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hello. i was wondering what makes a human. if someone had a brain transplant,

Anonymous — Tue, 03 Dec 2019 18:52:27 +0000

Identity

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hello. i was wondering what makes a human. if someone had a brain transplant, would you call the body by its name or by the brains name? if you get rid of the body is it still that person, and vise versa? (with the brain) thank you! hope you can help!

What is in myself and not in others and it doesn't change from childhood to

Anonymous — Fri, 27 Sep 2019 20:48:11 +0000

Identity

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What is in myself and not in others and it doesn't change from childhood to death

I have a mother with alzheimer dementia in a very advanced stage and she is

Anonymous — Thu, 28 Jun 2018 05:51:18 +0000

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I have a mother with alzheimer dementia in a very advanced stage and she is unconscious about anything is happening around her. I think she is alive phisically but not a conscious being, she acts by instincts, grabbing a piece of bread or crying when she needs something, like a baby or an animal. Cant talk, dont know who she is or anything... I cant stop asking myself wether she is "alive", alive here meaning as a conscious human being. If I was religious I would ask where did her soul go?? Is it still there? Is it only her body what is left? Is all mad people also "alive"under this terms? What about very young children (who hasnt developed self awareness yet)? What about people who lives in auto pilot all their life and never question ther existence? Actually when do we start being "alive" under this concept? "I think therefore I am" Sorry for the long lines, I hope I explained myself. Thank you in advance. Juan C.

Here is a question. Say I want to live forever and constantly move my brain from

Anonymous — Fri, 17 Feb 2017 03:55:37 +0000

Consciousness

Mind

Identity

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Here is a question. Say I want to live forever and constantly move my brain from one body to another, so I never age. I also replace non functioning parts of my brain with new ones made with stem cells. Eventually after living for a long enough time my brain is no longer anything like the original except for its collective memories. Would that thing still be me? To take it a step further I create clones of myself and each of them has a small part of my originals brain. Would I still exist? Or I created a collective consciousness in which I am able to communicate to each of my clones and we are able to share our experiences in one big cloud. What does that even mean for me? Am I even the same person or something completely different? These problems have been really bugging me and I am just trying to see if anyone has any answer.

My question involves the word "same" apropos to identity vs. comparison,

Anonymous — Thu, 08 Sep 2016 13:01:24 +0000

Identity

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My question involves the word "same" apropos to identity vs. comparison, especially to the base case of a particular induction proof. I was trying to find the flaw in the induction for: "P = All horses are the same color. Base Case: P(1) = One horse is the same color as itself. Induction: We have n+1 horses. Take any one away, and the rest will be the same (because of P(n)). Since it didn't matter which we took away, all horses must be the same." I posit that the flaw in this proof isn't simply the lack of "sameness" overlap in the P(2) instance, but in the choice of base case and use of the word "same." I say that there needs to be a comparison (i.e., 2 or more unique objects) in the base case to use the word "same" as it is in "P". If I say Horse A is the same color as Horse A, and you say Horse A is the same color as Horse B, are we really using the word "same" in the same sense? If not, doesn't it follow that it's better not to use them interchangeably in an induction proof such as the one above? If so, am I just naively over analyzing something that's actually very obvious and elementary? Thank you!!

Hi,

Anonymous — Wed, 17 Aug 2016 23:52:15 +0000

Identity

Mind

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Hi, I am working on a story which revolves around the idea of memory implantation. So, I am wondering: If Person A commits a crime, then they have the full memory and emotions of that crime erased from their mind and then that memory is placed into the mind of Person B so they believe they committed the crime (Even remembering the thoughts and feelings as they committed it) who is guilty of the crime? Kind Regards, Lee

Could I have come into existence and experienced my "self" if my ancestors had

Anonymous — Wed, 30 Mar 2016 11:48:43 +0000

Identity

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Could I have come into existence and experienced my "self" if my ancestors had not been the same persons, or if a different sperm cell had coupled with my mothers egg? Would my "I" then have remained unborn or been born to a different body, maybe at a different time, or my vacancy occupied by a different persons "I"? In order for a particular "I" to be realized, must it have existed as a potential beforehand, like a lottery tickets potential for winning? Evolution and probability theory indicate that the chances for any particular individual to exist is practically zero. Have we who exist been incredibly lucky, or can our "I" be realized in some other being? If so, on what grounds is the particular potential self assigned to a particular body. I have explored several philosophical texts hoping to find something about this topic, but without success. I would be very glad if you could comment on it or direct me to some illuminating textbook or other source.

In answering question 24759, Michael Cholbi writes: "It's important not to

Anonymous — Thu, 01 Oct 2015 22:45:59 +0000

Identity

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In answering question 24759, Michael Cholbi writes: "It's important not to confuse the facts by which others know or identify a person and the facts that constitute his or her identity as a person. The way you and I think about Nelson is in terms of social facts about him (his accomplishments, etc.). If I were struggling to remember who was South Africa's first post-apartheid leader, you'd naturally tell me, "Don't you remember? It was Nelson Mandela."" Professor Cholbi intended that as an argument in favour of the theory that "He's not Mandela unless he has that genetic constitution." But suppose we are extremely well informed geneticists and you were struggling to remember who was the person who had the unique sequence of nucleotides CTAG repeated for 999 times between locations 1A237C and 1A324A. I would also tell you: "Don't you remember? It was Nelson Mandela." What is the difference between the genetic and the social fact? Or the difference between genetic constitution and whatever events that occurred in Mandela's mother's womb after that genetic constitution was fixed? Michael Cholbi says: "Mandela's genetic constitution is essential to him. Everything else about him is contingent." But isn't that just assuming what is being asked? A genetic constitution is a causally relevant fact, like any other. Why choose that one for identity? Professor Cholbi didn't give a single argument, did he? I don't ask Askphilosophers to address the possibility of cloning and the cases of identical twins. It is just that I don't have a clue why people have to have "essences" and why such "essences" have to be sequences of nucleotides (or of numbers, for that matter: within a few years, we will only need the sequence of letters (A, C, T, G) to produce a genetically identical organism). Thank you.

I have been reading Stanford Encyclopedia's article on the "non-identity problem

Anonymous — Fri, 25 Sep 2015 23:04:25 +0000

Identity

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I have been reading Stanford Encyclopedia's article on the "non-identity problem". I find it very interesting, but in the whole article it is assumed that one person is the same person in two alternative realities if and only if he or she came out of the same egg (genetically and perhaps atom by atom) produced by her biological parents. I find this idea very wrong. Consider an alternative reality where a man named Nelson Mandela did the same important things that Nelson Mandela did in our reality, but who was conceived and born two months later than our Nelson Mandela. Does it make any sense to say that he would not have been Nelson Mandela? It doesn't, it makes sense only for philosophers who don't want things to make sense at all.... And what if the same egg produced a person completely different from our Nelson Mandela and with a different name? Would that person be Nelson Mandela? I am sure he wouldn't, for no reason, except if you *stipulate* that it has to be that way. Now you may ask: where do you stop? What if the alternative Nelson Mandela was born 5 years later than our Nelson Mandela? What if he had been given another name? What I feel is that it all depends on what is relevant for some subject. I don't believe in "identity" without some purpose or context.

As far as I can tell western and Buddhist philosophers would probably agree that

Anonymous — Thu, 03 Sep 2015 06:53:22 +0000

Identity

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As far as I can tell western and Buddhist philosophers would probably agree that if at noon Jones is in London and Brown is in Paris, then Jones and Brown are not identical people, because they are discernible (in this case by location). However it seems like they would disagree in the case of Jones in London at noon and in Paris at 6 PM. A western philosopher might say that while Jones in London can be discerned from Jones in Paris, this discernment is cancelled out by the fact that the two situations don't happen at the same time, as in the example with Jones and Brown, and so Jones in London at noon is still identical to Jones in Paris at 6. Whereas a Buddhist philosopher might say that Jones in London at noon and Jones in Paris at 6 can't be identical people, not only because they are discernible by location, but also because they are discernible by time. Mustn't there be something wrong with one of these views, or both perhaps? If they're both correct then Jones in London at noon is both identical and non-identical to Jones in Paris at 6, which seems pretty clearly false.