplies are being delivered under an agreement signed by Urenco and Energoatom in November 2023. The agreement remains in force until 2035, with an option to extend it through 2043. Natural uranium is supplied by the Canadian company Cameco.

This is not the first time the UK has provided such support. In August 2023, it announced £192 million in loan guarantees for enriched uranium supplies. In 2024, backed by these guarantees, Energoatom obtained £181 million in loans from Deutsche Bank AG and Barclays Bank PLC. According to Energoatom, the company met all its financial obligations to Urenco in full and on time in 2024–2025.

Commentary by Bellona:

Investigations into possible corruption at Energoatom continue ↑

Energoatom reported that on June 25, law enforcement agencies carried out investigative actions at the Khmelnytskyy NPP site in connection with specific procurement procedures carried out in previous years. The pre-trial investigation concerns the possible embezzlement and misappropriation of UAH 12 million.

In November 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) uncovered a large-scale corruption scheme at Energoatom. Amid the scandal, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers dissolved Energoatom’s Supervisory Board later that month. On December 26, 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court extended the pre-trial investigation into the Energoatom corruption case until August 10, 2026.

A new Supervisory Board was appointed in January 2026. On May 8, the Board received information from NABU indicating possible criminal conduct by Energoatom employees and ordered an internal investigation.

Bulgarian prime minister proposes completing the Belene NPP jointly with Ukraine ↑

On July 3, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said that during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in June, the two had discussed the ongoing negotiations between Bulgaria and Ukraine over the sale of equipment from the suspended Belene NPP project to complete units at units at the Khmelnytskyy NPP. According to Radev, Zelenskyy again proposed purchasing the reactors. Radev, however, responded by proposing that Bulgaria and Ukraine jointly complete the Belene NPP with support from European funds and supply electricity to Ukraine via Romania.

Negotiations on the sale of equipment from the Belene NPP project to Ukraine began in July 2023. In March 2025, the Ukrainian government authorized Energoatom to conclude an equipment purchase agreement with the Bulgarian state-owned energy company NEK EAD. However, this decision was followed in April by statements from some Bulgarian government representatives that negotiations on the sale of the reactors had been suspended.

The InfoAtom.news article presents the assessment of Bogomil Manchev, head of the Bulgarian Atomic Forum Bulatom, of the proposal to resume construction of the Belene NPP jointly with Ukraine, the project’s prospects, and the possibility of using the equipment intended for Belene at the Khmelnytskyy NPP.

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Urenco announces second phase of expansion at US uranium enrichment facility ↑

On June 2, Urenco USA announced an expansion of enrichment capacity at its facility in Eunice, New Mexico. The company plans to increase the facility’s annual capacity by 2.1 million separative work units (SWU) by 2036 through the installation of up to 24 new centrifuge cascades. The first cascades are expected to begin enriching uranium in 2032. Construction of a new enrichment plant at the facility is scheduled to begin in 2029.

Urenco’s current annual enrichment capacity in the United States is 4.3 million SWU, covering approximately one-third of current US demand. In July 2023, Urenco announced its first US production expansion program, which is expected to increase the facility’s annual capacity by 700,000 SWU by 2027.

The expansion began in October 2024. The first face of new cascades entered operation in May 2025, followed by the second in September, the third in December 2025, and the fourth in April 2026, marking the completion of half of the program. On June 29, the company announced that the fifth cascade had entered operation.

With the new expansion program and the refurbishment of existing capacity, installed capacity at the facility is expected to grow to more than 7 million SWU.

The announced US expansion is part of Urenco Global’s program to add a total of 4.6 million SWU per year of new uranium enrichment capacity over the next decade across the company’s facilities in the United States, the Netherlands, and Germany.

The enrichment plant in Eunice is currently the only commercial producer of low-enriched uranium in the United States. At the same time, as part of its program to strengthen domestic nuclear fuel supply chains, the US government is funding projects to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) and high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) by several other companies: Centrus Energy, Orano Federal Services, Global Laser Enrichment, and General Matter.

Commentary by Bellona:

Modernization and operation of European VVER nuclear power plants

Kozloduy NPP: Russian supplies continue as European vendors modernize equipment ↑

• Bulgaria again grants a sanctions exemption for Russian supplies to the Kozloduy NPP
• Pilot operation of the Czech Reactor Rod Control System begins at Units 5 and 6

On June 10, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers granted the Kozloduy NPP another authorization permitting derogations from the requirements of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning sanctions against Russia. The authorizations allow the plant to work with Russian contractors and import iron and steel products from Russia needed to fulfill previously concluded contracts until those contracts expire. Information on these contracts has not been published on the government website.

The need to continue working with Russian suppliers stems from the fact that a significant share of the plant’s systems and equipment is of Russian origin. As a result, some contracts for the supply of goods required for the reliable and safe operation of Units 5 and 6 of the Kozloduy NPP have been or will have to be concluded with Russian contractors because of the technical characteristics of the equipment.

The Bulgarian government grants such authorizations to the Kozloduy NPP on a regular basis. This year, for example, similar authorizations were also issued on February 4 and March 25.

Earlier this year, Unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP was taken offline several times to replace failed rupture disks manufactured by a Bulgarian company as substitutes for the original Russian components.

At a hearing in Bulgaria’s National Assembly, Kozloduy NPP Executive Director Ivan Andreev explained that the shift to Bulgarian rupture disks followed the termination in August 2025 of a contract for the supply of Russian rupture disk assemblies signed in October 2024. The stated reason was that, after the Council of Ministers authorized the procurement in May 2025, the Russian supplier requested changes to the contract terms, citing changes in market conditions since the contract had been signed.

Meanwhile, on June 22, the Ukrainian group of companies Energy Safety Group announced that the Reactor Rod Control System (RRCS) at Units 5 and 6 of the Kozloduy NPP had entered pilot operation. In the RRCS modernization project, the group is partnering with the Czech company ZAT, which signed a contract with the Kozloduy NPP in March 2023 to implement the project.

ZAT noted that the Bulgarian plant was the last site with VVER reactors in the EU where its RRCS had not yet been deployed. The company emphasized that replacing the RRCS equipment creates the technical conditions for a subsequent transition to non-Russian reactor rod control drives.

Modernization of the Armenian NPP sparks disagreements with Russia ↑

On June 16, the Armenian NPP press service reported that, as part of an EU-funded project to support nuclear safety in Armenia and implement measures identified following the stress tests, independent equipment for alternative water supply under emergency conditions had been delivered to the plant.

The project, implemented by the Slovak company VÚEZ, included the supply of equipment providing alternative water injection to the primary circuit, steam generators, spent fuel cooling pools,the service water system spray pond, and demineralized water storage tanks.

For many years, the EU has provided financial support to Armenia for the implementation of the measures set out in the national action plan developed following the safety stress tests conducted at the Armenian NPP after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In 2024, for example, the EU allocated €12.9 million to Armenia, while Dalgakiran Compressor Ukraine LLC, together with ES GROUP EUROPE, supplied mobile diesel generators to the Armenian NPP.

At the same time, the Armenian NPP continues to implement the program to extend the operating lifetime of Unit 2 until 2036. Rosatom is carrying out modernization and preparatory work under an agreement worth approximately $65 million, signed in December 2023.

In April 2026, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk stated that Rosatom was responsible for approximately one-third of the work required for the unit’s lifetime extension. According to him, Armenia has assigned the remaining work to Western contractors, who do not coordinate their activities with the plant’s general designer. He also said that Rosatom’s guarantee of the plant’s safe operation through 2036 is conditional on the state corporation carrying out at least 70% of the work covered by the agreement.

On June 3, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said that the Armenian authorities were carrying out work at the nuclear power plant with Western contractors without coordinating it with the Russian side and were negotiating supplies of an alternative to Russian nuclear fuel. “This could not only result in the loss of the guarantee, but could also lead to a disaster,” he said.

Nuclear fuel loaded into Unit 4 of the Mochovce NPP ↑

On June 29, Slovenské elektrárne began loading nuclear fuel into the VVER-440 reactor of Unit 4 at the Mochovce NPP. By July 4, all 349 fuel assemblies had been loaded.

Construction of Units 3 and 4 of the Mochovce NPP under a Soviet design began in 1987. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and due to a lack of funding, work was suspended in 1991. Construction resumed in 2008. After 2010, equipment for the project was supplied by Western vendors, including Rolls-Royce, Siemens, Framatome, Doosan, and others. Unit 3 entered commercial operation in October 2023.

Further details on preparations for the operation of Unit 4 at the Mochovce NPP, the reasons for the exceptionally long construction period, and the final cost of the two units are available in an interview with Branislav Strýček, CEO of Slovenské elektrárne.

Unit 4 of the Mochovce NPP, like the plant’s other nuclear power units and those at the Bohunice NPP, will for the time being operate on Russian fuel. Slovenské elektrárne, like the other operators of VVER reactors in Europe, has agreements with Western fuel suppliers Westinghouse and Framatome.

Westinghouse is currently in the process of licensing its VVER-440 fuel for Units 1 and 2 of the Mochovce NPP. Under the contract signed in 2024, deliveries of Framatome fuel were scheduled to begin in 2027. Framatome plans to begin supplying the first lead fuel assemblies of its own sovereign design in 2028.

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

New Rosatom agreements in Asia and Africa ↑

Laos. On June 15, Russia and Laos signed a framework intergovernmental agreement in Moscow on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement establishes the legal framework for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear sector and, according to Rosatom, will make it possible to begin assessing the potential for a Russian-designed nuclear power plant project in Laos. As an initial step, the parties plan to prepare a preliminary feasibility study to determine the optimal configuration of a nuclear power plant for Laos’s power system and identify potential sites for its construction.

According to Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, Laos is most likely to be offered a land-based small modular nuclear power plant.

It should be noted that Laos and Rosatom agreed to develop cooperation in the nuclear sector as early as 2016, when they signed a memorandum of cooperation.

Egypt. On June 17, Rosatom Construction Technologies and the Egyptian Healthcare Authority signed a cooperation agreement, confirming their intention to work jointly on a project to establish a nuclear medicine center in Egypt.

Uzbekistan. On June 26, Rosatom Technical Academy, a training center for the nuclear industry, and the Atomic Energy Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan signed a cooperation agreement in the field of nuclear medicine and related areas.

The document sets out the main areas of cooperation between the two organizations, including the development of nuclear medicine infrastructure in Uzbekistan, the training and professional development of relevant specialists, and the systematic exchange of scientific and technical information.

Rwanda. On June 30, Russia and Rwanda held the first meeting of their Joint Coordinating Committee on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, during which they signed a roadmap for the development of a small modular reactor project.

Vietnam. On June 30, Rosatom’s Fuel Division and Vietnam’s national oil and gas corporation, Petrovietnam, signed a memorandum of cooperation on establishing an additive technologies center in Vietnam. The center will be used to produce complex components for drilling and pumping equipment.

Rosatom research institutes involved in import substitution of materials and equipment for microelectronics ↑

On June 16, Rosatom reported that enterprises of its Science Division—NII NPO Luch JSC and Giredmet JSC—had completed a government contract for the import substitution of red phosphorus used in microelectronics. They developed their own technology for producing high-purity red phosphorus and phosphorus oxychloride, which are required for the manufacture of semiconductor devices and integrated circuits by microelectronics companies.

The project took two and a half years to complete. Giredmet specialists prepared the full set of process documentation, while a production area with a process line was established at the Luch site in Podolsk. The line was commissioned in 2025.

According to the Russian IT publication CNews, another Rosatom research institute, NIIgrafit JSC, signed a contract with the Ministry of Industry and Trade on June 19 to develop, by the end of 2028, a ceramic tape casting system. The system is intended for the production of ceramic substrates and multilayer ceramic substrates used in microelectronic component packaging. The equipment under development is intended to serve as a functional analogue of Slovenia’s KEKO CAM-C35 system from the CAM-C series.

According to CNews, on July 3, NII NPO Luch JSC was awarded a contract to develop an ion implantation metrology system for semiconductor wafers up to 200 mm in diameter. The system is intended to replace US-made KLA-Tencor equipment, specifically the ThermaProbe TP500 and TP630 models. The work is to be completed by October 2029.

In addition, CNews reported that on July 6, another Rosatom research institute, RFNC-VNIIEF, signed a contract to develop wafer bonding and debonding systems. They are intended to replace equipment produced by Austria’s EV Group—the EVG®510 and EVG®850 DB—and Germany’s SUSS MicroTec—the XBS300 and XBC300 Gen2.

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On June 3, a set of four steam generators for Unit 4 was delivered to the construction site.

On June 9, 163 dummy fuel assemblies were loaded into the reactor core of Unit 1. These assemblies fully replicate the design, weight, and dimensions of nuclear fuel but do not contain nuclear material. The loading marks the final stage of preparations for cold and hot functional testing of the equipment.

On June 22, a Rosatom delegation led by Director General Alexey Likhachev visited the construction site. The same day, cold hydrostatic testing of the Unit 1 reactor plant began to verify the leak-tightness and strength of its components. This stage includes flushing of the primary and secondary circuits, establishment of the water chemistry regime, and verification of the reactor plant’s and primary circuit equipment’s thermal-hydraulic, strength, vibration, and dynamic characteristics.

Likhachev stated that the first criticality of the Unit 1 reactor is scheduled for this autumn.

On June 29, the inner containment dome was placed in its design position at Unit 2 of the Akkuyu NPP. This operation completed the formation of the unit’s inner containment.

Kudankulam NPP, India. On June 8, Rosatom reported that the Machine-Building Plant in Elektrostal had manufactured nuclear fuel for the initial core loading of Unit 4 at the Kudankulam NPP.

On June 15, the reactor pressure vessel of Unit 5 was placed in its design position at the Kudankulam NPP construction site.

Uzbekistan. On June 4, the first concrete was poured for the foundation slab of the first unit equipped with a RITM-200N reactor plant at the integrated nuclear power plant. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and President of Russia took part in the ceremony by video link. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi delivered a welcome address to participants at the site.

According to Azim Akhmedkhadjayev, Director of the Atomic Energy Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers, Uzatom, construction of the plant will cost $9.5 billion. Uzbekistan intends to finance 85–90% of the total project cost through loans.

Xudapu NPP, China. On June 2, hot functional testing was completed at Unit 3, providing a comprehensive check of the unit’s systems under conditions as close as possible to normal operation. The next stage is nuclear fuel loading.

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. June 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

In September 2026, Rosneft plans to begin the first oil shipments from the coast of the Taymyr Peninsula as part of its Vostok Oil megaproject. The idea for the project was first put forward in 2019 by Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, who promised to create a “world-class” oil cluster and to secure cargo flow along the Northern Sea Route. The plan includes building two thousand kilometers of trunk pipelines and roughly seven thousand kilometers of inter-field pipelines.

Rosneft projected high profitability for the project, citing the eco-friendliness of the Arctic oil, which the company claims will meet “the growing needs of the global economy for eco-friendly energy resources.” Vostok Oil was originally supposed to launch in 2024. Two years behind schedule, the project now aims to ship around 30 million tons of oil by December 2026. Throughout this time, the company has been building large-scale infrastructure in the tundra zone of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Krasnoyarsk Krai – a zone that is extremely sensitive to external disturbance.

Industrial development comes at a high cost to the Arctic. And this isn’t just about the trillions of rubles invested in the project itself. The Arctic is more vulnerable to human impact than other regions. Oil development places significant strain on northern territories and carries growing risks for ecosystems and for the stability of infrastructure built on permafrost. All of this is unfolding against a backdrop of Russia’s aging oil pipeline infrastructure and chronic oil leaks.

Oil Cluster in Risk Zone

More than two thousand square kilometers of Black Sea coastal waters were contaminated with fuel oil after the Volgoneft tanker wreck; 20,000 tons of diesel fuel spilled into the tundra and rivers near Norilsk following a fuel tank accident; dozens of tons of oil ended up in the soil and the Kolva River in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug after a pipeline rupture. These are just a few of the major accidents in recent years that have released oil products into the environment. We often find out about oil spills through media reports that focus on the largest incidents. But the problem of oil leaks is far broader than that.

Causing serious harm to nature and people doesn’t require spilling tons of fuel all at once;  regular, localized pipeline ruptures occur constantly across Russia and attract almost no attention, while still inflicting irreparable damage on the environment. Oil pollution hits the Arctic even harder than other regions: low temperatures, the effects of the climate crisis, unstable permafrost soils, and the remoteness of these territories all raise the risk of oil spills, posing a significant threat to the region’s fragile ecosystem.

Oil is currently extracted actively in the Komi Republic, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Barents Sea shelf, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and Krasnoyarsk Krai.

The Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Krasnoyarsk Krai together account for a significant share of all oil extracted in Russia’s Arctic zone (AZRF): by some estimates, around 65% and 27% respectively. For Krasnoyarsk Krai, a large portion of that output comes from the Vankor cluster of fields in the north of the region, where Rosneft launched industrial development and extraction 17 years ago. Alongside it, Rosneft’s sphere of interest also includes the Payakha cluster of fields on the Taymyr Peninsula. In total, 13 fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Krasnoyarsk Krai form a resource base of 6.5 to 7 billion tons of oil for Rosneft’s Arctic megaproject Vostok Oil.

The core task of Vostok Oil is to link these Arctic fields into a single transport network connecting them to the Sever Bay port on the Kara Sea. From there, oil will be shipped by tankers along the Northern Sea Route to markets in the Asia-Pacific region and India. To this end, Rosneft is building enormous infrastructure that includes two thousand kilometers of trunk pipelines and roughly seven thousand kilometers of inter-field pipelines.

As of June 2026, an estimated 700 kilometers of pipeline have already been welded, and according to Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, the Bukhta Sever port will be ready to begin shipping oil as early as September, becoming a key oil hub in the Russian Arctic.

Building Vostok Oil has required enormous investment, estimated in 2024 at 11.8 trillion rubles (approximately €118 billion, based on the average exchange rate for 2024). That is one-third more than the planned budget expenditure for the entire Healthcare Development state program until 2030.

At the same time, the new pipelines are being built not to replace but to supplement the existing infrastructure, and so they do nothing to solve the problem of persistent oil leaks across the Arctic’s oil-and-gas regions: pipeline ruptures and oil leaks of varying scale occur continuously across the northern oil regions.

Pipes Age, Oil Leaks

About 90% of such accidents are caused by metal corrosion. More than 250,000 kilometers of oil pipelines run across Russia, and more than half of them are worn out. Among Russian companies, this figure ranges from 35% to over 80%. Rosneft, for instance, has 59% of its pipelines in a deteriorated state. This is largely because companies often continue to use infrastructure dating back to the Soviet era. In the absence of strict legal limits on service life, they can extend the operating life of old pipelines again and again.

To reduce the scale of pipeline ruptures, experts from environmental organizations propose capping the service life of oil pipelines, setting a maximum limit of 25–30 years.

“Any oil spill is somebody’s fault and somebody’s failure to do their job properly: there’s always a human factor involved, a desire to cut costs on quality, on the scope of pipeline diagnostics,” explains Sergei (name changed to protect the person’s identity), an environmental activist and resident of one of the Arctic oil-producing regions. According to him, oil spills and leaks appeared as soon as oil extraction began. But today the spills are becoming larger simply because production volumes have grown.

In the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug alone, inspections carried out from 2022 to 2024 revealed regular, monthly oil spill incidents at RN-Purneftegaz, a Rosneft subsidiary. The Okrug’s Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection assessed the scale of the identified contamination at 6.8 hectares and 82.4 million rubles in damages. And in 2024, inspections on forest fund land being developed by RN-Purneftegaz and Kharampurneftegaz (a Rosneft subsidiary) LLC found contamination covering 17.5 hectares, with damages estimated at 244 million rubles.

Data on the real scale of contamination remain fragmentary, much like the reports of oil spills themselves; the overall picture can only be pieced together from inspection results, official data, and media reports, which capture only part of the problem.

Pipes on Melting Ground

According to Ministry of Natural Resources estimates from as early as 2022, about 40% of infrastructure built on permafrost had already been deformed. Permafrost thaw is directly linked to the intense impact of climate change on the Arctic – the fastest-warming region in the world, where average temperatures are rising 3 to 4 times faster than the global average. Scientists project that for every 1.1-degree rise in temperature, thaw could destroy 3.9 million square kilometers of permafrost territory.

Arctic infrastructure was often built with the expectation of solid, permanently frozen ground. But as the Arctic warms, the surface layers of permafrost thaw, and roads, homes, industrial facilities, and infrastructure lose their stability.

Forecasts suggest that by 2050, the bearing capacity of soils across 70% of Russia’s Arctic zone will decline by 15% or more. The potential economic damage from permafrost thaw could reach five to ten trillion rubles, with direct losses to industry and energy amounting to as much as five trillion rubles annually, according to Mikhail Yulkin, founder and CEO of CarbonLab.

Given these high risks, companies are paying increasing attention to the problem of soil thaw, but because of the sheer scale of the infrastructure and of the permafrost itself, which covers 65% of Russia’s territory, monitoring soil temperatures everywhere is an extremely difficult task – not just at the corporate level, but at the state level as well. Russia still lacks a unified monitoring system. As Sergei Muzychenko, Deputy Head of the Ministry of Construction, has noted, facilities designed for 50 years or more of operation are effectively being engineered with little insight into the conditions they will face over their lifetime.

How Russia is trying to build a system for monitoring permafrost thaw

In 2022, Norilsk Nickel took 50 buildings in Norilsk out of operation due to ground shifts and installed temperature monitoring. Such additional oversight requires major expenditure: the company announced plans to invest 12.4 billion rubles in a geotechnical monitoring system for the Norilsk industrial district and reported the creation of a dispatch center.

Efforts to track the permafrost thaw process are also underway at the state level. A presidential directive to build a unified database based on Roshydromet was issued five years ago. In 2023, this task was written into the updated Fundamentals of Russian State Policy in the Arctic through 2035. As of early 2026, according to Aleksander Makarov of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, 78 monitoring stations were operating across 12 regions, including the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Krasnoyarsk Krai. That amounts to roughly 60% of the planned network for the state’s background permafrost monitoring system. Completing the remaining plan, Makarov said, depends on the availability of funding.

At a session of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences in April 2026, participants noted that a unified monitoring system needs to include not only background monitoring but also geotechnical monitoring. At present, such observations are carried out by individual companies, which track around ten thousand boreholes, but there is no shared database, and monitoring remains fragmented. According to Mikhail Zheleznyak, director of the Institute of Permafrost Studies at the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, building a unified permafrost monitoring system would cost 12 billion rubles.

According to scientific estimates, 45% of hydrocarbon deposits in the Russian Arctic are located in regions where soil thaw could cause serious damage to infrastructure, including oil pipelines.

Construction at polar latitudes is usually carried out in winter, at extremely low temperatures around minus 40 degrees Celsius; once operational, the pipelines carry oil products whose temperature can be well above freezing. This significant temperature contrast causes the metal to expand thermally. Combined with thawing soils, this can lead to pipeline deformation. Construction work also destroys vegetation cover, which disrupts the thermal balance of the permafrost, causing the soil to warm and thaw even further.

Seasonal processes create additional risks for pipelines. In winter, moisture within the soil migrates toward colder zones and freezes. The expanding ice forms frost heaves and icing mounds that can push the pipeline upward, causing geodetic shifts and ruptures. In summer, the reverse process occurs: the underground ice that expanded over winter thaws, which can cause the ground to subside and the pipe to sag.

This technology is still used today. Thermosyphons are most effective precisely under conditions of a large temperature difference between soil and air – meaning they work best during harsh polar winters. But because winters in Alaska, as in the Russian Arctic, are becoming milder, and average air temperatures are gradually rising, this technology is steadily losing its effectiveness. This is compounded by the fact that thermosyphons can only cool the permafrost within a limited zone along the pipeline itself, while the surrounding ground continues to thaw and shift.

At current rates of warming, localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. And that crisis, in turn, is being worsened in part by the very oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.

How Oil Poisons the Environment

Rosneft presents Vostok Oil as a “green” project and claims it will “meet the growing needs of the global economy for environmentally friendly energy resources.” The company points to the low sulfur content of the fuel, measures to utilize associated petroleum gas, and plans to build supporting renewable energy capacity.

But such measures don’t make oil environmentally friendly. Oil products make a significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution when burned, and when spilled, they poison soils, bodies of water, and marine ecosystems.

A major accident isn’t necessary to cause significant, lasting environmental damage. Regular, ongoing impacts – such as leaks from oil pipelines – are enough on their own. Studies have shown that for soils in the middle taiga and Western Siberia, destructive processes begin once oil products reach a concentration of 50 grams of oil per kilogram of soil.

Because of its composition, a spill contaminates the environment on several levels at once. Volatile compounds (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene) enter the air and seep into groundwater, spreading toxic contamination far beyond the site of the spill. Heavier fractions – resins, asphaltenes, and fuel oil – remain on the surface, forming a barrier that blocks air, water, and nutrients from reaching the soil, effectively cutting plants and soil organisms off from what they need to survive.

Seeping through the ground or entering bodies of water directly, oil products form a film that also blocks oxygen from reaching the water. They also coat any living organisms that come into contact with them – mammals and birds, for instance – in a toxic film.

The polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and heavy metals contained in oil can accumulate in organisms and travel up the food chain, moving from soil to plants, animals, and humans. In fish, plankton, birds, mammals, and reptiles, they cause developmental abnormalities, reduced reproductive capacity, and poisoning that ultimately leads to death.

According to environmental activist Sergei, if a spill isn’t contained, the oil ends up in waterways: “That’s a real disaster for local people, who end up dealing with the consequences of the spill. Especially for those who end up ingesting oil products through fish meat, through animal meat, through milk – if the cows were grazing in meadows where the oil spilled. Often people simply aren’t given reliable information about the condition of their drinking water sources, their rivers. The information is most likely being withheld by the Emergency Situations Ministry or Rospotrebnadzor.”

But even when a spill is contained, it’s impossible to fully eliminate the negative effects of oil contamination, and the environment can take decades to recover.

In the Arctic, low temperatures and the particular nature of the soil slow the breakdown of these compounds even further, meaning toxic substances persist in the environment far longer than they would, say, in chernozem soil conditions. This is critically dangerous for the fragile ecosystems of the northern regions, which are already under strain from a changing environment amid abnormal temperature increases. A separate problem is the release of oil products into the northern seas. Vostok Oil plans to use its pipeline infrastructure to channel oil from fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Krasnoyarsk Krai to the Bukhta Sever  port on the Yenisei Gulf shore of the Taymyr Peninsula. According to Rosneft representatives, the project’s core objective is to contribute to increasing cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route.

The company plans to transport petroleum products along the NSR using Arc7 ice-class tankers. Ten such tankers have been commissioned from the Zvezda shipyard, the only shipyard in Russia capable of building and servicing high ice-class tankers. These tankers can only cross ice up to 2.1 meters thick – relatively thin by NSR standards – without icebreaker escort. But ice thickness along the route varies by season and formation conditions, and can reach up to three meters.

“The risk of an oil or fuel spill from Arc7 tankers is fairly low, especially since new tankers are planned for use. But given Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and international sanctions on Russian oil, there’s a real possibility that during the summer-fall navigation season, shadow-fleet tankers without ice class will be sent to ship oil directly to Asian buyers – and that’s a genuine accident and spill risk. Shadow-fleet tankers tend to be old, carry questionable insurance, and are often in unknown technical condition,” says Ksenia Vakhrusheva, an expert with the Arctic project of the Bellona international environmental organization.

The harsh conditions and often unpredictable ice situation along the Northern Sea Route create risks of accidents involving oil spills. In Arctic waters, cleaning up such spills is practically impossible. The length of the NSR, the difficulty of navigating the route, and the lack of infrastructure all slow down the emergency response.

The oil film that forms on the surface after a spill can also seep under the ice, which, due to its porous structure, absorbs the spilled oil products and subsequently carries the contamination over enormous distances. In addition, oil becomes more viscous in cold water and retains its toxicity longer than it would in warm water.

Such spills are often fatal for Arctic wildlife. Oil products that coat fur and feathers destroy the animal’s insulation; animals and birds die quickly as they are no longer able to protect themselves from the cold.

It’s worth noting that transporting oil products along the Northern Sea Route affects the environment even without accidents or spills, simply because of the heavy fuel oil used by ships. Burning this fuel produces greenhouse gas emissions and black carbon – soot that settles on surfaces, directly polluting the environment and reducing the reflectivity (albedo) of ice. Once released into the atmosphere, black carbon traps heat 1,600 times more effectively than carbon dioxide. Ice coated in oil or black soot absorbs more heat and melts faster, further accelerating the warming of the Arctic.

Why Oversight Doesn’t Work

It is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies operating in the Arctic and other regions to pay fines and compensation for environmental damage than to invest systematically in spill prevention and the replacement of aging pipelines, as the cost of overhauling or replacing old pipelines far exceeds the one-off penalties.

Transneft, the operator of Russia’s pipeline infrastructure, allocates around 250 billion rubles annually for pipeline repair and reconstruction. Meanwhile, underinvestment in the modernization of Rosneft’s pipelines in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug alone was estimated at roughly 200 billion rubles annually back in 2018. Yet fines and compensation payments for individual accidents typically amount to only tens or hundreds of millions of rubles – as seen, for example, in the results of forest fund inspections in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

Under these conditions, companies may treat environmental payments as an operational risk rather than a reason to make long-term investments in infrastructure. In other words, this approach allows environmental liability to function as a kind of “spill tax” rather than as a tool for reducing risk and preventing future accidents.

In addition, because pipeline infrastructure stretches across such vast distances, “minor” spills are difficult to track and easier to conceal. They often occur in remote, sparsely populated areas that regulatory bodies don’t always reach, and companies can simply ignore photo and video evidence from eyewitnesses. Under Russian law, even fines for failing to report an oil spill do not exceed one million rubles for companies.

Anna Yezhak, a Greenpeace expert for Central and Eastern Europe, points out that the Arctic also has a number of inherent characteristics that make monitoring difficult in the region: it is a vast but sparsely populated territory with poorly developed transport infrastructure and extreme climatic conditions. Under such conditions, promptly detecting and cleaning up spills is difficult even setting aside the institutional constraints of present-day Russia.

Environmental activist Sergei echoes this: “A significant number of spills happen in hard-to-reach places. We simply can’t track them – in the sense that we can’t physically get there. It’s remote, there are checkpoints. So we don’t actually know how the government agencies operate there, or whether they even show up.”

The monitoring problem is also borne out by wildly divergent estimates. While still serving as Minister of Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection, Sergei Donskoy said that, according to public environmental organizations, equipment wear and tear causes more than 25,000 accidental spills in Russia every year, but no more than 5,000 of them come to the attention of regulatory bodies. Estimates of the volume of contamination diverge even more sharply: oil companies reported no more than 10,000 tons of oil products spilled per year, while public organizations estimated the true figure at more than 1.5 million tons.

Environmental activist Sergei believes that part of the monitoring problem could be addressed through greater openness and public oversight. According to him, modern communication tools would make it possible to give the public access to information about the condition of oil facilities, but companies withhold it under the pretext of security. Under that same pretext, he says, local residents are barred from areas where they used to fish, hunt, and gather mushrooms, and where drilling rigs and wells now stand instead. “What matters is openness, accessibility for independent [monitoring], and the role of public oversight by local residents, who have no stake in any corrupt schemes,” Sergei concludes.

According to Anna Yezhak, the situation with spill and leak monitoring is further worsened by the degradation of environmental oversight more broadly. Regional environmental agencies are effectively dependent on extractive corporations, grassroots environmental oversight has been suppressed by repressive legislation, and environmental information can be withheld under the pretext of protecting commercial confidentiality. At the same time, the redirection of government funds toward military needs has left environmental program budgets underfunded.

“The international sanctions and capital flight that followed the invasion of Ukraine have deprived businesses both of access to advanced monitoring systems and of any incentive to invest in the long-term modernization of infrastructure,” Anna Yezhak adds.

Expansion at the Arctic’s Expense

Oil production in the Arctic has significant, wide-ranging impacts on the region’s climate and ecosystems. New oil projects bring additional greenhouse gas emissions, increased shipping and black carbon emissions, as well as expanded pipeline infrastructure built on increasingly unstable thawing permafrost – creating more potential sources of leaks.

Many such leaks may go unrecorded in official statistics and receive little media attention. Smaller spills in hard-to-reach areas are more difficult to detect, verify, and bring into the public eye: they do not always come to the attention of regulators and rarely receive broad coverage. As a result, environmental damage may continue to accumulate quietly, while climate-related risks to oil infrastructure continue to grow.

As long as penalties for individual violations remain negligible compared with the cost of upgrading infrastructure and preventing accidents, it is cheaper to compensate for damage already done than to invest in preventing it. Environmentalists, activists, and entire organizations are facing increasing pressure from the state. In addition, the government is limiting the capacity of independent environmental oversight mechanisms. New oil megaprojects like Vostok Oil will add further harm and new risks on top of the enormous damage the oil industry has already inflicted on the Arctic’s environment and its people over decades.

Russian, and before that Soviet, extractive industry has never shown much concern for the Arctic environment, as evidenced by the industrial clusters around Norilsk, Vorkuta, Murmansk, and Usinsk. Now, in the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, as Russia tries to sell its resources on the world market while circumventing international sanctions, there are reasons to believe that environmental considerations rank near the bottom of Rosneft’s priorities for developing the Arctic.

“Right now, the Russian state and its extractive companies continue to treat the region as a source of natural resources – the priority of economically developing the Arctic is declared in every official document,” says Ksenia Vakhrusheva, an expert with the Arctic project of the Bellona international environmental organization. “And this ‘development’ is happening with no regard for the ecological condition of a region that is especially vulnerable to human impact. Russia’s oil extraction in the Arctic makes a substantial contribution to worsening global climate change, pollutes the environment for decades to come, and the proceeds from oil sales go toward continuing the war in Ukraine. To reduce these negative consequences under current conditions, it’s necessary to limit Russia’s ability to build oil-extraction infrastructure and sell Arctic oil on the international market.”

The post Oil Pipeline on Thin Ice appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for April can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in May
2. In May, eight nuclear-powered icebreakers operated along the Northern Sea Route
3. Russia’s EMERCOM opens Arctic integrated emergency rescue center in Sabetta
4. Sovcomflot’s revenue for the first quarter of 2026 increased by 60% to $444 million
5. The Russian government is seeking off-budget sources of additional funding for the construction of the new nuclear icebreakers Leningrad and Stalingrad, as well as a support vessel for their operation

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. The United Kingdom banned the provision of services for the maritime transport of Russian LNG, while exempting Yamal LNG. It also allowed the import of diesel fuel and jet fuel produced from Russian crude oil in third countries
7. South Korea’s National Assembly adopted a Special Act on the use of the Arctic sea route
8. Representatives of 127 investors and organizations called on the EU to maintain the moratorium on oil and gas exploration and production in the Arctic

Commentary by Bellona

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
9. Svalbard records Eurasia’s first confirmed case of a polar bear infected with and killed by avian influenza

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in May ↑

In May 2026, earlier than usual, an LNG carrier escorted by an icebreaker embarked on the first transit along the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route, marking the opening of the summer–autumn navigation season. On 26 May, the Arc7 ice-class LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie loaded cargo at the Arctic LNG 2 project and set course eastward. The voyage was carried out under the escort of the nuclear-powered icebreaker Ural. On 8 June, the vessel reached the Bering Strait.

For comparison, in 2025 the first eastbound voyage took place on 19 June, when the Arc7 ice-class LNG carrier Georgiy Ushakov departed the port of Sabetta carrying an LNG cargo bound for China.

In 2024, the first eastbound voyage was carried out by the oil tanker Shturman Skuratov, which departed Murmansk on 14 June and passed through the Kara Gates on 18 June. In 2023, the first such voyage began in Sabetta on 5 June, and on 19 June the LNG carrier Fyodor Litke entered the Bering Sea.

Otherwise, navigation along the Northern Sea Route during the month proceeded as expected. Cargo traffic in May remained broadly unchanged and was driven by shipments from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, crude oil exports from the Varandey, Prirazlomnoye and Novoportovskoye fields, as well as maritime transportation operations of Norilsk Nickel.

On 17 May, the research and expedition vessel Mikhail Somov departed Arkhangelsk on its first voyage of this year’s navigation season. The vessel is tasked with delivering cargo, fuel, equipment and rotating teams of polar researchers to hard-to-reach Arctic weather stations of Roshydromet in the White and Barents seas. At the time of departure, the vessel was 50 years old.

Traditionally, at the end of May, the port of Dudinka, which serves Norilsk Nickel, suspended operations due to the spring flood on the Yenisei River. According to AIS data, the last vessel, Taibola, departed Dudinka on 20 May. On 21 May, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Sibir completed flood-prevention works on the Yenisei, preparing the port for the spring ice breakup and high-water period. The suspension usually lasts about a month; however, this year restrictions on ice navigation were lifted as early as 6 June — less than three weeks after operations were suspended.

Yamal LNG

In May, Yamal LNG operated without significant changes compared with April. Based on AIS data, it can be assumed that 25 LNG cargoes were shipped from the Sabetta terminal. The main volume of deliveries was carried by 14 Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers operating on direct routes from Sabetta to Europe (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain). In addition, four voyages were made to the area of Kildin Island, where transshipment to non-ice-class LNG carriers was likely carried out.

According to a new analysis by the German environmental and human rights organisation Urgewald, up to six Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers serving the Russian Yamal LNG project may require dry-dock repairs at the Fayard shipyard in Odense, Denmark, this year. The estimate is based on historical vessel maintenance cycles as well as figures from the previous year, when five Arc7 LNG carriers associated with the Yamal LNG project underwent technical servicing at the Danish shipyard.

Arctic LNG 2

In May, the number of shipments from the Arctic LNG 2 project increased to six (compared with three in April). The Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers Christophe de Margerie and Alexey Kosygin each completed three loadings. Five LNG cargoes were delivered to the Saam FSU floating storage unit in the Murmansk area, while one cargo was transported eastward along the Northern Sea Route by the LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie.

The LNG was then transshipped onto vessels from the shadow fleet, which proceeded to China via the route around the Cape of Good Hope.

In May, seven shipments were recorded from the Saam FSU floating storage unit, compared with four in April and one in March following the incident involving the Arctic Metagaz tanker. Deliveries were made to the LNG carriers Buran, Voskhod and Arctic Pioneer, as well as to four vessels that joined the project’s operations in May — Kosmos (formerly Salalah), Luch (formerly Ibri), Orion (formerly Nizwa) and Mercury (formerly Ibra).

In addition, on 30–31 May, the shuttle tanker Shturman Shcherbinin (IMO 9759927), which serves Gazprom Neft’s Novoportovskoye field, remained at the Utrenny terminal for approximately one day. The vessel appears to have loaded gas condensate there.

Arctic oil projects

In May, the Varandey terminal (Lukoil) increased the pace of shipments, with nine voyages completed compared with four in April. Oil transportation was carried out by three Arc6 ice-class shuttle tankers: Vasily Dinkov, Kapitan Gotsky and Timofey Guzhenko.

From the Prirazlomnaya platform (Gazprom Neft), the tankers Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov carried out six oil shipments (four voyages were recorded in April).

The Novoportovskoye field (Gazprom Neft) accounted for 15 shipments (compared with 12 in April), carried out by the tankers Shturman Albanov, Shturman Malygin, Shturman Ovtsyn, Shturman Skuratov, Shturman Shcherbinin, Shturman Koshelev and Mikhail Lazarev.

Vessels from all three fields proceeded to the Murmansk area, where the oil was transshipped onto other tankers for further export. At the same time, regular AIS signal outages were recorded in the Murmansk area.

Norilsk Nickel

Norilsk Nickel reduced the number of container shipments in May, as the port of Dudinka on the Yenisei River annually suspends operations for several weeks at the end of the month due to the spring flood period.

Seven vessel calls were recorded at Dudinka, including the call of the container ship Monchegorsk, which arrived at the port at the end of April and departed on 6 May. Four voyages were carried out by vessels from Norilsk Nickel’s own fleet of Arc7 ice-class Arctic container ships (Norilsk Nickel, Talnakh, Nadezhda and Monchegorsk), while three additional voyages were performed by chartered vessels — Tersky Bereg, Taibola and Tambey.

One voyage from Arkhangelsk to Dudinka was carried out by the Arctic tanker Yenisei, which specializes in transporting petroleum products to support the needs of the Norilsk industrial region.

In May, eight nuclear-powered icebreakers operated along the Northern Sea Route ↑

In May, all eight nuclear-powered icebreakers of Atomflot continued operations in the western sector of the Arctic, primarily in the Kara Sea, the Ob Bay and the Yenisei Gulf.

By the end of May, the icebreaker Yamal headed to Murmansk, where its signal disappeared in early June. On 24 May, the icebreaker Ural headed eastward, where it escorted the Arc7 ice-class LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie carrying LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project.

In May, the icebreakers operated primarily in three areas:

• In the Kara Sea and on approaches to Sabetta, the icebreakers Yamal, 50 Let Pobedy, Arktika and Yakutia were operating.
• On the route between Dudinka and Mys Zhelaniya, the icebreakers Taimyr, Sibir and Ural were operating, with Arktika joining them at the end of the month.
• On the route between Cape Kamenny in the Ob Bay and Mys Zhelaniya, the icebreaker Vaigach was operating, with a brief deployment to the Kara Gates on 4–8 May.

Russia’s EMERCOM opens Arctic integrated emergency rescue center in Sabetta ↑

On May 12, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) announced the opening of a new Arctic integrated emergency rescue center in Yamal. Its establishment is envisaged by the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security for the Period up to 2035.

According to the plan, the center is to have a staff of 50, including 24 certified rescue personnel. It is also to be equipped with two Burlak all-terrain vehicles, mobile life-support units, and command vehicles with satellite communications. It has not been specified whether the new center has already received this personnel and equipment.

Alexey Chekunkov, head of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, stated that integrated emergency rescue centers along the Northern Sea Route would include three units: the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA), and the Marine Rescue Service. However, the Marine Rescue Service was not mentioned in the announcement of the opening of the center in Sabetta. Only representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the FMBA took part in the opening ceremony. At the same time, in addition to search and rescue operations at sea, the Marine Rescue Service is also responsible for responding to oil spills.

The center in Sabetta was originally scheduled to begin operations in December 2024.

The first Arctic integrated emergency rescue center of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations along the Northern Sea Route was established in Pevek, Chukotka, in 2024. Two more centers are planned to be built in Dikson (Krasnoyarsk Krai) and Tiksi (Yakutia). Construction in Tiksi is scheduled to begin in 2026, while construction in Dikson is planned to start in 2028. The creation of additional emergency rescue centers in Khatanga and Anadyr is also under discussion.

The first Arctic integrated emergency rescue center operated by EMERCOM along the Northern Sea Route was established in Pevek, Chukotka, in 2024. Two more centers are planned for Dikson (Krasnoyarsk Territory) and Tiksi (Yakutia). Construction in Tiksi is scheduled to begin in 2026, while work in Dikson is planned to start in 2028. The establishment of additional emergency rescue centers in Khatanga and Anadyr is also under discussion.

Sovcomflot’s revenue for the first quarter of 2026 increased by 60% to $444 million ↑

PAO Sovcomflot’s revenue (SCF Group) for the first quarter of 2026 amounted to $444 million, up 60% year on year, according to the company’s financial report. Net profit under IFRS stood at $94 million in January–March 2026, compared with a loss of $393 million a year earlier. EBITDA for the reporting period increased 2.2-fold to $227 million. The EBITDA margin was 66%, compared with 47% a year earlier.

Sovcomflot is Russia’s largest shipping company. The company is actively involved in Russian Arctic shipping: it provides ice-class LNG tankers for the Yamal LNG project, carries out shuttle oil transportation, provides floating oil storage operation services, and offers port services, including the management of oil terminals and tugboats.

The Russian government is seeking off-budget sources of additional funding for the construction of the new nuclear icebreakers Leningrad and Stalingrad, as well as a support vessel for their operation ↑

This was reported by Kommersant, citing a letter from Rosatom’s special representative for Arctic affairs, Vladimir Panov. Initially, 50% of the cost of each vessel was to be financed from the budget, with the rest covered by Rosatom.

Two options for raising funds are currently being discussed.

The first option under consideration is the introduction of a fee on each tonne transported along the Northern Sea Route, starting in 2027, when it would amount to $1.5. It would then gradually increase, reaching a peak of $2.75 in 2030 and 2031, before declining to $0.4 in 2035. In 2025, cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route amounted to 37.02 million tonnes. Applying the 2027 rate to this volume would generate $55.5 million per year, or RUB 4.1 billion at the current exchange rate, which is less than 5% of the cost of building a Project 22220 icebreaker.

The second option is to introduce a port fee at all Russian seaports for vessels carrying export cargo. The preliminary estimate of the fee is $0.2 per tonne. The document does not specify for how many years it is proposed to introduce it. According to the Association of Commercial Sea Ports, 696.6 million tonnes of cargo were exported through seaports in 2025, which would generate $139.3 million in fee revenue, or RUB 10.3 billion. To collect the same amount as under the first option, with exports remaining static, the fee would need to be introduced for 13 years.

Under the government order of December 15, 2022, the combined cost of Leningrad and Stalingrad was almost RUB 118 billion, while the multifunctional nuclear technology service vessel was estimated at RUB 24.8 billion. According to a Kommersant source familiar with the situation, each icebreaker is now estimated to cost around RUB 85 billion.

Both nuclear icebreakers are being built under Project 22220 and are expected to be commissioned in 2028 and 2030, respectively. Construction of Leningrad is reportedly ahead of schedule: as of May, it was 31.45% complete against a planned 30.05%. On May 14, 2026, control assembly of its first RITM-200 reactor unit was completed.

Four Project 22220 icebreakers are currently in operation. The first of them, Arktika, was commissioned in 2020, and the latest, Yakutia, in March 2025. The commissioning date for another icebreaker under construction has been postponed from late 2026 to 2027.

Commentary by Bellona:

The International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

The United Kingdom banned the provision of services for the maritime transport of Russian LNG, while exempting Yamal LNG. It also allowed the import of diesel fuel and jet fuel produced from Russian crude oil in third countries ↑

The United Kingdom banned the maritime transport of LNG produced in and exported from Russia to third countries and between third countries, as well as financial, insurance, and brokering services related to such shipments. The ban entered into force on May 20.

At the same time, the UK authorities exempted the Sakhalin-2 and Yamal LNG projects by issuing a temporary license valid until January 1, 2027. The license allows UK companies to participate in the transportation, insurance, and financing of LNG shipments from these projects to third countries.

In its May sanctions package, the United Kingdom also banned the import of petroleum products manufactured in third countries from Russian crude oil.

At the same time, an exemption was granted in the form of a license allowing the import of diesel fuel and jet fuel produced from Russian crude oil in third countries. The decision drew criticism from Ukrainian and British lawmakers. Initially, the license did not specify an expiration date, but on June 12 it was amended to state that it will remain valid until January 1, 2027.

This decision followed a US decision on May 18 to extend for 30 days a license covering maritime shipments of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products that had already been loaded onto tankers. The US first introduced these exemptions on March 12, and then extended them on April 18 and May 18.

The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Russian oil and coal back in 2022. In October 2025, it announced a ban on imports of petroleum products produced in third countries from Russian crude oil. In 2025, the United Kingdom bought 19.5% of its diesel and jet fuel imports from India, a country that refines Russian crude oil for export.

South Korea’s National Assembly adopted a Special Act on the use of the Arctic sea route ↑

On May 7, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea adopted, at a plenary session, the Special Act on the Promotion of Utilization of the Arctic Route and the Development of Related Industries, aimed at preparing the country for the use of Arctic shipping routes. The act was promulgated on June 16 and will enter into force on December 17, 2026.

The law provides for the establishment of an Arctic Sea Route Committee under the Prime Minister to coordinate and advise on issues related to the use of the Arctic shipping route. The route is expected to include the Northern Sea Route. The law also requires the preparation of a comprehensive master plan every five years covering infrastructure, including search and rescue capabilities, international cooperation, workforce development, financing, and investment attraction.

To study operations in Arctic waters, a delegation from Busan visited the Norwegian port of Tromsø in March, where the parties signed a non-binding agreement to deepen cooperation, exchange knowledge, and explore potential opportunities.

On May 15, it was announced that South Korea’s PanStar Line, part of PanStar Group, had been provisionally selected as the operator of the country’s first trial container voyage along this route. The Busan-based company was the sole applicant in the selection process. The round-trip voyage between South Korea (Busan) and Europe (Rotterdam) via Russia’s Northern Sea Route is scheduled for August or September 2026.

According to gCaptain, PanStar Line has not yet acquired a vessel for the voyage. According to the tender documentation for the selection of the operator, the vessel, with a capacity of about 3,000 TEU, must have an ice class and comply with the International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code requirements for operations in the Arctic.

The Arctic sea route has been a focus of South Korea’s attention for several years. In 2025, becoming one of the countries playing a leading role in the development of the Arctic sea route was identified as one of the country’s strategic development priorities. On May 26, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries announced its intention to launch a regular shipping service between South Korea and Europe via the Arctic by 2030.

Representatives of 127 investors and organizations called on the EU to maintain the moratorium on oil and gas exploration and production in the Arctic ↑

Several of the largest Nordic financial institutions, including Nordea Asset Management, Norway’s KLP, and Denmark’s Sampension, called on the European Union in an open letter to maintain the moratorium on oil and gas exploration and production in the Arctic in the EU’s new Arctic Strategy, which is due to be adopted in September.

The letter was written on May 27, 2026, and published on the website of the Nordic Center for Sustainable Finance, which supports banks and other Nordic financial institutions in phasing out investments in fossil fuels. It was signed by 127 organizations and individuals representing the financial sector, business, academia, trade unions, think tanks, and civil society. They argue that the EU should maintain and strengthen the protection of Arctic ecosystems from new oil and gas infrastructure.

The authors of the letter emphasize that further expansion of oil and gas development will increase pressure on Arctic ecosystems of global importance, raising the risk of oil spills and leaks that could cause irreversible environmental damage. They also warn that increased shipping will further intensify pressure on the region.

The letter was written in response to Norway’s efforts to persuade the European Union to reconsider its moratorium on oil and gas exploration and production in the Arctic. One of the key arguments has been the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz and the associated risks to the EU’s energy security. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has argued that the European Union needs stable energy partners and that Norway can serve as such a partner. Oil and gas exports from Norway’s continental shelf currently meet about 30% of the European Union’s demand.

Although Norwegian companies such as Equinor and Vår Energi are already developing several oil and gas projects in the Barents Sea, lifting the EU moratorium would make it easier to secure financing from European banks.

In response to such proposals, the authors of the letter argue that new resource projects in the Arctic will not provide a rapid solution to Europe’s energy security challenges. According to their estimates, the average development time for projects on the Norwegian continental shelf is 13 years, and even longer in the Barents Sea. The letter also emphasizes that the region’s oil and gas infrastructure is a potential target for hybrid attacks because of its proximity to Russian territory and the Northern Sea Route.

The letter also cites the results of an oil spill simulation at the Wisting field in the northern Barents Sea, which Norway plans to develop. According to the simulation, only about 7.8% of spilled oil could be recovered during the winter. The authors also emphasize that the Barents Sea is of critical importance for numerous species, including sperm whales, dolphins, Atlantic salmon, several coral species, and others.

Commentary by Bellona:

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

Svalbard records Eurasia’s first confirmed case of a polar bear infected with and killed by avian influenza ↑

Norwegian authorities report that this is the first case of a polar bear infected with avian influenza recorded in Europe. No similar cases have been reported in Asia to date. The first, and until now the only, confirmed case of a polar bear infected with avian influenza was recorded in Alaska in 2023.

At the same time, Norwegian scientists warn that avian influenza is spreading increasingly among animals in the Arctic region, including Svalbard in particular. It was first detected among animals in the archipelago in seabirds in 2022. The first recorded case of a walrus dying from the virus on Svalbard occurred in 2023, and in 2025 it was found in local Arctic foxes. Another case of a walrus dying from avian influenza on Svalbard was also documented in May.

It was also previously reported that evidence of past avian influenza infection was found in wild animals in Alaska in 2024. The same year, the virus was detected in ringed seals in Canada’s Nunavut territory, marking one of the first documented cases of avian influenza infection in marine mammals.

The mechanism by which avian influenza spreads in the Arctic has not yet been fully studied. Several possible causes exist, including changes in the epidemiology of the virus itself, shifts in the timing of bird migration and the northward movement of waterfowl ranges, as well as greater overlap between migration routes. However, it remains unclear which of these and other factors, or combinations of factors, have the greatest impact. At the same time, one study published in Nature emphasizes that transmission of the virus from birds to mammals occurs mainly not directly, but through the consumption of infected birds.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, May 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Nevertheless, we continue to systematically monitor and analyze developments related to Rosatom’s activities that we believe are of interest to an international audience. The aim of this review is to assess the scale of Russia’s international influence in the nuclear sector, as well as the associated political, economic, and environmental risks.

This digest covers events from May 2026.

You can follow the links to read the three most recent digests covering April, March and February 2026.

Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues. Download a PDF of this digest here.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of May 2026
1.1. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.2. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
1.3. Operational status of the ZNPP
1.4. Other events at the ZNPP
2. Energoatom launches production of Westinghouse nuclear fuel components
3. Ukraine’s centralized spent fuel storage facility receives an operating license
4. Energoatom’s Supervisory Board continues corporate governance reform
– After receiving information from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Board announced measures to strengthen integrity and corporate governance
– Two independent Board members reported the early termination of their mandates due to a heavy workload and other personal circumstances

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
5. US approves natural uranium export to Russia for enrichment
6. UK imposes sanctions on Russian uranium

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Rosatom signs new scientific and technical cooperation agreements with China
8. RITM reactors for icebreakers, floating power units, and small NPPs
9. Kaliningrad Sea Commercial Port comes under Rosatom’s direct control
10. Russia expands nuclear cooperation with African countries
– Rosatom says it has reached an agreement on the construction of an NPP in Rwanda; the US and Holtec are also expanding nuclear cooperation with Kigali
– Russia signs a new nuclear cooperation agreement with Equatorial Guinea
11. Rosatom seeks to build production chains for rare earth and critical minerals
12. Rosatom’s projects abroad

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of May 2026

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

May was marked by numerous reports of intensified military activity around the Zaporizhzhia NPP and its satellite city of Enerhodar, both in the media and in official communications from Russia’s Permanent Mission to the international organizations in Vienna. During the period under review, there were eight such communications in which Russia called on the IAEA to respond appropriately, assess, and condemn Ukraine’s actions.

On May 3, Russian representatives at the ZNPP informed the IAEA team at the site that a drone attack had damaged the external radiation control laboratory, located approximately 4 kilometers from the plant’s perimeter. According to the plant’s Russian press service, no critical damage to the laboratory’s equipment was recorded.

Visiting the laboratory the following day, the IAEA team observed damage to meteorological equipment. The team was told that the equipment was not operable.

On May 22, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the IAEA stated that the damage to the laboratory equipment had been caused by the Russian side itself back in March 2022, during the seizure of the ZNPP by Russian forces.

According to the statement, the equipment in question was a SODAR system for measuring vertical profiles of meteorological parameters, which was part of the RODOS system. The statement included photographs showing firearm damage, as well as the findings of a commission that assessed the technical condition of the equipment on April 8, 2022.

On another day, Russian representatives at the ZNPP informed the IAEA team that on May 16 a drone carrying explosives had fallen near the turbine hall of Unit 1 without detonating (this is also mentioned in INFCIRC/1363). The IAEA wrote that the Agency’s team could not confirm the report, as it received the information only two days later and was told that all drone debris had already been removed.

On May 30, the IAEA team at the ZNPP was informed of a drone strike on the turbine hall of Unit 6. During a walkdown the following day, members of the mission observed a hole in the wall and damage to the metal cladding of a pipe several meters away. According to Grossi, this was the first time since April 2024 that military activity had directly affected the ZNPP site.

Russian-appointed ZNPP Director Yuri Chernichuk said that IAEA experts had been allowed to collect parts of the drone for identification.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Forces rejected Russian accusations over the strike on the ZNPP and drew the attention of IAEA Member States to the fact that, ahead of almost every session of the IAEA Board of Governors, Russia “launches a new wave of information manipulation around the Zaporizhzhia NPP.”

In addition to the incidents listed above, reports in May also referred to strikes on the ZNPP transport workshop on May 17, when the IAEA team observed damage, and again on May 23 and 31; strikes on vehicles carrying plant personnel on May 14 and 25; and reports that on May 21 drones had mined one of the roads used to supply Enerhodar and the plant.

There were also regular reports of numerous drone strikes on targets in the nearby city of Enerhodar. Russia accused Ukraine of attacking civilian buildings and infrastructure and creating threats to nuclear safety. (For details, see, for example, the communications of Russia’s Permanent Mission to the IAEA, INFCIRC/1358–INFCIRC/1370.)

It is worth noting that on May 27, the ZNPP had neither landline nor internet connections for about 12 hours. The exact cause was not known, but the outage coincided with reports of attacks on Enerhodar.

On May 26, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev announced that Russia had requested a meeting with the IAEA leadership to discuss the situation. The telephone conversation between IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Likhachev took place on June 1. According to Rosatom’s press release, Likhachev “demanded that Rafael Grossi publicly provide a clear assessment of Kyiv’s crimes against the ZNPP and Enerhodar, and acknowledge that the only real threat to the safety of the ZNPP remains the continuing Ukrainian attacks.”

Earlier in May, following reports of a strike on the ZNPP transport workshop in late April that killed one person, Ukraine’s Permanent Mission to the IAEA stressed in a statement that Russian claims portraying the incident as a threat to civilian facilities and nuclear safety were misleading.

The statement says that Russian military positions, occupation facilities, and repressive structures in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory are presented as “civilian infrastructure,” while Russia’s militarization of Enerhodar and the area around the plant is being deliberately concealed. Photo and video evidence is available, for example, on the Telegram channels Real Enerhodar | Ukraine and actual_energodar.

Another statement emphasized that any assessment of the situation at and around the plant should proceed from the fact that the risks arising there are a direct consequence of Russia’s illegal seizure of the ZNPP, the presence of Russian military and other unauthorized personnel at the site, the militarization of the surrounding area, the intimidation of Ukrainian personnel, and obstruction of the restoration of Ukraine’s full sovereign control over the plant.

Ukraine recalls that for more than four years, Russia has used occupied territories in and around Enerhodar to carry out systematic attacks on Ukrainian towns and settlements on the opposite bank of the Dnipro River, including Nikopol, Marhanets, Illinka, and others.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

In May, the IAEA teams at Ukraine’s operating NPPs—Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine—as well as at the Chernobyl NPP site, reported increased military activity near these facilities. There were numerous reports of drone overflights near the sites (IAEA Updates 349–353).

On May 7, representatives of the Chernobyl NPP reported a fire in the exclusion zone that had spread over an area of 1,100 hectares and was caused by a drone crash. The fire was extinguished within several days, and no increase in radiation levels was recorded.

On May 22, a fire broke out at the Dniprovska substation following a military attack. This substation provides off-site power to the South Ukraine NPP as well as to the Zaporizhzhia NPP. At the request of the grid operator, the South Ukraine NPP was disconnected from the power line connected to the substation.

Operational status of the ZNPP ↑

On May 26, Russian representatives at the ZNPP informed the IAEA team that diesel fuel deliveries from a nearby storage facility for the diesel steam generators used to process liquid waste had been suspended due to the deteriorating military situation around the plant. It was noted that, at that time, the diesel fuel reserves on site intended for the emergency diesel generators were sufficient for 10 days.

At the same time, since March 24, when the ZNPP’s main 750 kV Dniprovska power line was damaged, the 330 kV Ferrosplavna-1 backup line has remained the plant’s only source of off-site power. As in April, no agreement was reached in May on a temporary localized ceasefire to carry out repair work. (This information can be found in IAEA Updates on the situation in Ukraine 349–353.)

On May 29, the ZNPP completely lost its off-site power supply for one hour, for the 16th time since the start of the war in Ukraine.

It is also worth noting that on May 22, Rostekhnadzor issued a registration certificate for the ZNPP’s mobile electrical laboratory, authorizing it to perform commissioning and preventive testing, as well as measurements of electrical equipment and electrical installations with voltages of up to 750 kV.

According to Ukrainian nuclear energy expert Olha Kosharna, this is further evidence that Russia is preparing to connect the ZNPP to its power grid.

Other events at the ZNPP ↑

On May 6, Sergey Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration of Russia, visited the Zaporizhzhia NPP. During a meeting with the Russian-appointed management of the plant, participants discussed the current state of the ZNPP, measures to support it, and preparations for bringing it into power generation mode when this becomes possible.

On May 22, the Russian president signed a decree officially authorizing JSC “Operating Organization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP” to possess nuclear materials and installations.

On May 28, Vladislav Isayev was reappointed Director General of FSUE “Zaporizhzhia NPP” for the next two years.

Commentary by Bellona:

Energoatom launches production of Westinghouse nuclear fuel components ↑

On May 14, Ukraine’s state-owned company Energoatom announced the launch of domestic production of Westinghouse nuclear fuel components. SS “Atomenergomash”, a separate subdivision of Energoatom, received the materials needed to manufacture the first batch of bottom nozzles for VVER-1000 fuel assemblies. Production of the batch is expected to take four months.

Earlier, in May 2025, Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB recognized Atomenergomash as a qualified and approved supplier of fuel assembly components for VVER reactors. These steps are part of Ukraine’s plan to establish domestic production of fuel assemblies under a Westinghouse license.

Ukraine’s centralized spent fuel storage facility receives an operating license ↑

On May 28, Ukraine’s State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate issued a license for the operation of the centralized spent fuel storage facility (CSFSF), designed by Holtec. The statement notes that this marks the completion of Ukraine’s own system for the safe management of spent nuclear fuel.

The centralized spent fuel storage facility is located in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Contracts for its construction were signed with the U.S. company Holtec International in 2005, and construction began in 2017.

Commissioning activities began at the CSFSF in 2022. Before that, spent nuclear fuel from all Ukrainian NPPs except the Zaporizhzhia plant was transported to Russia for storage.

It should be noted that on June 7, as a result of a UAV strike, the container receiving building at the CSFSF site was partially destroyed; no spent nuclear fuel was present in the building. The building sustained damage to its facade, stairwell, windows, doors, and internal walls between office rooms.

Energoatom’s Supervisory Board continues corporate governance reform ↑

• After receiving information from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Board announced measures to strengthen integrity and corporate governance
• Two independent Board members reported the early termination of their mandates due to a heavy workload and other personal circumstances

In May, the Supervisory Board of JSC NNEGC Energoatom announced a series of measures to strengthen integrity and reform corporate governance.

On May 8, the Supervisory Board received information from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) indicating possible criminal offenses by company employees.

In this connection, the Board directed a formal internal investigation, the suspension of several employees for the duration of the investigation, and the reorganization of specific structural units responsible for physical protection and economic security.

In addition, the Supervisory Board approved the engagement of an international executive search firm to support the selection of candidates for the positions of Chair of the Management Board, Director for Nuclear Safety and Operations, Chief Financial Officer, and several others.

As a reminder, Energoatom’s Supervisory Board took office in February 2026 after the previous board was dissolved amid a corruption scandal in November 2025. The new board consists of seven members: three representatives of the Ukrainian government and four international experts, including Rumina Velshi, former President and CEO of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, who was elected Chair of the Board; Patrick Fragman, former CEO of Westinghouse Electric Company; Laura Garbenčiūtė-Bakienė; and Brice Bohuon.

At the same time, in May, the Supervisory Board announced the early termination of the mandates of two independent Supervisory Board members —Patrick Fragman and Brice Bohuon. Both explained their decision by an excessive workload that proved significantly higher than expected, while Fragman also cited an offer of new full-time employment.

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

US approves natural uranium export to Russia for enrichment ↑

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued two licenses on May 6 authorizing the export from the United States to Russia of 8,500 metric tons of natural uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride. The licenses in question are XSOU8861 and XSOU8865, both valid until December 31, 2028. In both cases, the supplier is Solstice Advanced Materials US, Inc.—the owner of the Metropolis Works uranium conversion facility, which was owened by Honeywell International until October 2025—while the recipients are Russia’s TENEX and the Ural Electrochemical Plant.

The license applications submitted in February and June 2024 stated that the uranium enriched in Russia would be used at US nuclear power plants.

In February 2024, we also wrote about another export license application, XSOU8860. The NRC has not yet issued authorization for it.

In May 2024, the US adopted a law banning imports of low-enriched uranium from Russia. However, until the end of 2027, waivers may still be granted in cases where no alternative supplies are available for US reactors, or where the import is in the national interest of the United States.

UK imposes sanctions on Russian uranium ↑

On May 20, 2026, the UK government brought into force a new package of economic sanctions against Russia. The new measures were adopted as amendments to the basic statutory instrument governing the UK sanctions regime with respect to Russia.

Among the amendments introduced is a chapter concerning Russian uranium, which sets out prohibitions on:

• the import into the UK of uranium consigned from Russia, as well as uranium of Russian origin;
• the acquisition of uranium of Russian origin or uranium located in Russia;
• the supply and delivery of uranium from Russia to third countries, as well as the provision of related technical assistance, financial services, and brokering services.

According to the document (Schedule 3HA), the prohibitions apply to natural, enriched, and depleted uranium.

At the same time, the amendments provide for exemptions (section 60K) intended to reduce the risks associated with the introduction of certain restrictions. These exemptions cover relevant activities necessary for the continued operation of nuclear installations in third countries, provided that such installations were operational on the date the amendments entered into force, as well as activities involving uranium that was exported from Russia before the restrictions were introduced and is stored in a third country.

The prohibitions introduced are also subject to standard exceptions and licensing mechanisms.

It should be noted that the UK government had previously stated its intention to phase out the use of Russian uranium at all nuclear power plants in the country by 2028.

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Rosatom signs new scientific and technical cooperation agreements with China ↑

During the Russian president’s state visit to China on May 19–20, Rosatom signed three interagency memoranda of understanding.

A memorandum with the China Atomic Energy Authority concerns cooperation in developing human resources for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It provides for collaboration and exchange of experience in personnel training for the nuclear industry.

A memorandum with China’s Ministry of Science and Technology concerns scientific and technical cooperation in controlled nuclear fusion. Russia and China both participate in the international ITER project.

A memorandum with the Chinese Academy of Sciences concerns cooperation in science and technology, covering controlled nuclear fusion, nuclear medicine, accelerator technologies, and new photonic and quantum technologies.

The joint statement issued after the talks says that Russia and China intend to ensure the timely completion of construction and commissioning of new units at the Tianwan and Xudabao NPPs, as well as to develop cooperation in nuclear fusion, fast reactors, and the closed nuclear fuel cycle. The statement also notes that the parties agreed to work through comprehensive arrangements concerning the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle and the joint construction of nuclear power plants.

Commentary by Bellona:

RITM reactors for icebreakers, floating power units, and small NPPs ↑

•  Rosatom has manufactured two RITM-series reactor units, with another 14 in production for floating power units, small NPPs, and Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers
• The government is discussing off-budget financing mechanisms for the Leningrad and Stalingrad icebreakers

On May 14, the control assembly of the first reactor unit for the Project 22220 nuclear icebreaker Leningrad was completed at ZiO-Podolsk, an enterprise of Rosatom’s mechanical engineering division.

On May 27, Rosatom reported that ZiO-Podolsk had manufactured the first RITM-200S reactor unit for the lead floating nuclear power unit (FPU). The FPU hull had been delivered the previous month from China to the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg.

The new reactor unit for the FPU was the 14th RITM-series reactor manufactured by Rosatom enterprises.

Another 14 RITM-200 reactor units are currently at various stages of manufacture. Seven of them are also intended for floating power units, while two are intended for the small NPP in Yakutia and two for the small NPP in Uzbekistan.

The remaining three reactor units are intended for Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers now under construction: one for the nuclear icebreaker Leningrad — at that point, the reactor unit was being prepared for hydraulic tests preceding control assembly — and two for Stalingrad.

The financing of new icebreaker construction remains one of the key issues for keeping construction on schedule.

In May, Kommersant reported that the government was discussing sources of off-budget financing for the construction of these two icebreakers, as well as a multifunctional nuclear service vessel. One option under consideration is the introduction of a port fee of $0.20 per metric ton on all export cargoes. Another option is to levy an additional $0.40–2.75 per metric ton of cargo transported along the Northern Sea Route until 2035.

In 2022, the construction cost of the fifth (Leningrad) and sixth (Stalingrad) icebreakers was estimated at 56.6 billion and 61.3 billion rubles, respectively, while the multifunctional nuclear service vessel was estimated at 24.8 billion rubles. The federal budget was expected to finance 50% of the cost, with Rosatom covering the rest. According to Kommersant, the cost of each icebreaker has now risen to 85 billion rubles.

On June 1, the Russian government, together with Rosatom, was instructed to secure financing—primarily off-budget financing—for the construction of the fifth and sixth icebreakers and the multifunctional nuclear service vessel, in order to “strictly adhere to the construction schedules for these vessels and their commissioning deadlines.” The possibility of providing state guarantees is envisaged as a means of attracting financing.

Kaliningrad Sea Commercial Port comes under Rosatom’s direct control ↑

According to data from Russia’s Unified State Register of Legal Entities, since May 18, 2026, State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom has been the sole shareholder of JSC Kaliningrad Sea Commercial Port (KSCP).

Earlier, in December 2025, KSCP, which had previously been transferred to state ownership, came under the management of the FESCO transport group. Rosatom controls FESCO through its controlling stake in PJSC Far Eastern Shipping Company, the group’s parent company.

This followed a November 2023 decree by the Russian president, under which 92.5% stake in PJSC FESCO was transferred to Rosatom.

Russia expands nuclear cooperation with African countries ↑

• Rosatom says it has reached an agreement on the construction of an NPP in Rwanda; the US and Holtec are also expanding nuclear cooperation with Kigali
• Russia signs a new nuclear cooperation agreement with Equatorial Guinea

On May 14, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said that Rosatom had reached an agreement to build an NPP in Rwanda. He did not provide any details.

Nuclear Engineering International, in turn, reported that on May 15 Rwanda and Rosatom finalized an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant. The agreement sets out specific measures to be implemented by the end of 2026 as part of launching the project to establish a Center for Nuclear Science and Technology — the agreement on its construction was signed in 2020 — as well as the introduction of small modular reactor (SMR) technology, with commissioning planned for 2030–2032.

On May 19, during the second African Nuclear Energy Innovation Summit, held in Rwanda, Russia and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding on healthcare and nuclear medicine.

At the same time, Rwanda is expanding cooperation with other international partners in the nuclear field. At the summit on May 19, the US and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding concerning strategic civil nuclear cooperation. In addition, the US company Holtec International and the Rwanda Atomic Energy Board (RAEB) signed a comprehensive development agreement to advance the deployment of Holtec’s SMR-300 small modular reactor in Rwanda.

In parallel, Russia continues to expand its network of nuclear cooperation agreements with other African states. On May 19 in Moscow, Nikolay Spassky, Deputy Director General for International Relations at Rosatom, and Simeón Oyono Esono Angüe, Equatorial Guinea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Diaspora Affairs, signed a memorandum of cooperation on civil nuclear energy.

The document provides for the establishment of specialized working groups to assess the potential for implementing practical projects in nuclear power and non-power applications of nuclear technologies. It also sets out specific steps by both sides to develop human resources in the civil nuclear sector.

As noted in Bellona’s recently published report on Rosatom’s activities in 2025, the agreements with Rwanda and Equatorial Guinea reflect Russia’s effort to expand its political presence in Africa through nuclear cooperation, although for now this remains a very long-term prospect.

According to the IAEA, at least 15 African countries plan to develop nuclear power, while around nine more are considering doing so. Rosatom has already signed agreements and memoranda on nuclear power development with most of them.

Rosatom seeks to build production chains for rare earth and critical minerals ↑

On May 20–22, Moscow hosted the International Congress on Rare Metals, Materials and Technologies, RAREMET 2026, organized by Rosatom’s Giredmet Institute. The event was attended by delegations from India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other Global South countries.

According to Rosatom’s in-house news magazine Strana Rosatom, the discussions focused mainly on increasing production and developing deep processing of raw materials in Russia and partner countries.

The article notes that Russia holds around 10% of the world’s rare earth metal (REM) reserves, but accounts for less than 1% of global production. Up to 75% of the REMs consumed in Russia are imported.

The organizations involved aim to reduce this figure to 48% by building a full domestic technological chain, from ore mining to finished products. Rosatom has been assigned much of the responsibility for this task.

Since 2023, the corporation’s mining division has included the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant in Perm Krai and Lovozersky GOK, a loparite ore mining enterprise. Before these assets were handed over to Rosatom, the shares in both companies had been transferred from their previous owners to the state.

In addition to rare earth metals, Rosatom is developing projects involving other critical minerals, including lithium.

Polar Lithium, a joint venture between Rosatom and Nornickel that holds the rights to develop Russia’s largest lithium deposit on the Kola Peninsula, aims to become the country’s first producer of lithium-bearing raw materials. The company was added to the US sanctions list in January 2025.

Polar Lithium plans to begin construction of the mining and processing plant facilities in mid-2028 and to commission the plant in 2030, with planned production of 30,000 metric tons per year.

At the same time, Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade has lowered its forecast for domestic lithium demand by 2030 from 100,000 to 10,000 metric tons, reflecting the pace of development of Russia’s electric vehicle market. The downgrade in domestic demand forecasts raises questions about the economics of the Polar Lithium project. As a result, according to CEO Igor Demidov, the company is counting on export supplies and state support measures. More details on the development of Russia’s lithium market are available in an RBC article.

Rosatom is trying to develop lithium projects not only in Russia, but also abroad. In September 2024, Rosatom subsidiary Uranium One Group and Bolivia’s state-owned company YLB signed an agreement to build a lithium carbonate production plant. However, the project was never launched, as the contract was not ratified by the Bolivian government. At the end of 2025, after a new government came to power, it was stated that this and a number of other lithium contracts could be reconsidered.

Russia’s rare earth metals and lithium projects are developing against the backdrop of intensifying global competition for critical minerals. More details on Russia’s attempts to increase its presence in this market, as well as on growing competition from China and the US, are available in the Jamestown Foundation article “Russia Struggling to Compete in Rare Earths.”

Rosatom’s projects abroad ↑

Kudankulam NPP, India. On April 30, India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) issued a permit for the installation of major equipment at units 5 and 6 of the Kudankulam NPP, including the reactor pressure vessel, steam generators, and main circulation pumps.

The Kudankulam NPP consists of six power units with Russian VVER-1000 reactors. Units 1 and 2 entered commercial operation in 2014 and 2017, respectively, while construction of units 3 and 4 began in 2017. First concrete for units 5 and 6 was poured in 2021.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On May 7, Akkuyu Nuclear reported that the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NDK) of the Republic of Türkiye had granted Akkuyu Nuclear a permit to conduct commissioning tests at unit 2 of the Akkuyu NPP prior to nuclear fuel loading.

The application documents for obtaining the permit had been under review since May 2025. The Turkish nuclear regulator’s website states that decision No. 2026-13/1 was adopted on March 18, 2026.

On May 14, four hydro-accumulators for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) for unit 3 were delivered to the cargo terminal of the plant under construction.

Bushehr NPP, Iran. On May 8, Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev said that construction of unit 2 of the Bushehr NPP, which had halted in late February after the start of military action by the US and Israel on Iranian territory, was gradually resuming.

About 2,200 employees of Iranian contractor organizations have returned to the site. In March, about 600 Russian employees were evacuated from Iran. Likhachev said they would return to the plant once the risks associated with the military conflict had been eliminated. Technical and advisory support for construction work is being provided remotely.

He also noted that Russian enterprises continue to manufacture equipment for the Bushehr NPP. The reactor being manufactured for unit 2 is 60% complete, while the steam generators are 50% complete. Casting and forging of workpieces for equipment for unit 3 are continuing.

Paks II NPP, Hungary. On May 11, Hungary’s Minister of Economy and Energy István Kapitány, who took up the post after the change of government in April, said that one of his first priorities would be to review the contracts for the Paks II project, as questions had arisen about its cost. On May 18, the head of Rosatom said he had not yet contacted Hungarian representatives on the matter.

Meanwhile, on May 2, Vitaly Polyanin, project director for the construction of the Paks II NPP, said that work at the site was proceeding according to plan after first concrete was poured for the foundation slab of unit 5 on February 5.

On May 12, Likhachev said that Rosatom plans to involve Turkish companies that gained experience during the construction of the Akkuyu NPP in building the Paks II NPP. The statement was made in the context of Rosatom’s claim that at its construction sites in Belarus, Turkey, and Egypt, local companies carry out up to 40% of the work and can then apply the competencies they have acquired at other sites. Likhachev cited the work of Belarusian specialists in Bangladesh as an example. They are also involved in Egypt and at the Paks II NPP construction site.

According to Alexander Nikitin, Bellona’s Nuclear Adviser, there may be several reasons for this, including a shortage of Russian specialists who will be needed for the planned construction of Russian NPPs, as well as the search for ways to bypass sanctions restrictions.

El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On May 5, the steam turbine condenser for unit 1, manufactured at Energyen’s plant in South Korea, was delivered to the site of the El Dabaa NPP under construction. Nuclear Engineering International notes that South Korean companies Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Doosan Enerbility are actively involved in the construction of the turbine islands and the supply of related equipment for the El Dabaa NPP.

On May 22, the VVER-1200 reactor pressure vessel for unit 2, four steam generators, and the pressurizer for unit 1 were delivered to the site of the El Dabaa NPP under construction. The equipment was manufactured at the Atommash plant in Volgodonsk.

Balkhash NPP, Kazakhstan. On May 28, during the Russian president’s state visit to Kazakhstan, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the basic principles and terms of cooperation for the Balkhash NPP construction project in Kazakhstan. The document sets out the main parameters for the construction of a two-unit NPP with VVER-1200 reactors, as well as areas of cooperation during the plant’s operation, including maintenance services and fuel supplies.

It should be noted that on May 14, the government of Kazakhstan approved a comprehensive plan for the development of production localization for the nuclear sector for 2026–2030. The document states that the current capabilities of Kazakhstan’s industrial sector are estimated at 20–22% of the volume of goods, services, and equipment needed for nuclear power. The government of Kazakhstan plans to increase this figure to 30% “by the completion of NPP construction.” This target level is also reflected in the agreement signed with Rosatom.

Kazakhstan and Russia also signed an agreement under which Kazakhstan will receive a Russian state export loan to finance construction of the NPP. Another agreement concerns a plan for interagency cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety regulation for 2026–2030.

According to Almassadam Satkaliyev, Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, construction of the two units will require about $14.4 billion, while another approximately $2 billion is planned for physical security systems and social infrastructure. The start of major construction work at the site is scheduled for 2027. Under the agreements with Rosatom, commissioning of the first unit is expected seven years after first concrete is poured — in 2034.

According to Rosatom, more than 90% of the engineering surveys — site studies for construction — that began in August 2025 have already been completed. Their results will make it possible to determine the exact location of the NPP, taking into account all safety requirements.

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. May 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for March can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in April
2. Eight nuclear icebreakers operated along the Northern Sea Route in April
3. The Chinese company NewNew Shipping has announced a new route to Murmansk and plans to operate up to 12 voyages between China and Arkhangelsk in 2026
4. Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade has approved the Arctic Ship Repair Development Program
5. Arctic routes will remain secondary over the next five years, especially for container shipping, according to a report by insurance company Coface

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. The EU has adopted its 20th sanctions package targeting Russian Arctic oil and LNG, the shadow fleet, and diamond exports
7. Russia increased LNG exports by 8.6% in January–April
8. Russian shadow fleet vessels transporting Arctic oil are using fraudulent insurance documents – Bloomberg
9. The International Maritime Organization has adopted a new Emission Control Area in the North-East Atlantic
10. A shadow fleet tanker made a major detour to avoid Norwegian oversight
11. Satellite navigation disruptions are increasing at low altitudes near Norway’s border with Russia

Commentary by Bellona

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
12. Vorkutaugol Announces Production Cuts, Workforce Reductions, and Rollback of Social Benefits

Commentary by Bellona

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in April ↑

According to the forecast of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), overall ice conditions along the Northern Sea Route are expected to remain favorable from April through August, with no significantly difficult sections anticipated. At the same time, according to the Northern Sea Route Administration (Glavsevmorput), ice conditions in the Kara Sea during the third ten-day period of April were more severe than during the same period in 2025.

The main cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in April was generated by the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, production at the Varandey, Prirazlomnoye, and Novy Port oil fields, as well as shipments by Norilsk Nickel.

Yamal LNG

In April, Yamal LNG continued to operate as usual. According to Global Fishing Watch, 25 cargoes of liquefied natural gas were loaded from the terminal in Sabetta. A total of 6.5 million tonnes were shipped during the first four months of the year, 1.5% less than during the same period last year.

According to a report by the Urgewald analytical group, 22 LNG cargoes with a total volume of approximately 1.618 million tonnes were delivered to European Union countries in April, which is 17.1% more than in April 2025. In addition, three cargoes of stable gas condensate with a total volume of 120,000 tonnes were shipped from the plant.

April marked the third consecutive month in which all Yamal LNG cargoes that reached their final destinations were delivered exclusively to Europe. Most cargoes were shipped directly to European ports; however, in six cases, tankers called at the Kildin Island area for transshipment onto non-ice-class vessels. Urgewald recorded two ship-to-ship transfers for the Asian market, with Arc7 icebreaking tankers transferring cargoes to conventional LNG carriers bound for China via traditional routes. As of the end of April, these cargoes were still in transit and had not yet reached their final recipients.

In total, from January through April, the European Union imported a record volume of liquefied natural gas from Yamal LNG—91 cargoes with a combined volume of 6.69 million tonnes, 17.2% more than during the same period in 2025 (for more information on LNG exports from Russian Arctic fields, see here).

Arctic LNG 2

In April, Arctic LNG 2 began returning to stable operations following the explosion on the tanker Arctic Metagaz in March, which temporarily disrupted logistics chains. Total shipments during the first four months of the year amounted to 1 million tonnes.

The Arc7 icebreaking LNG carriers Christophe de Margerie and Alexey Kosygin carried out three loadings at the plant and delivered them to the Saam FSU floating storage unit near Murmansk. The LNG was then transshipped onto shadow fleet tankers, which proceeded toward China via the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.

During April, four cargoes were transferred from the Saam FSU to the tankers Zarya, Arctic Vostok, Arctic Mulan, and La Perouse. At the end of the month, the tanker Arctic Pioneer also joined the operations, completing its loading in May.

In addition, April saw a noticeable expansion of the shadow fleet associated with Arctic LNG 2. According to gCaptain, four tankers—Kosmos, Luch, Orion, and Merkuriy (previously operating under the names Salalah, Ibri, Nizwa, and Ibra)—were observed heading north in the Atlantic at the end of the month. Analysts linked these vessels to the Arctic LNG 2 project, which was subsequently confirmed. In May, Merkuriy and Kosmos were recorded loading cargoes at the Saam FSU.

All four vessels were built in 2005–2006 and spent nearly 20 years as part of the fleet of the Omani company now known as Asyad Shipping, where they were used to export LNG from Oman. These tankers display the typical characteristics of shadow fleet vessels: they are old and have recently been transferred to little-known companies.

Arctic Oil Projects

In April, six oil shipments were carried out from the Varandey terminal, performed by three Arc6 ice-class shuttle tankers: Vasily Dinkov, Kapitan Gotsky, and Timofey Guzhenko.

At the Prirazlomnaya platform, the tankers Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov carried out four crude oil shipments, while a fifth was completed with the vessel’s departure on May 1. The support vessels Antey and Hermes were also active; however, a significant portion of their movements was accompanied by the deactivation of their Automatic Identification System (AIS).

A total of 12 shipments were recorded from the Novy Port field, carried out by the tankers Shturman Albanov, Shturman Malygin, Shturman Ovtsyn, Shturman Skuratov, Shturman Shcherbinin, Shturman Koshelev, and Mikhail Lazarev.

Vessels from all three fields proceeded to the Murmansk area, where the oil was transshipped onto other tankers for further export. At the same time, AIS signal outages were regularly recorded in the Murmansk area.

Norilsk Nickel

Norilsk Nickel increased its container shipments along the Northern Sea Route in April. A total of 14 vessel calls were recorded in Dudinka, compared with seven calls in both February and March. The company’s own fleet of Arc7 ice-class Arctic container vessels (Norilskiy Nickel, Talnakh, Nadezhda, Monchegorsk, and Zapolyarny) completed eight voyages. Another six voyages were carried out by chartered vessels: Terskiy Bereg, Taybola, Turukhan, Utrenniy, Yastreb, and Mys Manorskiy.

The Arctic tanker Yenisey, which specializes in transporting petroleum products to supply the Norilsk Industrial District, completed one voyage.

Eight nuclear icebreakers operated along the Northern Sea Route in April ↑

In April, the nuclear icebreaker fleet continued to support navigation in the western sector of the Northern Sea Route, primarily in the Kara Sea, the Gulf of Ob, and the Yenisei Gulf. Its main workload was associated with escorting LNG export shipments from Sabetta and the Utrenny terminal, as well as ensuring access to the port of Dudinka.

• The nuclear icebreaker Yamal remained in the Murmansk area without an AIS signal until April 10, after which it operated on the route between the port of Dikson and Cape Zhelaniya.
• 50 Let Pobedy operated throughout the month between Sabetta and Cape Zhelaniya.
• Taymyr provided icebreaking escort services in the Yenisei Gulf on the approaches to Dudinka during the first half of April, and spent the second half of the month operating between Bukhta Sever and Cape Zhelaniya.
• Vaygach operated in the Kara Sea on the approaches to Mys Kamenny in the Gulf of Ob.
• Arktika operated in the Gulf of Ob on the approaches to Sabetta.
• During the first half of the month, Sibir provided icebreaking escort services in the Gulf of Ob on the approaches to the Utrenny terminal and Sabetta, after which it operated between Cape Zhelaniya and Dudinka.
• Ural operated primarily in the Yenisei Gulf.
• Yakutiya operated between Cape Zhelaniya, Dudinka, and Mys Kamenny.

In addition to Atomflot’s nuclear icebreakers, diesel-electric icebreakers operated by Rosmorport, as well as corporate icebreakers owned by major resource extraction companies, are active in the Arctic. For example, Gazprom Neft operates two diesel-electric icebreakers, Andrey Vilkitskiy and Aleksandr Sannikov, in the Gulf of Ob, providing escort services for tankers bound for the Novy Port oil terminal.

In April, the icebreaking escort season ended in several Arctic areas. Icebreaking escort services in the port of Kandalaksha were discontinued on April 13, while such services in the waters of the port of Arkhangelsk and in the White Sea ceased on April 15.

The Chinese company NewNew Shipping has announced a new route to Murmansk and plans to operate up to 12 voyages between China and Arkhangelsk in 2026 ↑

On April 2, at the International Transport and Logistics Forum, NewNew Shipping Line CEO Ke Jin announced the expansion of the company’s Arctic routes. During the 2026 navigation season, the company plans to begin calls at Murmansk. Apparently, this refers to a pilot call that was mentioned in March by Murmansk Region Governor Andrey Chibis.

On April 13, at a meeting of the Federation Council, Arkhangelsk Region Deputy Governor Igor Murayev stated that NewNew Shipping Line plans to operate up to 12 voyages along the Northern Sea Route between China and Arkhangelsk during the 2026 summer-autumn navigation season. According to Murayev, the company is considering five to six export-import voyages in each direction. Cargo volumes are currently being secured, and planning for the summer-autumn navigation season is underway.

In March, NewNew Shipping and the Arkhangelsk Region signed a memorandum of cooperation for the upcoming navigation season.

In addition, Belarus has expressed interest in cargo transportation through Arkhangelsk. According to Murayev, negotiations are underway on organizing cargo shipments to and from China via the port of Arkhangelsk, with Belarus’s Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Industry leading the discussions on the Belarusian side.

At the same time, plans are being developed jointly with Rosatom for the construction of five Arc7 ice-class container vessels with a capacity of 4,800 TEU each. In March, Rosatom announced that it had accepted the design work for an Arctic-class container ship carried out by the design division of the United Shipbuilding Corporation.

In 2023, the Chinese company NewNew Shipping Line completed seven voyages along the Northern Sea Route, and in 2024 it completed 14 voyages. According to estimates by Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Alexey Chekunkov, NewNew Shipping Line was expected to complete 29 voyages along the Northern Sea Route in 2025, although final statistics were not published. According to data from the Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL), a total of 23 voyages were carried out between Russia and China in 2025, including container and general cargo shipments.

Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade has approved the Arctic Ship Repair Development Program ↑

Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade has developed and approved the Program for the Development of Ship Repair for Vessels Operating in the Arctic through 2035. The announcement was made on April 17 during a meeting of the State Commission for Arctic Development chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev. The program is aimed at modernizing and expanding ship repair capacity in the Northern Sea Route waters.

The document itself has not been made publicly available. However, in March, a representative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade stated that by 2035 the volume of ship repair services in the Northern Sea Route waters would increase more than threefold, while ship repair capacity would double.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to prepare the document as early as October 2024. It was supposed to be completed by June 1, 2025.

Before February 2022, no more than 30% of transport vessels and no more than 15% of fishing vessels were repaired at Russian shipyards. Most repair work was carried out in the Baltic states, Norway, Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, and countries in the Asia-Pacific region. After sanctions were imposed, many foreign shipyards refused to service the Russian fleet. For example, the only shipyard in Europe that continues to repair Russian LNG tankers is Denmark’s Fayard A/S in Odense. Some Russian vessels have also begun undergoing maintenance at Chinese shipyards, including repairs to propulsion system components and other operations.

According to estimates by experts at Nordic Engineering JSC, 14 ship repair facilities operate in the Arctic, and the average age of their dry docks exceeds 50 years.

Arctic routes will remain secondary over the next five years, especially for container shipping, according to a report by insurance company Coface ↑

In April, the international insurance company Coface published a report titled “Will Arctic Maritime Routes Really Reshape the Global Trade Map?” , concluding that despite growing shipping activity in the Arctic, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on global trade over the next five years.

To assess economic viability, Coface compared transportation costs on Arctic and traditional routes between Asia and Northern Europe, as well as Asia and North America, for three types of vessels: tankers, bulk carriers, and container ships.

The authors of the report concluded that the use of Arctic routes may be economically beneficial for the transportation of liquid bulk and dry bulk cargoes. However, container shipping through the Arctic remains uncompetitive. Operational constraints, vessel size limitations, and additional costs associated with Arctic navigation prevent such services from matching the efficiency of traditional routes.

In the short term, only 3.5% of trade between East Asia, Northern Europe, and North America is expected to be carried out via Arctic routes.

The authors of the report believe that, in the short term, the significance of these routes will be more political than commercial.

Commentary by Bellona:

The International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

The EU has adopted its 20th sanctions package targeting Russian Arctic oil and LNG, the shadow fleet, and diamond exports ↑

On April 23, the European Union adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia. A substantial part of the package is devoted to new measures aimed at restricting supplies of Russian oil and LNG and countering Russia’s shadow fleet.

The package prohibits the sale or transfer of oil tankers to any Russian person or for use in Russia. For sales to third countries, a due diligence mechanism is introduced to ensure that buyers have no links to Russia. In addition, sales contracts must now include provisions explicitly prohibiting the buyer from reselling the vessel to Russian entities or entities associated with Russia.

In addition, the document contains provisions that lay the groundwork for future sanctions packages to prohibit services related to the maritime transportation of Russian crude oil and petroleum products.

The package also prohibits maintenance and the provision of other services to Russian icebreakers and LNG carriers and, starting in January 2027, bans the provision of LNG terminal services to Russian companies. These restrictions could affect not only Yamal LNG—the only current exporter of Russian LNG to the EU—but also other LNG producers in Russia and the fleet of Russian LNG carriers.

The 20th package adds another 46 vessels to the EU sanctions list, imposing a ban on port access and the provision of services related to maritime transport. Among them are the ice-class tankers Mikhail Lazarev (IMO 9837547) and Mikhail Ulyanov (IMO 9333670), which are involved in transporting oil from the Prirazlomnoye and Novy Port fields. The restrictions also target the new Arc6 ice-class tanker Valentin Pikul (IMO 9885879), built at the Zvezda shipyard to transport oil from the Varandey offshore loading terminal in the Pechora Sea. The tankers Ivan Aivazovsky (IMO 9876359), Sakhalin (IMO 9249128), Ocean II (IMO 9233777), and Elbus (IMO 9290385), all of which have been observed operating in the Arctic, were also sanctioned.

The total number of vessels included on the sanctions list has reached 632.

The package also includes the port of Murmansk, one of Russia’s key hubs for Arctic oil exports. The restrictions are justified on the grounds that the port is actively used by shadow fleet vessels. According to Barents Observer, more than 100 shadow fleet tankers have called at Murmansk since October 2025. EU companies are now prohibited from conducting any transactions with the port of Murmansk, including paying port service fees, charges, using infrastructure, and related activities. The European Commission has clarified that providing services to a vessel that has previously called at such a port does not constitute a violation. However, vessels flying the flags of EU member states are prohibited from calling at the port because doing so would require the payment of port fees.

In addition, the EU has tightened diamond traceability requirements. Importers of polished diamonds will be required to demonstrate that the diamonds were not mined, processed, or manufactured in Russia.

Earlier, in 2024, a blockchain-based diamond traceability mechanism was planned for launch. The timeline was postponed several times, but the system was ultimately not implemented due to uncertainty over how it would function and be governed. Instead, a regime requiring importers to provide documentary proof of diamond origin was introduced.

At present, most Russian diamonds are mined in the Russian Arctic Zone. Despite G7 and EU sanctions against Alrosa, Russia’s largest diamond mining company, and the ban on imports of Russian diamonds introduced in 2024, Russian diamonds continue to find their way into Europe and the United States.

Russia increased LNG exports by 8.6% in January–April ↑

Reuters, citing preliminary LSEG data, reports that Russia increased its LNG exports to 11.4 million tonnes in January–April, up 8.6% compared with the same period in 2025. In April alone, exports reached 2.92 million tonnes, 13.2% higher than a year earlier.

According to Reuters, Russian LNG exports to Europe increased by 20.8% in January–April, reaching 6.4 million tonnes. According to Urgewald, during the same period the EU imported 91 cargoes with a total volume of 6.69 million tonnes, of which 1.618 million tonnes were delivered in April, 17.1% more than in April 2025. All of this gas originated from the Yamal LNG plant.

The terminal in Zeebrugge, Belgium, remains the leading import destination, receiving eight cargoes in April alone.

On April 25, 2026, the EU ban on imports of Russian LNG under short-term contracts entered into force. A full ban on supplies under long-term contracts will take effect on January 1, 2027.

The Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL) analyzed export trends at Yamal LNG during 2025 and early 2026 and prepared an assessment of logistics capacity for the period beyond 2027. Following the complete closure of the European market, a reorientation of exports toward Asia is inevitable; however, current logistics capabilities are not prepared for such a shift. According to the Centre’s assessment, the existing fleet will be able to support only 120–130 voyages per year, which is more than two times lower than current levels. This is due to longer transport distances, the seasonal nature of the Northern Sea Route, and the need for transshipment operations.

According to CHNL estimates, maintaining current export volumes via the Northern Sea Route will be impossible without expanding the icebreaker fleet, developing infrastructure, and restructuring logistics.

Despite this, according to Bloomberg, citing anonymous sources, Russia is already seeking to increase exports eastward by offering LNG to South Asian countries at discounts of up to 40% through intermediary companies based in China and Russia. However, China remains the only stable buyer of Russian LNG in Asia so far.

Russian shadow fleet vessels transporting Arctic oil are using fraudulent insurance documents – Bloomberg ↑

Bloomberg, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported that some tankers in Russia’s shadow fleet are using insurance certificates issued in the name of Seaguard P&I, a company purportedly registered in Pinneberg, Germany. However, it was later established that the listed address belongs to an ordinary residential building, while the company itself has no confirmed registration in German corporate records.

Documents issued by this entity were used by at least several vessels, including the tanker Paz, which loaded Russian Arctic oil in Murmansk in March 2026 in circumvention of restrictions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.

According to intelligence data, at least five additional tankers obtained fraudulent Seaguard P&I insurance certificates, including the tanker Deyna, which was detained by French authorities in March 2026 while transporting Russian oil from Murmansk.

The International Maritime Organization has adopted a new Emission Control Area in the North-East Atlantic ↑

From 27 April to 1 May in London, the 84th session of the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 84) adopted a new Emission Control Area (ECA) for the North-East Atlantic, covering the waters surrounding Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Portugal.

Vessels operating in this area will be required to use fuel with a sulfur content of no more than 0.1% and comply with limits on emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM). The requirements will enter into force in September 2027, with mandatory compliance beginning in September 2028.

In October 2025, the adoption of this decision was postponed due to disagreements over carbon emissions charges for ships under the Net Zero Framework.

ECAs are already in force in the Norwegian Sea and the Canadian Arctic, where similar restrictions entered into force in March 2026.

Russia opposed the initiative, although its waters are not included within the boundaries of the new ECA. According to Sian Prior, Lead Advisor to the Clean Arctic Alliance, of which Bellona is a member, the Russian delegation indicated that it does not intend to comply with these requirements.

A shadow fleet tanker made a major detour to avoid Norwegian oversight ↑

In mid-April, media attention was drawn to the shadow tanker Apple (IMO 9271327), sailing under the flag of Equatorial Guinea. On its way to Murmansk to load Russian oil, it bypassed Norway’s Exclusive Economic Zone, making a significant detour and passing at a distance of 200 nautical miles (370.4 km) from the Norwegian coast. In this way, it was able to avoid inspection.

The tanker Apple is 23 years old and is under sanctions imposed by the EU, the US, the UK, and other countries. It has repeatedly changed its name and flag and has an opaque ownership structure.

Arve Dimmen, Director of Navigation Technology and Maritime Services at the Norwegian Coastal Administration, confirmed to Barents Observer that the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) in Vardø, northern Norway, attempted to contact the vessel, but was unsuccessful.

“They were unable to make contact,” Dimmen said. “This means we have neither CLC data nor Barents SRS data for this vessel,” he added.

The Civil Liability Convention (CLC) certificate confirms insurance coverage for oil pollution damage. The Barents Sea Ship Reporting System (Barents SRS), established by Norway and Russia in 2013 with the approval of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), requires all vessels carrying polluting cargoes to submit a report before entering the area between the Lofoten Islands and the Norwegian-Russian maritime border.

Satellite navigation disruptions are increasing at low altitudes near Norway’s border with Russia ↑

Persistent interference with GPS/GNSS signals has been regularly recorded for an extended period in northern Norway, particularly in eastern Finnmark and over the Barents Sea. Areas near the Russian border are affected most severely.

According to the Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) and the Norwegian police, two types of interference have been recorded: signal jamming and spoofing (the transmission of false signals that cause a navigation system to receive incorrect coordinates).

Measurements conducted since early March have detected interference at altitudes as low as 600 meters above the Varanger Peninsula, lower than previously recorded. Preliminary analysis indicates that Russia remains the source of the interference.

Disruptions to satellite navigation can result in the loss of accurate positioning and complicate the operation of traffic management systems. In Norway’s Arctic regions, where weather conditions are challenging and infrastructure is limited, the associated risks of accidents in maritime and air transport increase significantly.

“Everyone who uses GPS must be able to trust the information they receive. Manipulating these signals is unacceptable. If you are planning a trip near the border, we caution against relying solely on GPS equipment. Bring a map and compass as well,” warned Stein Kristian Hansen, duty chief of staff of the Finnmark Police District.

“Everyone who uses GPS should be able to trust the information they receive. That these signals are manipulated is unacceptable. If you are going on a trip near the border, we warn against blindly trusting the GPS equipment. Bring a map and compass as well”, warned duty chief of staff Stein Kristian Hansen in the Finnmark police district.

Norway is considering raising the issue at the international level, including through appeals to UN bodies involved in radio communications regulation.

Commentary by Bellona:

Heightened Industrial Activity in the Russian Arctic

Vorkutaugol Announces Production Cuts, Workforce Reductions, and Rollback of Social Benefits ↑

This was stated in an official company announcement issued on behalf of CEO Maksim Panov.

The primary reason cited is a decline in the company’s product exports. In particular, its main customer, Severstal PJSC, has replaced part of its Vorkutaugol supplies with cheaper coal from Kuzbass. As a result, deliveries under the long-term contract will be reduced from 280,000 tonnes to 180,000 tonnes per month starting in May 2026. The agreement is also set to expire on April 30, 2027, and it remains unclear whether it will be extended.

In addition, supplies to enterprises in the occupied parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions have ceased, as all coke-chemical production facilities there have been mothballed since the first quarter of 2026. Deliveries have also stopped to the Moscow Coke and Gas Plant, which since March 2026 has been unable to pay for new coal shipments or settle outstanding debts for previous deliveries.

Vorkutaugol states that in 2025 the company received support from municipal, regional, and federal authorities, which allowed it to cover the previous year’s losses. However, the situation has worsened this year amid an overall increase in losses across Russia’s coal industry, from 112.6 billion rubles in 2024 to 408 billion rubles in 2025.

As a result, Vorkutaugol is developing a production cutback program and has suspended the Federal Industry Agreement and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which provided employees with a broad range of medical and financial benefits, including compensation for heating and electricity costs and long-service bonuses.

At the same time, the statement emphasizes that any public expression of dissatisfaction with the situation—described in the document as “speculation”—will be interpreted “exclusively as hostile actions aimed at destabilizing the situation and escalating social tensions” and will be subject to “assessment by law enforcement and regulatory authorities.”

It should be noted that Vorkutaugol operates four active mines and one open-pit coal mine.

In October 2025, the Russian government approved a comprehensive development plan for Vorkuta through 2035 with a total investment volume of 330 billion rubles. The program is aimed at turning the city into a “powerful Arctic outpost” and includes, among other measures, the expansion of coal production and the construction of the Vorkuta–Ust-Kara railway to connect Vorkuta to the Northern Sea Route. However, there is still no information on the start of implementation of the plan’s specific measures.

Commentary by Bellona:

Accidents and Incidents in the Northern Sea Route ↑

In Arkhangelsk Oblast, the wildfire season began on April 18, two weeks earlier than in 2025. By mid-April 2026, around 60 fires had been recorded across an area of more than 57 hectares, compared with only a few incidents during the same period a year earlier.

A court has ordered the owner of the small vessel Schastlivy to compensate for environmental damage caused to Kola Bay near the Port of Murmansk. The vessel sank in January 2024 and was not scheduled to be recovered until September; however, there is no confirmation that it was ever raised.

In 2026, operations are scheduled to begin in the waters of the Port of Tiksi to raise and dispose of 12 sunken vessels that pose environmental threats and create risks to safe navigation.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, April 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Nevertheless, we continue to systematically monitor and analyze developments related to Rosatom’s activities that we believe are of interest to an international audience. The aim of this review is to assess the scale of Russia’s international influence in the nuclear sector, as well as the associated political, economic, and environmental risks.

This digest covers events from April 2026.

You can follow the links to read the three most recent digests covering March, February and January 2026.

Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues. Download a PDF of this digest here.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of April 2026
– Zaporizhzhia NPP lost all off-site power three times in April
– One person was killed in a drone attack on a transport workshop near Zaporizhzhia NPP

2. EBRD launches preparatory program for repairs to the New Safe Confinement at Chernobyl NPP
– Preparatory program for restoring the damaged NSC approved
– Fundraising campaign launched and initial financial commitments announced at the international conference in Chernobyl

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. Extended maintenance underway at Metsamor NPP as part of lifetime extension program
4. Alternative fuel deployment for VVER reactors continues in Europe
4.1. Westinghouse and European VVER operators discuss fuel performance results and future plans
4.2. Framatome expands cooperation with European VVER-440 operators on new fuel project
5. Kazakhstan’s newly adopted nuclear industry development strategy envisions construction of at least three NPPs by 2050
6. Vietnam and South Korea sign agreements on nuclear cooperation

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Ethiopia and Rosatom approve roadmap for further nuclear cooperation
8. Rosatom expands additive technology exports with first 3D printer delivery for India’s aerospace industry
9. First unit of Kursk II NPP commissioned
10. First hull of PEB-106 floating nuclear power unit delivered from China to St. Petersburg
11. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of April 2026 ↑

• Zaporizhzhia NPP lost all off-site power three times in April
• One person was killed in a drone attack on a transport workshop near Zaporizhzhia NPP

Since March 24, Zaporizhzhia NPP has been receiving off-site power through only a single 330 kV backup power line. Negotiations on a temporary ceasefire to allow repair work on the 750 kV line continued throughout April but produced no results (the damaged section is located above the Dnipro River, where the front line runs).

The plant’s off-site power configuration remained extremely vulnerable, and in April Zaporizhzhia NPP briefly lost off-site power three times.

On April 14, according to Russian representatives of the plant, the one-and-a-half-hour outage was caused by a problem on the line transmitting power between the 330 kV switchyard of Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant and the autotransformer at the 750 kV open switchyard of Zaporizhzhia NPP, through which backup power is supplied to the site. Before the outage, instability was observed in the electrical grid, which is consistent with information received by the IAEA from Ukraine’s grid operator about attacks on the electrical grid that caused a local voltage drop in the transmission system around the time of the disconnection.

The backup power line was disconnected two more times, on April 16 and 26.

On April 27, the Russian representatives of Zaporizhzhia NPP informed the IAEA about a drone attack that killed one person at a transport workshop located a few kilometers from the site in an industrial area near the plant.

A note from the Russian Permanent Mission in Vienna sent to the IAEA specified that the transport workshop is located 4.5 kilometers from the plant in Enerhodar and that at around 12:30 a.m. the drone struck a bus carrying the driver. The incident was described as posing a threat to nuclear safety and the lives of civilians.

On May 8, Ukraine sent a note to the IAEA describing Russia’s statements as an attempt to manipulate nuclear safety issues. The document states that Russia portrays facilities used by the Russian military and occupation authorities as civilian infrastructure while concealing the militarization of Enerhodar and the area around Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Regarding the incident at the transport workshop, the note states that satellite imagery and attached materials indicate the presence of trenches, fortified positions, and military equipment at the site. The document also emphasizes that the incident did not affect Zaporizhzhia NPP, its safety systems, or create any risk of a radioactive release. (It should be noted that the facility whose coordinates are provided in INFCIRC/1361 is located approximately 1.5 kilometers from the plant site.)

Ukraine called on the IAEA to take these circumstances into account when preparing reports on the situation around Zaporizhzhia NPP.

On April 28, Ukraine sent a note to the IAEA stating that Russian drone activity had intensified within the observation zone of the Chernobyl NPP ahead of the 40th anniversary of the accident.

On April 30, the IAEA announced that it had deployed its seventh mission to assess the status of 14 Ukrainian electrical substations, which are essential for ensuring reliable off-site power supply to Ukraine’s operating NPPs.

EBRD launches preparatory program for repairs to the New Safe Confinement at Chernobyl NPP ↑

• Preparatory program for restoring the damaged NSC approved
• Fundraising campaign launched and initial financial commitments announced at the international conference in Chernobyl

On April 1, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which manages the International Chernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA), announced that donors had endorsed a plan for early engineering and procurement works to pave the way for repairs to the New Safe Confinement at Chernobyl NPP, which was damaged in a Russian drone attack in February 2025.

According to an assessment by the Novarka 2 consortium (comprising the original NSC designer-builder Bouygues Travaux Publics and Vinci Construction Grands Projets), restoring the NSC’s full functionality by 2030 could cost at least €500 million.

The program will be implemented in three phases and includes the analysis of existing technical data, development of a repair concept, preparation of engineering solutions in cooperation with the Ukrainian nuclear regulator, as well as preparation of the plan for potential implementation through detailed engineering, procurement documentation and, where justified, early procurement of long-lead items.

On April 26, the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the Chernobyl International Conference on Nuclear Safety and Recovery took place at the plant site. Participants included President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Moldova Maia Sandu, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, EBRD President Odile Renaud-Basso, representatives of the European Union, and energy, finance, and foreign ministers from partner countries.

The event marked the launch of the fundraising process for the restoration of the NSC, with participants announcing initial commitments totaling approximately €100 million. In addition, SSE Chernobyl NPP and the EBRD signed a grant agreement allocating €30 million for the preparatory stage of the implementation of the above-mentioned program.

On April 29, the U.S. Department of State announced its intention to allocate up to $100 million for the restoration of the NSC.

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Extended maintenance underway at Metsamor NPP as part of lifetime extension program ↑

On April 1, Unit 2 of Metsamor NPP was shut down for five months instead of the usual 45 days as part of the plant’s lifetime extension program. Repair and modernization work involving Rosatom entities is expected to extend the plant’s operating lifetime through 2036.

Metsamor NPP originally operated two VVER-440 units, both of which were shut down in 1989. In 1995, Armenia restarted Unit 2. In 2011, its operating license was extended through 2021, and after modernization work carried out in 2021, it was further extended through 2026.

In December 2023, Armenia and Russia signed an agreement on further modernization and another extension of Metsamor NPP’s operating lifetime through 2036. The contract was valued at $65 million.

The work involves specialists from Rosatom Service JSC, Atomenergoremont, and its Novovoronezhatomenergoremont (NVAER) branch. Welding operations are being technically supported by experts from TSNIITMASH SIA JSC, while non-destructive testing of welded joints is being carried out by Belatom Service JSC. The current maintenance campaign will place particular emphasis on the modernization of Trains I and II of the reactor building’s essential service water system.

In February 2026, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that the operating lifetime of the Metsamor NPP reactor could eventually be extended by another 10 years, through 2046.

Commentary by Bellona:

Alternative fuel deployment for VVER reactors continues in Europe

Westinghouse and European VVER operators discuss fuel performance results and future plans ↑

On April 8, Westinghouse announced that it had co-hosted the VVER Fuel Forum in Budapest together with MVM Paks NPP, which became the last European operator of Russian-designed NPPs to sign a fuel supply agreement with the American company.

The forum focused on the operating experience with VVER-1000 and VVER-440 fuel at operating units, as well as plans for its further deployment. It was reported that:

• Ukraine’s Energoatom, which has the most extensive experience cooperating with Westinghouse, uses American fuel at its nine operating reactors and plans to fully switch to it in 2028;
• in Finland, the VVER-440 NOVA E-6 fuel delivered to Fortum in 2024 is being used at Unit 2 of Loviisa NPP and has demonstrated the expected performance;
• in Bulgaria, RWFA fuel for VVER-1000 reactors was loaded into the mixed core of Unit 5 at Kozloduy NPP in 2024 and currently accounts for half of the reactor core. Lead test assemblies of the RWFA-13 design are planned for loading into Unit 6 of Kozloduy NPP;
• in the Czech Republic, ČEZ received the first deliveries of upgraded VVER-1000 fuel for Temelín NPP and VVER-440 fuel for Dukovany NPP in 2025. Fuel loading will begin after licensing procedures are completed for each plant (Russian fuel for Dukovany NPP will continue to be supplied until the Rosatom contract expires in 2028);
• in Slovakia, the licensing process for VVER-440 fuel for Units 1 and 2 of Mochovce NPP is ongoing (in November 2024, Slovenské elektrárne extended its fuel supply contract with Rosatom through 2030);
• in Hungary, the licensing process has begun for VVER-440 NOVA E-6/NOVCD fuel for Units 1–4 of Paks NPP. Westinghouse plans to deliver the first reload batch in 2028.

The statement also notes that Westinghouse is expanding fuel pellet production in Västerås, Sweden, which will result in a 50% increase in capacity by 2028.

Recall that Westinghouse leads the APIS (Accelerated Program for the Implementation of Secure VVER Fuel Supply) project, launched in 2023 and funded by the European Union, which also involves 11 other European companies. To date, Westinghouse has fuel supply contracts with all European operators of VVER reactors.

Framatome expands cooperation with European VVER-440 operators on new fuel project ↑

On April 9, Framatome announced the signing of contracts with four European energy companies operating VVER-440 reactors — ČEZ (Czech Republic), Fortum (Finland), MVM Paks NPP (Hungary), and Slovenské elektrárne (Slovakia).

According to the press release, the contracts formalize long-term cooperation within Framatome’s project to develop fully European fuel for VVER-440 reactors, which will be manufactured at facilities in France and Germany.

The project is currently in its first phase, which includes the design of a fuel assembly designated VERA-440, as well as its associated transport container. The next stage involves a Lead Test Assembly program, which is expected to support licensing for loading the fuel into reactors at the respective NPPs.

Framatome and 16 other participants, including the four companies mentioned above, are already cooperating on the development of new VVER fuel technology under the Safe and Alternative VVER European Project (SAVE), funded by the European Union.

Framatome plans to begin manufacturing the first lead test fuel assemblies of its own design in 2028. Finnish utility Fortum notes that regular fuel deliveries could potentially begin in the early 2030s.

Notably, on April 13, the Prague office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation published an article titled “Dependency is not just about gas and oil, Dukovany power plant still runs on Russian nuclear fuel” examining the continued dependence of EU countries on Russian nuclear fuel and other elements of the Russian nuclear fuel cycle, despite efforts to reduce energy dependence on Russia after 2022. The article examines fuel supplies for VVER reactors in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, the search for alternatives to TVEL fuel, as well as Russia’s continuing role in uranium conversion and enrichment.

Commentary by Bellona:

Kazakhstan’s newly adopted nuclear industry development strategy envisions construction of at least three NPPs by 2050 ↑

On April 15, Kazakhstan adopted a strategy for the development of its nuclear industry through 2050.

According to statements by the Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the strategy envisions that at least three NPPs will be operating in the country by 2050.

It was also noted that implementation of the country’s first NPP project has already begun, construction of a second plant is under consideration, and the potential use of small modular reactor (SMR) technologies is being explored as a possible option for a third station.

The strategy itself outlines the following nuclear generation development plans:

•  construction of the first NPP in the Almaty Region (Southern Zone of Kazakhstan’s Unified Power System) with a planned capacity of 2,400 MW (Bellona note: the plant will be built based on a Rosatom design);
• construction of a second NPP in the Southern Zone of Kazakhstan’s Unified Power System with a planned capacity of up to 2,400 MW;
• construction of an NPP based on SMR technology with a total capacity of up to 1,200 MW (subject to economic feasibility and taking into account the development of Kazakhstan’s national power grid);
• construction of an NPP with a planned capacity of up to 2,400 MW in one of the prospective zones of Kazakhstan’s Unified Power System.

Following the selection of a Rosatom design for the country’s first NPP in June 2025, the government of Kazakhstan announced plans to build two additional plants, considering China as a potential technology supplier.

Notably, according to Atomic Energy Agency Chairman Almasadam Satkaliyev, Kazakhstan and Russia are working on a mechanism for an intergovernmental Russian loan to finance the first NPP project, named Balkhash. The loan is expected to cover 85% of the project’s cost, estimated at approximately $15 billion for two reactor units.

Vietnam and South Korea sign agreements on nuclear cooperation ↑

On April 22, during South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s state visit to Vietnam, ministries and agencies from the two countries signed 12 cooperation agreements.

Among them were two memoranda of understanding related to the nuclear energy sector:

• a memorandum of understanding between Vietnam National Industry-Energy Group (PVN – PetroVietnam) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) on research and cooperation in nuclear power plant development;
• a memorandum of understanding on financial cooperation for nuclear power plant projects, signed by PetroVietnam, KEPCO, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation.

The main provisions of the four-party memorandum include consideration of financial support measures for new nuclear power plant projects in Vietnam, assistance in developing financial models to ensure the projects’ economic viability, and the establishment of a working group on financial support for NPP projects.

At the end of 2024, Vietnam resumed its nuclear program and returned to plans for two previously suspended NPP projects. In March, Russia and Vietnam signed an updated agreement on the construction of Ninh Thuan-1 NPP. Japan, which before 2016 had been expected to participate in the construction of Ninh Thuan-2 NPP, declined to join the revived project.

According to South Korean National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, Seoul and Hanoi are currently only at an early stage of discussions on possible cooperation on the Ninh Thuan-2 NPP project. He noted that the parties are examining the project as a whole, including its feasibility, risks, and the possibility of financial cooperation.

A report by Nuclear Engineering International noted that during the Korea–Vietnam Business Forum held on April 23, several South Korean companies expressed interest in participating in the construction of new NPPs in Vietnam and in developing supply chains for the country’s nuclear sector.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Ethiopia and Rosatom approve roadmap for further nuclear cooperation ↑

On March 31, Ethiopian Nuclear Energy Commission and Rosatom, represented by Deputy Director General Nikolai Spasskiy, signed a strategic roadmap for the development of nuclear energy.

The document outlines practical steps for implementing the agreement signed in September 2025 on the development of an NPP project in Ethiopia and defines the further direction of cooperation between the two countries.

Rosatom expands additive technology exports with first 3D printer delivery for India’s aerospace industry ↑

On April 28, Rosatom announced that its fuel division, which is developing the company’s additive technology business, had exported a 3D printer to a non-CIS country for the first time. The company delivered to India a RusBeam 2800 industrial 3D printing system for electron-beam wire deposition under vacuum.

The equipment has already passed acceptance testing and been commissioned at one of India’s major manufacturing centers. The system will be used to produce components for the aerospace industry.

According to Director General Alexey Likhachev, Rosatom won the international tender by offering not only the equipment itself, but also technological expertise, materials, and related services.

Notably, Rosatom Additive Technologies, which operates under TVEL’s management structure, has been placed under sanctions by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

First unit of Kursk II NPP commissioned ↑

On April 29, Unit 1 of Kursk II NPP, featuring a VVER-TOI reactor with a capacity of 1,253 MW, was commissioned and officially placed into commercial operation.

First hull of PEB-106 floating nuclear power unit delivered from China to St. Petersburg ↑

According to industry outlet SeaNews, whose publication has been preserved in the Web Archive, the hull of a PEB-106 floating nuclear power unit was delivered from China to the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in late March. According to available information, it is currently moored at the shipyard alongside the Chukotka nuclear-powered icebreaker, which is under construction.

Rosatom plans to build four floating nuclear power units based on the technical solutions used for the Akademik Lomonosov floating power unit, but equipped with new RITM-200S reactors. The units are intended to supply power to the Baimskaya mining project in Chukotka.

It was previously reported that, due to the workload of Russian shipyards and their inability to complete the order within the required timeframe, the first two PEB hulls would be built by the Chinese shipyard Wison (Nantong) Heavy Industry Co Ltd. The nuclear equipment, including the RITM-200S reactors and turbines, will then be installed on the hulls at the Baltic Shipyard.

The hull of the first unit was laid down in August 2022. Under the contract signed in 2021, it was to be delivered to Russia by October 2, 2023, while the second hull was scheduled for delivery by February 2, 2024. The contract was valued at $225.8 million.

It was previously reported that the first two power units, to be deployed near Cape Nagloynyn, were scheduled to enter operation in early 2027, with the third planned for early 2028 and the fourth for early 2031. In 2024, the commissioning date for the first PEB was postponed to 2028.

In addition, a contract was signed in 2024 with the same Chinese company for the construction of the hull of the third floating power unit.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Xudapu NPP, China. On April 3, cold functional tests were completed at Unit 3 of Xudapu NPP, including containment leak-tightness and strength tests under low-temperature and high-pressure conditions.

On April 6, Rosatom’s fuel company TVEL delivered fuel for the unit’s initial core loading.

Paks II NPP, Hungary. Following Hungary’s parliamentary elections held on April 12, Viktor Orbán’s government was replaced after 16 years in power by a cabinet led by Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party.

On April 13, Magyar stated that Hungary’s new government would review all classified government decrees, contracts, and financing arrangements related to the construction of Paks II NPP under Rosatom’s project in order to determine why the project cost had doubled from the original €12.5 billion.

Later, on May 11, the incoming Minister of Economy and Energy István Kapitány said that one of his first steps in office would be to reassess the Paks II project.

In response, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stressed that he was ready to answer any questions regarding the project, including its cost.

“We understand the economics of such projects better than anyone else in the world. Numbers are rational things. We can easily explain and justify them if required by the Hungarian customer. Contracts of this kind are not public for obvious reasons: a nuclear power plant is an extraordinary facility,” he said.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. On April 16, the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) issued an operating license for Unit 1.

On April 28, nuclear fuel loading began at the unit. The ceremony was attended by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev and Bangladesh’s Minister of Science and Technology, Fakir Mahbub Anam. By May 12, 163 fuel assemblies had been loaded into the reactor core. The reactor will next be brought to the minimum controlled power level, after which power will be gradually increased.

Rosatom and Bangladesh signed an agreement on the construction of Rooppur NPP in February 2011. The $12.65 billion contract was signed in December 2015, and the construction license was issued in June 2016. Construction of Unit 1 began in November 2017, followed by Unit 2 in July 2018. The first batch of nuclear fuel was delivered to the site in October 2023.

Likhachev stated that startup operations at Unit 2 are planned to begin in 2027.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On April 21, during a working visit to the Akkuyu NPP construction site, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said that Turkish companies were interested in acquiring a stake in the project and that the parties were discussing specific parameters of potential participation.

Back in July 2025, reports had already emerged about negotiations with Turkish investors regarding the sale of a 49% stake in Akkuyu NPP.

Turkish financial news portal Doviz.com, citing an unnamed source, reported that negotiations are currently underway with two or three Turkish companies. According to the report, the partner will not necessarily receive the full 49% stake, and the share could be smaller.

The outlet also noted that the cost of the Akkuyu NPP project, originally estimated at $20 billion when the agreement with Russia was signed, has risen to $27–28 billion.

Turkish media, citing sources in the country’s Energy Ministry, report that commissioning of Unit 1 is scheduled to begin in September–October of this year.

Meanwhile, on April 2, tanks of the passive core flooding system were installed in the reactor building of Unit 2 at Akkuyu NPP.

On April 29, manufacturing was completed for a set of steam generators and reactor internals for Unit 4.

On April 30, installation of components of the passive heat removal system was completed on the dome of the reactor building of Unit 1 at Akkuyu NPP.

Kudankulam NPP, India. On April 25, flushing of the safety systems to the exposed reactor began at Unit 3.

Recommended publications ↑

On April 13, the Prague office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation published an article titled “Dependency is not just about gas and oil, Dukovany power plant still runs on Russian nuclear fuel” on the continued dependence of EU countries on Russian nuclear fuel and other elements of Russia’s nuclear fuel cycle despite efforts to reduce energy dependence on Russia after 2022. The article examines fuel supplies for VVER reactors in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, the search for alternatives to TVEL fuel, as well as Russia’s continuing role in uranium conversion and enrichment.

Оn April 26, The Moscow Times published an opinion piece by Bellona website editor Charles Digges about the state of Chernobyl cleanup on the 40^th anniversary of the disaster, highlighting the Russian drone attack on the New Safe Confinement. The article is available on the outlet’s website (“40 Years Later, Chernobyl Remains a Lesson in the Unthinkable”).

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. April 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Nevertheless, we continue to systematically monitor and analyze developments related to Rosatom’s activities that we believe are of interest to an international audience. The aim of this review is to assess the scale of Russia’s international influence in the nuclear sector, as well as the associated political, economic, and environmental risks. 

This digest covers events from March 2026. 

You can follow the links to read the three most recent digests covering February and January 2026, December 2025. 

Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues. Download a PDF of this digest here.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of March 2026
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
– The United States did not support a Board of Governors resolution on the impact of Russia’s attacks on nuclear safety in Ukraine
– IAEA and Russian representatives held another round of consultations in Moscow on the Zaporizhzhia NPP
– IAEA shifted to more neutral wording on the Zaporizhzhia NPP in its updates
1.2. Military threats at the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
1.3. Operational status of the ZNPP
2. Restoration of the NSC at Chernobyl Estimated at €500 Million
3. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Approves Siting and Construction of Nuclear Fuel Assembly Production Facility

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
4. Turkey Expands Talks on New NPPs: CANDU Among Technologies Under Consideration

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
5. Russia and Vietnam Resume Ninh Thuan 1 NPP Project
6. Rosatom and Uzatom signed an agreement on a new NPP configuration
7. Rosatom to participate in the creation of a joint venture on critical minerals in Brazil
8. Rosatom and DP World to establish a joint venture with FESCO involvement
9. Likhachev comments on Rosatom’s projects and plans
10. Start of construction of Kursk NPP-2 Unit 3 and Unit 1 reaching 100% capacity
11. Contract signed for the construction of two units at Kola NPP-2
12. Rosatom’s Projects Abroad in Brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of March 2026

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

• The United States did not support a Board of Governors resolution on the impact of Russia’s attacks on nuclear safety in Ukraine
• IAEA and Russian representatives held another round of consultations in Moscow on the Zaporizhzhia NPP
• IAEA shifted to more neutral wording on the Zaporizhzhia NPP in its updates

On March 5, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi presented to the Board of Governors his latest report (GOV/2026/7) on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in Ukraine, covering the period from November 12, 2025, to February 20, 2026.

The report states that throughout this period, military activity was observed and recorded in the immediate vicinity of all Ukrainian NPPs.

According to the IAEA teams at ZNPP, military activity near the Russian-occupied plant intensified compared to previous periods.

In addition, military attacks affected the stability and reliability of off-site power supply to all Ukrainian NPPs: damage to grid infrastructure was reported, along with disconnections of individual power lines, reactor shutdowns and disconnections from the grid, and frequent power reductions in response to grid instability and transmission capacity limitations.

The report provides a detailed chronology of incidents at Ukrainian NPPs related to military activity.

Regarding ZNPP, the report notes that during the reporting period the Russian nuclear regulator Rostekhnadzor issued 10-year operating licenses for Units 1 and 2. According to information provided to the IAEA by the Russian side, the license conditions stipulate that the reactors shall remain in cold shutdown until safety guarantees related to the ultimate heat sink and off-site power are resolved, and that additional safety documentation must be submitted and approved before the units can be moved to any other operational mode.

The report also describes the activities and observations of IAEA mission experts at ZNPP. It notes that IAEA access to certain areas (the western parts of the turbine halls, warehouses, and a number of infrastructure facilities) remains restricted, and that armed troops and military equipment (including armored personnel carriers, military logistics vehicles, and weapon-mounted armored vehicles) are present at the site. Equipment supplies are described as generally sufficient but subject to delays, with some shortages reported and plans to replace Western components with Russian alternatives.

The Board of Governors adopted a resolution recognizing the direct impact of Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on nuclear safety and security.

Reuters reports that the wording of the resolution is softer than in previous cases. The resolution was adopted with 20 votes in favor—including France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Argentina—10 abstentions, and 4 votes against, from Russia, China, Niger, and the United States.

In its statement, the United States said that while it continues to support the IAEA’s work in Ukraine and calls on all parties to refrain from actions that jeopardize nuclear safety and security, the proposed resolution is unnecessary and does not contribute to achieving peace between Ukraine and Russia.

On March 13, the 12th round of interagency consultations between IAEA and Russian delegations took place in Moscow, involving Rostekhnadzor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, and the National Guard. According to Rosatom, the main topic of the meeting was the safety of ZNPP and Enerhodar. Grossi was also “informed about the preparations carried out jointly with Rostekhnadzor to restart the ZNPP’s power units, including obtaining the relevant licenses from the Russian regulator.”

Separately, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev told journalists that the equipment needed to address ZNPP’s water supply issues has already been manufactured (the contract for the manufacture and supply of a cooling pond recharge station was signed in January 2025).

Ukrainian nuclear energy expert Georgiy Balakan noted that following the Moscow consultations, the IAEA changed the wording in its official statements on the situation in Ukraine: whereas prior to Update 343 (March 6) the reports consistently opened with the phrase “Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” starting with Update 344 (March 19) a neutral formulation has been used without indicating the plant’s affiliation.

In the author’s view, this neutralization of wording may contribute to legitimizing Russian control over the plant. He identifies as the starting point of this trend the decision adopted in early 2025 to conduct IAEA mission rotations to ZNPP via the territory of Russia rather than the territory of Ukraine.

Russia has previously expressed dissatisfaction with wording in IAEA reports and resolutions that “call into question Russia’s ownership of ZNPP.”

Military threats at the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

In March, the IAEA reported continued instability in ZNPP’s off-site power supply (Updates 344, 345, 346). The plant remained temporarily without its main 750 kV Dniprovska power line and relied on a single backup 330 kV Ferrosplavna-1 power line, restored on March 5 under a ceasefire arrangement facilitated by the IAEA.

In other regions of Ukraine, IAEA teams reported the impact of attacks on grid infrastructure, including disconnections of nuclear facilities from the grid and the use of backup power sources. Reports also noted the presence of drones near NPPs.

Notably, on March 4—the fourth anniversary of Russia’s seizure of ZNPP—Greenpeace Ukraine published a report analyzing satellite imagery of switchyards and power line pylons at ZNPP and the Zaporizhzhia thermal power plant over the past year. The report catalogs incidents involving damage to the 750 kV Dniprovska and 330 kV Ferrosplavna-1 power lines, including their locations, outage durations, and repair conditions. It states that the analysis found no evidence supporting claims of Ukrainian involvement in the damage, and that some incidents occurred in areas under Russian control.

Operational status of the ZNPP ↑

From March 3, as part of integrating ZNPP into Rosenergoatom’s management standards, IT functions at the plant (including operation of automated process control systems) were transferred to Consist-OS, an integrator and IT competence center of Rosatom’s electric power division.

On March 16, ZNPP’s Russian press service reported that a VVER-1000 reactor simulator had been launched at Sevastopol State University to train specialists.

Restoration of the NSC at Chernobyl Estimated at €500 Million ↑

On March 10, the State Specialized Enterprise “Chernobyl NPP” reported that the French companies Bouygues Travaux Publics and Vinci Construction Grands Projets, which designed and built the New Safe Confinement (NSC) over the Unit 4 sarcophagus at Chernobyl as part of the Novarka consortium, had completed a preliminary technical assessment of the damage caused to the structure by a drone strike in February 2025.

Preliminary plans envisage restoring the NSC by 2030, with the cost of the work estimated at €500 million.

Full restoration of NSC functionality will require a range of measures, including replacement of all damaged membranes, repairs to the main crane maintenance system and other damaged equipment, as well as repairs to load-bearing steel structures and restoration of the outer cladding’s full airtightness. This is an extremely complex technical task given the high radiation fields in the work area.

Dismantling of unstable structures of the old Shelter over the destroyed unit will only be possible after the NSC’s functionality has been restored.

As of March 2026, more than €70 million had been raised from 15 international donors under the International Chernobyl Cooperation Account (ICCA), a donor fund managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In February, the Ukrainian government additionally allocated €31 million from the state budget for these works. Earlier, in June 2025, a further €42.5 million had been pledged by donors at a meeting of the ICCA Assembly in London.

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Approves Siting and Construction of Nuclear Fuel Assembly Production Facility ↑

On March 25, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved a proposal by the Ministry of Energy to construct a nuclear fuel assembly manufacturing complex near Pivdennoukrainsk for Ukrainian NPPs using Westinghouse technology.

Energoatom, the operator of Ukraine’s NPPs, noted that this is an important step toward Ukraine’s energy independence. The next stage will involve developing design documentation and undergoing a comprehensive state review. Cooperation between Energoatom and Westinghouse on nuclear fuel production began in 2019, when the US partner initiated qualification of one of Energoatom’s separate subdivisions as a supplier of top nozzles and bottom nozzles for Westinghouse’s VVER-1000 fuel assemblies.

In 2025, Energoatom signed agreements with Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB on technology transfer and licensing for the design and manufacture, as well as the procurement of equipment to produce fuel assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors.

Ukrainian nuclear energy expert Olha Kosharna, citing materials from a conference on nuclear sector development, notes that the planned annual capacity of the future fuel fabrication plant is 570 fuel assemblies, to be assembled from imported components using Ukrainian-made top and bottom nozzles. She also notes that there are seven VVER-1000 units in government-controlled territory in Ukraine, requiring 294 fuel assemblies annually (546 including ZNPP).

(In 2023, the head of Energoatom stated that from 2026 the company plans to meet up to 50% of Ukrainian NPPs’ fuel needs with domestically produced fuel, with the remaining half to be supplied by Westinghouse.)

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Turkey Expands Talks on New NPPs: CANDU Among Technologies Under Consideration ↑

On March 3, during a visit by Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar to Canada, Türkiye Nükleer Enerji Anonim Şirketi (TÜNAŞ), which is responsible for developing nuclear power plants in Turkey, and Candu Energy Inc. (a subsidiary of AtkinsRéalis) signed a memorandum of understanding to explore the potential deployment of CANDU technology as part of Turkey’s plans to expand its nuclear program.

AtkinsRéalis states that the project involves three nuclear reactors. The parties will jointly assess various CANDU technologies and their suitability for sites identified by TÜNAŞ, as well as review regulatory and licensing requirements in Turkey. In addition, potential business models will be considered, including financing and structuring options, ownership arrangements, project delivery approaches, an assessment of localization opportunities, as well as workforce development and human capital requirements.

Turkey’s first NPP—Akkuyu NPP—is being built by Rosatom. However, construction is several years behind the original schedule. Turkey plans to build two additional plants at sites in Sinop and Thrace. In addition to Canada, Turkey is in talks with South Korea, China, and Russia.

According to Bayraktar, the project offering the most competitive terms and the greatest contribution to localization will be selected. He also stated that Turkey expects Korea Electric Power Corporation to submit a binding proposal to advance the negotiations, and that the goal is to reach a decision this year.

Forbes published a column on Turkey’s nuclear strategy examining factors that could influence negotiations with potential vendors and the choice of technology.

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Russia and Vietnam Resume Ninh Thuan 1 NPP Project ↑

On March 23, Russia and Vietnam signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction of the Ninh Thuan 1 NPP in Vietnam. The project includes construction of two VVER-1200 units, based on the reference design of Leningrad NPP-2, as well as fuel supply for the entire operating lifetime of the plant, spent fuel management, personnel training, and decommissioning at the end of its service life.

The agreement stipulates that its implementation is contingent on Russia providing a state export credit to Vietnam. However, all details of the cooperation — including timelines, project costs, and loan terms — will be specified in additional agreements, protocols, and contracts.

Vietnam had previously planned to build an NPP based on a Russian design, with an intergovernmental agreement signed in 2010. It also had agreements with Japan to construct a second plant, Ninh Thuan 2. In 2016, Vietnam abandoned its nuclear program for environmental and financial reasons, but returned to these plans in late 2024.

Vietnam also approached Japan with a proposal to resume NPP construction at another site, but in December 2025 Japan declined due to tight timelines (Vietnam aims to commission two NPPs by 2035).

Russia and Vietnam are already linked by cooperation in the nuclear sector. This includes plans to establish a Center for Nuclear Science and Technology in Vietnam, which will include a research reactor of Russian design. The existing research reactor in Dalat operates on Russian-supplied fuel and is used to produce medical isotopes.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom and Uzatom signed an agreement on a new NPP configuration ↑

• Rosatom and Uzatom signed a roadmap and a supplementary agreement to the NPP construction contract, introducing a revised project configuration (VVER-1000 and RITM-200N)
• Site preparation began for the foundation base of the RITM-200N reactor building

On March 24 in Tashkent, Rosatom and the Atomic Energy Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzatom) signed a roadmap for cooperation in nuclear and related fields, as well as a supplementary agreement to the NPP construction contract providing for a new plant configuration — two VVER-1000 units and two RITM-200N units with a capacity of 55 MW each. The agreement on this configuration was signed in September 2025.

The roadmap covers all key areas of cooperation under the NPP construction project, including personnel training, public outreach on modern nuclear technologies, and the development of a future “nuclear” town adjacent to the plant.

The NPP is expected to generate approximately 17.2 billion kWh annually, covering up to 14% of Uzbekistan’s total electricity consumption.

On the same day, work began at the construction site on the concrete base for the RITM-200N reactor building. This stage will level the foundation base, provide waterproofing, and establish grounding. The next key milestone at the site will be the pouring of first concrete for the reactor building foundation slab.

Director General of Rosatom Alexey Likhachev said that construction of the small units alone would generate orders for Russian companies worth up to 2 trillion rubles (approximately $24.7 billion) (Bellona note: likely referring to the full project lifecycle, see commentary below).

“In terms of macroeconomic effects, this represents a return of up to 1.5 rubles to the Russian Federation for every ruble invested at the construction stage, and up to 2 rubles during the operation of the NPP,” Alexey Likhachev said.

It is also worth noting that on March 9, Uzatom Director Azim Akhmedkhadzhaev and Senior Executive Vice President of Framatome’s Instrumentation and Control business unit Laurent Thieffry discussed the development of a strategic partnership in the context of implementing integrated projects for the construction and operation of nuclear power units in Uzbekistan.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom to participate in the creation of a joint venture on critical minerals in Brazil ↑

On March 25, Uranium One Group (Rosatom’s uranium mining company with assets in Kazakhstan, Tanzania, and Namibia) and the Brazilian company Núcleo Brasil Energia Participações (NBEPar) signed an agreement to establish a joint venture to implement mineral resource development projects in Brazil.

The company, to be named Nadina Minerals, will carry out geological exploration at prospective deposits and develop mining and processing operations for metals of critical importance to high-tech industries.

According to a statement by NBEPar, its objectives include developing partnerships, expanding private sector participation in nuclear energy projects, and attracting investment to strengthen the sector both nationally and internationally. As part of this effort, the new joint venture will be responsible for mapping Brazil’s territory to identify areas with mineral resource potential, as well as for the development and processing of strategic minerals for the nuclear fuel cycle.

Rosatom and DP World to establish a joint venture with FESCO involvement ↑

In late March, media reports indicated that Rosatom and the UAE-based port operator DP World had agreed to establish a new joint venture to develop global logistics operations and transport capacity, including along the Northern Sea Route.

According to Director General of Rosatom Alexey Likhachev, the agreements between the state corporation and DP World include investments in port infrastructure and an ice-class fleet.

The joint venture will be established on the basis of Global Logistics LLC, registered by Rosatom in December 2025. Rosatom will hold a 51% stake, while the Emirati company will hold 49%.

Rosatom’s contribution to the new joint venture will be its 92.4% stake in Far Eastern Shipping Company (PJSC FESCO), the parent company of the FESCO transport group and one of Russia’s largest container operators (under EU, UK, and Swiss sanctions). The second partner will contribute cash equivalent to the market value of the FESCO stake.

In early April, Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service approved the transaction.

This is not the first joint venture between the parties: in October 2023, International Container Logistics was established with a similar ownership structure (51% held by Rosatom) to develop supply chains between BRICS countries. In December 2023, Rosatom and DP World signed a strategic cooperation agreement on the global market.

Likhachev comments on Rosatom’s projects and plans ↑

On March 12, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev held an Information Day.

He said that Rosatom has scheduled four reactor startups for 2026: Unit 1 of the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey (“The unit is definitely set to be commissioned by December this year”), Unit 1 of the Rooppur NPP in Bangladesh, and two units in China — Unit 7 of the Tianwan NPP and Unit 3 of the Xudapu NPP. First concrete is also planned for the SMR project in Uzbekistan.

Likhachev has repeatedly stated in recent years that two of these units — in Turkey and Bangladesh — will be launched “this year,” with deadlines repeatedly shifting: for Akkuyu NPP from 2023 to 2024 and 2025, and similarly for Rooppur NPP from 2024 to 2025.

He also presented several performance results for the state corporation. In particular, he said that Rosatom’s international revenue amounted to $17.2 billion, “5.2% above plan,” and that its overseas order book had increased to $206 billion.

Note that in January, the figures cited were $16.5 billion and $200 billion, respectively.

In Russia, Rosatom has started project implementation at nine construction sites out of the eighteen planned.

Start of construction of Kursk NPP-2 Unit 3 and Unit 1 reaching 100% capacity ↑

On March 16, Unit 1 of Kursk NPP-2, which was synchronized with the grid on December 31, 2025, and is currently in trial operation, was brought to 100% capacity.

In March 2026, the IAEA’s Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) and the World Nuclear Association reported that official construction of Unit 3 at Kursk NPP-2 (first concrete for the reactor building foundation) began on January 31, 2026. There has been no public confirmation from Rosatom.

Analysis by Bellona of available sources (including publications by regional authorities and photographs from the site) suggests that the ceremony most likely took place earlier — presumably on December 24, 2025. This raises questions about the accuracy of the dates recorded in international databases and indicates that information on the construction of Kursk NPP-2 units is being deliberately withheld by Rosatom.

A detailed analysis of this case and the methodology used are presented in a separate article by Dmitry Gorchakov on Bellona’s website in Russian and English.

Contract signed for the construction of two units at Kola NPP-2 ↑

On March 18, Rosenergoatom and JSC Concern Titan-2 signed a general contractor agreement for the construction of two units at Kola NPP-2 with VVER reactors of 600 MW each, featuring elements of spectral control and the capability to participate in a closed nuclear fuel cycle through the use of uranium-plutonium fuel.

Construction of the units is planned between 2027 and 2037, with two additional similar units planned at the site in the future.

At present, the plant operates four units with VVER-440 reactors. The first two units already have operating licenses extended to 60 years (until 2033 and 2034) and could potentially receive further extensions of up to five years.

The third and fourth units, currently 45 and 42 years old, are licensed to operate until the end of 2026 and until 2039, respectively, and the plant plans to extend their operation to 60 years.

Accordingly, commissioning of the first units of Kola NPP-2 is expected to take place before the shutdown of the first units of the existing plant or be synchronized with it.

Rosatom’s Projects Abroad in Brief ↑

Bushehr NPP, Iran. Starting on February 28, the United States and Israel began carrying out strikes on Iranian territory, continuing them in the following weeks. The strikes were aimed, among other things, at disrupting Iran’s nuclear program and targeted uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow, the nuclear complex in Isfahan, and the heavy water reactor in Arak.

According to Iranian sources, in March there were also reported strikes on the territory of the Bushehr NPP — on March 17, 24, and 27, and April 4. On the first day of the operation, February 28, an attack was also reported near the city of Bushehr, a few hundred meters from the plant. In all cases, it was reported that there were no casualties or damage at the site.

Rosatom began evacuating its personnel on the first day of the operation, and construction work at the Bushehr NPP was suspended. More than 600 people were evacuated from Iran in stages. By April 20, all personnel had been evacuated.

According to Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, as of April 20 only 20 staff remained at the NPP site and 4 in Tehran to maintain infrastructure and contacts with the Iranian customer.

For more on the risks to the Bushehr NPP associated with military activity in Iran, see the article by Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov, “Another Russia-Linked Nuclear Power Plant Is at Risk From War. This Time, in Iran.”

El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On March 6, a thrust truss intended to secure the reactor vessel in the reactor cavity was installed in its design position at Unit 2. On March 16, a bubbler — one of the components of the reactor pressure compensation system — was installed in the reactor building of Unit 1.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On March 13, a thrust truss intended to secure the reactor vessel was installed in its design position in the reactor building of Unit 4. On March 25, a polar crane was installed at Unit 2.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. On March 31, boron flushing of the primary circuit piping of the reactor system was completed at Unit 1.

Recommended publications ↑

On March 6, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report on the characteristics of Russia’s civil nuclear exports four years into the war — “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Civil Nuclear Exports Four Years into the War.” Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov contributed to the report by giving an extensive interview to its author, Jane Nakano.

On March 16, Forbes published an article reviewing Turkey’s nuclear strategy, in which Güney Yıldız argues that Ankara is deliberately diversifying its nuclear portfolio and not relying solely on Rosatom. In addition to Akkuyu, Turkey is discussing new projects with Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), EDF, and Canadian partners, aiming to reduce dependencies and strengthen energy security (“Turkey’s New Nuclear Calculus: Brilliant Strategy Or Regulatory Nightmare?”).

On March 27, the British newspaper The Times published an article featuring extensive commentary by Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov on Rosatom’s global influence in international markets and, in particular, the United Kingdom’s dependence on supplies of nuclear materials from Russia — “From Russia without love: inside Putin’s grip on our nuclear power.”

On April 2, The Moscow Times published an opinion piece by Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov on the situation at Iran’s Bushehr NPP following the start of military operations by the United States and Israel, and on Rosatom’s role in Iran’s nuclear program. The article is available on the outlet’s website (“Another Russia-Linked Nuclear Power Plant Is at Risk From War. This Time, in Iran.”).

Оn April 26, The Moscow Times published an opinion piece by Bellona website editor Charles Digges about the state of Chernobyl cleanup on the 40^th anniversary of the disaster, highlighting the Russian drone attack on the New Safe Confinement. The article is available on the outlet’s website (“40 Years Later, Chernobyl Remains a Lesson in the Unthinkable”).

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. March 2026  appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for February can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in March
2. In March, operations along the Northern Sea Route were supported by seven nuclear icebreakers
3. Direct passenger voyages from Murmansk to Svalbard have resumed
4. The Russian government plans to test ice reconnaissance drones on the Northern Sea Route and in the Arctic zone
5. JSC “Northern Shipping Company” has been selected as the operator of regular cabotage shipping along the Northern Sea Route

Commentary by Bellona

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. France has inspected the sanctioned tanker Deyna, carrying Russian Arctic oil from Murmansk
7. The United Kingdom has authorized the military to detain vessels of the shadow fleet
8. A Ukrainian drone strike on a shipyard in Vyborg damaged the Purga, an Arctic patrol icebreaker currently under construction
9. Canada has presented a comprehensive plan for the development of its Arctic territories

Commentary by Bellona

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
10. The annual maximum extent of Arctic sea ice has set a new record low for the second consecutive year
11. New study: polar bears are becoming smaller and losing genetic diversity due to the loss of sea ice

RECOMMENDED MATERIALS

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in March ↑

In March, Arctic sea ice reached its annual maximum. According to the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), on March 15 the ice extent was 14.29 million km². This result is virtually identical to the record low value of 2025 (14.31 million km²) and, together with it, is the lowest on record since observations began in 1979.

Shipping along the Northern Sea Route in March was supported by the LNG projects Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2, oil shipments from the Varandey, Prirazlomnoye, and Novoportovskoye fields, as well as cargo transport by Norilsk Nickel.

In March, operations at the Arctic LNG 2 project became significantly more complicated, and export shipments slowed following the explosion of the tanker Arctic Metagas in the Mediterranean Sea on March 3. As a result of the explosion, the vessel lost propulsion and is still drifting in the central Mediterranean with LNG and heavy fuel (most likely fuel oil) on board.

After that, vessels servicing Arctic LNG 2 changed their routes. Some carriers began avoiding the Mediterranean Sea and used longer routes via the Cape of Good Hope, which increased fleet turnaround times. This led to a buildup of cargo in the Arctic. The floating storage unit Saam FSU near Murmansk approached full capacity, and LNG carriers were forced to idle in the Barents Sea awaiting unloading. After March 17, not a single loading operation was recorded at the Utrenny terminal of the Arctic LNG 2 plant.

In total, in March the LNG carriers Christophe de Margerie and Alexey Kosygin each loaded twice at the terminal. However, only one cargo was shipped from the Saam FSU—on March 2 to the tanker Voskhod, which then headed around Africa toward China.

The Yamal LNG project continued operating as usual in March. A total of 25 LNG cargoes were shipped from the plant in Sabetta and, as in February, were delivered to EU countries. The bulk of deliveries was carried by 14 Arc7 ice-class tankers operating on direct routes from Sabetta to European ports. At the same time, part of the cargoes was transshipped via ship-to-ship operations near Kildin Island, where LNG was transferred to non-ice-class tankers for onward delivery to Europe.

At the same time, shipments of stable gas condensate (SGC) to the EU continued. Transport was carried out by two specialized tankers—Boris Sokolov and Yuri Kuchiev, each of which completed one voyage in March.

In March, oil shipments from Arctic terminals continued in a stable mode. According to AIS data, the tankers Vasily Dinkov, Kapitan Gotskiy, and Timofey Guzhenko carried out four loadings from the Varandey terminal. From the Prirazlomnaya platform, the tankers Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov completed at least five shipments. From the Gate of the Arctic terminal (Novoportovskoye field), seven Arc7 tankers of the Shturman series carried out approximately 12–13 voyages. Vessels from all three fields proceeded to the Murmansk area (Kola Bay), where oil was transshipped onto other tankers for further export, while AIS signal outages were regularly recorded in the Murmansk area.

The metallurgical company Norilsk Nickel continued regular container shipments along the Northern Sea Route between the port of Dudinka and Murmansk. As in the previous month, seven vessel calls were recorded in Dudinka in March. These vessels mainly transported non-ferrous metals for export, while in the opposite direction they delivered general cargo, equipment, and materials for the needs of the Norilsk industrial region.

The company’s own fleet of Arc7 ice-class container ships (Norilskiy Nikel, Talnakh, Nadezhda, Monchegorsk, and Zapolyarny) completed five voyages in March, and the chartered vessels Terskiy Bereg and Taybola carried out two additional voyages.

In March, operations along the Northern Sea Route were supported by seven nuclear icebreakers ↑

In March, seven nuclear icebreakers of Rosatomflot operated actively along the Northern Sea Route, ensuring navigation in its western sector. Their main operations were concentrated in the Gulf of Ob and the Kara Sea, where they operated between the following key points:

• Yamal at the beginning of the month escorted vessels from the Kara Gates to Sabetta and the Utrenny terminal, after which it operated between the Utrenny terminal and Sabetta in the Gulf of Ob and Cape Zhelaniya—the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya. On March 26, it moved to the Severnaya Bay area and then headed to Kola Bay, rounding Novaya Zemlya from the north.
• 50 Let Pobedy operated throughout the month between Sabetta, the Utrenny terminal (both located close to each other in the Gulf of Ob), and Cape Zhelaniya in the northern part of the Kara Sea.
• Taymyr escorted vessels along the route between the port of Dudinka and Cape Zhelaniya.
• Vaigach provided icebreaking assistance between Cape Kamenny in the Gulf of Ob and the northern part of the Kara Sea.
• Arktika and Yakutiya focused on escort operations in the Gulf of Ob—on approaches to the port of Sabetta and Cape Kamenny.
• Ural operated between the northern part of the Kara Sea and the port of Dudinka.

On the evening of March 17, the nuclear icebreaker Sibir (Project 22220) returned to the Arctic after a month-long mission in the Gulf of Finland, where it had been deployed due to severe ice conditions. The icebreaker arrived on February 18 and over 28 days escorted 165 vessels—mainly tankers and bulk carriers—to and from the port of Primorsk. After returning, Sibir resumed operations on the Northern Sea Route.

Along with Sibir, the diesel-electric icebreaker Murmansk (Project 21900M) arrived in the Gulf of Finland on February 19. According to AIS data, around March 27 Murmansk completed its operations and departed back toward the Arctic. Thus, the icebreaker spent approximately 37 days in the Gulf of Finland.

Direct passenger voyages from Murmansk to Svalbard have resumed ↑

The first voyage in 2026 of the research vessel Professor Molchanov took place on March 8, delayed by several days due to a storm. The departure had originally been scheduled for March 4. It is currently the only vessel operating on this route.

Transport operations are organized by the Arktikugol trust. The main purpose of the voyages is to transport employees, their family members, contractors, and scientists, as well as to supply the settlement. The voyages are also used for tourism purposes.

Direct maritime service between Murmansk and Barentsburg was restored in 2025 after a 27-year hiatus. Last year, Professor Molchanov completed five voyages, and in 2026 the number is planned to increase to ten.

Regular passenger sea transport from Murmansk to Barentsburg ceased in the late 1990s. This happened after, in 1998, Arktikugol halted operations at the mine and mothballed the settlement of Pyramiden due to unprofitability. However, the mine in Barentsburg continued operating, and people remained in the settlement.

Arktikugol is also attempting to develop its tourism business. In 2020, flights from Russia to Svalbard were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and later additional restrictions were imposed as a result of sanctions.

The Russian government plans to test ice reconnaissance drones on the Northern Sea Route and in the Arctic zone ↑

On March 20, the Russian government approved Resolution No. 300 introducing an experimental legal regime for the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles on the Northern Sea Route and in the Arctic zone (AZRF). The document was published on March 31. The initiator and operator is FSUE Atomflot.

The experimental legal regime is introduced for a period of three years. It allows for simplified rules, including the suspension of certain provisions of the Air Code and certification requirements, and applies in the waters of the Northern Sea Route and adjacent Arctic territories, including the Yamalo-Nenets, Nenets, and Chukotka autonomous okrugs, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Yakutia, Karelia, and Komi.

The main objective is to test an ice reconnaissance system based on deck-based unmanned aerial vehicles. Such systems are intended to provide real-time information on ice conditions, which is expected to improve the safety of navigation along the Northern Sea Route and support the development of year-round shipping in challenging Arctic conditions.

In addition, testing of aerial cargo delivery and other aviation operations is planned. Flights are to be conducted under the direct control of an external pilot, with real-time transmission to a geoinformation portal.

Over the three-year period, at least 600 flights for ice reconnaissance are planned, covering an area of no less than 6,000 km² along the Northern Sea Route.

JSC “Northern Shipping Company” has been selected as the operator of regular cabotage shipping along the Northern Sea Route ↑

The Russian Ministry for the Development of the Far East and Arctic has announced the results of the selection of a recipient of a federal subsidy for organizing regular cabotage cargo shipments along the Northern Sea Route in 2026–2028. The winner of the tender is JSC “Northern Shipping Company”.

Minvostokrazvitiya, Russia’s ministry for the development of the Far East, has for the first time designated a single operator for the entire three-year period. Previously, such shipments were carried out on an occasional basis. The new approach is expected to enable the establishment of a regular sailing schedule and a transition to systematic planning of Arctic logistics.

JSC “Northern Shipping Company” will operate voyages between ports in the European part of Russia (St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk) and the Far East (Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Vostochny, Korsakov) in both directions.

The company confirmed its readiness to carry out shipments with a subsidy of 244.3 million rubles, compared to the maximum possible funding of up to 1.3 billion rubles for the entire period from 2026 to 2028.

Commentary by Bellona:

The International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

France has inspected the sanctioned tanker Deyna, carrying Russian Arctic oil from Murmansk ↑

On March 20, France inspected the tanker Deyna in the Mediterranean Sea, carrying oil extracted in the Russian Arctic. According to vessel tracking services, the tanker, which used the flag of Mozambique to circumvent sanctions, was sailing from Murmansk to Port Said, Egypt.

The inspection operation was carried out in cooperation with the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters, which had been monitoring the vessel. The tanker was escorted by French Navy ships to an anchorage in the Gulf of Fos, where it is awaiting an investigation by the Marseille prosecutor’s office on charges of sailing under a false flag.

This is already the second detention of a shadow fleet tanker by France in recent months. In late January, the tanker Grinch, flying the flag of the Comoros, was intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea. Like Deyna, it was carrying oil extracted in the Russian Arctic, which it had loaded in Murmansk. Grinch was released by France after the vessel’s owner paid a fine of “several million euros,” as stated by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot.

French President Emmanuel Macron commented on the detention of the vessel Deyna amid the oil crisis caused by the war in Iran: “The war involving Iran will not deflect France from its support for Ukraine, where Russia’s war of aggression continues unabated.”

Emmanuel Macron condemned the illegal activities of Russian tankers, emphasizing the role of the shadow fleet in financing military operations in Ukraine.

The United Kingdom has authorized the military to detain vessels of the shadow fleet ↑

From March 25, 2026, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer granted the armed forces and law enforcement officers the authority to inspect and detain Russian shadow fleet vessels passing through the country’s territorial waters. The British authorities expect that Russian tankers will now have to use alternative routes, avoiding the English Channel, which is jointly managed by the United Kingdom and France, or risk being detained.

This decision marks a new step in the United Kingdom’s efforts to counter the Russian shadow fleet. For several years, the Royal Navy has been tracking the routes and activities of sanctioned Russian vessels and has provided support in operations to detain shadow fleet ships carried out by other European states, including France.

In response to the tightening of measures to intercept shadow fleet vessels, Russia’s Maritime Board held meetings to develop additional ways to protect ships departing from Russia or sailing under the Russian flag. The Russian government also condemned the United Kingdom’s sanctions on 554 shadow fleet vessels, calling them unlawful.

A Ukrainian drone strike on a shipyard in Vyborg damaged the Purga, an Arctic patrol icebreaker currently under construction ↑

Ukraine carried out a series of drone attacks on the Vyborg Shipbuilding Plant in the Leningrad Region, as a result of which the patrol vessel Purga under construction was damaged.

Purga is a multipurpose patrol vessel of Project 23550, intended for use by the Coast Guard of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service. Project 23550 vessels have an Arc7 ice class and can perform the functions of an icebreaker, tug, firefighting vessel, and combat ship. They are equipped with an artillery mount, a helicopter deck and hangar, and can operate unmanned aerial vehicles and high-speed boats. The ships also feature aft deck space designed to accommodate containerized Kalibr-K cruise missile systems.

One such vessel, Ivan Papanin, was commissioned in September 2025, while three others, including Purga, are at various stages of construction in Vyborg and at the Admiralty Shipyards in Saint Petersburg.

This strike is the first known case of a Ukrainian drone damaging a Russian military vessel in the Baltic Sea. On the same night, March 25, Ukraine attacked the Russian port of Ust-Luga, which resulted in a large-scale fire.

It is currently unknown to what extent the damage will delay the construction of Purga. The Vyborg Shipbuilding Plant is one of the most significant shipbuilding enterprises in the Russian Federation, specializing in offshore equipment and civilian ice-class vessels.

Canada has presented a comprehensive plan for the development of its Arctic territories ↑

On March 12, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney presented a comprehensive plan for the development of Canada’s Arctic territories.

The program, which includes long-term investments totaling more than 40 billion Canadian dollars, is aimed at strengthening defense infrastructure as well as the region’s socio-economic development. According to Carney, under this plan Canada assumes full responsibility for protecting its sovereignty in the Arctic and also plans to develop mineral resources, expand clean energy, and establish trade corridors.

Four new facilities being developed to strengthen the presence of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic will also be used for search and rescue operations, emergency evacuations, and assistance to populations in remote areas.

The document also places emphasis on the development of renewable energy. A key project is the expansion of the Taltson hydroelectric power plant, which will increase hydropower capacity in the Northwest Territories by 60 megawatts, doubling it.

The project also lays the groundwork for the future connection of the Northwest Territories’ power system to the rest of Canada. This integrated hydropower network will serve more than 70% of the territory’s population, support new mineral extraction projects, and significantly reduce its dependence on diesel fuel, cutting CO2 emissions by 82% to 240,000 tons per year.

In the area of transport infrastructure, plans include the construction of the country’s first deep-water port on the Arctic Ocean at Grays Bay, as well as the implementation of several other infrastructure projects, primarily related to the development of the highway network. These projects are intended to connect isolated Arctic territories with the rest of the country, provide access to critical mineral deposits, create more than 11,000 jobs, and significantly reduce the cost of living in the North. Many of the facilities will have dual military-civilian use.

Commentary by Bellona:

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

The annual maximum extent of Arctic sea ice has set a new record low for the second consecutive year ↑

On March 22, the annual maximum extent of Arctic sea ice reached a historic low for the entire period of observations (since 1979), totaling 14.29 million km² and surpassing last year’s record low of 14.31 million km², according to NASA.

The continued decline in ice extent is occurring against the backdrop of a persistent long-term trend. This year’s figures are about 1.3 million km² below the 1981–2010 average. The trend is even more pronounced in summer, when Arctic sea ice reaches its annual minimum. Annual summer measurements show a decline of 12.2% per decade. For example, the summer minimum in 2025 was about 4.6 million km², placing it among the ten lowest values on record.

NASA emphasized that, according to data from the ICESat-2 satellite, ice thickness is also decreasing—especially in the Barents Sea to the northeast of Greenland. Relatively low ice concentration was also observed in the Sea of Okhotsk.

An additional factor is anomalous weather conditions. During the 2025 winter season, temperatures in some parts of the Arctic were recorded at up to 12°C above normal, along with strong cyclones that broke up thin ice and hindered its formation.

New study: polar bears are becoming smaller and losing genetic diversity due to the loss of sea ice ↑

An international group of researchers, including representatives from Canada, the United States, and Norway, has published a new report in the journal Ecological Monographs on the impact of climate change on the genetics and evolution of polar bears.

Scientists examined all 20 polar bear populations. Some are declining sharply; however, part of the populations remain stable, and some are even thriving due to factors such as high biodiversity, abundant prey, and access to glacial ice, which supplements the diminishing sea ice.

Nevertheless, on average, polar bears are becoming smaller. This is a form of maladaptation, meaning it does not provide a benefit: reduced body size makes bears more vulnerable, limits the time they can go without food, and leads to the birth of smaller cubs with lower survival rates.

In addition, the researchers confirmed that, in evolutionary terms, polar bears are not adapting to climate change. Although some individuals show behavioral flexibility—for example, adopting new hunting strategies—this is not transmitted to offspring through evolutionary mechanisms.

In addition, reduced gene flow between populations is leading to declining genetic diversity in many of them. This decline, along with increasing levels of inbreeding, indicates lower adaptive capacity and greater vulnerability.

Maintaining contact between populations is crucial for the survival of the entire species, the authors of the report emphasize.

“According to our research, one of the most clear-cut ways to preserve polar bears in a warming Arctic is to maintain ecosystem connectivity through habitat preservation. Through marine reserves, strategic shipping lane planning, and other measures, we can ensure that polar bears and other Arctic species can continue to disperse and connect with other populations, which is necessary for preserving genetic diversity and long-term species resilience,” says Dr. Ruth Rivkin, lead author of the study and a researcher at the University of Manitoba (Canada), who also works with the conservation NGO Polar Bears International.

At the same time, Rosatom maintains that shipping along the Northern Sea Route does not have a negative impact on the environment. This suggests that Russia does not plan to introduce any additional measures aimed at protecting Arctic species in the context of maritime transport.

Recommended Materials ↑

On March 4, Bellona held a session at the annual Arctic Circle – Polar Dialogue in Rome, where experts and journalists examined how Russian propaganda narratives around the Arctic are formed and why they do not reflect reality. A report from the event and its video recording are available here.

Bellona has published the article “Russia is not prepared for oil spills, Kerch Strait report shows” On December 5, 2025, Russia submitted to the International Maritime Organization a report on the response to the accident in the Kerch Strait. The document indicates that Russia lacks a plan for responding to heavy fuel oil spills at sea in winter conditions. We explain what this means in the context of Arctic shipping and the development of the Northern Sea Route.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, March 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

On April 7, an oil spill occurred near Anapa in the Black Sea. At the time, the Sofia (IMO 9211999) was operating in the immediate vicinity. According to the environmental monitoring project Transparent World, which detected the spill in satellite imagery, the discharge occurred overnight from April 6 to April 7 approximately 47 kilometers west of Anapa. 

The initial spill covered about 8 square kilometers. By April 17, it had expanded to 581 square kilometers. On April 18, the spill split into two major fragments measuring 220 and 228 square kilometers, which then drifted toward open sea. 

Using Sentinel satellite imagery, RiskSat estimated that 300–350 tons of petroleum products entered the environment. The exact substance has not been identified, though Transparent World believes it was crude oil or heavy ship fuel (HFO). The cause also remains unclear.  Officials with operational headquarters in Krasnodar have claimed a Ukrainian drone attack was the most likely cause, but have provided no evidence for that assertion (f.e. photo or video recording).

The situation was complicated by the fact that the spill only became publicly known five days after the fact. The Krasnodar operational headquarters detected an oil slick on April 11, only when it had approached within 11 km of Anapa. That same day, local residents first reported birds covered in fuel oil washing ashore. 

On April 16, the operational headquarters reported that over the previous two days more than 200 dead and oil-covered birds had been found along the Anapa coast, though the post was later deleted. Volunteers had reported 320 contaminated birds as early as April 12. Dead dolphins have also been reported. 

Initially, three vessels from Russia’s Marine Rescue Service were deployed in response. They collected about 28 tons of oil-water mixture. According to the operational headquarters, containment booms were installed and part of the slick was treated with 45 kilograms of biosorbent. 

In addition, as of April 17, Russian authorities said 247 tons of contaminated shoreline material had been collected. Officials reported 400 meters of coastline outside the city were cleaned on April 12 (though volunteers involved in the work say it was 300 meters), followed by another 600 meters on April 13. Cleanup was also conducted on Anapa’s central beach, where contamination extended for an estimated 170 meters.

The last available data on the tanker spill dates to April 20. On this day, the second of four and one of the most destructive waves of drone attacks struck the oil refinery and marine terminal in Tuapse, about 150 kilometers from the Sofia spill site (the first attack was April 16, the third April 28). Drones hit oil storage and transfer infrastructure, triggering a major fire involving tanks and port facilities. Another petroleum spill occurred in the Black Sea, and residents reported an “oil rain” in the city. It is likely that emergency and volunteer resources were redirected there. 

Why This Matters in the Arctic Context

According to Global Fishing Watch data, Sofia does not only operate in the Black Sea. During summer navigation it has sailed along the entire Russian Arctic coast — from Murmansk to Anadyr on the Pacific Ocean. 

In May 2022, shortly after the war began, the vessel changed its flag from Maltese to Russian and began switching off its AIS transponder while passing along European coasts from Norway to the Bosporus and occasionally in other waters, concealing its true location. 

Such practices can delay awareness of accidents and reduce the effectiveness of emergency response. This appears to have happened with Sofia: its transponder was turned off during the incident. 

Risks associated with shadow fleet vessels are amplified by opaque ownership structures, in some cases inadequate insurance coverage for environmental damage, and vessel age and wear. Sofia, for example, is an Aframax tanker without ice class, built in 2000.

Even beyond this, the leak itself was effectively concealed, and only became known once the slick reached a major city. That Sofia was the pollution source was established solely through a public environmental organization, not through investigation by responsible authorities. 

And this happened in a shipping region located near Marine Rescue Service and Emergency Ministry bases. By contrast, along Russia’s Arctic coast emergency rescue centers exist in only eight settlements, and the distance between two neighboring centers at Pevek and Tiksi on the Murmansk-Anadyr route is about 1,500 kilometers by air and around 2,000 kilometers by sea. There are also far fewer populated areas whose residents might detect and report spills than along the Black Sea coast. 

At the same time, 100 shadow fleet vessels reportedly operated along the Northern Sea Route in 2025 alone. 

In 2026, Rosatom — the route’s infrastructure operator — stopped publishing the list of vessels granted transit permits on the Northern Sea Route. Information on vessel locations, accidents and incidents along the route has also ceased to be publicly available. 

In addition, in January 2026 Russia reportedly attempted to shelter a foreign shadow fleet tanker, Marinera, in Murmansk, further increasing concerns tied to shadow fleet operations. 

The Volgoneft Experience 

Beyond the timeliness of response lies the question of effectiveness. Too few Marine Rescue Service vessels were assigned to the Sofia spill, recovering only 28 tons of already diluted mixture. 

A more revealing example is the wreck of the tankers Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, carrying fuel oil, on December 15, 2024. 

Russian emergency response services proved wholly unprepared to contain a spill even from relatively small tankers in comparatively favorable climatic conditions (compared with winter in other Russian seas), in shallow waters, and despite an emergency response center being located within 100 kilometers. 

The consequences remain unresolved nearly a year and a half later, while fuel oil pollution was detected as far as Odesa, 600 kilometers from the accident site.

In a report submitted to the International Maritime Organization on December 5, 2025 concerning response to the Kerch Strait disaster, Russia explicitly stated that it lacks a winter maritime heavy-fuel spill response plan. Nothing is known about creation of such a plan.

The report says many failures and delays were linked to the behavior of heavy fuel oil in cold water. But delayed removal of fuel from the grounded stern of Volgoneft-239, resulting in additional pollution, problems with shoreline cleanup and waste disposal, and the use of river-sea tankers in storm conditions in open waters point to a broader systemic problem. 

Russia Avoids Assisting Its Own Distressed Vessels

Two incidents over the past six months also stand out in which Russia reportedly refused to assist its own vessels in distress. One involved the LNG tanker Arktik Metagaz, reportedly attacked by Ukrainian drone boats and drones near Sicily. 

Although sailing under Russian flag, it received no assistance from Russian authorities, aside from sending Russian crew members home after they were rescued by the Libyan coast guard. Arktik Metagaz reportedly remains adrift in the Mediterranean. Surviving tanks may still contain LNG and liquid fuel, posing risks to shipping, coastal settlements, and marine and coastal ecosystems. 

In November, another Russian shadow fleet tanker, Kairos, sailing under Gambian flag, was also left without assistance. Fortunately, it had unloaded its oil cargo before the accident and did not pose a major environmental threat. But it later emerged that ten crew members had been left aboard without a captain or first officer, with limited food, water and power. Bulgaria launched a rescue operation on December 7, while Russia made no effort to assist crew or vessel.

Taken together, these cases once again suggest that Russia lacks not only the capability but also, at times, the willingness to address the environmental consequences of its fleet’s operations, investigate their causes, or even save crew members in distress. Where consequences do not threaten political or economic interests or trigger major public pressure, they appear often to be ignored. 

In the Russian Arctic — with its sparse population and vast distances between settlements — an oil spill or other serious industrial accident could be similarly overlooked, unless it threatens a major infrastructure project.

The post Russian Shadow Fleet Tanker Responsible for Black Sea Oil Spill Regularly Used the Northern Sea Route  appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

But this site is also the Russian nuclear power plant closest to the border with Ukraine. Likely for this reason, Rosatom is carrying out construction under conditions of limited transparency—either not publicly disclosing key construction milestones or doing so with significant delays and inconsistencies. This has led to confusion even at the level of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

When was the first concrete poured for the base slab of Unit 3 of Kursk II NPP?

The four new VVER-TOI units at Kursk II are intended to replace the older RBMK reactors at the existing Kursk NPP. Construction of the new plant began in 2018. The first unit of Kursk II was connected to the grid at the end of 2025. The second unit is roughly one year behind the first. Units 3 and 4 are currently in their early stages. However, developments over recent months present a contradictory picture of their status. Specifically, it remains unclear whether construction of Unit 3 has officially begun, and that concreting of the base slab of the reactor building started.

In March 2026, the status of Unit 3 at the Kursk II NPP was updated in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) and in the World Nuclear Association database. According to the new entry, first concrete was poured on January 31, 2026, and the unit was officially classified as under construction. Based on data from the WebArchive service, this update appeared in the PRIS and WNA databases in mid-March.

At the same time, there were no public confirmations of construction beginning from Rosatom or its subsidiaries. One of the few reference points was a statement by the plant director in early 2025, indicating plans to begin first concrete pouring by the end of the year.

The only Russian source reporting on the start of construction of Unit 3 at Kursk II NPP was by Kursk Region Governor Alexander Khinshtein. On January 29, a post with photos from an official ceremony at the Kursk II construction site was published on his Telegram channel. The text of the post stated, among other things: “You know why these photos from the Kursk II construction site are historic? Because on the day they were taken, the ‘first concrete’ was poured! Together with plant personnel, on the eve of the first unit’s physical start-up, we launched the pouring of the foundation slab for Unit 3 with a ceremonial first concrete event…”

If these statements are to be believed (although any statements by officials in Russia today should be treated with caution) it can be inferred that the first concrete ceremony did not take place on January 29, nor on January,31 as indicated in the PRIS and WNA databases, but no later than December 31, 2025, when Unit 1 of Kursk II NPP was connected to the grid. This is because physical start-up (first criticality) procedures clearly occur before first grid connection.

Moreover, on January 22, Alexander Khinshtein was involved in a serious car accident and remained hospitalized until February. Therefore, he could not have physically attended any ceremony at the end of January.

At the same time, in his post, Khinshtein links the term “physical start-up” to a news item about the unit’s grid connection on December 31, which suggests that he (or his aides and advisors) is simply confusing the concepts of physical start-up and grid connection.

The term “physical start-up” usually refers either to a specific event—the reactor reaching the minimum controlled power level (MCP, or first criticality)—or to the broader phase leading up to it, beginning with the loading of the first fuel assembly into the reactor. According to the PRIS database (as of April 24, 2026), first criticality at Unit 1 of Kursk II NPP took place almost a year earlier, on May 22, 2025. On December 31, the unit achieved first grid connection, when it began supplying electricity to the grid. Thus, the first concrete pouring for Unit 3 could have taken place “on the eve” of the events of December 31.

At the same time, the photos from Khinshtein’s channel clearly show that they were taken in cold weather and clear conditions—most likely in late autumn or early winter. People are wearing warm winter clothing and their breath is visible; the sun is relatively low even during the day. However, there is neither the mud typical of spring nor a stable snow cover (which in Kurchatov formed only after December 27, 2025) visible in the images.

The most important photographic evidence from Khinshtein is one image in the post showing a helmet with the inscription “first concrete at Unit 3, VVER-TOI, Kursk II NPP” (consistent with the traditions of such ceremonies), on which he is signing and has only partially written the date “24.X…”. The Roman numeral “X” could be followed by “I”, “II”, or nothing, corresponding, in European date ordering, to 24 October, 24 November, or 24 December 2025.

An analysis of archived weather observations in the city of Kurchatov shows that the first two dates are unlikely due to relatively warm above-zero temperatures. By contrast, on December 24 it was cold (around –10°C), partly clear, and still without a stable snow cover.

The governor’s schedule indicates that he was on official visits that day. Early in the morning, he attended the opening of a facility just north of Kursk (in the settlement of Kamyshi—around 8–9 a.m., judging by the sun’s position in the photos, which also confirms clear weather). He then opened a center for adaptive sports for people with disabilities in Kursk, including veterans of the war, and could well have proceeded afterward to the Kursk NPP site, where, judging by the photos, he appears to have been around midday.

At the same time, the governor’s visit to the NPP is, of course, not reflected in his official schedule, nor is the event mentioned in the information channels of Rosatom or its subsidiaries.

All of the above leads to the following conclusion: most likely, the first concrete pouring ceremony for Unit 3 of Kursk II NPP did indeed take place on December 24, 2025—not on January 31, as indicated in the PRIS database.

Interestingly, following the update of the PRIS database—although this is most likely unrelated—there was a brief mention of concrete pouring at Unit 3 in materials from Rosatom-affiliated entities. On March 26, the corporation’s machine-building division published a note on its website (only in Russian) about the start of manufacturing the reactor vessel for Unit 3 at the Atommash plant. In the background section of the article, almost in passing, it was noted: “At the Unit 3 site, first concrete for the reactor building was poured in December 2025, and foundation concreting is currently ongoing.” The same material was republished on the Rosenergoatom website on the same day. Thus, without much publicity, information about a key milestone for the operator of Russian NPPs appeared on its website, effectively confirming that it took place on December 24.

Why is Rosatom being so secretive about Kursk II NPP?

Key milestones in nuclear power plant construction—especially the start of construction (first base slab concrete pouring)—are typically marked by formal ceremonies. In the case of Rosatom’s international projects, such events are attended not only by the head of Rosatom, but also by senior officials from both countries, and sometimes even by the heads of state (either in person or, more often, via video link), as well as representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For example, Rafael Grossi attended the first concrete ceremony at Paks II on February 5, 2026. Similarly, Vladimir Putin and the President of Egypt jointly launched such a ceremony at El Dabaa in January 2024.

Sometimes, stages that are less significant from a technical standpoint but important in political and symbolic terms are accompanied by public ceremonies attended by the head of Rosatom and officials from the host country. This was the case, for example, in August last year in Kazakhstan during the start of site survey works, and on April 28 this year during the first fuel loading into the reactor at the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh.

Within Russia, in recent years Putin has launched first concrete ceremonies via video link for Unit 3 of Leningrad II NPP in March 2024 and Unit 4 in March 2025. The only major nuclear unit whose official construction start in recent years was not accompanied by prominent media coverage or the involvement of Putin is precisely Unit 3 of Kursk II NPP.

But why? The reason is certainly that Kursk NPP is the Russian nuclear power plant closest to the border with Ukraine. For the past four years, it has effectively been the only Russian nuclear plant located roughly 60 km from the front line. During the Ukrainian counteroffensive in August 2024, the front line moved even closer— to approximately 20 kilometres from the nuclear power plant. At that time, Rosatom actively drew attention to the situation at the plant, highlighting potential risks of drone strikes, partially evacuating personnel from the construction of new units, and securing a visit by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It appears that after this period (and possibly even earlier), a decision was made to scale back public reporting on developments at the site due to security reasons.

Almost all key preparatory stages for the launch of the first unit of the new plant took place under near-total information blackout. Its grid connection on December 31, 2025 was the first milestone to be publicly highlighted by Rosenergoatom and Rosatom. Obviously, an event that is no longer limited to activities at the construction site but involves supplying electricity to the grid is much harder to conceal, and reporting a major achievement by the end of the year was likely necessary. It is possible that subsequent stages after grid connection are considered less vulnerable to external attacks and therefore do not require the same level of information blackout, as any potential incident would no longer relate to construction delays but rather to risks to an operating nuclear power unit.

However, prior to this, Rosatom’s structures did not publicly report on key preceding milestones of the reactor start-up—such as the beginning of the physical start-up phase, fuel loading, or reaching first criticality.

Concurrently, during the period when Unit 1 of Kursk II NPP reportedly reached first criticality in May 2025, Vladimir Putin paid a personal visit to the site. His visit to the Kursk region and the plant on May 21, however, was reported without any reference to these critical construction milestones. But according to PRIS data, the following day—May 22—is listed as the date the unit reached first criticality. In other words, Putin continues to be personally involved in key nuclear construction events, but Rosatom does not publicly acknowledge them and tightly controls all information released regarding construction timelines and milestones.

Credibility Risks for IAEA and WNA Databases

The fact that this publicly available information is reflected in International Atomic Energy Agency databases only with significant delays—or with distortions—raises additional concerns. The Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) has been developed and maintained by the IAEA for more than 50 years and is compiled on the basis of information provided by national sources. In the case of Russia, this source is most likely Rosatom itself. However, to what extent can these data be subject to any form of external verification?

Over the past four years, Russia and Rosatom have actively sought to bring the IAEA and its Director General to their side in shaping public assessments of events surrounding the Zaporizhzhia NPP. At the same time, Rosatom—responsible for managing the occupied plant—has systematically restricted IAEA staff access to key facilities for evaluation.

Information provided by international organizations, particularly those within the UN system, plays an important role in countering disinformation and manipulation by conflicting parties. During armed conflicts, pressure from major nuclear powers on international organizations—especially the International Atomic Energy Agency—increases significantly, requiring these institutions to demonstrate a high degree of resilience, impartiality, and accuracy in all aspects of their work.

Unfortunately, even the IAEA is not immune to serious basic errors. For example, as of this writing  (April 26, 2026), the PRIS database lists the location of the Belarusian NPP—built by Rosatom—as Wenzhou (a city in China), rather than Ostrovets in Belarus.

Regardless of the reasons—whether inaccuracies in source data, insufficient verification or correction process, or technical errors—such cases point to the vulnerability of these databases.

Such vulnerability creates a risk that international databases (such as PRIS) and industry databases (such as WNA’s database, which partially rely on PRIS) may become instruments of information manipulation, particularly during armed conflicts. It raises a broader issue: if information about a nuclear unit near a conflict zone can be distorted for security-related reasons, what would prevent similar distortions elsewhere—for example, to present projects as being completed faster than they actually are for competitive advantage?

All of this creates demand for alternative databases with more transparent data disclosure. Examples include the WNISR Interactive Dataviz, as well as the database on Rosatom’s international projects currently being developed by Bellona, so far compiled in report format. Although no database is flawless, the existence of alternative sources and the possibility of cross-checking them is of critical importance for researchers and decision-makers.

The resilience of international nuclear organizations, their credibility, and their ability to address critical challenges during armed conflicts will largely depend on their capacity to ensure data accuracy and to resist potential distortions—whether concerning the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP or any other civilian nuclear facility.

The post The curious, secretive case of the Kursk II nuclear power plant’s weird data appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

The 23-year-old Metagaz tanker, which is a part of Russia’s shadow fleet, was carrying LNG from Russia’s sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 plant. Some time in mid-February, it had loaded near Murmansk at the Saam floating LNG facility (Saam FSU) and plotted a course for Port Said in Egypt.  But on March 3, it was allegedly attacked by unmanned Ukrainian boats and drones near Sicily.

According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ship was fully laden at the time of the incident and carried nearly 138,000 m3 (~60,000 tonnes) of LNG. As shown in photos taken after the incident and carried in the media, it seems possible that two tanks out four might have remained undamaged. This may mean that the ship is still carrying LNG of an approximate volume of 60-65 thousand m3 (~30000 tonnes) and remains a danger to other ships, coastal communities and marine species should further explosions and/or fire caused by overpressure in tanks and leaks of LNG take place.

Additionally, according to the announcement of the Russian foreign affairs ministry, the tanker was also carrying 450 tonnes of fuel oil (likely HFO) and 250 tonnes of diesel fuel. This could potentially be used as a fuel while doing a ballast voyage—when ship’s sail without cargo—or when the volume of boil-off gas is not enough.

Now, after more than a month since the incident, the damaged ship continues to drift in the Mediterranean Sea with no apparent coordination among Italy, Malta or Libya. An attempt to tow the ship away from the Libyan coast and its oil platform was made by the Libyan National Oil Corporation at the end of March. This effort managed to drag the ship toward international waters, where, in April, Libyan authorities attempted to stabilize the vessel in international waters. But waves and wind mean the ship’s situation is still precarious, and it can continue to drift at any time.

This is an outstanding case to highlight two systemic problems.

Absence of established rescue operation plans for LNG tankers at sea

LNG tankers carry flammable and explosive cargo, which, if left without any control, can lead to spills with ignition and/or combustion potential. Natural gas, liquified at a temperature of –162C, is transported in highly insulated tanks in the absence of any supporting cooling system on board. The warmth from the surrounded environment causes slow changes in pressure and temperature inside a vessel’s tanks, which leads to release of the boil-off gas.

This boil-off gas, during normal ship operations, is used to fuel the engines, and during periods of excessive pressure, it can be burned or flared. In rare cases it can be re-liquified on board. But the Arctic Metagaz likely did not have a reliquification plant on board. While being heavily damaged and drifting without any crew on board, adequate boil-off management—which would allow for the safe evaporation of what LNG remains in the vessel’s undamaged tanks—is impossible.

There are no exact figures for the volume of LNG that Arctic Metagaz is still carring, which make it difficult to predict the ignition and combustion potential of the remaining cargo.

The actions of coastal European countries and the European Union have shown that there is no established publicly available operation plan to neutralize threats posed by damaged LNG ships at sea. Maltese contingency plan only included monitoring of its position, a warning to shipowners sailing in the area and potential towing it away from Malta.

Two weeks after the accident, the leaders of nine EU countries, including those around the Mediterranean Sea, warned the European Commission about the potential environmental damages should further explosions occur aboard the Arctic Metagaz, and asked for advice and leadership on a rescue operation. But there were no publicly announced steps from the EU authorities to address this situation.

Lack of clarity in responding to accidents in international waters when ship owners refuse responsibility

Russia, as the flag state of Arctic Metagaz, has redirected responsibility for the safety operation to coastal countries affected by the accident, and does not seem willing to organize a rescue operation. This is not the first time that Russia has abdicated responsibility for the fate of its shadow fleet ships. In November 2025, Russia left the damaged Gambian-flagged oil tanker Kairos in Turkish waters without any assistance. In the case of Arctic Metagaz, Russia’s affiliation is official. The ship sailed under the Russian flag, but likewise received no assistance from Russian authorities, aside from flying the crew’s Russian nationals home after their rescue by the Libyan coast guard.

The coastal European countries, including Italy and Malta, seem willing to mount an emergency response only if a damaged ship is located in their territorial waters, and do not foresee any rescue operations if their shores or other facilities are not in immediate danger—although they admit high environmental risk of the situation. There is also no publicly announced plan for emergency operations or mitigation of potential negative consequences.

The International Maritime Organization is monitoring the situation but is not providing any guidance for a potential rescue operation. It does, however stand “ready to provide technical and coordinative assistance”.

Environmental consequences

Methane—comprising 85-95% of LNG—is a short-lived but highly potent greenhouse gas. According to the International Energy Agency, methane is responsible for 30% of global temperature rise since the Industrial revolution. The gas leaks to the atmosphere—which is exactly what occurred aboard the abandoned LNG tanks of the Arctic Metagaz—contributing to global warming. The highly flammable and explosive properties of LNG endanger species near or around the damaged ship.

What’s more is that the spill of any remaining fuel oil could leave a long-lasting negative impact on the marine and coastal life. If a similar accident occurs in Arctic waters—all the more possible given that the bulk of Russia’s shadow fleet cargo originates from Arctic LNG plants and oil terminals in Murmansk—the environmental consequences of an oil spill there would be far more long-lasting and severe than one in warmer southern regions.

The post Italy and Malta have shown no plan for a drifting gas tanker Arctic Metagaz appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Nevertheless, we continue to systematically monitor and analyze developments related to Rosatom’s activities that we believe are of interest to an international audience. The aim of this review is to assess the scale of Russia’s international influence in the nuclear sector, as well as the associated political, economic, and environmental risks.

This digest covers events from February 2026.

You can follow the links to read the three most recent digests covering January 2026, December and November 2025.

Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of February 2026
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Military threats at the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
1.3. Operational status of the ZNPP

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Canada and the United Kingdom expand sanctions against entities linked to Rosatom
3. First concrete at Paks II NPP and termination of the Siemens Energy contract
4. Armenia plans to build an NPP based on a small modular reactor
5. The United States and Hungary sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement
6. Equipment replacement at Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria led to unplanned outages of Unit 6
7. Holtec offers alternative equipment for Russian-designed NPPs in India

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
8. New START Treaty between Russia and the United States expires
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear Events in Ukraine and the War

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Events of February 2026

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

On February 10, the head of Ukraine’s nuclear power operator Energoatom, Pavlo Kovtoniuk, told Reuters that Russia would not be able to bring the ZNPP back into operation, as the plant is no longer fully compatible with Russian technologies: main equipment, as well as control, protection, and monitoring systems, are of Ukrainian origin, and the plant currently lacks some equipment and spare parts.

He noted that restarting the plant would require Russia to replace the American fuel, which would in turn necessitate a complete overhaul of the unit’s control system, designed to operate with this specific type of nuclear fuel.

According to him, any attempt to restart the reactors could lead to a nuclear accident.

In response, Rosatom said it categorically rejected these claims, stating that the ZNPP units are identical to Russian VVER-1000 reactors and that Russia therefore has all the necessary production capabilities to manufacture equipment, components, and nuclear fuel.

After February 10, when only one external power line remained available to the ZNPP, the Russian-appointed plant director, Yury Chernichuk, said there were plans and the capability to connect a power line to the plant from the Russian side. Preparatory work is already under way, but he noted that doing so now is not feasible, as the line could be damaged by Ukraine.

On February 18, Rosatom held a ceremony to mark the issuance of an operating license for Unit 2 of the ZNPP. The event was attended by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, Head of Rostekhnadzor Alexander Trembitsky, and Director General of JSC EO ZNPP Ramil Galiev. As with Unit 1, which was granted a license in December 2025, the permit is valid for 10 years.

Rosatom said that obtaining the license confirms that the unit’s equipment, safety systems, and staff qualifications fully comply with the stringent requirements of Russian regulations governing the use of nuclear energy.

This is one of two ZNPP units (the other is Unit 6) that operated on Russian fuel, while the remaining four were switched to fuel supplied by Westinghouse.

Military threats at the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

In early February, a two-week IAEA mission to assess the condition of electrical substations critical to the stable operation of Ukraine’s NPPs, which have been damaged by ongoing Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, was completed.

In September 2024, when such missions were just beginning, 10 substations were included on the list of critically important facilities. The IAEA reported that, due to continued attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, two additional substations have since been added.

Throughout February, IAEA teams at Ukraine’s operating NPPs — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — as well as at the Chernobyl NPP site reported that strikes on energy infrastructure continued to affect the facilities’ operation and nuclear safety due to power line outages and the need to reduce output.

There were also reports of drones detected near Ukrainian nuclear power plants. (For more details, see IAEA Updates 340, 341, 342, and 343.)

On February 10, the 330 kV Ferrosplavna-1 backup power line at the ZNPP was disconnected once again. The damage reportedly occurred near the open switchyard of the Zaporizhzhia thermal power plant following military activity. At the same time, IAEA experts at the ZNPP reported hearing an explosion.

The IAEA team requested access to the open switchyard to independently assess the possible impact of the damage, but access to this area has not been granted to the experts for several years.

The line was restored on March 5. After the area was demined, the IAEA team was eventually able to visit the open switchyard and observed damage to various electrical components, including circuit breakers, disconnectors, current transformers, and cable sections.

Operational status of the ZNPP ↑

On February 26, Russia’s Permanent Mission to the international organizations in Vienna circulated a note on the “actual state of affairs” at the ZNPP for the period from November 8, 2025, to February 13, 2026, providing information on operation and maintenance, interaction with IAEA mission experts, staffing, and other issues.

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Canada and the United Kingdom expand sanctions against entities linked to Rosatom ↑

In February, several countries expanded sanctions against Russia, targeting companies linked to Rosatom.

On February 19, Canada added to its sanctions lists organizations from the defense-industrial complex, drone developers, entities in the technology sector, as well as companies involved in energy trading and technology procurement. These included:

• Rosatom Digital Solutions — promotes Rosatom’s digital products on the open market (also under US sanctions);
• Rosatom Additive Technologies — oversees the design and organization of production of equipment, powder materials, components, and software, and provides services in the field of additive manufacturing (also under UK and US sanctions).

On February 24, the United Kingdom expanded its sanctions lists to include, among others, three Rosatom companies which, according to the press release, are involved in securing contracts for the construction of new Russian nuclear facilities abroad, thereby generating additional energy revenues to offset declining oil income, as well as the heads of two of these companies:

• Rosatom Energy Projects and its Director General Andrey Rozhdestvin;
• Rein Engineering — specializes in managing overseas projects for the construction and operation of Russian-designed nuclear power plants, including participation as a shareholder in project companies;
• Rusatom Overseas (also under US and Canadian sanctions) and its President Ilya Vergizaev.

In addition, the United Kingdom added Afrikantov Experimental Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering (OKBM), part of Rosatom, to its sanctions list. OKBM is a leading design organization for the development of nuclear reactors for nuclear-powered submarines and surface vessels of the Russian Navy.

Commentary by Bellona:

First concrete at Paks II NPP and termination of the Siemens Energy contract ↑

• Construction of the foundation slab for Unit 1 has begun
• Contract with Siemens terminated amid German export licensing issues

On February 5, first concrete was poured for Unit 1 of Hungarian Paks II NPP, marking the start of the plant’s construction phase. According to the schedule, this stage is expected to be completed on December 24, 2026.

In February, news agencies reported that Rosatom had terminated its contract with Siemens Energy at the end of 2025 for the supply of components for the Paks II NPP under construction (Reuters, Hungarian outlet Vilaggazdasag).

Under an agreement concluded in 2019, Siemens Energy was to supply control systems for the new reactor units at Paks II in a consortium with the French company Framatome, but difficulties arose in obtaining export licenses from the German government.

In June 2025, the Hungarian government announced that Siemens Energy’s division responsible for nuclear control technologies would be relocated to Hungary, which was expected to help overcome these obstacles.

According to Hungary Today, the termination of the contract suggests that this decision was either taken too late or that the legal obstacles ultimately proved too significant.

According to Rosatom, the contract was terminated because the German company was unable to fulfill its contractual obligations. Rosatom also clarified that Siemens Energy’s involvement was limited to certain elements of the control systems and accounted for less than 4% of the total equipment scope for the project. It is claimed that these components can be replaced with Russian or European alternatives.

Siemens Energy, for its part, confirmed that Rosatom had initiated the termination of the contract but did not confirm the company’s withdrawal from the project. In response to media inquiries, the company stated that it is fulfilling its contractual obligations in compliance with all national and international laws.

It also noted that work related to control and instrumentation systems for the Paks II project is currently suspended, but that the company remains in close contact with the customer on this matter.

Commentary by Bellona:

Armenia plans to build an NPP based on a small modular reactor ↑

• Likhachev discussed extending the service life of the Metsamor NPP and building new power units with Armenian authorities
• A joint statement confirmed the completion of negotiations on a 123 Agreement between Armenia and the United States

On February 3, Armenia’s Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Davit Khudatyan said the authorities had made a principled decision to build a future NPP based on a small modular reactor. Proposals from Russia, the United States, China, South Korea, and France are currently under review, but no final decision on a specific design has been made. Once the design is selected, it will become clear which country Armenia will partner with to implement the new NPP project.

On February 6, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev held talks with Armenian National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan. Likhachev outlined progress on the second lifetime extension of the Metsamor NPP and discussed in detail the construction of new nuclear power units. Rosatom is offering Armenia comprehensive cooperation in nuclear energy, including the construction of large, medium, and small NPPs and the implementation of related projects, including non-nuclear ones.

On February 9 in Yerevan, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US Vice President J.D. Vance signed a joint statement on the completion of negotiations on an Agreement for Cooperation between the Governments of Armenia and the United States Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement).

A 123 Agreement provides the legal framework for the export of nuclear materials and technologies from the United States and enables agreements with US companies on civilian nuclear projects.

According to J.D. Vance, “this means up to $5 billion in initial exports from the United States, as well as an additional $4 billion in long-term support under fuel and maintenance contracts.”

The United States and Hungary sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement ↑

On February 16, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in civil nuclear energy that could serve as a basis for long-term cooperation.

According to a US Department of State statement, during the visit Rubio emphasized the United States’ commitment to turning Hungary into a regional hub for small modular reactor development and urged it to select US small modular reactor technologies. He also confirmed that US company Holtec International is ready to assist Hungary with spent nuclear fuel storage.

The agreement builds on earlier arrangements on civil nuclear cooperation announced by Hungary and the United States in November. At the same time, a contract was announced for US company Westinghouse to supply fuel for the VVER-440 reactors at Paks I NPP.

A similar agreement on cooperation in the development of a civil nuclear energy program was also signed in January 2026 between the US Department of Energy and the Government of Slovakia.

Equipment replacement at Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria led to unplanned outages of Unit 6 ↑

• Component failures followed the replacement of Russian equipment sets with Bulgarian ones
• Kozloduy NPP faced difficulties sourcing components from Russia

On February 14, Kozloduy NPP (two operating Soviet-designed units with VVER-1000 reactors) announced that Unit 6 would be shut down to replace a failed rupture disk of the turbine moisture separator reheater, located in the non-nuclear part of the unit. The replacement components were reported to be made from newly supplied materials equivalent to the original ones. The work was completed on March 5.

From October 23 to December 1, 2025, the unit underwent scheduled maintenance, including comprehensive preventive and technical servicing of systems and structures, as well as nuclear fuel reloading. However, during the following month, the unit was shut down twice (on December 14 and 22) due to damage to and the need to replace rupture disks of the turbine moisture separator reheater.

On February 19, Bulgaria’s National Assembly considered potential violations of the regulatory framework related to design modifications and the use of uncertified components at Kozloduy NPP, which led to three unplanned shutdowns of Unit 6.

These events were characterized as a threat to the energy and national security of the Republic of Bulgaria and as causing losses amounting to tens of millions of euros. Questions from lawmakers were answered by the Executive Director of Kozloduy NPP Ivan Andreev and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency Tsanko Bachiyski.

The main question raised by lawmakers was why the plant’s management chose to replace the original Russian equipment sets not with approved and certified Russian rupture disks, but with products from the Bulgarian company Atomenergoremont AD.

According to Andreev, the latest contract for the supply of rupture disks with the Russian supplier Energeticheskoye Oborudovaniye LLC was signed in October 2024, and in May 2025 the required authorization for a derogation from the EU sanctions regime was obtained. After being notified of this, the supplier requested a seven-month extension of the delivery deadline (the contract was due to expire in March 2026) and announced a 14% price increase, citing EU sanctions on Russia affecting logistics and associated costs, as well as inflation, since a significant amount of time had passed since the original bid was submitted. During the hearing, it was stated that the contract value was about €153,500, or roughly €3,000 per set.

According to Andreev, given the legal constraints, such changes could not be incorporated into the contract, and it was therefore terminated at the initiative of Kozloduy NPP in August 2025.

At the same time, due to difficulties in sourcing spare parts, consumables, and steel from Russia, Kozloduy NPP took steps to diversify supplies of consumables by turning to European alternatives.

According to Andreev, in previous years the Bulgarian company Atomenergoremont AD had manufactured rupture disks, as some of the original supplies were delayed or included defective components, and these disks operated for the full service life specified by regulations — four years.

Andreev also said that requests for the supply of rupture disks had been sent to manufacturers in Ukraine and Germany.

Tests of alternative rupture disks manufactured by Atomenergoremont AD based on drawings provided by Kozloduy NPP were carried out in June 2025. No design modifications were introduced; the only difference from the Russian products was the material — a European equivalent of the Russian steel was used, although its properties differed somewhat in this case.

As for the legal basis for such changes, according to Bachiyski, this replacement is considered unrelated to nuclear safety and therefore does not require amendments to licensing documents, with approval of a technical decision being sufficient. Accordingly, he said that in this case there were no violations of the Act on the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy or the requirements of the Regulation on Nuclear Power Plant Safety.

One of the government’s main questions to the plant’s management concerned the financial losses resulting from the decision. The unit had been operating at reduced output since December 2025. According to the Executive Director, lost revenue as of mid-February was estimated at 18 million leva (about €9.2 million). However, the forced outages shifted the timing of the next major overhaul of the unit, which will offset the shortfall in electricity generation in the future.

In late February, Energy Minister Traycho Traykov said that “those responsible will be held accountable.” One of Bulgaria’s parliamentary parties filed a request with the prosecutor’s office to investigate the events described.

On March 5, Unit 6 was again shut down for two days to replace rupture disks of the turbine moisture separator reheater with ones equivalent to the original. It was noted that tests conducted in independent laboratories confirm that the materials used have the required properties.

On March 25, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers adopted a decision allowing Kozloduy NPP to derogate from certain provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 of July 31, 2014, and to conclude procurement contracts with companies from Russia (without specifying which ones). According to Bulgaria’s Energy Minister, the measure concerns exemptions from requirements in ten procedures related to the supply of original components, aimed at preventing a recurrence of similar incidents.

Commentary by Bellona:

Holtec offers alternative equipment for Russian-designed NPPs in India ↑

On February 16, Holtec International reported the delivery to the Kudankulam NPP site — where two Russian-designed VVER-1000 units are in operation and four more are under construction — of a set of equipment for spent nuclear fuel storage. The equipment includes high-density racks for storing spent nuclear fuel in borated water pools and a transportable cask.

Holtec said it supplies owners of Russian-designed NPPs with alternative, more technologically advanced systems and equipment, reducing their dependence on Russian suppliers. The company also emphasized its experience in reverse engineering and manufacturing equipment for plants built to Russian designs, including previous work supporting facilities with Russian-designed reactors such as the Chernobyl NPP in Ukraine.

Earlier, the first delivery of Holtec equipment, manufactured by its subsidiary Holtec Asia for Kudankulam NPP, took place in September 2025.

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

New START Treaty between Russia and the United States expires ↑

• Russia suspended its participation in the treaty in 2023; inspections have not taken place since 2022
• The United States supports a new agreement; China is not ready to join the negotiations

On February 5, the New START Treaty between Russia and the United States expired.

Originally a ten-year agreement in force since 2011, the treaty established verifiable limits on all deployed strategic delivery systems and warheads in Russia and the United States. During his first term, in 2020, the Trump administration did not support extending New START without additional conditions and sought to link its extension to broader arrangements, including the possible involvement of China and the introduction of additional constraints, including on nuclear arsenals. Russia, for its part, maintained that changing the format of the treaty was not advisable. Ultimately, the treaty was extended without changes for five years under the administration of Joe Biden in January 2021.

According to the United States, since 2022 Russia has not complied with the provision on allowing US inspectors access to its facilities (a decision Russia took in August 2022).

In February 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was suspending its participation in the treaty, citing the development of new types of nuclear weapons by the United States and the need for Russia to be prepared to conduct nuclear tests.

In the fall of 2025, ahead of the treaty’s expiration, Russia stated that it was ready to continue observing the quantitative limits under the agreement for another year, provided that the US side acted similarly. It was noted that Russia did not receive an official response from the United States to this proposal.

After February 5, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated: “In the current circumstances, we assume that the parties to the New START are no longer bound by any obligations or symmetrical declarations in the context of the Treaty, including its core provisions, and are in principle free to choose their next steps. In doing so, the Russian Federation intends to act responsibly and in a balanced manner, developing its policy in the field of strategic offensive arms on the basis of a thorough analysis of the US military policy and the overall situation in the strategic sphere.”

The Trump administration, as in 2020, supports the development of a new agreement that would consider current threats, including the growth of China’s nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the United States intends to combine the pursuit of new arrangements with strengthening of its own nuclear deterrence.

China, while expressing regret over the expiration of New START, called on Russia and the United States to return to dialogue, but stated that it does not intend to join arms reduction negotiations at this stage, as China’s nuclear forces are significantly smaller than those of Russia and the United States.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom’s Projects Abroad in Brief ↑

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On February 3, unit step-up transformers were installed at the site.

Paks II NPP, Hungary. On February 5, first concrete was poured for the foundation slab of the reactor building of Unit 1 at Paks II NPP. The plant is now considered to be under construction. According to the schedule, this phase of work will be completed on December 24, 2026.

El Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On February 6, concreting of the first tier of the inner containment of the Unit 3 reactor building was completed.

Recommended Publications ↑

On February 18, Greenpeace Ukraine published a study by McKenzie Intelligence Services on military activity at the Zaporizhzhia NPP during the summer of 2025 (Analysis of Russian Military Activity at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) During June & August 2025). The study, based on the analysis of satellite imagery, documents the expansion and fortification of military infrastructure at the Zaporizhzhia NPP site in 2025 and analyzes the observed condition of the cooling pond.

On February 22, the German newspaper Die Welt published an article featuring extensive commentary by Bellona expert Dmitry Gorchakov on US dependence on supplies of Russian enriched uranium and efforts to reduce this dependence — “America is hungry for uranium — and is putting itself at the mercy of Vladimir Putin” (Amerika ist hungrig nach Uran – und liefert sich Wladimir Putin aus).

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. February 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Russia has long been actively involved in Iran’s nuclear program. The largest project within this cooperation is the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Construction of the first unit at the site began as early as 1975 by the West German company Kraftwerk Union, but was halted in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution. In 1995, Russia signed contracts to complete the unit using a VVER-1000 reactor and to supply nuclear fuel for the first ten years of its operation. Russia also committed to taking back spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing.

The unit was connected to the grid in 2011 and entered commercial operation in 2013. A year later, a contract was signed for the construction of the second phase of the plant, consisting of two additional VVER-1000 units with a total cost of around $10 billion. Notably, according to TASS, the project has been fully financed by Iran without the use of Russian loans. At present, Rosatom is involved in the construction of the second unit at Bushehr, although the bulk of the work is being carried out by local contractors. Construction of the third unit has not yet officially begun.

In September 2025, an agreement was signed to build a second Russian-designed nuclear power plant in Iran, in the Sirik area of Hormozgan province. The project includes four reactor units with a total capacity of 5,020 MW. Its estimated cost is around $25 billion, and unlike Bushehr, it is expected to involve Russian financing.

However, in the context of the ongoing full-scale war in Iran, the prospects for any large-scale nuclear construction in the near future appear highly uncertain.

Why Bushehr Is Not Related to Iran’s Enriched Uranium Problem

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is not directly linked to Iran’s potential military nuclear program. The plant has operated under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards since the very beginning. IAEA inspectors have access to the facility, receive operational data, and monitor it to ensure that nuclear materials used there are not diverted for military purposes.

Even when, after the US and Israel attacks in June 2025, Iran significantly reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, it partially maintained the agency’s access to the Bushehr NPP. Apparently for the simple reason that Iran truly has nothing to hide at this station.

Most of the debates in recent years surrounding Iran’s increasingly advanced nuclear program have focused on other facilities. These include, above all, uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow (which rely on indigenous rather than Russian enrichment technologies), the nuclear complex in Isfahan, and the heavy water reactor in Arak, which has been suspected of being used for plutonium production. All of these facilities were targeted in attacks both in June 2025 and in February–March 2026. Fortunately, according to the IAEA, these strikes did not result in significant environmental consequences or radioactive releases, partly because many of the facilities are located underground. In total, Iran operates more than a dozen nuclear sites.

Particular concern also surrounds an stockpile of slightly over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%. This material could be relatively quickly further enriched to higher levels suitable for the production of several nuclear weapons. Its exact location remains unknown, but the attacks on the aforementioned facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow appear to have aimed both at destroying this material (or more precisely, burying it under the debris of underground storage sites) and at disabling the centrifuges used for its enrichment. In addition, media reports in March widely circulated claims about a possible U.S. special forces operation aimed at seizing this uranium.

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant also hosts a significant amount of nuclear material—approximately 210 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel and around 70 tonnes of fuel in the reactor core, according to Rosatom CEO. However, these materials are subject to safeguards and accounting by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and their use for nuclear weapons purposes (for example, through the extraction of plutonium from spent fuel) is highly unlikely due to the relatively low suitability of reactor-grade plutonium for weapons use and the need for complex reprocessing infrastructure.

According to the author’s estimates, this volume of spent fuel broadly corresponds to what would be expected from a VVER-1000 reactor operating since 2011. At the same time, it suggests that, despite the intergovernmental agreement to return spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Russia, the material has in practice continued to accumulate in Iran over the years.

Nuclear Risks at the Bushehr NPP During Wartime

Such a volume of nuclear material on site—and, more importantly, the presence of the country’s most powerful operating nuclear reactor—makes the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant the most dangerous facility in Iran in terms of potential environmental consequences in the event of an attack. This assessment is shared, among others, by the IAEA Director General.

In the worst-case scenario, a direct hit by a missile or bomb on a reactor unit could damage the operating reactor and lead to the release of radioactive materials beyond the site, with potential consequences extending to neighboring countries.

Notably, the status of a civilian facility under IAEA safeguards has not fully shielded Bushehr from attacks—whether intentional or incidental. Concerns about such risks already emerged during the first Israeli and U.S. operation against Iran in June 2025. At the time, Vladimir Putin reportedly had to engage directly with Israeli leadership to secure the safety of “more than 200” Russian specialists working at the plant. However, no strikes on or near the facility were recorded at that stage, and Rosatom did not report any suspension of construction activities or evacuation of personnel.

However, in March 2026, according to the Iranian side, there were already three incidents involving projectiles striking the territory of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—on March 17, 24, and 27. On the first day of the operation, February 28, an attack was also reported near the city of Bushehr, just a few hundred meters from the plant. In all cases, it was reported that there were no casualties or damage to the facility itself.

Unlike in 2025, Rosatom began evacuating personnel on the very first day of the operation. A total of 94 people were initially evacuated, primarily employees’ children and non-essential staff. As of March 3, according to a statement by the Rosatom CEO, 639 Russian nationals remained at the site. By March 12, an additional 150 people had been evacuated, followed by another 163 on March 25. Ultimately, Rosatom plans to retain only a minimal team of several dozen personnel who will “maintain the operability of the plant, ensure the preservation of equipment, and support the functioning of the residential settlement where the workers live.”

According to the Rosatom CEO, the first unit of the Bushehr NPP continues to operate, and the Iranian side does not plan to shut it down. This increases the risk of a nuclear incident in the event of damage not only to the reactor itself but also to surrounding infrastructure.

Experience from the situation at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine shows that attacks on a country’s broader energy infrastructure can also pose a serious threat to nuclear sites. Such attacks may lead to the disconnection of a reactor from the grid, a station blackout, and the emergency shutdown of an operating unit. Under adverse conditions, such a scenario could potentially result in a large-scale radiological accident.

Against this backdrop, particular concern is raised by repeatedly stated intentions by Donald Trump to target Iran’s power infrastructure, including statements such as “a very strong hit on each of their power plants, and likely simultaneously” (April 1), as well as calls to “strike and destroy” Iranian power plants, “starting with the largest” (March 21).

Although the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is not even among the five most powerful power stations in Iran—being smaller than several gas- and oil-fired plants—the risks associated with disruption to the plant’s operation, including the loss of external power supply following a reactor shutdown, remain significant.

A Troubling Trend

Against the backdrop of long-standing threats from the Iranian regime and well-founded concerns about its nuclear program, it is understandable that discussions about how to locate and neutralize 400 kg of enriched uranium are attracting global attention. However, other developments are equally concerning—and are already forming a dangerous trend.

Over the past four years, civilian nuclear energy facilities have increasingly become targets of direct or indirect attacks in armed conflicts: in Ukraine (including the Zaporizhzhia NPP and other facilities across the country), at the Kursk NPP in Russia—located close to the Ukrainian border and also exposed to risks of attacks (intentional or otherwise), construction delays, and personnel evacuations—and now at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. Ironically, all of these facilities were built based on Russian designs, and all are, to varying degrees, linked to a single state nuclear corporation—Rosatom.

It is difficult to predict how this will ultimately unfold. What is already clear, however, is that neither national authorities, nor international coalitions, nor even UN bodies such as the IAEA are capable of guaranteeing the effective protection of civilian nuclear facilities during armed conflicts. One can only hope that in the coming years we will not witness a man-made nuclear accident at a nuclear power plant caused by military activity, and that the international nuclear community will eventually draw lessons from this turbulent period and develop more effective mechanisms to minimize such risks in the future.

The post Another Russia-Linked Nuclear Power Plant Is at Risk From War. This Time, in Iran appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Even beyond that, serious questions remain about the effectiveness of the response. More than a year after the accident, its consequences have yet to be fully addressed. 

What Happened

On December 15, 2024, two tankers carrying heavy fuel oil—Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239—broke apart during a severe storm rated at force 7, with waves reaching up to nine meters and wind speeds exceeding 20 m/s.

Both vessels were “river-sea” class tankers, originally designed for transporting oil products along inland waterways and later retrofitted in the 1990s for limited operation in coastal marine areas under favorable weather conditions. Typically, such tankers spend the winter in river ports, as navigation ceases when rivers freeze. 

Following the accident, the stern section of Volgoneft-239, carrying a crew of 14, drifted ashore and ran aground on a sandbank near Cape Panagia in Russia’s southern Krasnodar Region, near the port of Taman. Other fragments of both vessels sank in open water at depths of 20–23 meters within the port of Kavkaz.

Of the 28 crew members, 27 were rescued. One crew member from Volgoneft-212 died from hypothermia. 

At the time of the accident, the tankers were carrying M-100 heavy fuel oil. Early media reports estimated that 3,000–3,700 tonnes had spilled, while Russia’s Ministry of Transport later reported that 2,400 tonnes had entered the environment out of a total cargo of 9,200 tonnes.

According to the IMO report, the total cargo amounted to 8,553 tonnes, of which 1,197.6 tonnes from Volgoneft-212 and 1,185 tonnes from Volgoneft-239 were released during the initial accident. A further 740 tonnes leaked on January 10 from the grounded stern of Volgoneft-239. 

In total, approximately 3,122.5 tonnes of heavy fuel oil entered the environment. 

The response effort involved several key tasks: 

• securing and eventually raising sunken vessel fragments containing residual oil;  

• stabilizing and removing the grounded stern section of Volgoneft-239;

• limiting further spread of oil already released into the sea;  

• removing oil from the seabed and shoreline;  

• and disposing of collected contaminated waste.

Spill liquidation 

Work on the grounded stern

Removal of the grounded stern section began only on January 10—four weeks after the accident. By that time, oil had already begun leaking into the environment, resulting in an additional spill of 740 tonnes. 

The operation was carried out by Russia’s Marine Rescue Service and emergency responders. A 422-meter access road was constructed, and the stern was surrounded by protective embankments and reinforced against storms.

The remaining oil was removed by January 25. Between February 1 and March 9, the structure was dismantled and transported for processing. 

In total, 3,279.7 tonnes of oil-contaminated sand-water mixture and 1,714.75 tonnes of oil and oil-water mixture were removed for disposal.

Oil recovery at sea

On December 15, 28 vessels were deployed to monitor and respond to the spill. However, only a thin surface film of lighter oil fractions was detected.

Because this film could not be effectively contained using booms and skimmers, it was treated with sorbents. Between the start of the incident and September 25, 2025, sorbents were applied over 184,433 square meters of water surface, and only 25 tonnes of oil-water mixture were recovered. 

The heavier fuel oil did not rise to the surface. Due to low temperatures—around 7°C at the surface and 4°C at the seabed—it dispersed through the water column and settled on the bottom. 

Cleanup of seabed oil deposits near Anapa and the Temryuk district began on February 12, 2025, with extensive use of divers. By September 25, approximately 1,960.9 tonnes of oil-contaminated material had been collected, much of it manually. 

Work on Sunken Wreckage

Following the shipwrecks, the bow sections of both tankers, the stern of Volgoneft-212, and individual fragments of the hulls came to rest on the seabed in the Kerch Strait. With the involvement of divers, their exact locations, condition, and the nature of the damage were established, including existing and potential leak points, which were subsequently sealed. Localized recovery of oil products was also carried out.

Scheduled monitoring and additional sealing of potential leak sites are still ongoing. 

One of the main difficulties in carrying out this work, according to the report, was adverse weather conditions, particularly low temperatures. Diving operations began four days after the accident, on December 19. However, between December 19 and December 31, there were only five working days in total.

“Depths of up to 25 meters in the area where the fragments sank, combined with low water temperatures, reduced the time divers could remain on the seabed (when breathing air) in a no-decompression mode. Other challenges included underwater currents and low visibility (from 0.5 to 1.0 meters) caused by pollution in the accident area and ongoing storms,” the report states.

The next phase of work—preparing the hulls for lifting, including dismantling individual structural elements—was also carried out by a diving team. Beginning on May 22, monitoring operations were launched to detect and eliminate possible oil leaks. In addition to divers, three specialized vessels with technical equipment and rescue personnel were involved. However, due to unfavorable weather conditions, monitoring was conducted on only 31 out of 67 calendar days. The operations themselves took place from June 6 to July 27, and no incidents or complications were reported during this period.

The next step, scheduled to be completed by October 30, involved installing protective domes—cofferdams—over the sunken bow sections and the stern of Volgoneft-212. This technology is being used in Russia for the first time in work involving shipwreck debris to extract oil products, and it carries certain risks. Indeed, the first cofferdam was installed on September 2, and, according to Kavkazsky Uzel, new heavy fuel oil discharges were recorded along approximately three kilometers of coastline on September 2 and 3. Their occurrence was also acknowledged by the official operational headquarters. 

As of early February 2026, installation of the remaining structures had been completed, and all three cofferdams had been secured to the seabed with piles to withstand storm conditions. 

The third stage—pumping heavy fuel oil out of the fragments of the sunken tankers—was still in the planning stage at the time the report was written. Since this phase requires favorable conditions, the work is tentatively scheduled to begin no earlier than April 2026. 

Coastal Cleanup

The report offers limited information regarding coastal cleanup initiatives, concentrating specifically on the Temryuk district and the city of Anapa, where initial oil discharges were observed along the shoreline on December 17, 2024.

From the start of operations through August 2025, according to the report, a total of 983.465 kilometers of coastline had been cleaned (including repeat cleanups), and 180,556.384 tonnes of contaminated sand and soil had been collected. Their disposal is ongoing. 

“During coastal monitoring, no new discharges of heavy fuel oil were detected,” the report states. The period during which this monitoring took place is not specified, but it can be assumed that it began in August 2025, as mentioned above, and ended on September 25—the date for which final work statistics are provided in the document. 

However, as early as October, both the official operational headquarters and local volunteers repeatedly recorded new oil discharges. Additional discharges were also observed in November.

On December 12, 2025, the government commission overseeing the response to the maritime accidents reported that more than 90% of the spilled heavy fuel oil had been collected in the Kerch Strait—equivalent to 185,000 tonnes of contaminated sand and soil, of which 160,000 tonnes had already been disposed of. Shortly thereafter, however, volunteers from the “Delfiny” (Dolphins) team reported on their Telegram channel that on the very next day—December 13—they collected 128 bags of oil-and-sand mixture. 

In December, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) reported that 29.6 kilometers of protective earth barriers had been constructed along the coastline to protect beaches. However, these defenses did not withstand winter storms; in January, volunteers reported that they had been partially destroyed and that new oil discharges had occurred. 

The most recent reports from both media and volunteers documenting oil discharges date to the end of February 2026. 

The report submitted to the IMO does not indicate what portion of the results achieved was due to independent volunteer efforts. At the same time, activists reported that as many as 4,000 volunteers were involved in the response within the first week alone. According to Meduza, around 60,000 people took part over the first year after the accident. Volunteers were engaged in cleaning the coastline, identifying new sites of oil contamination, and—significantly—rescuing birds affected by oil pollution.

Many volunteers noted that in the first week after the accident, the burden of the response along the coastline fell largely on them, while regional and federal authorities played only a limited role. Indeed, a state of emergency at the regional level was declared only on December 25, and at the federal level on December 26. 

It was also reported that, despite the large-scale involvement of volunteers, authorities were often slow to provide support. Facilities for receiving and rehabilitating rescued birds, as well as accommodation in apartments and hotels for volunteers arriving from across the country, frequently had to be arranged independently. Volunteers also often had to purchase cleanup equipment at their own expense. 

Waste disposal

One important issue not addressed in the report submitted to the IMO is how exactly the removal of collected waste was organized, and which specific facilities were responsible for its disposal. 

Independent volunteers involved in the cleanup reported incidents in which, due to delays in waste removal, bags of collected material were washed back into the sea, or ended up buried under sand on the shoreline as a result of careless handling by drivers. 

Local residents also criticized the placement of a temporary waste storage site in the industrial zone of the Voskresensky farmstead, which lies within a resort area.

Contaminated sand began to be transported there on December 27. Initially, authorities promised that it would be removed by April 1, 2025, but the deadline was postponed several times. On July 27, 2025, official Russian media reported that 5,000 tonnes of sand remained at the temporary site, down from a peak of 130,000 tonnes.

According to land registry records, the site is designated as a warehouse, where waste storage is prohibited. Nevertheless, the oil-contaminated sand was largely stored in the open air. As a result, residents reported strong petroleum odors and respiratory problems. 

From Voskresensky, the sand was transported onward, primarily to disposal sites in smaller settlements across Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Region. By mid-summer 2025, the BBC had identified nine such sites. 

Significant protests by local residents occurred in one of these locations—Semikarakorsk in Rostov Region—where people took to the streets to block trucks carrying contaminated sand. 

What this means for the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route 

Lack of Preparedness

The report states in its conclusions that “one of the key lessons” from the Kerch Strait accident is “the need to develop a strategy for responding to heavy fuel oil spills in cold conditions, where heavy fuel oil becomes negatively buoyant.”

This means that, as of today, no such strategy exists—and has not existed in the country. At the same time, heavy fuel oil is a regular cargo along the Northern Sea Route. In addition, it continues to be used as fuel on most vessels operating along the NSR. The M-100 fuel carried by the Volgoneft tankers is itself one of the most widely used grades of heavy marine fuel in Russia.

The Kerch Strait accident clearly demonstrates that the responsible services were entirely unprepared for such a situation, despite the proximity of the accident to a port where rescue vessels, a Marine Rescue Service center, and EMERCOM facilities were located. As a result, oil discharges were detected not only in the area around Anapa and the nearby Temryuk district, but also—after bypassing occupied Crimea—reached the western coast of the peninsula, including Sevastopol and Yevpatoria, and further on to Odesa, more than 600 kilometers from the site of the shipwrecks. Oil contamination continued to be recorded onshore as late as the end of February 2026—more than a year after the accident. The total affected marine area is estimated at 30,000–40,000 square kilometers. 

In the event of a similar accident along the Northern Sea Route, the number of rescue vessels, specialized equipment, and personnel would be significantly lower, and the effectiveness of any response operation correspondingly reduced. 

Harsh conditions

In several places, the report identifies low water temperatures as one of the main obstacles to spill response. 

For obvious reasons, this factor would play an even more significant role in Arctic conditions. Even in summer, water temperatures in the southern parts of the Kara Sea rarely exceed 6°C. At the same time, the Novoportovskoye oil field—located on the shores of this sea—accounts for a large share of the oil transported along the Northern Sea Route. In other sections of the route, such as the Laptev Sea or the East Siberian Sea, maximum surface water temperatures in summer typically reach only 10°C and 7°C respectively and drop below zero in winter. 

Another major obstacle cited in the report is the depth of up to 25 meters at the wreck sites. On the continental shelf of the Kara Sea, depths can reach 100 meters, while in the Laptev Sea they can reach 50 meters.

It remains unclear how divers—who carried out a substantial portion of the work at sea, including the direct collection of contaminated material from the seabed—would operate under such temperatures and depths, or how effective untested technologies, such as the installation of cofferdams for extracting oil from sunken vessel fragments, would be. It should be recalled that cofferdams were used for this purpose in Russia for the first time during the Kerch Strait accident. 

Another key difference between the Northern Sea Route and the Black Sea is the presence of extensive ice cover, which may make such operations impossible. If oil products become trapped in ice, their recovery becomes virtually unfeasible due to the enormous volume of contaminated ice and the logistical difficulty of transporting it. 

Infrastructure

While in the Kerch Strait the port and rescue infrastructure were located just a few kilometers from the accident site—yet still failed to prevent a fatality and widespread shoreline contamination—there are rescue centers in only eight communities along Russia’s entire Arctic coastline, five of them located along the Northern Sea Route. The distance between two neighboring centers, in Pevek and Tiksi, is approximately 1,500 kilometers by air and around 2,000 kilometers by sea.

According to the report, even during shoreline cleanup, around 35,150 tonnes out of 180,556 tonnes of contaminated material were collected manually—in areas inaccessible to machinery. How such manual cleanup operations would be carried out in the Far North, where rescue infrastructure may be hundreds of kilometers away, and how many volunteers would be willing or able to travel there to assist, remains unclear.

Shadow fleet and aging tankers

The experience of the Volgoneft tankers themselves is also instructive. These vessels belonged to Russian companies, had undergone the required technical inspections—at least on paper—and their positions and routes were known and not concealed. Nevertheless, their age, negligence, and operation under unsuitable conditions led to a major accident.

At the same time, Russia is rapidly expanding its shadow fleet in the Arctic. While 13 such vessels were recorded on the Northern Sea Route in 2024, that number had risen to 100 in 2025.

Shadow fleet vessels often switch off their transponders to conceal their true location, and at least one case is known in which information about a vessel’s transit along the NSR in 2025 was deliberately hidden. In the event of an accident, such practices could prevent rescue services from locating the incident in time.

In addition, shadow fleet vessels frequently change flags and ownership, often lack adequate insurance, and many are more than 15 years old. At the same time, half of all tankers authorized to use the Northern Sea Route in 2025—including both shadow fleet and officially registered vessels—are over 25 years old, and three are more than 50 years old.

The tanker Nikolay Zhivotkevich, a single-hull vessel also authorized to transit the NSR in 2025, turns 49 this year. Single-hull tankers pose a significantly greater environmental risk than double-hull vessels, as they lack an external protective barrier. The Kerch Strait disaster—where both Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239 broke apart in a storm—clearly illustrates how accidents involving such vessels can unfold and the consequences they can entail.

In 2025, at least 35 medium- and large-tonnage single-hull tankers were granted permission to operate along the Northern Sea Route.

Thus, the accident involving the Volgoneft tankers demonstrates that Russian emergency response services were completely unprepared to deal with a heavy fuel oil spill even from relatively small vessels, under comparatively favorable climatic conditions (compared to winter conditions in other Russian seas), in shallow waters, and despite the presence of a Marine Rescue Service emergency center within 100 kilometers of the wreck sites. 

The report states that most failures and delays were primarily due to the specific behavior of heavy fuel oil in cold water. However, the delayed removal of oil from the grounded stern of Volgoneft-239, which led to additional environmental contamination that could have been avoided, along with problems in shoreline cleanup, waste disposal, and the use of the tankers themselves under unsuitable conditions, all point to a more systemic problem. 

In the extreme climatic conditions of Arctic seas, combined with the limited emergency response infrastructure characteristic of the Northern Sea Route, even the consequences of a smaller spill would be far more difficult to address.

The post Russia is not prepared for oil spills, Kerch Strait report shows appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed. 

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.  

Our previous monthly highlights for January can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in February
2. Russia redeployed two icebreakers from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea due to severe ice conditions

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. The profit of Novatek, which produces LNG in the Arctic, decreased by 60% in 2025
4. The United Kingdom has introduced its largest package of sanctions against Russia
5. The European Union failed to agree on a new package of sanctions against Russia
6. Ice-class LNG tankers of Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, intended for the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, remain idle after their removal from the sanctions list
7. The new U.S. maritime strategy envisions a strengthened presence in the Arctic and the construction of icebreakers

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
8. A glacier in Svalbard, which serves as an indicator of climate processes for scientists, has shrunk by 20% over five years
9. Rising temperatures in the Barents Sea have led to a decline in fish biomass

PERSECUTION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES
10. The NGO “Arktida,” which covers political processes and environmental issues in the Russian Arctic, has been designated as “undesirable” in the Russian Federation

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
11. Ukrainian drones struck Lukoil oil refinery in Ukhta

RECOMMENDED MATERIALS

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in February ↑

February is a key month for assessing the winter state of Arctic sea ice, as its extent typically reaches a seasonal maximum during this period. According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), Arctic sea ice extent increased from 13.6 million km² at the beginning of February to approximately 14.1 million km² by early March. Although this figure was slightly higher than in February 2025, when it set a new record low at 13.75 million km², it remained significantly below historical averages (the 1981–2010 average maximum was 15.30 million km²), continuing the long-term downward trend in ice extent. 

In February, shipping along the Northern Sea Route maintained regular activity under winter ice conditions. The main cargo flow was ensured by the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, as well as oil shipments from the Varandey, Prirazlomnoye, and Novoportovskoye fields. In addition, regular voyages by Norilsk Nickel continued. 

The Yamal LNG project maintained a high level of shipments. In February, 21 LNG cargoes with a total volume of 1.54 million tonnes were dispatched from the Sabetta terminal. For the first time since 2018, all cargoes were delivered to European Union countries, with no supplies to Asia. 

Shipments were carried out by Arc7 ice-class tankers Eduard Toll, Rudolf Samoylovich, Vladimir Voronin, Yakov Gakkel, Boris Vilkitsky, Georgy Brusilov, Boris Davydov, Nikolay Zubov, and Vladimir Rusanov directly to European ports. Meanwhile, Vladimir Vize and Nikolay Urvantsev, according to Global Fishing Watch data, conducted ship-to-ship transfers near Kildin Island close to Murmansk onto non-ice-class tankers, including Seapeak Yamal, LNG Phecda, and LNG Dubhe, which then proceeded to European ports. Of the 14 Arc7 vessels serving Yamal LNG, six are operated by Seapeak (United Kingdom) and five by Dynagas (Greece).

The Arctic LNG 2 project in February continued operating under the established LNG transshipment scheme via the floating storage unit Saam FSU in Ura Bay near Murmansk. Arc7 ice-class tankers were loaded directly at the plant in the Ob Bay and delivered LNG cargoes to the storage facility. Christophe de Margerie loaded three times, while Alexey Kosygin loaded once. The cargo was then transshipped onto shadow fleet tankers, which subsequently sailed to China either around Africa or via the Suez Canal. In February, five cargoes were shipped from the Saam FSU by the tankers Iris, Arctic Mulan, La Perouse, Arctic Metagaz, and Buran. 

In February, approximately six oil shipments were carried out from the Varandey terminal (Lukoil). Operations were conducted by Arc6 ice-class shuttle tankers Vasiliy Dinkov, Kapitan Gotskiy, and Timofey Guzhenko. The tankers were loaded directly at the ice-resistant berth in the Pechora Sea, after which they delivered oil to the Murmansk area for transshipment onto shadow fleet vessels, which then proceeded to China and India. Despite frequent AIS signal disruptions in the Murmansk area, Global Fishing Watch data confirm stable and regular shipment cycles. 

The Prirazlomnoye field (Gazprom Neft). Transportation was carried out using a similar shuttle scheme; however, AIS signals were switched off for longer periods, complicating the tracking of operations. Global Fishing Watch data suggest that approximately five shipments were made from the platform in February by the tankers Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov, with the assistance of the support vessels Antey and Hermes. 

Regular AIS signal disruptions were also observed during oil shipments from the Novoportovskoye field. Global Fishing Watch data suggest that around 13 voyages were carried out in February—one more than in January. Active vessels included Arc7 ice-class tankers of the Shturman series: Shturman Albanov, Shturman Malygin, Shturman Skuratov, Shturman Shcherbinin, and Shturman Koshelev, as well as Mikhail Lazarev and Shturman Ovtsyn. 

The metallurgical company Norilsk Nickel also continued exporting its products via the Northern Sea Route. In February, seven calls were made at the port of Dudinka. Of these, five voyages were carried out by Arc7 ice-class cargo vessels from the company’s own fleet (Talnakh, Zapolyarny, Nadezhda, Norilskiy Nickel, and Monchegorsk), which transport metal products, containerized, and general cargo. Two additional voyages were performed by chartered vessels from the Severny Proekt fleet—the dry cargo ships Utrenny and Turukhan. One more voyage was carried out by the Arctic tanker Yenisei, which specializes in transporting petroleum products (diesel fuel and aviation kerosene) to supply the Norilsk industrial district. 

Commentary by Bellona:

Russia redeployed two icebreakers from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea due to severe ice conditions ↑

On 18 February, to address unusually severe ice conditions in the Gulf of Finland, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Sibir (Atomflot) and the diesel-electric line icebreaker Murmansk (Rosmorport) were redeployed from the Arctic. According to monitoring data from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, about 80% of the Gulf’s waters were covered with ice up to half a meter thick. 

In the Gulf of Finland, diesel-electric icebreakers of Rosmorport—Vladivostok, Mudyug, Kapitan Kosolapov, Kapitan Sorokin, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Kapitan M. Izmailov, Kapitan Nikolaev, Kapitan Plakhin, and Kapitan Zarubin—were deployed for icebreaking support during the 2025–2026 winter navigation season. However, they were not fully capable of escorting large deadweight vessels, which require a wider channel in the ice. 

Prior to the redeployment, Sibir, intended for year-round operations along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), supported cargo shipments for Norilsk Nickel, Novatek, and Gazprom Neft. In the Gulf of Finland, the icebreaker’s primary task was to escort large oil tankers along the route between the port of Primorsk and Rodsher Island.

The icebreaker Murmansk was previously based in Arkhangelsk and carried out line escort operations in the Kara Sea and the Yenisei Gulf. After redeployment, it was assigned to the route between the port of Ust-Luga and Rodsher Island. 

In late February, Russian media actively circulated claims that Russian icebreakers were allegedly assisting Finnish vessels in the Gulf of Finland. However, this information was refuted by both Finnish media and the Russian authorities. The reports were based on a press release issued by the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency on 26 February, which had been misinterpreted. 

In fact, the press release referred to standard international practice, under which Russian icebreakers assist vessels bound for Russian ports, such as Primorsk or Ust-Luga. If such a vessel is pushed by drifting ice into Finnish territorial waters, the Finnish agency may, upon request, allow a Russian icebreaker to enter Finnish waters to provide assistance. 

Commentary by Bellona:

The International Situation in the Arctic and Sanctions on Russia’s Activities in the Arctic Region

The profit of Novatek, which produces LNG in the Arctic, decreased by 60% in 2025 ↑

On 11 February, Novatek published its financial results for 2025, showing a decline in profit of more than 60% to 183 billion rubles (approximately $2.37 billion), compared to 493 billion rubles in 2024. This occurred against the backdrop of a slight increase in hydrocarbon production of about 1%. 

According to industry media estimates, this is linked to the cumulative impact of Western sanctions, which since 2022 have significantly affected Arctic LNG projects, especially Arctic LNG 2. The project is operating at low capacity and is forced to sell its output to China at discounts of 30–40%, while logistics are complicated by the use of a shadow fleet and ship-to-ship transfers. 

Further tightening of sanctions pressure is expected in the near term. The EU plans to fully ban imports of Russian LNG after the transition period ends, effectively closing the European market. Anticipated restrictions on maritime services from the United Kingdom are expected to increase pressure on logistics, insurance, and fleet maintenance. As a result, vessels will have to use longer routes, leading to higher costs.

The French company TotalEnergies, which holds a 19.4% stake in Novatek and 20% in Yamal LNG, in February requested clarifications from the French government and the European Commission regarding the upcoming EU ban on imports of Russian LNG. TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné stated that, in light of the planned EU ban on LNG imports from 2027, the company could redirect supplies from the Yamal LNG project to other markets if the ban applies only to deliveries to Europe. In response, the European Commission clarified that European companies will not be allowed to redirect Yamal LNG to other countries. 

The United Kingdom has introduced its largest package of sanctions against Russia ↑

On 24 February 2026, the United Kingdom introduced its largest package of sanctions against Russia, marking the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine. A number of the companies targeted by the sanctions are linked to Arctic projects: 

• Transneft, which effectively controls Russia’s trunk oil pipeline system. One of Transneft’s key Arctic projects is the Zapolyarye–Purpe–Samotlor oil pipeline, which ensures the transportation of oil from fields in the north of Krasnoyarsk Krai and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. It is the northernmost oil pipeline in Russia. 

• 175 companies linked to the Russian oil trading network 2Rivers Group (formerly Coral Energy). Azerbaijani businessman Tahir Garayev, founder of Coral Energy, together with Etibar Eyub, established an extensive network of trading and shipping companies that used a shadow fleet to export Russian oil. The tanker Sai Baba (IMO 9321691), owned by 2Rivers Group, was granted permission to operate in the Northern Sea Route waters in 2024. 

• 50 shadow fleet vessels, including the oil tanker Prisma (IMO 9299678), which had been granted permission to operate in the Northern Sea Route waters. 

• The United Kingdom also imposed sanctions on Maritime Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Ltd (New Zealand) and its affiliated company Maritime Mutual Association Limited (Gibraltar). Both companies are accused of insuring shadow fleet tankers transporting sanctioned oil worth tens of billions of dollars, including via the Arctic. According to Reuters, the group insured nearly every sixth sanctioned tanker. 

The European Union failed to agree on a new package of sanctions against Russia ↑

The European Union failed to agree on the 20th package of sanctions against Russia, which had been proposed by the European Commission in early February with a call for adoption by the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. 

The package included a full ban on maritime transport of Russian oil, an expansion of the list of shadow fleet vessels, restrictions on new tankers, maintenance of LNG carriers and icebreakers, which were intended to undermine gas export projects, as well as other measures. 

However, on 23 February, at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, ministers failed to reach a consensus. Hungary and Slovakia opposed the adoption of the 20th package, blocking the decision, which requires unanimity among all 27 countries. 

Hungary stated that it would not support the sanctions until Ukraine resumes the transit of Russian oil through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline. Slovakia took a similar position. Both countries justified their refusal by citing energy dependence, as Hungary and Slovakia remain the only European Union countries still receiving Russian oil via pipeline. 

Commentary by Bellona:

Ice-class LNG tankers of Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, intended for the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, remain idle after their removal from the sanctions list ↑

In February, media reported on the situation involving four tankers of the Japanese company Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL)—North Moon, North Ocean, North Light, and North Valley (Arc4 ice class), built in 2024 for the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects. 

Three of them were placed under European Union sanctions in May 2025. In July of the same year, the restrictions were lifted after MOL officially pledged not to use these tankers for transporting Russian Arctic LNG. However, after the sanctions were removed, all four LNG carriers remained idle for more than six months. Three vessels were anchored off Batam, Indonesia, while the fourth was located in European waters, first off the coast of the Netherlands and later Spain. 

In March, the first signs of movement appeared. According to Global Fishing Watch data, the tanker North Moon headed towards South Korea. The other three vessels remain inactive for now.

The new U.S. maritime strategy envisions a strengthened presence in the Arctic and the construction of icebreakers ↑

In mid-February, the United States published the America’s Maritime Action Plan, a new maritime strategy that includes a dedicated section on the Arctic. The document is aimed at restoring U.S. maritime dominance, with a particular emphasis on developing its domestic shipbuilding industry. 

The section on the Arctic is based on the assumption that melting Arctic ice and technological innovation are opening access to the region, increasing interest in resource extraction, new trade routes, scientific research, and strategic expansion by both the United States and its allies, as well as by competitors. The document identifies only China as a competitor. 

A significant expansion of the U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is planned to patrol the Arctic coastline. To date, 11 Arctic Security Cutters have already been ordered, with the first expected to be delivered in early 2028. Contracts have been distributed among three contractors: the American shipbuilder Davie Defense will build two icebreakers in Finland at Helsinki Shipyard and three in Texas; Bollinger Shipyards will build up to four units at shipyards in the United States; and Finland’s Rauma Marine Constructions will build up to two units in Finland. 

The strategy envisages strengthening the U.S. presence in Arctic waters, developing resilient communications and navigation at high latitudes, enhancing maritime domain awareness, investing in ports, logistics, and search-and-rescue capabilities, as well as exploring opportunities for seabed mineral extraction and expanding hydrocarbon production in Alaska, including a liquefied natural gas project. 

At the same time, it became known that American investor Gentry Beach, who, according to media reports, has ties to the circle of Donald Trump, has signed an agreement with the Russian company Novatek on potential cooperation in an LNG project in the North Slope Borough in the far north of Alaska. 

Most likely, this refers to the sale of the third technological train of the Arctic LNG 2 project, which began construction in 2023 at the Center for the Construction of Large-Scale Marine Structures (CSKMS) in Belokamenka, Murmansk Region. However, due to sanctions against Novatek and its subsidiaries, active construction has been suspended until 2026. The launch was planned to be postponed to 2028. 

In an interview with The New York Times, Gentry Beach said that the agreement is at an early stage and faces serious obstacles. According to Anchorage Daily News, oil and gas industry experts in Alaska believe that the project is unlikely to be implemented. 

Commentary by Bellona:

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

A glacier in Svalbard, which serves as an indicator of climate processes for scientists, has shrunk by 20% over five years ↑

The Aldegonda Glacier in Svalbard has decreased by about 20% over the past five years, The Barents Observer reports. Scientists from St. Petersburg who studied the glacier believe it could disappear within 30 years. Norwegian scientists suggest this may happen somewhat later, but still relatively soon—before 2100. 

“The Aldegonda Glacier serves as an indicator of large-scale climate processes occurring on the planet. By observing it, we ‘capture’ climate fluctuations across at least the entire Northern Hemisphere. Over the past decade, this glacier has been losing mass at an unprecedented rate… This period has also included some of the warmest years on record in the Arctic,” the website of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute quotes its researcher, Candidate of Sciences Anton Terekhov. According to some data, the rate of warming in Svalbard exceeds the global average by 5–7 times.

Senior researcher at the Norwegian Polar Institute Jack Kohler also believes that if the trend continues, Aldegonda and other small glaciers (with an area of about 10 km² or less) are also likely to disappear, but not within 30 years—rather by 2100. 

“We annually monitor four glaciers in the area of Ny-Ålesund [northern part of the Spitsbergen archipelago – ed.], and the longest series of observations has been conducted since 1960,” he told the Barents Observer. “I personally have not worked on the Aldegonda glacier, but in 2004-2010 we carried out similar measurements on the neighbouring Linnébreen glacier, and we also have data on glaciers in the Ny-Ålesund area.”

Rising temperatures in the Barents Sea have led to a decline in fish biomass ↑

A new study by the Institute of Marine Research found that in recent years, sea surface temperatures in the Barents Sea have increased by 0.5–2.5°C. The northern part of the Barents Sea to the west and north of Svalbard, as well as the eastern part of the sea, have been particularly affected. The results were presented at the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø in early February 2026. 

Warming is significantly affecting not only spawning grounds but also leading to a reduction in the food base. As a result, fish populations are declining, particularly species inhabiting the pelagic zone, i.e. not located in close proximity to the seabed. Some fish are also migrating to colder areas. 

Overall, according to scientists, fish biomass in the seas surrounding Norway, including the Arctic seas, declined twofold from 35 million to 17 million tonnes between 2013 and 2025, reaching the lowest level for the entire observation period since 2000. 

Another factor exacerbating the situation is fishing. Geir Huse, Director of Marine Ecosystems and Resources at the Institute of Marine Research of Norway, says that the most commercially important northern fish stocks, such as Arctic cod, have reached a critical level. 

“This is primarily due to a failure in recruitment – not enough young fish are growing up. But in recent years, more Arctic cod has also been harvested than recommended,” he warns. 

Persecution of Non-Governmental Organizations by the Russian Authorities 

The NGO “Arktida,” which covers political processes and environmental issues in the Russian Arctic, has been designated as “undesirable” in the Russian Federation ↑

On February 16, 2026, the Russian authorities added “Arktida” to the register of “undesirable organizations.” 

This means that it can no longer operate in the country, and Russian citizens and legal entities are prohibited from working with it, cooperating with it, participating in its projects, distributing its materials, donating money, or providing any other form of funding. Even materials published by the organization before it was designated as “undesirable” can still be used as grounds for prosecution. A first violation entails administrative liability in the form of a fine, while a repeated violation can lead to criminal liability, with prison sentences of up to four years for participation in the organization’s activities and up to six years for leadership roles. 

“Arktida” is an NGO focused on climate issues, Indigenous rights, and corruption in Russia’s Arctic regions. In particular, the organization prepared a detailed report on key decision-makers in Russian Arctic policy and their specific areas of influence. 

Following its designation as “undesirable,” Arktida stated that it disagrees with this status and will continue its work, but will close all projects in Russia and cease cooperation with individuals and organizations located or registered in the country in order not to put them at risk. 

Accidents and Incidents in the Northern Sea Route 

Ukrainian drones struck Lukoil oil refinery in Ukhta ↑

On February 12, Ukrainian drones carried out a strike on a Lukoil oil refinery in Ukhta (Komi Republic), located nearly 2,000 km from Ukraine. The attack caused explosions and a fire in the industrial zone. Ukhta is an important transport hub for oil and gas in Russia’s North, with oil pipelines from the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and gas pipelines from Yamal passing through the city. This marks a repeat attack on the facility following a strike in August 2025.

Recommended Materials ↑

Bellona held a seminar on countering Russian disinformation in the Arctic at the Arctic Frontiers international conference in Tromsø, Norway. The American Sunlight Project (ASP) and the Bellona Foundation shared new evidence on how Russia communicates about the Northern Sea Route. The findings are striking — and extend far beyond the Arctic.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, February 2026  appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Benjamin Schulz, lead analyst at The American Sunlight Project, presented findings from a study of Russian propaganda surrounding the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the English-language information space. He analyzed around 4,400 publications from Russian state and affiliated sources across platforms including Pravda Network websites, Telegram channels, WhatsApp, X, and others. 

The analysis identified three core narratives: 

• The Northern Sea Route will benefit the global economy by enabling faster and cheaper shipping; 

• Russia possesses the technology and infrastructure needed for its safe development; 

• A “multipolar world” cannot emerge without the assertion of Russian sovereignty in the Arctic. 

Schulte also noted a shift in strategy: much of this content now appears aimed less at human readers than at generating large volumes of material for training large language models such as ChatGPT and Gemini. Through repetition, these claims become more likely to be treated as credible by AI systems and incorporated into responses to user queries. 

The Reality Behind the “Fast, Cheap, and Safe” Narrative 

At a plenary session of the Arctic forum, Italy’s foreign minister Antonio Tajani spoke about the promise of Arctic shipping routes without questioning their underlying assumptions—an example of how repeated narratives can gain acceptance even at the highest levels. 

Ksenia Vakhrusheva, an expert with Bellona’s Arctic program, explained why these claims are oversimplified and often misleading. 

Russian authorities argue that climate change will reduce ice cover and make navigation along the NSR easier. In reality, climate change may increase risks due to higher waves, stronger storms, and coastal erosion. Even during periods of reduced ice, vessels frequently become trapped in drifting ice and may wait weeks for assistance. Navigation along the Northern Sea Route is likely to remain difficult and hazardous despite warming trends. 

Vakhrusheva emphasized that the route’s primary function is not international transit but the export of resources from the Russian Arctic. The NSR is actively used to transport oil, gas, and other raw materials, and Russia’s development plans for the region are focused on expanding extraction. 

She argued that the international community should not support such activity, as further Arctic hydrocarbon development accelerates climate change and helps finance Russia’s war against Ukraine and hybrid operations against Western countries. 

Among possible countermeasures, she cited sanctions on Russian Arctic oil and gas, which would reduce shipping traffic along the route. 

Claims that Russia has the technology and infrastructure to ensure safe development of the NSR are also misleading. Effective technologies for cleaning up oil spills in icy Arctic conditions do not yet exist. In addition, search-and-rescue infrastructure in Russia’s Far North is extremely limited and insufficient to guarantee safe navigation. Vakhrusheva pointed to Russia’s poor track record in handling spills—even those occurring near major transport hubs, such as near the port of Murmansk.

Building ships with the necessary ice class and icebreakers is slow and underfinanced. Russia lacks shipbuilding technologies and financial resources. If Russia planned to build three new nuclear ice-breakers with increased power capacity (series 10510) in its pre-war plans, then now it reduced its ambition to only one – and its construction is significantly delayed. End of cooperation with Western suppliers, particularly from Finland, loss of Ukrainian supplier—NKMZ in Kramatorsk (formerly Rosatom’s plant)—led to disruption of supply chains and delays. Additionally, Russia does not have technology and capacity to respond to major accidents with nuclear vessels, ex.in case of sinking.

Why Russian Disinformation Works 

Ukrainian investigative journalist Liubov Velychko outlined the mechanisms behind Russian disinformation in the Arctic, highlighting three key methods: 

Greenwashing. Companies such as Rosneft promote an image of environmental responsibility—for example, by funding polar bear feeding programs in zoos or supporting small-scale research projects. These symbolic actions do little to protect wild populations or offset the environmental damage caused by oil and gas development but help cultivate a “green” image. 

Commissioned research. Major energy companies like Rosneft and Gazprom fund research institutions, creating incentives for scientists to avoid studying the environmental harms of the oil and gas industry. 

Leveraging authority. Prominent scientists and institutional leaders often sit on corporate boards, then appear at international conferences and climate summits presenting lobbying positions as independent expert opinion. 

Velychko stressed that both journalists and governments must investigate potential conflicts of interest among speakers to understand whose interests they represent.

How authorities seek to project an image of prosperity among Indigenous communities

Sámi activist Andrei Danilov, a member of the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia, described how authorities seek to project an image of prosperity among Indigenous communities while suppressing independent activism. 

A key role is played by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). While it formally represents around 40 Indigenous groups across the North, Siberia, and the Far East, it has lost independence in recent years following leadership changes and now largely reflects the government’s position. 

At the same time, RAIPON continues to participate in international institutions such as the Arctic Council and UN forums, creating the appearance of representation and well-being while obscuring widespread human rights violations. 

Danilov noted that conditions for Indigenous activists are becoming increasingly dangerous. Those defending environmental rights and opposing extractive industries face systematic pressure from both corporations and the state. 

In December 2025, coordinated raids across several regions led to the detention of at least 17 Indigenous representatives on suspicion of involvement in an extremist organization. Human rights advocates say the cases are fabricated, aimed at punishing peaceful activism and participation in international forums, including UN discussions on Indigenous and environmental issues. 

Among those detained was Selkup activist Daria Egereva, who had spoken at the UN climate conference COP30 about the destruction of her people’s traditional way of life due to state-backed industrial projects. She was arrested on terrorism charges on December 18 and now faces up to 20 years in prison. 

Danilov himself was forced to leave Russia and seek political asylum in Norway due to mounting pressure and risks tied to his advocacy.  

In sum, the expanding campaign of climate and environmental disinformation in recent years has hindered sound policymaking, eroded trust in institutions, and deepened social divisions. Much of Bellona’s work is focused on identifying, analyzing, and countering such disinformation to ensure that political decisions are grounded in scientific evidence and reliable facts.

The post How Russia Is Entrenching False Narratives About the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route in Global Public Opinion appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for December can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in January
2. Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route decreased by 2.3% in 2025, while cargo turnover at Arctic basin seaports declined by 6.3%

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. South Korea announced plans to conduct a trial voyage along the Northern Sea Route in September 2026
4. French military forces took control of the tanker Grinch, which was sailing from Murmansk carrying Arctic oil
5. Germany for the first time blocked a shadow fleet tanker, Tavian, with a falsified IMO number from entering its territorial waters
6. The EU has formally established a phased ban on imports of Russian gas, including both pipeline gas and LNG
7. In 2025, exports of salmon smolts from Norway to Russia almost doubled, reaching €18.5 million
8. Russia has announced the suspension of its participation in several working groups of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission
9. Sweden and Finland have called on the European Union to tighten sanctions against Russian Arctic shipping
10. Fourteen European countries published a joint statement calling for action to address security threats posed by Russia’s shadow fleet

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
11. A partner has withdrawn from Norilsk Nickel’s project to build a copper plant in China, putting the entire project at risk
12. Norilsk Nickel has summarized its results for 2025
13. Rosneft has begun the winter delivery of cargo for construction at the fields of the Vostok Oil project

PERSECUTION OF SCIENTISTS ENGAGED IN ARCTIC RESEARCH IN RUSSIA
14. Scientist Alexey Dudarev was arrested on charges of “treason” for publications in a journal of the Arctic Council, of which Russia is a member

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES IN THE ARCTIC
15. Climate change may reduce the risk of radiation spreading from the sunken submarine Komsomolets, according to the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
16. A large industrial waste dump has been surveyed at the UNESCO World Heritage site Putorana Plateau

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
17. Oil product spills in the Murmansk region and Yakutia

Northern Sea Route and Shipping

Overview of shipping on the Northern Sea Route in January ↑

In January, the Northern Sea Route continued to operate under winter navigation conditions. The main Arctic projects maintained stable exports of LNG and oil.

The Yamal LNG project in Sabetta carried out 25 LNG shipments in January, totaling about 1.69 million tonnes. Deliveries were made roughly every 1–1.5 days. Most shipments (23 cargoes) were sent directly to European countries — France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Transportation was carried out by Arc7 ice-class Yamalmax LNG carriers, with a transit time of 6–9 days.

The remaining two cargoes were sent to China via the Suez Canal on conventional Arc4 tankers with icebreaker escort while transiting the Arctic seas. Delivery times were 44 and 58 days respectively. Ship-to-ship transshipment near Kildin Island did not take place in January; all shipments were carried out directly from Sabetta.

The Arctic LNG 2 project used an established LNG transshipment scheme through the Kola Bay in January. Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers delivered LNG to the floating storage facility Saam FSU near Murmansk, where it was transshipped for onward transportation to China via the Suez Canal.

The LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie loaded at the Arctic LNG 2 terminal on January 6, 14, and 22. At the end of the month, a new Russian LNG carrier, Alexey Kosygin, commissioned on December 25, 2025, joined operations. On January 29 it loaded at the Arctic LNG 2 terminal and left the Ob Bay escorted by the nuclear icebreaker Arktika. After transshipment at the Saam FSU, LNG cargoes were taken by shadow fleet LNG carriers, including Buran, Voskhod, Iris, Zarya, Arctic Pioneer, and others.

On January 26, the first LNG cargo of the year from the Arctic LNG 2 project was unloaded at the Beihai LNG terminal in China. It was delivered by the LNG carrier Buran, which had loaded at the Saam FSU floating storage facility near Murmansk.

The Arctic oil projects Varandey, Prirazlomnaya, and Novy Port also continued oil shipments during the winter. Cargoes were loaded onto specialized icebreaking tankers, which delivered crude oil to the Murmansk hub for ship-to-ship transfers to shadow fleet vessels and further export to China and India. According to Global Fishing Watch data, the Novoportovskoye field operated by Gazprom Neft was the most active. Shuttle tankers of the Shturman series (Shturman Albanov, Shturman Malygin, Shturman Ovtsyn, Shturman Koshelev, Shturman Skuratov, Shturman Shcherbinin, Mikhail Lazarev) made at least 12 voyages in January, loading at Mys Kamenny.

Tracking the exact number of shipments from the Varandey terminal (Lukoil) and the Prirazlomnaya platform (Gazprom Neft) is more difficult than for other projects due to the systematic disabling of AIS signals during operations. Nevertheless, analysis of tracks in Global Fishing Watch indicates clear activity of shuttle tankers near both facilities in January. Among them are the tankers Kapitan Gotskiy, Timofey Guzhenko, and Vasiliy Dinkov, operating at the Varandey terminal, as well as Mikhail Ulyanov, Kirill Lavrov, Antey, and Hermes, operating with the Prirazlomnaya platform. All of the listed tankers are under international sanctions. Despite this, shipments continued, and operations at the Varandey terminal were cited as one of the factors behind the growth of transshipment volumes in Arctic ports.

Norilsk Nickel also remained active on the Northern Sea Route and the Yenisei River. In January, six core vessels serving the project (Arc7 container ships Norilsk Nickel, Talnakh, Nadezhda, Monchegorsk, Zapolyarny, and the tanker Yenisei) made at least 23 port calls, including 9 calls at the port of Dudinka, 4 in Murmansk, 4 in Arkhangelsk, and other destinations.

On January 4, the container ship Norilsk Nickel completed a call at Pevek — the easternmost port on the Northern Sea Route. This was the last voyage before navigation in the port closed on January 14. Pevek became the last port in Chukotka to end the navigation season. The vessel delivered a cargo of construction materials and equipment for the construction of the Baimsky mining and processing plant at the Peschanka deposit in Chukotka. After unloading, the nuclear icebreaker Sibir of Rosatomflot took the vessel under escort and ensured its passage to Dudinka.

On the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route in the Bering Sea area, the cargo vessel Maria became trapped in ice. On January 4, after completing the delivery of coal to one of the settlements in Chukotka, the vessel was caught in heavy ice and was unable to move independently for more than 10 days. The military diesel-electric icebreaker Evpatiy Kolovrat was deployed to free the vessel. The operation began on January 12, and by January 14 Maria had been released. After that, the vessel resumed operations delivering cargo to southern Chukotka.

Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route decreased by 2.3% in 2025, while cargo turnover at Arctic basin seaports declined by 6.3% ↑

Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route reached 37.02 million tonnes in 2025, which is 2.3% lower than the previous year. The previous decline in cargo traffic occurred in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The cargo structure remained unchanged: 58% LNG, 24% crude oil and petroleum products, 11% general cargo, 4% gas condensate, with the remainder consisting of coal, ore concentrate, bulk cargo, and fish.

The decline in cargo traffic was mainly due to reduced LNG production at the Yamal LNG plant as a result of maintenance. Increased shipments from the Arctic LNG 2 project partially offset the losses, but not completely.

On January 16, the Association of Commercial Sea Ports published statistics on cargo turnover at Russian ports for 2025. According to the data, cargo turnover at Russia’s Arctic basin seaports amounted to 87.1 million tonnes, which is 6.3% lower than in 2024.

These statistics do not include cargo turnover at the small port of Mezen and the port of Dikson (0.9 million tonnes), as well as oil shipments from the Prirazlomnaya platform (3.7 million tonnes). Taking these into account, the total cargo turnover of marine terminals amounted to 91.7 million tonnes.

A decline in cargo turnover was recorded at all major Arctic ports:

Murmansk — 47 million tonnes (−9.8%),
Sabetta — 29.1 million tonnes (−0.4%),
Varandey — 4.6 million tonnes (−10.3%),
Arkhangelsk — 2.2 million tonnes (−14.6%).

The main contribution to this decline came from a reduction in dry cargo handling by 18.3%, to 21.3 million tonnes. This primarily concerns coal, containerized cargo, and mineral fertilizers. Turnover of liquid bulk cargo decreased by 1.6%, to 65.8 million tonnes.

According to Pavel Oleinik, director of the Murmansk Commercial Sea Port, the decline in cargo turnover in Murmansk is linked to a drop in coal transshipment, which accounts for more than 77% of the port’s throughput. Among the reasons are the long transportation distance and high railway tariffs, which make exporting coal through Murmansk less profitable compared with other ports. Even the growth in iron ore concentrate transshipment does not compensate for the decline in coal volumes.

Commentary by Bellona:

The international situation in the Arctic and sanctions on Russia’s activities in the Arctic region

South Korea announced plans to conduct a trial voyage along the Northern Sea Route in September 2026 ↑

On January 5–6, Acting Minister of Oceans and Fisheries Kim Seong-beom announced at a press briefing in Busan plans to conduct a trial container voyage along the Northern Sea Route. A vessel with a capacity of 3,000 TEU is expected to sail from Busan to Rotterdam around September, when ice coverage is expected to be at its lowest.

The project involves holding a competition among Korean shipping companies that possess the competencies to operate in Arctic conditions.

The state plans to allocate up to 11 billion won (approximately $7 million) to support shipping companies in the construction of icebreakers and other ice-class vessels for polar navigation, as well as to provide various benefits, including reduced fees for the use of port infrastructure.

Earlier, in late December, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea included the development of Arctic shipping routes among its priorities for 2026.

In recent years, however, leading shipping companies have instead avoided using the Northern Sea Route, citing geopolitical, economic, and environmental risks. Among the companies that have officially refused the route or declared it unacceptable are Maersk, CMA CGM, Evergreen, Hapag-Lloyd, and MSC.

Commentary by Bellona:

French military forces took control of the tanker Grinch, which was sailing from Murmansk carrying Arctic oil ↑

On January 22, the French Navy conducted an operation to intercept the oil tanker Grinch in the Mediterranean Sea between Spain and Morocco. The 250-meter vessel departed from Murmansk in late December 2025 and was carrying 730,000 barrels of oil produced at Russia’s Arctic fields.

The purpose of the detention was to verify the legality of the flag used by the tanker. The vessel was escorted to an anchorage off the French coast for inspection. A preliminary investigation confirmed the use of a false flag, and the case materials were forwarded to the Marseille prosecutor’s office.

The investigation showed that the tanker, formally sailing under the flag of the Comoros, had changed its flag at least five times in recent years. Since the beginning of 2025, Grinch has been under sanctions imposed by the United States, the EU, and the United Kingdom. The tanker’s owner, Cube Ventures Shipping SA, is also under sanctions. In February, the tanker was released after the owner paid a multi-million fine.

On the same day, January 22, within several hours after the incident with Grinch, two other tankers that had departed from Murmansk carrying Russian oil changed course and headed back to Murmansk. These were the vessel Huihai Pacific, which had been heading toward the North Sea, and Adonia, which was near Norway’s North Cape.

Germany for the first time blocked a shadow fleet tanker, Tavian, with a falsified IMO number from entering its territorial waters ↑

On January 10, German authorities denied the oil tanker Tavian passage through the Baltic Sea. During an inspection using a helicopter and document checks, the authorities identified a falsified IMO number and false vessel registration. This precedent became the first case in which a European country prohibited a vessel from Russia’s shadow fleet from passing through its waters.

In shipping databases, the vessel was listed as a new tanker flying the flag of Tanzania, but in fact it turned out to be the 28-year-old tanker Arcusat under the flag of Cameroon. A month earlier, the German newspaper Kieler Nachrichten reported that the vessel was in extremely poor technical condition. Since 2013, it has changed its name 11 times and has been on U.S. sanctions lists since 2021 due to illegal oil trading.

Initially, Tavian was heading to Primorsk in the Leningrad region, likely to load Russian oil, but after Germany refused it passage, the vessel turned around and headed to Murmansk. On January 16, the ship was located near Murmansk in the Barents Sea.

Falsifying an IMO number undermines maritime safety, as authorities cannot identify the real owner or verify the existence of valid insurance, including mandatory coverage for environmental pollution liability. Without verified data, it is impossible to confirm a vessel’s compliance with international safety standards, technical condition requirements, and environmental regulations, which increases the risk of accidents, oil spills, and other incidents.

Commentary by Bellona:

The EU has formally established a phased ban on imports of Russian gas, including both pipeline gas and LNG ↑

On January 26, the EU formally adopted a regulation under the RePowerEU program aimed at the gradual phase-out of imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG. According to the new regulation:

• A full ban on imports of Russian LNG will take effect from the beginning of 2027.
• A ban on pipeline gas will take effect from autumn 2027 (approximately by September 30, 2027).
• Mandatory verification of the country of origin of gas will be introduced before import authorization is granted.
• EU member states must submit national plans by March 1, 2026, outlining how they will replace Russian gas and diversify supplies.

The regulation provides for transition periods for already concluded contracts in order to minimize the impact on prices and markets.

By March 1, 2026, EU member states must prepare national plans for the diversification of gas supplies and identify potential challenges related to replacing Russian gas.

Of the 27 EU member states, two — Hungary and Slovakia — voted against the measure, citing their geographic position and lack of access to the sea, as well as their dependence on pipeline supplies and infrastructure problems in neighboring EU countries that prevent them from replacing Russian gas with alternative sources at an acceptable price.

Hungary has announced its intention to challenge the ban in the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Despite the political decision to impose a ban, imports of Russian LNG into the EU remained at a high level in 2025. According to an analysis by the German environmental organization Urgewald, Yamal LNG accounted for 14.3% of the EU’s total LNG imports in 2025. European countries spent about €7.2 billion on purchases from the project. At the same time, 76.1% of Yamal LNG’s total exports in 2025 were directed to the EU (75.4% in 2024). The largest importers were France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Imports of LNG into European countries were paradoxically affected by the ban on the transshipment of Russian LNG through EU ports, which came into force in March 2025. Previously, part of the cargo from Yamal LNG was transshipped in EU ports and then sent to China or India. Now these volumes are being left in Europe and sold directly to European buyers.

The increase is particularly noticeable at the Belgian terminal in Zeebrugge. In 2024, about 2.7 billion cubic meters of LNG were kept there, while the rest was sent onward. In 2025, imports rose to 5.5 billion cubic meters (or 4.6 million tons), exceeding China’s total imports from Yamal over the same period (3.6 million tons).

This trend continued in 2026. According to Urgewald, in January 92.6% of exports from the Yamal LNG project were delivered to EU countries — France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. European ports received 23 out of 25 cargoes, with a total volume of about 1.69 million tons. This is 8% higher than in January 2025.

Commentary by Bellona:

In 2025, exports of salmon smolts from Norway to Russia almost doubled, reaching €18.5 million ↑

In 2025, the Norwegian company Agaqua supplied salmon juveniles to Russia worth about €18.5 million, setting a record for recent years and nearly doubling the figures for 2024.

Agaqua remains the only Norwegian company continuing to export salmon smolts to Russia, supplying them to Russia’s largest salmon producer, Inarctica. At the same time, Norwegian fish feed suppliers Skretting and BioMar completely stopped deliveries to Russia in 2022, and another producer, Ewos, joined them in 2023.

Since 2014, Russian sanctions have been in place banning the import of Norwegian salmon into Russia, but the import of juveniles and feed remains legal and is based on long-standing ties in aquaculture.

At the end of 2024, Agaqua’s subsidiary (Villa Sea) received permission from the Norwegian Food Safety Authority to use the transport vessel Sea Salmon to deliver salmon smolts to Murmansk until October 2029.

Commentary by Bellona:

Russia has announced the suspension of its participation in several working groups of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission ↑

Despite the fact that Norway and Russia agreed in December 2025 on the sector’s operations for 2026, Russia has announced the suspension of its participation in several working groups of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission.

Norway’s Minister of Fisheries and Ocean Policy, Marianne Sivertsen Næss, said in an interview with HNN that the suspension will affect working groups on fisheries management and control, the exchange of statistics, and scientific cooperation. She added that, despite this, the parties have maintained common technical rules on fishing practices and agreed on a joint research program for 2026.

At the same time, the dispute continues over the fishing company Norebo, which controls about 40% of Russia’s cod quota in the Barents Sea. In June 2025, Norway, following the European Union, banned Norebo vessels from accessing its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, citing suspicions of intelligence activities. This prompted threats from Russia to terminate the fisheries agreement with Norway.

In January 2026, Norebo owner Vitaly Orlov filed a lawsuit against Norway, seeking the removal of sanctions and the restoration of access for the company’s vessels to Norway’s exclusive economic zone for fishing. The first hearing took place on January 26 at the Oslo District Court, where the company requested an interim measure — the extension of its licenses while the main case is under consideration. The court rejected this request, citing the priority of Norway’s national security over the commercial interests of a sanctioned company.

Sweden and Finland have called on the European Union to tighten sanctions against Russian Arctic shipping ↑

In January, Sweden and Finland called on the European Union to tighten sanctions against Russian Arctic shipping. They propose that the 20th sanctions package introduce a full ban on insurance, transshipment, port calls in European ports, and, most importantly, the repair of vessels transporting oil, gas, and coal. Earlier, in November 2025, the United Kingdom introduced a similar ban, which is expected to take effect during 2026.

European shipyards and insurance services are critically important for Russian Arctic vessels. Without access to them, Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers would face downtime, operate with increased risk, or seek repairs in Asia, which would increase both time and costs.

Fourteen European countries published a joint statement calling for action to address security threats posed by Russia’s shadow fleet ↑

On January 26, the UK Department for Transport published a joint open statement addressed to the international maritime community, signed by 14 coastal countries of the Baltic and North Seas (Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, as well as Iceland).

In the statement, they express concern about growing threats to maritime safety originating from Russia. These include manipulation of AIS systems (switching them off or falsifying data) and interference with global satellite navigation systems (GNSS). Such actions endanger maritime navigation, complicate traffic coordination, increase the risk of accidents, and hinder rescue operations. The countries call for recognizing such interference as a security threat, ensuring that crews are trained to operate without GNSS, and developing alternative terrestrial radionavigation systems.

The statement emphasizes the need for all vessels to comply with international conventions (SOLAS, MARPOL, COLREG, UNCLOS, and others). In particular, vessels are allowed to sail under the flag of only one country. The use of multiple flags or changing them at will violates Article 92 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and is treated as the absence of nationality and a state flag.

Vessels must also carry valid documentation on safety and insurance, safety management systems, incident reports, and pollution prevention plans. Manipulation of AIS, switching off transponders, or falsifying location data is prohibited.

Commentary by Bellona:

Heightened Industrial Activity in the Russian Arctic

A partner has withdrawn from Norilsk Nickel’s project to build a copper plant in China, putting the entire project at risk ↑

Norilsk Nickel’s multi-billion-dollar project to build a copper plant in China, announced by the company’s head Vladimir Potanin in 2024, has come close to collapse after the Chinese partner decided to withdraw from the project. Norilsk Nickel did not disclose the partner’s name, but according to Reuters, it may be the company Xiamen C&D.

The new facility, with a capacity of 500,000 tons of copper per year, was planned for the port city of Fangchenggang in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Bloomberg, citing sources, reports that Norilsk Nickel had planned to sign the construction agreement before May 2025, timing it to coincide with Putin’s visit to Beijing.

The company is now searching for a new partner. If it fails to find one, it may have to ask the government to extend the operation of the copper plant in Norilsk, which was planned to be shut down in 2027. The Norilsk plant, built in 1935, was originally intended to be modernized to reduce harmful emissions. However, Norilsk Nickel decided that opening a new facility in China would be simpler. In addition, this would help address problems with equipment supplies and bring production closer to customers — after the start of the war, more than 50% of Norilsk Nickel’s sales have been directed to Asia, primarily to China.

Despite statements about a “strategic partnership without limits” and Putin’s visits, China views Russian companies as toxic partners. Chinese banks regularly block Norilsk Nickel’s payments whenever a new sanctions package is introduced, the company’s vice president Anton Berlin previously complained. Relocating production to China could also have helped address this problem.

Norilsk Nickel has summarized its results for 2025 ↑

Overall, the company’s production volumes remained largely unchanged, showing a slight decline, while financial indicators, on the contrary, increased slightly.

Nickel production fell by 3% to 199,000 tonnes compared with the previous year. This was due to a higher share of blended ores and a lower share of high-grade ores in the processed feedstock. Almost all nickel — 198,200 tons — was produced from the company’s own raw materials. Production of premium-grade nickel increased, in particular Nornickel Plating Grade nickel, which rose by 30%.

Copper production amounted to 425,000 tonnes, or 2% lower than a year earlier. Of this, 70,000 tonnes were produced by the company’s Zabaykalsky division.

Norilsk Nickel’s net profit under IFRS for the first half of 2025 increased by 2% to $842 million, compared with $829 million a year earlier.

The implementation of several operational projects continued.

In the Polar Division, construction began on a new level at the Glubokaya shaft of the Skalisty mine in order to maintain declining capacities and develop new mining capacity. The reconstruction of the cobalt production workshop at the Kola site was completed.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosneft has begun the winter delivery of cargo for construction at the fields of the Vostok Oil project ↑

In January, Rosneft reported that its subsidiary RN-Vankor had begun the winter delivery of nearly 1 million tonnes of cargo to the fields of the Vankor and Payakha clusters in the north of the Krasnoyarsk region (both clusters are part of Rosneft’s Vostok Oil project). Deliveries are carried out along the Northern Sea Route during the winter navigation season using six sea vessels and two icebreakers for escort, while overland transport uses winter roads and ice crossings stretching more than 2,000 km.

The main cargo includes construction materials, metal structures, pipes, equipment, machinery, and specialized vehicles required for the construction and operation of oil production facilities and hydrocarbon transportation infrastructure.

The Vankor cluster is an already operating group of fields on the Taimyr Peninsula, including the Vankor, Suzun, Lodochnoye, and Tagul fields. Oil has been produced at the Vankor field since 2009. As part of the Vostok Oil project, an oil pipeline is being built from Vankor to Payakha and further to the Bukhta Sever port in order to redirect flows for export along the Northern Sea Route to Asia.

The Payakha cluster is also part of the large Arctic project Vostok Oil and includes the Payakha, East Taimyr, and West Irkinsky fields. In 2019, the oil reserves of the Payakha group of fields were confirmed at 1.2 billion tonnes. Pilot production began in 2025, and oil is currently transported by truck.

The full launch of the first phase of the Vostok Oil project, with shipments of up to 30 million tonnes of oil per year through the Bukhta Sever port along the Northern Sea Route, has been postponed to 2026.

Persecution of scientists engaged in Arctic research in Russia

Scientist Alexey Dudarev was arrested on charges of “treason” for publications in a journal of the Arctic Council, of which Russia is a member ↑

In St. Petersburg, Alexey Dudarev, Doctor of Medical Sciences and Chief Researcher at the North-West Public Health Research Center of Rospotrebnadzor, has been arrested in a “treason” case. This was reported by the human rights project Perviy Otdel. Dudarev was detained on January 14 on his way to work. A search was conducted at his apartment. The court ordered his detention in custody until March 13, 2026.

According to his family, Dudarev never had access to classified information and did not sign any related confidentiality obligations. As reported by The Barents Observer, Dudarev studied the impact of toxic pollutants on the health of people living in the Far North, including Indigenous communities. The scientist himself has not admitted guilt.

The charges are based on Dudarev’s publications in open international scientific journals of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), where he was a co-author. Investigators claim that information from these scientific publications could allegedly have been used by Norwegian intelligence.

Since the 1990s, AMAP has operated within the framework of the intergovernmental forum the Arctic Council, whose members include eight Arctic states, including Russia and Norway. After the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s activities in the council were suspended, but it has not formally withdrawn and remains a member.

Commentary by Bellona:

Environmental and Climate Issues in the Arctic

Climate change may reduce the risk of radiation spreading from the sunken submarine Komsomolets, according to the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority ↑

The Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has published a study on the possible impact of climate change on the spread of radioactive substances from the Soviet nuclear submarine K-278 Komsomolets, The Insider reports. The submarine sank in the Norwegian Sea in 1989 at a depth of 1,673 meters after a fire. Fuel assemblies with nuclear fuel remain in the reactor, and two torpedoes with nuclear warheads are still on board. The total radioactivity is estimated at around 3 PBq.

Scientists conducted computer modeling of various scenarios of radioactive leakage, taking into account projected climate changes. They examined four scenarios: continuous leakage from the seabed, continuous leakage throughout the water column, a one-time release from the seabed, and a one-time release throughout the water column. For each scenario, they calculated the spread of contamination under current conditions and under intensified climate change.

According to the study’s conclusions, global warming will reduce the risk of radiation reaching surface waters. The reason is that rising air temperatures and increased precipitation strengthen the stratification of ocean waters, meaning that the warm upper layers mix less with the colder deep layers where the submarine is located. As a result, radioactive substances are less likely to reach the surface.

The modeling showed that in the event of a leak, radiation would spread mainly within the Norwegian Sea, with some reaching the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Concentrations along the Norwegian coast — in the areas of the Lofoten Islands, Tromsø, and Kirkenes — would increase gradually over two decades but would remain significantly lower under climate change conditions compared with the baseline scenario.

The study was conducted as part of Norway’s nuclear safety action plan. The agency emphasizes that the work is predictive in nature and does not mean that the submarine currently poses a real threat.

In the early 1990s and in 2007, Russian scientists who examined the Komsomolets using the Mir submersible recorded small leaks of radionuclides from the submarine, including cesium-137 from a pipe near the reactor compartment. In 2019, a Norwegian-Russian expedition measured the concentration of radioactive substances at the leakage sites — it was about 100 Bq/L. Scientists noted that these leaks do not pose a danger to marine ecosystems.

A large industrial waste dump has been surveyed at the UNESCO World Heritage site Putorana Plateau ↑

In 2025, the Russian Geographical Society, together with the organization Taimyr Reserves, conducted an expedition to the Putorana Plateau to survey sites where illegal industrial waste has accumulated. The plateau, which is included on the UNESCO World Heritage List, is located in the northwestern part of the Central Siberian Plateau, east of Norilsk and south of the Taimyr Peninsula.

During the survey, three contaminated sites were recorded in the area of Lake Ayan — at the mouths of the Amnundakta and Gulemi rivers, as well as near the Yuzhny Ayan ranger station.

Most of the waste consists of old scrap metal: more than 700 barrels, metal structures, buckets, and wire. Wood waste, glass, textiles, rubber, and petroleum products were also found. The most difficult situation was recorded at the mouth of the Gulemi River, where 16 sealed barrels containing petroleum products were discovered.

The greatest risk is the potential contamination of soil and water by petroleum products, corrosion products, and the movement of waste during floods.

A cleanup plan is currently being developed. The timeline for its implementation has not yet been announced.

Accidents and Incidents in the Northern Sea Route

Oil product spills in the Murmansk region and Yakutia ↑

On January 11, a gasoline spill occurred at a Rosneft oil depot in Olenegorsk in the Murmansk region. About 80 tonnes of AI-95 gasoline leaked onto the ground after a pipeline rupture.

On January 26, about 100 cubic meters of oil products were spilled during pumping from a storage tank at a regional Emergency Ministry (EMERCOM) oil depot in the settlement of Tiksi in Yakutia. Part of the fuel reached the ice of Neelova Bay. A state of emergency was declared in the area.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, January 2026 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

At Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø, The American Sunlight Project (ASP) and the Bellona Foundation shared new evidence on how Russia communicates about the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The findings are striking — and extend far beyond the Arctic.

Analyzing more than 4,400 pieces of content from Russian state linked channels, we identified three core narratives: that the NSR will benefit the world through faster shipping; that only Russia possesses the tools and technology to develop it safely; and that a new multipolar world order depends on Russia asserting sovereignty in the High North.

Much of this content is pushed through the Pravda network, a coordinated set of state-linked websites posing as independent media while amplifying Kremlin narratives. Posts also appear in closed channels on Telegram and WhatsApp.

This pattern suggests a new tactic: targeting algorithms and large language models (LLMs), not just human readers. We cannot prove Russia’s exact intent, but the scale and structure of this content make it a reasonable concern. From 2024 to 2025, mentions of the NSR rose 238%, while total views fell 31%. This pattern may represent early signs of grooming LLMs to produce preferred answers, repeating the narrative to shape the responses AI systems give when they scan and summarize information for millions of people every day.

If these systems learn from repetition rather than reality, what people — and LLMs — “see” can drift far from the facts. Examining Russia’s NSR narratives closer shows just how wide that gap already is.

The first narrative — faster global trade — remains largely theoretical. International transit is almost non-existent. From 2022-2024, the NSR saw no fully international transits; in 2025, one voyage was conducted from China to Britain. Most of the NSR’s traffic (85%) is Arctic oil and gas shipped for export from Russia​. The current cargo volume on NSR is half of that planned in official Russian government documents, as a result of international sanctions against major Russian oil and gas exports and explorations.

 The second narrative — that only Russia has the tools and technology needed to safely develop the NSR — is overstated. Building ships with the necessary ice class and icebreakers is slow and underfinanced. Russia lacks shipbuilding technologies and financial resources.

If Russia planned to build three new nuclear ice-breakers with increased power capacity (series 10510) in its pre-war plans, then now it reduced its ambition to only one – and its construction is significantly delayed. End of cooperation with Western suppliers, particularly from Finland, loss of Ukrainian supplier – NKMZ in Kramatorsk (formerly Rosatom’s plant) – led to disruption of supply chains and delays. Additionally, Russia does not have technology and capacity to respond to major accidents with nuclear vessels, ex.in case of sinking.

The NSR is becoming populated by shadow fleet vessels. Their number reached 100 in 2025, up from just 13 in 2024. More than one-third of them are oil tankers with poor insurance and in some cases with no or low ice class — significantly increasing the risk of oil spill in a region of limited search-and-rescue infrastructure. 

Russian nuclear corporation Rosatom as an administrator of the Northern Sea Route has stopped its official reporting on accidents and incidents on the NSR. However, we know that several incidents happened in 2025: ships collided, ran aground and got trapped in ice even in September, the month with the least ice volume on the route. Sea and pack ice make voyage time less predictable and increase environmental and crew safety risks. 

The third narrative — that a multipolar world depends on Russia asserting sovereignty in the High North — is not about shipping at all. It hints at why the Kremlin’s information campaigns exist in the first place. The NSR is central to Russia’s Arctic extraction strategy, energy revenues and great-power identity. That strategic importance helps explain the scale of the messaging effort.

Disinformation doesn’t always take the shape of outright lies. What makes these narratives concerning is how they are amplified. Coordinated distribution through Pravda and private channels, combined with the focus on automated systems, moves these claims beyond ordinary state messaging. That is why we treat them as a disinformation concern.

The Northern Sea Route may never become a major shipping corridor. But shaping how the world perceives it clearly matters to the Kremlin. Ignoring this goal, and the tactics used to achieve it, risks allowing a carefully crafted message ecosystem to shape public debate about one of the most pristine parts of our planet.

In the Arctic, facts still matter. And increasingly, so do the digital systems that read them. 

How we respond to these narratives — and the tools they target — will shape Arctic security and the environment for years to come.

The post From Coordinated Distribution to AI-targeted Repetition: How Russian Info Campaigns Shape Perceptions of the High North’s Future appeared first on etc.bellona.org.