Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union - lobbyists

LOBBYISTS AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO KNOW BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK

christian — Mon, 29 Sep 2014 10:49:56 +0000

The effects of lobbying in the European Parliament are contingent and not certain. They fluctuate in accordance with inter-institutional interactions, national interests, types of policy, types of legislation, as well as the style of lobbying, the coalitions formed around specific policies and the nature of resources deployed by lobbyists themselves. The most effective collectively organised interests and lobbyists know that Brussels is very much an insider’s town. They are aware that knowing who to speak to, and when, are vital resources in the informal interpersonal and inter-institutional networks operating in Brussels.

Interest representation and lobbying in parliaments are normally justified in terms of information transmission, translation and timing. The transmission of information from interest organisations to MEPs is deemed essential as it provides pre-digested information for elected representatives who are often not experts in the particular policy area under consideration. This ‘briefing’ function also allows specific groups and organisations to translate often complex and technical information into accessible data for busy elected representatives. Successful lobbyists supply information in a clear fashion so that the MEP doesn’t have to be an expert in the field. In these interchanges the preferences of MEPs and lobbyists alike are for issue-specific briefings and the provision of detailed amendments at appropriate times. Of most use for both sides in the MEP–interest relationship is contact on ‘issues of particular interest’ and ‘propositions for amendments to the directives under discussion’. The clear preference in the EP is for direct, personal, well-timed and pertinent contact; with lobbyists providing targeted information on specific legislative amendments.

As important as transmission and translation of information, however, is the timing of its dissemination. The timing of the provision of information at the appropriate point in the EU’s legislative cycle is a key resource of groups and lobbyists. Certainly, under the co-decision procedure lobbyists have become increasingly aware of the need to act more quickly to get their views across to MEPs.

Within the EP itself there is recognition of the intimate connection between substantive policy concerns and the procedural constraints and opportunities affecting the timing of influence. In this context, timing is particularly acute when amendments to Commission proposals are to be tabled in committee. Committees that have heavy legislative loads are especially colonised by representatives of organised groups and consultants.

The provision of information is not simply ‘supply-led’ but is also ‘demand-led’. Committee rapporteurs, committee chairmen, vice-chairmen and shadow rapporteurs are particularly prominent ‘targets’ for the supply of information and, in reverse, are significant ‘consumers’ of information from outside organisations. Rapporteurs in drafting their reports routinely seek information not only from other EU institutions but also from interest associations and lobbyists. In addition, committee members often request draft amendments from interested organisations when the groups concerned have not already suggested their own favoured amendments. As a consequence, the process of amendment in committee is often characterised by intensive negotiation, dialogue and compromise not only among committee members but, crucially, between MEPs and affected interests across Europe.

Amendment Overload

While the provision of detailed legislative amendments by lobbyists may be welcomed by busy MEPs in reducing their need to review complicated texts and draft amendments personally, one consequence of a preference for specific amendments is ‘amendment overload’. It is not unknown for a single legislative proposal to attract up to 500 amendments in committee. Indeed, the rise in the number of amendments tabled in Parliament, and the increased time-costs associated with voting, has resulted in electronic voting becoming more widely used in EP committees.

Of course, the tabling of amendments does not necessarily ensure their adoption when voted on. Nonetheless, the fact remains that interest representatives are currently responsible for the initial drafting of a very high proportion of the amendments tabled in Parliament’s committees. More generally, few insiders would contest the fact that, even in the absence of specifically drafted amendments, the inspiration behind individual legislative (and other) amendments often flows from outside the EP.

The sheer complexity of processing amendments should not be underestimated, with each amendment having to be translated into all EU languages, distributed to all committee members, and then voted on, or a compromise brokered. This process is complicated still further in instances (frequent in practice) of overlap between individual amendments, and of multiple amendments to individual articles and paragraphs of proposals and to draft reports. Moreover, duplication of tabled amendments is a common phenomenon, with different MEPs, even from different party groups, submitting identical amendments. Besides the embarrassment factor in such cases, it is thus apparent which MEP has been successfully influenced by which interest. This does, of course, raise the intriguing normative question of whether such amending capacity is necessarily ‘sinister’ or ‘anti-democratic’.

Nonetheless, MEPs can, and do, defend their tabling of amendments, generated outside Parliament, as attesting to their responsiveness to societal demands rather than as evidence of their domination by unelected interests. They would also contend that each amendment has not simply to be tabled, but also presented, justified, argued, frequently compromised, and only then voted on in Parliament’s committees or plenary. Amendments are often subject to intense controversy, with votes on individual amendments in committee frequently being more contested than the final vote in committee or plenary.

Inter-institutional and Intra-institutional Intelligence

MEPs and interest representatives trade not only substantive information on policies but also exchange ‘inter-institutional’ information. The reciprocal trading of information on the thinking and scheduling of legislation within the Commission or Council is a vital commodity in the MEP–Lobbyist relationship. Of particular currency in this exchange is intra-institutional information on the work patterns of, and rate of legislative progress in, the various parliamentary committees engaged in processing specific directives. Representatives of interest associations and lobbyists often provide informal monitoring for MEPs of the asymmetries of committee activity on a particular directive. They track the different deadlines imposed by the various committees for the tabling of amendments; variations in the speed of processing proposals across committees; and possible divergences of policy emphases in the different committees dealing with the same issue.

In this way, interest groups with a mastery of the EP’s procedural complexities and a developed surveillance capacity provide not only substantive policy briefing but also inter- and intra-institutional intelligence for MEPs.

Hearings

The capacity of the EP to gain (and disseminate) information has been enhanced through the procedure of public hearings. Such hearings are convened by the EP’s committees with the permission of the Bureau. The purpose of hearings is to invite experts and interested organisations to provide evidence and engage in structured dialogue with committee members. Representatives of the Commission and Council attend the hearings, and the Commission is frequently invited to respond to the views expressed during the course of the hearing.

The main advantages of public hearings are that they help committee members to familiarise themselves with a particular policy (either in terms of detail or the broader context). One dimension is that they provide a procedure whereby MEPs can engage in ‘exploratory dialogue’ and ‘forward thinking’ and so raise issues for consideration by the other EU institutions. Another dimension of hearings is that they provide MEPs with supplementary sources of advice and information from independent experts, organised interests and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with which to assess the outcomes of the Commission’s own pre-legislative consultations.

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European Parliament

PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDERS

christian — Sat, 02 Aug 2014 10:32:26 +0000

Lobbying is a legitimate, unavoidable, and when conducted properly even a desirable activity. Lobbying can be a reflection of the principles of representativeness and voter participation, and can provide decision makers with information vital to their work.

In order to increase transparency in lobbying, lobbyists should observe the following principles when engaging with Public Office Holders

Lobbyists shall not engage in any conduct that is corrupt, dishonest or illegal, or unlawfully cause or threaten any detriment;
Lobbyists shall use all reasonable endeavours to satisfy themselves of the truth and accuracy of all statements and information provided by them to clients whom they represent, the wider public and Public Office Holders;
Lobbyists shall not make misleading, exaggerated or extravagant claims about, or otherwise misrepresent, the nature or extent of their access to Public Office Holders e.g. Government representatives, members of political parties or to any other person;
Lobbyists shall keep strictly separate from their duties and activities as lobbyists any personal activity or involvement on behalf of a political party;
When making initial contact with Public Office Holders with the intention of conducting lobbying activities, lobbyists who are proposing to conduct lobbying activities on behalf of clients must inform the Public Office Holders that (i) they are lobbyists or employees of, or contractors or persons engaged by, lobbyists; (ii) whether they are currently listed on the Register of Lobbyists; (iii) the name of their relevant client or clients; and (iv) the nature of the matters that their clients wish them to raise with Public Office Holders.

EU Code of Conduct (Transparency Register)

In their relations with the EU institutions and their Members, officials and other staff, registrants shall:

a. always identify themselves by name and by their entity or entities they work for or represent; declare the interests, objectives or aims promoted and, where applicable, specify the clients or members whom they represent;

b. not obtain or try to obtain information, or any decision, dishonestly, or by use of undue pressure or inappropriate behaviour;

c. not claim any formal relationship with the EU or any of its institutiions in their dealings with third parties, nor misrepresent the effect of registration in such a way as to mislead third parties or officials or other staff of the EU;

d. ensure that, to the best of their knowledge, information which they provide upon registration and subsequently in the framework of their activities within the scope of the register is complete, up-to-date and not misleading;

e. not sell to third parties copies of documents obtained from any EU institutions;

f. not induce Members of the EU institutions, officials or other staff of the EU, or assistants or trainees of those Members, to contravene the rules and standards of behaviour applicable to them;

g. if employing former officials or other staff of the EU or assistants or trainees of Members of the EU institutions, respect the obligations of such employees to abide by the rules and confidentiality requirements which apply to them;

h. observe any rules laid down on the rights and responsibilities of former Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission;

i. inform whomever they represent of their obligations towards the EU institutions.

Individuals representing or working for entities which have registered with the European Parliament with a view to being issued with a personal, non-transferable badge affording access to the European Parliament's premises shall:

j. comply strictly with the provisions of Rule 9, of, and Annex X and the second paragraph of Article 2 of Annex I to, the European Parliament's Rules of of Procedure;

k. satisfy themselves that any assistance provided in the context of Article 2 of Annex I to the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure is declared in the appropriate register;

l. in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest, obtain the prior consent of the Member or Members of the European Parliament concerned as regards any contractual relationship with or employment of a Member's assistant, and subsequently declare this in the register.

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EU code of conduct

STANDARDS/GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDERS DEALING WITH LOBBYISTS

christian — Sat, 02 Aug 2014 09:37:08 +0000

The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe recommends that Codes of Conduct and Guidance (wherever they exist) be reviewed in order to ensure that public office holders have appropriate standards/guidance for dealing with lobbyists and others whose intent is to sway public policy on behalf of specific interests. We define “Public Office Holders” in broad terms as anyone holding positions which, by any title have decision-making or advisory responsibilities such as cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and advisors, ministerial appointees, deputy ministers, heads of government agencies, members of parliament, senators and their staff.

First of all, lobbying has an important role to play to play in securing the democratic right to make representations to government and to have access to the policymaking process [which] is fundamental to the proper conduct of public life and the development of sound policy.

Public office holders should take particular care not to give the impression of giving greater weight to representations because they come from paid lobbyists;
Representations should be given such weight as they deserve based on their intrinsic merit;
Public office holders must in their dealings with lobbyists observe the prohibitions on paid advocacy and on the provision of advice or services for payment or other reward. The prohibition on accepting payment in return for services means that public office holders may not, in return for payment or other incentive or reward, assist outside organisations or persons in influencing ministers, officials, members of parliament. This includes conferring exclusive benefits upon the organization or making use of their position to lobby, or to help others to lobby, ministers, officials and members of parliament, by whatever means.
A Public Office Holder may never provide services in return for payment or other incentive or reward (regardless of whether the Public Office Holder intends to register and declare the interest.
Public Office Holders should decline all but the most insignificant or incidental hospitality, benefit or gift offered by a lobbyist.

Basic Rules of Ethics for Members of Parliament (MPs, MEPs) in their relations with Lobbyists

A "Lobbyist" - anyone who engages, as an occupation, in acts to convince a Member of Parliament on matters of legislation and Parliament’s resolutions.

A Member of Parliament shall avoid employing a lobbyist, or any activity on behalf of a lobbyist, in the Parliament or outside the Parliament , whether directly or by means of an assistant of the Member of Parliament.

A Member of Parliament shall avoid giving a personal undertaking to a lobbyist, his sponsors or his agents, that he will vote or act in the Parliament in a certain manner.

A Member of Parliament shall avoid deceiving a lobbyist regarding matters that are being dealt with by the Parliament or its Committees.

A Member of Parliament shall refuse to receive from a lobbyist, directly or indirectly, payment or other benefit, whether for himself or for another person or body.

A Member of Parliament, who wishes to speak on a certain matter in a committee of the Parliament , after a lobbyist or any other person with an interest has approached him on that matter, in writing or orally, shall disclose in his speech that a certain lobbyist or person with an interest approached him on this matter, on behalf of a certain body.

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