This suggestion represents a u-turn in US policy towards Belarus and puts the EU in a difficult position. The EU has adopted unprecedented measures against both Belarus and Russia following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. At present, the EU is trying to improve its sanctions compliance mechanisms.
Although the “sanctions relief for grain” transaction could in principle help to alleviate hunger and even famine in parts of Africa, this may also undermine the integrity of Europe’s sanctions policy towards the Belarusian regime, which continues to commit gross human rights violations and to provide a base for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Sanctions as a “natural habitat” for the Belarus regime
In the past, EU-Belarus relations had a cyclical nature, with periods of sanctions and deteriorating bilateral cooperation — 1997-1999, 2004-2008, 2011-2015 — interspersed with the restoration of dialogue. The EU has adopted sanctions in response to every significant election or referendum marked by serious fundamental rights violations in the country except for the 2001 and 2015 presidential elections.
A graph illustrating the cyclical nature of EU sanctions. Source: From Sanctions to Summits: Belarus after the Ukraine Crisis.
Following the fraudulent 2020 presidential election and post-election violence, the EU enacted three rounds of sanctions against Belarus. The sanctions pressure gradually increased. The fourth and the fifth sanctions packages targeted Belarusian oil and potassium exports following the Ryanair plane diversion as well as the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes.
Due to the suspension of the transport of Belarusian fertilisers by the Lithuanian railways in compliance with the US sanctions in 2022, the reorientation of Belarusian oil and potassium products to alternative markets faced structural and logistical challenges, which were further compounded by the war in Ukraine. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EU pressure against Belarus has ramped up. There are EU sectoral bans on wood, cement, steel, and rubber products, financial restrictions on transactions with the Belarusian Central Bank, as well as the prohibition on road transport between the EU and Belarus. Belarus is now one of the most sanctioned states in the world.
But sanctions have been a “natural habitat” for the Belarusian regime since 1997. The restoration of cooperation in 2008 and 2015 followed previous instances of sanctions on Belarus. The Belarusian authorities have consistently managed to convince the EU to lift sanctions in exchange for a few concessions, such as the release of political prisoners or minor amendments to the Belarusian Electoral Code. Both in 2008 and 2015, the EU was ready to make concessions and relax sanctions even though they did not fulfil the objectives of democracy promotion in Belarus. The Russian war in Georgia in 2008, the illegal occupation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Donbas in 2014 made stability in Belarus more important for the EU than a real democratic transformation.
In a similar vein, the Belarusian regime might have calculated to use Russian aggression against Ukraine as a tool for its external legitimation in 2022. Those hopes did not materialise. In 2022, the EU sanctioned Minsk as a co-aggressor along with Moscow. Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia—previously conducted in Minsk—were swiftly moved to Istanbul. This does not mean that Minsk will stop its efforts to engage in a dialogue with the West. The Belarusian regime has a well-tested recipe of remaining in power by playing Russia against the West and trading political prisoners for the relief of sanctions. This is a scenario that the EU must be careful to avoid, or it risks repeating past mistakes.
Tightening up EU sanctions
Up until 2022, the EU lacked sufficient tools for the enforcement of its sanctions. According to some allegations, in 2020 the Belarusian authorities used Czech-made stun grenades against peaceful protestors in Belarus supplied in violation of an EU arms embargo on Belarus in place since 2011. Similar claims are relevant with respect to German-made body armour. Those incidents signal the proper implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions remain up for question.
In contrast to the United States, where the Office of Foreign Assets Control oversees compliance and implementation issues concerning US sanctions, in the EU, the final decision stays in the hands of member states. The decentralisation of sanctions monitoring risks the divergent application of sanctions across the EU. In this respect, the growing oversight role of the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services, and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) will certainly bring more harmonisation to EU sanctions implementation.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the coordination at the EU level on financial investigations has been strengthened via the Freeze and Seize Taskforce and Europol’s Operation Oscar. The Commission also foresees criminal responsibility for any sanctions breaches. Such measures change the preventive nature of sanctions by aligning breach punishments with criminal penalties.
The “grain for sanctions” deal poses a dilemma
The improvement of EU sanctions monitoring contrasts with discussions on the potential relief of sanctions measures in exchange for the transport of grain. Such a preliminary lifting of sanctions or any trade-off will undermine the objectives of EU sanctions against Belarus. The relaxation of sanctions may also send the wrong signal to Belarusian civil society—their Belarusian cause being subsumed under a bigger deal on Ukraine.
Therefore, any potential discussion on the future easing of sanctions in exchange for some concessions by the Belarusian authorities should take place with the involvement of Belarusian civil society, experts, academia, and representatives of the democratic forces.
Given that the EU-Belarus relationship has long been marked by a cycle of rapprochement and retrenchment, the EU would keep more leverage if it suspends sanctions instead of lifting them. The temporary suspension of sanctions to alleviate hunger in Africa would increase the EU’s bargaining power since it can be reversed if the regime resumes behaviour deemed problematic by the EU.
Yuliya Miadzvetskaya
University of Tubingen
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine put EU countries on high alert, the Baltic states, Czechia, and the Nordic countries gradually stopped issuing Schengen visas to Belarusians. They consider Belarus an accomplice to Russian aggression.
Instead of exclusively targeting the regime of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenka, these visa restrictions affect ordinary Belarusians, most of whom have no say in Belarusian politics and foreign policy. On the contrary, the rigged election and massive post-election protests in 2020 brutally suppressed by the authorities demonstrated that most of the population did not support the regime.
The EU-Belarus visa system
Belarusians have long led the rankings of Schengen visas per capita, despite the process of obtaining one not being easy. In 2020, Belarus signed an EU visa facilitation agreement, which brought visa requirements and processes more in line with other non-EU countries in the region.
A map showing the facilitation of EU visas and liberalisation of visa requirements. Image: European Council.
The European Commission described the visa agreement as an important step in strengthening the EU’s engagement with Belarusians and Belarusian civil society. It introduced multiple-entry visas with longer validity and reduced consular fees and processing times.
But in November 2021, the EU suspended visa facilitation provisions for Belarusian officials. This was in response to the artificial migrant crisis that Belarusian authorities had created at the EU-Belarus border. Even though ordinary Belarusians continued to benefit from the visa agreement, COVID-19 and Belarusian domestic travel restrictions made crossing land borders more challenging.
At the start of 2022, it seemed the travel industry might return to business as usual. But then Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. Some EU states suspended issuing Schengen visas to Belarusians—either without explanation or citing the Belarusian regime’s support of Russian aggression.
Baltic states and Poland
Just a few years ago, Belarusians needed to apply for Schengen visas at the embassies of neighbouring EU countries or via specialised Lithuanian and Polish visa centres requiring minimum supporting documents. The Russian war against Ukraine changed this.
On 24 February 2022, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda announced a state of emergency in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Lithuania stepped up border protection measures to guard against Russian or Belarusian provocations or hybrid attacks. On 11 March, restrictions for Schengen tourist visas were re-introduced, limiting the issue of visas to certain groups, such as lorry drivers, athletes, or family members of Lithuanian nationals.
Visa restrictions for ordinary Belarusians have been re-introduced. Image: onliner.by.
Currently, Lithuania accepts applications only for long-term national visas for those who can prove their intention to live in the country temporarily or permanently. Latvia followed suit with similar restrictions, suspending the issue of short-term Schengen visas for Belarusians as of 5 April.
As of 14 June, Estonia will temporarily suspend the operations of its visa centres across Belarus for three weeks. No explanation has been given. In the past, these centres have provided assistance for Estonian, Finnish, and Swedish Schengen visas.
Poland still offers more options for Belarusians, but these concern only long-term national visas for work or study, visas for possessors of the “Pole’s Card” (a document confirming a foreigner’s belonging to the Polish nation), or those seeking a Polish national visa for humanitarian reasons.
While Schengen visas from the Baltic states and Poland are unavailable, obtaining a national visa still remains difficult. Hurdles include high demand, a shortage of online appointments, and long wait times. In addition, Belarusian intermediaries that help to prepare application packages and secure appointments have started to charge higher fees.
For instance, services for obtaining Polish humanitarian visas and registering for an appointment online can cost more than €300 ($321.69). These fees are not insignificant for Belarusians. According to Belstat, the nominal gross salary in Belarus in May 2022 was about €600 ($643.38). The minimum monthly salary was only €180 ($193.01). Travel to neighbouring EU countries is, thus, becoming a privilege for those who can afford it.
Czechia’s new migration law
A March 2022 survey by Chatham House. Image: Chatham House.
On 5 March, the Czech government stopped issuing visas and residence permits for Belarusians. The decision was in response to Belarusian authorities’ provision of Belarusian territories for Russian attacks on Ukraine. Earlier, Czechs had introduced similar restrictions for Russian citizens.
On 6 May, the Belarusian diaspora in the Czechia learned about a new draft law to prohibit the migration of Russians and Belarusians to Czechia. A few days later, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian opposition leader in exile, visited Prague to convince Czech politicians that ordinary Belarusians should not be associated with the actions of the Lukashenka regime:
“We need to put pressure on the regime and help Belarusians, because Belarusians do not carry any threats for the Czech Republic […] On the contrary, there is a need for more visas, more scholarships, more initiatives that reinforce Belarusian-Czech ties.”
Czechia demonstrated solidarity with Belarusian democratic forces back in 2020, when massive anti-regime protests swept across Belarus. Just two years later, it seems Czech politicians are forgetting the difference between the regime and the Belarusian people that remain subject to politically motivated persecutions.
Where can Belarusians still obtain a Schengen visa?
Currently, Belarusians do not have many options to choose from if they need a Schengen visa. Italy, Greece, France, and Hungary might remain good working options, if not for the long waiting times—often months.
A Spanish visa centre in Minsk used to issue tourist visas but closed down suddenly, failing even to return documents in time for some of its applicants. At present, Belarusian intermediaries offer tours to Spain’s visa centre in Moscow, which does not have long wait times. Ironically, Belarusians now have to travel to Russia—the state that attacked Ukraine—to obtain a Schengen visa, and face even more visa restrictions than Russians.
The decision of EU states to close their doors to ordinary Belarusians is unfortunate. Belarusians already bear the brunt of the Lukashenka regime, which intimidates, arrests, tortures, and even kills Belarusians who disagree with or actively oppose regime policies or the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the past, the EU promoted people-to-people contacts via its visa facilitation agreements. Now many EU states do the opposite. This is placed in stark contrast to the Belarusian authorities’ recent visa waiver for Lithuanian and Latvian citizens.
As long as the EU fails to make a clear distinction between Belarusians and the Lukashenka regime, ordinary people will remain isolated from their EU neighbours. This deprives ordinary Belarusians of experiencing an alternative way of life and society just across the border. The image of the EU also suffers as Belarusians continue to face high costs, bureaucracy, and queues at consulates and visa centres.
Belarusian officials called for the strengthening of the organisation. Meanwhile, the summit exhibited only ambiguous support for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. There were calls for a dialogue with NATO. For its part, Minsk appears to be acting through post-Soviet organisations, like the CSTO, to counter the Kremlin’s pressure.
Limited support for Moscow
The CSTO was founded by nine post-Soviet countries in 1992. Under Russia’s leadership, its aim was to manage the military aspects of the Soviet Union’s collapse. The CSTO has remained a loose association for decades as its membership dwindled to six nations—Belarus, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The CSTO is notoriously non-transparent. Moreover, the Belarusian regime has been unusually shtum about the 16 May Moscow summit. So, recent news requires some deciphering. In late 2022, Belarus will take over the annually rotating chairmanship of the CSTO. Having been cut off from the West and its regional neighbours, Minsk has become extremely dependent on Moscow. Chairmanship of the CSTO provides Minsk with additional leverage in relations with Putin’s Russia. The Belarusian regime may take advantage of this to better negotiate a place in the sun once Russia makes its peace with Ukraine and the West.
This explains Belarusian leadership’s wish to further strengthen the CSTO. Addressing the recent CSTO summit, Belarusian dictator President Alexander Lukashenka said, “We cannot allow a new international architecture to be constructed without us… I believe that the CSTO should strengthen its status in the international system.”
A map of CSTO (red) and NATO (blue) members. Image: Wikimedia Commons.
More specifically, Lukashenka wants to increase political coordination among member states and to have the CSTO speak with one voice. Lukashenka lamented the CSTO lacked solidarity, arguing its members have given in to Western pressure and are failing to support Belarus and Russia in their hour of need.
Indeed, the summit failed to back Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Moscow Carnegie Centre analyst Alexander Baunov commented,
the Kremlin had no chance to get CSTO countries involved in its war… It is unlikely that CSTO allies are expected to do more than generally recognise that responsibility lies not only with Russia.
Against this backdrop, the Belarusian regime’s wish to engage with such a set of partners looks like another new edition of its earlier search for counterbalances against Moscow. Inside the CSTO framework, Minsk sees opportunities for coalition building.
How can the CSTO intervene in the war in Ukraine?
Belarusian troops deployed in Kazakhstan. Image: YouTube.
It seems Moscow wanted the CSTO to act as a peace-keeping force after the success of Russian military operations in Ukraine. On February 19, before the invasion, Stanislau Zas’, the CSTO Secretary-General, said that sending CSTO forces to Donbas would be possible with Ukraine’s consent and a UN mandate.
In preparation, last December, CSTO countries amended regulations on peace-keeping. The concept of a “coordinating country” to lead CSTO peace-keeping forces was introduced. This change was important in the context of the invasion of Ukraine, because Russia, as a party to the war, could not lead a peace-keeping force. However, Belarus could. Minsk repeatedly offered to send Belarusian peacekeepers to Eastern Ukraine throughout the 2010s. In January, the CSTO carried out its first mission in Kazakhstan, sending troops for a short while for no obvious reasons. The logic had to do with preparing for possible deployment in Ukraine.
Moscow, however, failed to achieve its goals in Ukraine and hardly can rely on the CSTO. The summit’s participants failed to mention the Ukraine conflict in their final statement. Secretary-General Zas’ noted they did not discuss CSTO participation in military operations in Ukraine. Instead, CSTO leaders announced their willingness for practical cooperation with NATO to lower tensions.
China as the saviour from Putin?
Even before assuming the chairmanship, Minsk can promote its agenda inside the CSTO. This is made possible by Secretary-General Zas’, who came to run the CSTO after holding key security positions within the Belarusian government. His actions as a key official in the organisation correspond with Minsk’s plans for the CSTO. He has sought better multilateral coordination and increased Chinese involvement. For example, Zas’ helped to facilitate the expansion of the organisation by accepting Azerbaijan, which is known for its close cooperation with Belarus and Uzbekistan—both states known for their independent stance regarding the Kremlin. Increasing membership diminishes the power imbalance between Russia and the rest of the CSTO members—something which Minsk likes.
Stanislau Zas’. Image: ont.by.
Minsk is continuing this “the more the merrier” logic with its recent attempts to bring China closer to the CSTO. Indeed, Belarusian officials have been articulating this idea for many years. On 18 May 2022, Secretary-General Zas’ met with his counterpart from the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Secretary-General Zhang Ming, to announce “a new epoch of interaction” between the organisations.
The secretaries-general of the CSTO and the SCO were meeting for the second time in the history of the two organisations (the first time was in 2003). Zas’ underscored that the CSTO and the SCO share many assessments and approaches concerning security. After the talks, both politicians emphasised their negative opinions of the NATO expansion. Zas’ invited the SCO Secretary-General to consider the possibility of the SCO becoming a partner or observer in the CSTO.
To sum up, Minsk tries to use post-Soviet international multilateral organisations (like the CSTO or the Eurasian Economic Union) to solve issues with Moscow, because it has the chance to get better deals with the Kremlin. The CSTO is not just a tool in Putin’s hands. Member states, including Belarus, can defend their autonomy from Russia via the organisation. It would be wrong to dismiss the current Belarusian regime as a mere marionette of Putin. Further developing the multilateral format of the CSTO—with China acting as a counterweight to Russia—is yet another strategy for Minsk to survive politically in absence of other alternatives.
Both leaders’ lives reflected the fate of their countries after 1991, in constant battle with Soviet ghosts from the past. Shushkevich lost Belarus’ first independent presidential election in 1994, which paved the way for authoritarianism in Belarus. Kravchuk made history as the first president of an independent Ukraine.
The Belarusian regime denied Shushkevich the respect he was due. In later life, they withheld Shushkevich’s pension. And in death, they refused him a place at the prestigious Minsk cemetery. By contrast, Kravchuk received a state funeral attended by current and former Ukrainian presidents.
Shushkevich’s way
Stanislau Shushkevich. Image: BBC.
In April 2022, Stanislau Shushkevich, 87, was hospitalized in an intensive care unit, suffering complications from Covid-19. He died at home on 3 May. In his capacity as the first head of independent Belarus, together with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, he signed the Belavezha Accords on 8 December 1991, dissolving the Soviet Union.
Born in 1934 to a family of teachers, Shushkevich spent his childhood in Nazi-occupied Minsk. His family hid a Jewish boy in their house, risking execution at the hands of the Nazis. After the war, he studied physics, completed a doctorate, and built an academic career. Shushkevich entered Belarusian politics as a deputy of the BSSR Supreme Soviet in 1990. After becoming the speaker of the Belarusian parliament in 1991, he served as the first official head of independent Belarus, although executive power rested with the prime minister.
Shushkevich’s political career declined as he lost his position in early 1994. He ranked fourth in the country’s first presidential elections that year, losing to pro-Russian populist Alexander Lukashenka. According to political analyst Valer Karbalevich, Shushkevich’s reputation suffered because he appeared too centrist to deal effectively with multiple crises, despite the fact he was not head of the executive branch.
Under Shushkevich’s leadership, the white-red-white national flag and historic Pahonia coat of arms (now associated with Belarusian independence and democracy) became official state symbols by the minimum required majority of 231 votes. In an interview from 2019, Shushkevich recalled the strong pro-Russian mood among political elites in early 1990.
In late 1993, Shushkevich signed the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty. Shushkevich opposed the treaty but was pressured to sign by pro-Russian deputies. This step drew Belarus closer into Moscow’s orbit.
In 1995, Shushkevich became a deputy in the 13th Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus. He did not recognise the results of the 1996 constitutional referendum, which had significantly increased Alexander Lukashenka’s powers at the expense of the Belarusian legislature. Shushkevich refused to join the modified lower chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives.
Kravchuk and Shushkevich
Born in the same year as Shushkevich, Kravchuk came from a family of farmers in western Ukraine and made a career in a Communist Party, dealing with propaganda and ideology. In July 1990, he became the chair of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and then, in 1991, the first president of independent Ukraine. Like Shushkevich, Kravchuk lost his country’s 1994 presidential elections to the pro-Russian candidate, Leonid Kuchma.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, while Belarus possessed nuclear missile launchers. Under Kravchuk and Shushkevich, both countries gave up their inherited Soviet nuclear armaments. Western countries welcomed the move. But domestically, their decisions remain controversial.
Former Ukrainian presidents pay their respects at Kravchuk’s funeral. From left to right: Viktor Yushchenko, Leonid Kuchma, and Petro Poroshenko. Image: Reuters.
As part of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the US, the UK, and France guaranteed Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan their independence within existing borders in exchange for relinquishing their nuclear armaments. But Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 lay waste to the memorandum’s assurances.
Despite the controversial perceptions of Kravchuk in Ukraine, he secured a place in his country’s history through his genuine support for Ukrainian independence. Even though Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin both came from the nomenklatura, Kravchuk understood that Russia didn’t want an independent Ukraine—even as the Soviet Union fell apart.
The professor versus the populist
In many ways, Shushkevich was a complete antipode to Lukashenka, who came to power in Belarus in 1994. Shushkevich openly described Lukashenka as an uneducated person, who gave away Belarus’ independence to Russia.
Lukashenka, in his time as a member of the Belarusian Parliament, lied about Shushkevich in his notorious anti-corruption report. In 1997, he froze Shushkevich’s pension, which subsequently dropped in value to $0.20 per month. Belarusian media reported that his wife finally managed to secure him a minimum social pension in 2015.
In September 2021, state authorities removed Shushkevich’s name from school textbooks following his critical comments about the rigged 2020 presidential election. After he passed away earlier this month, the authorities denied Shushkevich’s family a place at the prestigious Minsk cemetery where many prominent Belarusians are buried.
Shushkevich’s funeral made a stark contrast to the state funeral for Kravchuk in Kyiv on 17 May. The Shushkevich family decided on a private funeral service at St. Mary’s Catholic Cathedral in Minsk. Shushkevich had been instrumental in reinstating the cathedral’s status as a church in the 1990s. No state officials were formally present to pay their respects. Lukashenka ignored the funeral. Although some state media briefly reported on Shushkevich’s passing, they failed to mention his role in recent Belarusian history. Belarusians bid him farewell.
CEU Press is releasing the English translation of Shushkevich’s memoirs, A Life for Belarus: The Fall and Postmortal Rise of the USSR, in November 2022.
Unprecedented visits and drills
On 11 May, the State Secretary of Security Council Alyaksandr Valfovich made an unprecedented, publicised visit to Belarusian army units deployed on the Ukrainian border. They were stationed there following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Their numbers were reinforced after 4 May, when the army conducted a surprise check of its rapid response forces. Troops took positions along the Ukrainian border and with bordering NATO countries.
Belarusian state media gave extensive coverage of these troop movements but provided no context. In fact, it was escalation along the Russia-Ukrainian border that triggered these reinforcements and readiness checks along Belarus’ borders. In recent weeks, Ukrainian troops have finally begun to fire on Russian territory. Minsk apparently is worried the Ukrainian army could do the same to Belarus. After all, some Russian troops remain stationed in Belarus and, most probably, continue to be involved in Putin’s military operations in Ukraine.
Belarusian territorial defence troops. Image: BelVPO.
Belarusian state media also omitted other crucial details about the deployments. First, while the deployment on the border with Poland and the Baltics has added to numerous units already there, the units deployed on the Ukrainian border are only temporary.
The second omitted detail is the 10 May military exercises in the Kobryn and Lida districts began with about 430 territorial troops. In the past, such exercises only featured half this number of soldiers. The increased numbers demonstrate Minsk’s increased concern.
No new money for arms
Concurrently, Minsk has demonstrated its armament plans. On 10 May, Belarusian security officials held a conference to discuss its annual plan for military purchases. Reporting from the meeting, state media revealed that last year Belarus purchased 80 armoured personnel carriers (Russian-made BTR-82A), four drones, more than 2,000 anti-tank guided missiles, and 10 aircraft were overhauled.
Belarusian Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin, however, announced that Minsk was not going to increase its defence budget. Moreover, Khrenin said the army would buy as much as possible from the national arms industry. As for the purchases abroad, Khrenin said that some expensive weapons—like Su-30SM aircraft, helicopters, Tor-M2 missile systems, etc…—would be purchased by drawing from the remainder of a Russian loan used for the construction of a nuclear power plant.
Belarusian Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin. Image: president.gov.by.
Minsk aspires to continue an earlier course aimed at building an army that fits Belarusian needs by discarding heavy and costly equipment. Talking at the conference on 10 May, Belarusian dictator President Alexander Lukashenka said the emphasis laid a decade ago on increasing Belarusian army mobility had proven right.
Lukashenka went on to discuss “some lessons of Ukrainian war.” In this regard, he even cautiously praised the Ukrainian army saying, “The most efficient, including on the part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, were mobile groups that instantly, unexpectedly approached the enemy, which is much superior to them in power.”
To emulate this approach, Lukashenko continued, vehicles are needed so that within an hour or two using the developed road infrastructure of Belarus, they can approach enemy units detected by reconnaissance and strike:
We need very agile units. And we need to concentrate on this. Of course, the S-400 [surface-to-air missile system], ultra-modern aircraft, etcetera, are good. But, as we have seen, large high-tech forces, whether it be the United States or NATO, have a tremendous capability to destroy all sorts of airfields, etcetera, in one-to-two hours. And where will you land your planes? Moreover, the survivability of these planes is next to zero. Therefore, wherever you look, mobility is needed.
The Belarusian government is also continuing its missile programme. On 10 May, the State Committee for Military Industry Chairman, Dzmitry Pantus, announced that Belarus was about to test new missiles in May and August for the Palanez, a multiple-launch rocket system (apparently adapted for cruise missiles, as well), and for the BUK surface-to-air missile system. “Manufacturing rockets and missiles today is one of the key priorities of the State Committee for Military Industry,” Pantus stated.
Russian nukes and Minsk
Of course, Belarusian officials also referred to military cooperation with Russia. Lukashenka stated this week:
We were always aware of what our army could do against NATO (this is a colossus!) … But we must not forget that behind us stands Russia, a nuclear power. And we have a corresponding agreement. And we have been talking on this topic very often lately with the president of Russia.
This statement appears to be in reaction to recent regional developments. First among them is the finalisation in April of a Polish contract with the United States on the purchase of Abrams tanks. And second is in reaction to Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s statement to the effect that Warsaw is willing to deploy American nuclear weapons and more American troops on its territory.
A mock-up of a Belarusian missile, supposedly an analogue to the Russian Iskander model. Image: 4esnok-by.
Besides the general rhetoric of Russian nuclear might, Minsk recently revealed more specific arrangements with Moscow. Reportedly, S-400 air defence systems will “be left” in Belarus (it was not clear, under whose command). Minsk is going to purchase Russian Iskander ballistic missile systems currently deployed in the country.
Besides this, Moscow promised Russian experts’ help in developing a Belarusian missile, “similar to the Russian Iskander” ballistic missile. Minsk may try to develop such a missile to be launched from its own Palanez platform. So far, the Palanez has been developed with non-Russian, mostly Chinese technology, in a probable collaboration with Azerbaijan. Even the testing for the Palanez has taken place outside in Russia.
Belarus is sending somewhat contradictory signals about its intentions in the security sphere. These contradictions reflect pressures from different directions. On the one side, there is the deep dependence on Russia that developed after the 2020 collapse in relations with all other neighbours. On the other side, there is a fear of over-dependence on Russia combined with an aversion to fighting with Putin against Ukraine. This suggests Belarus is not hopelessly lost to Putin and there are still ways to prevent it from being dragged into the ongoing war in Ukraine.
In another unusual move, Belarus recently announced visa-free land entry for Lithuanians and Latvians, effective from 15 April to 15 May 2022. Belarusian authorities claimed the Orthodox and Catholic Easter holidays as the reason for the changes. Governments in Latvia and Lithuania reacted with suspicion. Not only is Belarus viewed as a participant in the continuing war in Ukraine, but Latvia and Lithuania recall the artificial migration crisis that Minsk created not long ago.
By opening its borders, Belarusian authorities appear to be looking to alleviate domestic tensions in society and exploring the possibility of increasing contact with the EU.
Preventing Covid-19 or controlling society?
From 21 December 2020 to 3 April 2022, private Belarusian citizens could not enter Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, or Ukraine by land. The pretext was to contain Covid-19. But, for whatever reason, no restrictions applied to crossing Belarusian borders by air.
Belarusian citizens could exit Belarus by land once every three months, but only if they presented documented proof of travelling for work, study, medical reasons, family emergencies, or funerals. Only foreign diplomats, members of official delegations, or heavy goods vehicle drivers were exempt from these restrictions.
Minsk National Airport. Source: belarus.by.
In an unexpected move, Belarusian authorities lifted these limitations on 3 April 2022, returning to its pre-Covid-19 border crossing routine. Foreigners still need to present negative PCR tests or vaccination certificates, except for those who enter Belarus due to the war in Ukraine. Russians are also exempt from Covid-19 regulations.
Also, nationals of 76 countries can visit Belarus without a visa if they travel via Minsk National Airport. Although in October 2021, Belarusian Dictator Alexander Lukashenka amended the visa-free regime to exclude U.S. citizens from the list.
Currently, Minsk Airport serves only a few destinations in Russia, Turkey, the UAE, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. A reduction in flights followed sanctions against Belarus in 2021. The sanctions were in reaction to a pair of events. The first was the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in May 2021, so the authorities could apprehend one of the passengers, opposition blogger Raman Pratasevich. The second event involved Belavia, the Belarusian national airline, flying migrants from the Middle East to Belarus to manufacture a border crisis with Belarus’ neighbours. The events led to limits on air travel to and from Belarus.
A new wave of migration from Belarus?
The lifting of travel restrictions could be an attempt to alleviate internal pressures in Belarusian society. Sanctions are provoking economic decline and prospects for the future remain uncertain. According to a recent World Bank report, a significant reduction in exports, tighter monetary and fiscal policy, and a decline in household consumption would reduce Belarusian GDP by at least 6.5 per cent in 2022.
Belarusians are more likely to consider migration in this situation. In spring 2022, EU countries started issuing short term, tourist Schengen visas after the lifting of Covid-19 restrictions on travel. There is a wait of several weeks for a free appointment slot at any of the EU consulates or visa centres in Minsk.
In March, Belarusians queued at the consular department of the foreign ministry to legalise their documents, even despite the significant increase in processing fees. The legalisation of degree certificates is a necessary procedure to recognise them in another country. This suggests Belarusians are expecting an economic downturn and preparing to work abroad.
Belarusians queue to legalise their documents. Source: euroradio.fm.
Belstat, the national statistics authority, has not released official data on migration since 2019. But continued state repressions, a deteriorating economy, the relocation of businesses away from Belarus, and the war in Ukraine are all pressures that compel Belarusians to emigrate. For instance, the Georgian Interior Ministry recently reported the number of Belarusians entering Georgia has grown tenfold between 24 February and 16 March 2022, exceeding 15,000 people.
Visa-free entry for Latvians and Lithuanians
On 15 April, in a surprise move following the opening of borders, the State Border Committee announced visa-free entry via land borders for Lithuanian and Latvian nationals for one month. Belarusian authorities reported in the first two weeks about 11 thousand travellers had taken advantage of the changed visa regime.
Lukashenka has repeatedly stated that Lithuanians and Latvians “are lining at the border and ask us to let them through to Belarus.” On April 29, he added, “They [foreign governments] do not let their people travel to Belarus, because people come here to buy salt.”
But petrol is likely to be in greater demand than Belarusian salt. Political analyst Pavel Usau noted the visa waiver could have economic reasons. Belarusian authorities might want to take advantage of lower petrol prices and essentially turn Belarus into a petrol station for Europeans. This might help alleviate the economic pressure from sanctions. Usau suggested the authorities might think of extending visa-free rules to other European states that are geographically close to Belarus.
In response to the visa waiver, Latvia’s Foreign Ministry advised its citizens against visiting Belarus. The ministry cited “significant risks” and warned about possible recruitment “by the intelligence agencies of Russia and Belarus.”
Latvian officials say they have no reason to believe the visa-free regime was enacted for humanitarian reasons or with any good intentions. They recalled the recent “hybrid attack” on EU borders, referring to the 2021–2022 migrant crisis provoked by Minsk in reaction to the deterioration in Belarus-EU relations.
The bigger picture
Political analyst Valer Karbalevich suggested the visa waiver is a part of a larger plan by Belarusian authorities. As evidence, Karbalevich cited a letter dated 6 April by Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei to EU foreign ministries. In the letter, Makei writes about the need to “rethink the paradigm that will determine the future of Belarus-EU relations and that of the European security.”
RFE/RL journalist Rikard Jozwiak posted Makei’s letter to EU foreign ministries on Twitter. Source: Twitter @RikardJozwiak.
Karbalevich believes Minsk is trying to revive a strategy from 2014. They are attempting to use the Russia-Ukraine conflict to improve relations with the West. In this context, Makei’s letter and the visa waiver can be interpreted as steps to relaunch relations with the West.
But circumstances have changed significantly since 2014. Levels of trust between the EU and Belarus are extremely low. Small, symbolic steps cannot outweigh Belarusian dependency on Russia or a set of bigger issues, such as the growing number of political prisoners and the stated intention to expand Belarus’ death penalty. As long as Russian troops remain in Belarus and use Belarusian facilities to attack Ukraine, it is hard to take Lukashenka’s clumsy attempts at resuming contact with the EU seriously.
The visa waiver scheme and the opening of borders have not been completely ineffectual. These decisions have benefitted ordinary people. Belarusian citizens are now able to travel to the EU without spending a fortune on flights from Minsk, and Latvians and Lithuanians can visit their family and friends in Belarus, or just buy cheap petrol.
Later, in 2021, the Belarusian authorities’ actions against the opposition violated various international laws. Two noteworthy events included the state’s exploitation of Middle Eastern migrants as part of a hybrid attack on Poland’s and Lithuania’s borders and the hijacking of a Ryanair flight from Athens to Vilnius.
These acts of state terrorism resulted in sectoral sanctions by the EU, the UK, and the US. Contemporary estimates predict the 2021 sanctions potentially affect Belarusian exports worth up to 5 per cent of GDP. Given the growth potential of the Belarusian economy of around 2 per cent per year, IMF and EBRD experts expect the negative impact of sanctions should amount to 1.2 and 1.5 percentage points of GDP respectively. But after Lithuania banned the transit of potassium through its territory, forecasts became even gloomier. In January 2022, the World Bank updated its prognosis downward. It estimated a contraction of GDP by 2.8 per cent in 2022.
On 24 February 2022, Russia started a war against Ukraine. Russia used Belarusian soil to launch its troops and missiles into Ukraine. The international community identified Belarus as a party at fault in this aggression. The West then enacted the most severe sanctions in Belarusian history. The sanctions were compounded by a loss of trade from both Russia and Ukraine, which were Belarus’s top international trade partners.
Sanctions and trade distortions
Photo: bne IntelliNews
The sectoral sanctions announced by the EU and the UK forbid the import of nitrogen products, certain types of potash, synthetic materials, wood products, rubber products, cement, and certain metal and machine products. In the previous years, the export of these categories to the EU amounted to 7.3 per cent of Belarus’s GDP. Among the negative factors preventing the reorientation of Belarus’s exports is the high level of toxicity associated with Belarus. Some companies are voluntarily exiting Belarus. Several logistics firms have chosen to avoid it entirely. Probably the main manifestation of this toxicity was a political scandal in Lithuania over the transport of Belarusian fertiliser. Along with several high-profile resignations, the scandal resulted in the restriction on the export of potash goods through Lithuanian territory. Yet another difficulty is that certain exports to the EU were business segment-specific.
Besides formal sanctions, a potentially large negative impact on Belarus comes from the plain fact that Ukraine used to be its second-largest trade partner. Exports to Ukraine sat around 5.5 per cent of GDP and imports at 2.5 per cent. Currently, most of the exports and imports to and from Ukraine are de-facto stopped. The resumption of previous trade volumes with Ukraine is unlikely for the foreseeable future because of Belarus’ co-aggressor status.
Another affected area of the Belarusian economy is its exports of services. Notably, Belarus’s exports of transportation services used to be worth roughly 7 per cent of GDP. In late April 2022, the EU banned Belarusian cargo trucks from entering its territory. In response, European carriers were banned from entry into Belarus. We are yet to see the impact of these bans, but it’s clear that the profits of Belarusian transport companies are set to shrink. In addition, the IT sector, which used to generate 4 per cent of GDP in exports, is likely to contract. There has been a mass exit of IT companies from the country. An expert-opinion based estimate predicts up to a one-quarter loss in these categories.
Policy response by the government
Dealing with the root of the problem, namely the provision of Belarusian territory for Russian military use, was never discussed publicly by Belarusian officials. The government has focused on strategies to treat the symptoms, rather than focusing on the disease itself. Among the coping strategies that have been discussed publicly, the main ones are: (1) an increase in Russian support for Belarus and a rise in Belarusian exports to Russia; (2) the reorientation of exports towards Asian and developing markets; and (3) a greater mobilisation of interior resources that can be done with broader government involvement.
Belarus-Russia border. Photo: jamestown.org
New relationships with Russia
After the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war, Alexander Lukashenka said he supported Moscow’s decision and was ready to help Russia in everything. In his later comments, he claimed that Belarus together with Russia would survive the sanctions and would live “better than in the Soviet Union.” Currently, Belarus is the only post-soviet country which openly supports the Russian invasion.
Belarusian officials claim they have agreed to postpone debt payments to Russia until 2027–2028. The suggestion was also made that Russia would offer low energy prices for Belarus and nominate payment in roubles.
Another important dimension of the Belarus-Russia relationship is trade. Half of Belarus’s foreign trade is linked to its eastern neighbour. Thus, the predicted (by the World Bank) 11 per cent contraction of the Russian economy implies a corresponding decrease in demand for Belarusian goods and services. However, this negative effect can be partially offset by the fact that several international companies are exiting Russia so Belarus may potentially take over some of their markets.
The turn East
Belarusian officials have always articulated the idea of reorientation towards the East. This process is indeed taking place at some scale. But China cannot fully replace European markets for several reasons. First, due to a lack of competition among buyers, China can demand to pay lower prices from Belarus. Second, for a number of Belarusian exports, the EU was a premium, high margin market. Any reorientation of exports towards China means at best lower margins and at worst the loss of any profitability due to higher transport costs. Lastly, China, as a large world player, values its relationships with European and US markets much more than its interactions with Belarus. Any toxicity linked with Belarus is likely to affect China’s decisions as well.
Economic mobilization
A traditional Belarusian coping strategy is the enlargement of the government’s role in the economy during a crisis. Even before the war, Belarus started to tighten fiscal discipline. It raised many taxes and cancelled exemptions. Prominent business associations, which expected certain liberties from the government, have been told the government needs money for the economy and will not postpone or lessen taxes.
With the impact of sanctions, the disruptions of trade with Russia and Ukraine, and the absence of a sound government plan, the war may result in a sharp drop in Belarus’s GDP, a rise in un- and underemployment, and an increase in inflation. The World Bank expects a 6.5 per cent contraction of Belarusian GDP. Other estimates are even more severe, ranging from -8 to -12 per cent of GDP.
Lev Lvovskiy, PhdD
Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC)
Alongside the EU prohibitions on flights and the Baltic States’ decision to close their ports to Belarus, the new restrictions doom the country and its neighbourhood to degradation.
Transit sanctions on Belarus are a part of an economic war against Russia launched in response to its invasion of Ukraine, rather than a part of a realistic plan for regime change in Minsk.
All roads lead to Russia
After Brussels banned Belarusian and Russian heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) from entering the EU territory, many branch operators expected the worst. They feared Minsk would mirror the response and prohibit all EU freight carriers from entering the country. So far, the Belarusian government has taken a milder course. It has restricted EU-based HGVs from moving inside Belarus farther than 50 km. All HGVs will have to deposit their freight at logistics centres in Belarus. From these centres, transportation will be taken over by Belarusian or Russian firms.
Image: State Border Committee of Belarus.
Brussels’ move didn’t come from the blue. Poland and Lithuania began unofficially limiting the transit of goods via Belarus approximately a year ago. For example, in mid-February, Lithuania and Poland processed only 60 per cent of the daily, officially agreed to norm. Last week, the Belarusian State Border Committee complained that Polish and Lithuanian authorities were processing less than 40 per cent of the mutually agreed norms for HGV trade.
The bad news, therefore, was not unexpected in Minsk. But it still comes as a blow. HGV transport had been a growth industry, ranking second behind IT in Belarus’ export of services. The Belarusian Ministry of Transport calculates, that in 2021, the value of transport services had increased by almost 40 per cent to $4.3bn. This is the fastest growth rate in the sector’s history. Of this growth, automobile transport companies provided 76 per cent of the total.
Much of this business presumably involved the transport of goods to and from the EU. Minsk continues to withhold accurate statistics. The disruption of supply will not only result in economic decline. It will also reorientate Belarusian citizens more firmly to Russian, Chinese, and other non-Western sources of consumption. Divisions with the EU will not only be political but increasingly a cultural divide, too. This may prove to be the worst blow to regional cooperation and reintegration.
Belarusian access to the sea
Image: BelTA
Roadway transportation has been exacerbated by continuing difficulties with shipping Belarusian exports and imports. Belarus, as a landlocked country, is now totally dependent on Russian ports. Other neighbouring countries have prohibited Belarusian entities from using their seaports. After the EU introduced limitations on the export of Belarusian oil products, Minsk signed a February 2021 agreement with Moscow on the export of these goods via Russian ports. A one-sided Belarusian dependence on Russia is solidifying.
Minsk has worked to retain access to the sea. Two years ago, Lithuania started to restrict Belarusian potash exports. After Vilnius had rejected the Belarusian investors’ offers to develop the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, Minsk looked for alternative export routes. Officials redirected leftover credit from a Russian loan to finance a nuclear power plant. In the second half of 2021, these funds were used to begin construction on Belarus’ own, purpose-built port facility near Saint Petersburg, in Russia. These terminals, built specifically for the export of potash, will enter service in 2023.
So, last November, while Vilnius announced the forthcoming prohibition of Belarusian potash transport via its territory, Minsk did face a problem. But it also had a solution literally under construction. In fact, the Lithuanian government acted on its own initiative—US and EU sanctions at the time did not require such measures from Vilnius.
After the problems with potash exports, Minsk then encountered increasing limitations and bans on other types of cargo. By early 2022, Belarus found itself semi-blockaded by all neighbouring states except Russia. It is reported that since March, the Estonian government has banned all transit—even for Belarusian oil products not included in EU sanctions—via Estonia.
In March, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenka announced (and Russian President Vladimir Putin later confirmed) that in two years Belarus would have its “own ports” on Russia’s Baltic shores. Minsk plans to concentrate its imports and exports via these seaports. Construction is reportedly already underway. This case suggests the Belarusian government is working to maintain its agency, rather than simply capitulating to directives from Moscow. Not only has Minsk avoided going to war for Putin, but it also proactively seeks to relieve political and economic pressure from Russia by taking the initiative.
Everyone’s Problem
However, the ports of North-Western Russia may not provide a full-fledged alternative for Belarusian firms. Indeed, in a few months, they may lose up to 90 per cent of container cargo volumes, warn Russian logistics experts. These losses would result from the newest round of Western sanctions, decisions taken by European trade hubs, and global container shipping lines, which all aim to stop working with Russia. Of about twenty major container shipping lines, fourteen have already refused to work with Russia. It appears the rest are about to do so, too. Only one, China’s COSCO, appears ready to keep moving Russia-related goods. At the same time, large oceangoing ships (especially from South-East Asia) cannot reach North-Western Russian ports, because of the shallowness in the Baltic Sea. Instead, cargo must be reloaded on small feeders in some European havens to be then brought to Russia.
Image: A map, produced by the United Transport and Logistics Company, showing Belarusian physical trade flows.
In this grim situation, Belarusian state media like to emphasise that neighbouring countries, by cutting the links with Belarus, are making this region of Europe into a dead end. Decreasing transit and trade will generate poverty for all involved.
For example, with the loss of the Belarusian potash business, cargo turnover at Lithuania’s Klaipeda port is forecast to fall by almost a third. In addition, Latvian railways are set to lose about a third of total freight turnover (last year, Belarusian freight made up 27 per cent).
However, Belarus itself is also becoming a dead-end. Its significance for both its closest allies, Russia and China, is rapidly fading. The main cause is the ongoing disruption of links between Belarus and its neighbours. Belarus is central to the region between the Black and Baltic seas. The entire area faces a decline with dim prospects for development.
This article cites just some of the numerous instances illustrating how general sanctions imposed on Belarus, and upon entire branches of its economy so far failed to make the regime capitulate. Instead, they drive the region into poverty and Belarus into Putin’s hands. Even worse, many of these sanctions were imposed on Belarus for actions taken by Russia. In a paradox, they further limit any autonomy of Belarus from Russia and at the same time punish it for Russia’s actions. Future efforts to promote democracy and prosperity in the region require revising this approach.
Belarusian “rail partisans” have physically damaged railway signalling equipment, while hacker groups, known as cyber partisans, have interfered with railroad software systems. Partisans say their actions do not affect passenger safety.
Authorities have responded with violence and charges of terrorism. Punishments range from long prison sentences to the death penalty. The authorities accuse the rail partisans of being in the pay of Western governments. They claim the so-called partisans seek to perpetrate disasters and mass human casualties. But only partisans have suffered physically so far.
What has happened since the start of the war?
Today’s rail partisans trace their history to Belarusian resistance in the Second World War. In 1943, partisans disrupted German reinforcements and supplies, destroying more than 90,000 rails, 1,061 trains, and 72 railroad bridges in Belarus alone. The “rail war” during WWII is a part of the school curriculum in contemporary Belarus.
Since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine, both state and independent Belarusian media have reported an increasing number of incidents on the Belarusian railways. Incidents at this scale have not been seen since WW2. However, a distinctive feature of the new “rail war” is modern partisans do not destroy trains or railway tracks.
The most common form of sabotage is the arson of relay cabinets. As a result, automatic signalling systems for trains and switches stop working, disrupting schedules, and forcing the trains to move at reduced speeds of 15–20 km per hour.
On 25 March, rail partisans damaged relay cabinets on the Barysau-Navasady section of Belarus’ railway. Source: Twitter @HannaLiubakova.
On 25 February, a cyber partisan group attacked Belarusian railway software systems in order to slow down the movement of Russian military equipment. Various systems, including electronic tickets sales, were down for more than two weeks, disrupting railway operations.
ByPol, a Poland-based group of former security officers who left Belarusian law enforcement agencies after the rigged 2020 elections and police violence that ensued, took responsibility for damaging railway equipment across Belarus. On 2 March, the Interior Ministry partially confirmed sabotage acts on the country’s railways, mentioning several incidents in Mahiliou, Homiel, and Minsk regions.
Authorities have been releasing information about arrests in order to intimidate participants of the anti-war movement. At the same time, independent media reports have been intermittent due to the serious risks that anti-war protesters could face if exposed. Therefore, it is not yet possible to evaluate the scale of the current “rail war.” Acts of sabotage are estimated to number more than 80.
Ukraine’s military command has acknowledged Belarusian resistance. On 23 March, Ukraine noted, “Sympathetic Belarusians, condemning the contribution of the current illegal Belarusian authorities to the war against Ukraine, have partially disrupted railway traffic between the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine.” On 24 April, Ukrainian presidential adviser Olexiy Arestovych also indicated he was aware of the contributions of Belarusian partisans in disrupting enemy railway operations.
The intimidation campaign against rail partisans
A map showing railway resistance that took place in March 2022. Source: Twitter @franakviacorka.
In mid-February, police began a two-week operation of searches and arrests in Stoubcy (Minsk region). Security forces detained and persecuted people for subscribing to “extremist” channels on Telegram, an instant messaging service. Human rights defenders linked these raids to damaged automated railway systems near Stoubcy.
In early March, Belarusian Prosecutor General Andrej Shved opened a criminal case of terrorism for “offences against traffic safety and transport operations.” The Interior Ministry placed railway facilities under guard. Deputy Interior Minister Henadz Kazakevich has openly threatened partisans with the death penalty.
Kazakevich’s threats preceded a shooting incident in the Mahiliou region of Belarus on 30 March. Police detained three Babrujsk residents for the alleged destruction of a relay cabinet in the Asipovichy district. Officers claim they opened fire at the suspects for “actively resisting arrest.” By contrast, railway community Telegram channels assert the suspects did not resist. They allege officers deliberately shot the suspects the kneecaps after they were already detained.
In the last week of March, independent Telegram channels reported the arrests of more than 40 railway workers. The authorities charged the detainees with high treason, espionage, and terrorist acts. By 30 March, Telegram channels affiliated with the security forces posted more than three dozen “confession” videos featuring arrested railway workers.
Anti-war resistance online
Belarusian opponents of the war have also been disseminating information about Russian troop movements in Belarus. At first glance, this may seem a less risky form of resistance. But Belarusians can face extremism charges for the sharing of sensitive information. Guilty sentences can carry prison terms of up to six years.
For instance, on 5 April, the police arrested Iryna Abdukeryna, a former teacher from Hojniki, a town in the Homiel region. She was charged with taking pictures of a Russian military convoy and sharing them with the Belaruski Hajun Telegram channel. She is now one of 1,143 political prisoners in Belarus as of 24 April. Throughout March and April, human rights defenders have reported an increase in the number of arrests on similar charges.
The Belaruski Hajun project aims to uncover the movements of the Russian troops in Belarus. Belarusian opposition activist and blogger Anton Matolka is the originator of the project. The project’s Telegram channel has almost 400,000 subscribers and features user-generated content about Russian troop movements in Belarus. Warnings of Russian missile launches and aircraft missions from the Belarusian territory also appear on the channel.
Matolka told Radio Liberty that his team has been receiving nearly 1,000 messages daily. In response, Belarusian authorities recognised all projects linked with Anton Matolka as extremist groups. The activist thinks that his various initiatives have contributed to the redeployment of Russian troops away from Belarus. He believes Russian soldiers did not feel secure and they did not expect the population would display such levels of hostility towards them.
Belarusians who oppose the regime’s logistical support of Russia’s war have faced brutal repression. Activists, who have been driven underground, must now use more covert forms of protest. The campaign of intimidation suggests the authorities are troubled by such developments, which are perceived as a direct threat to the regime’s continued hold on power.
Rapid rise in Belarus-Russia trade
Speaking during his recent visit Lukashenka said, “I am glad that these sanctions were imposed on us. Finally, we have begun to cooperate with Russia in the way we should have been cooperating for a long time.” Slightly earlier, at a 9 April Belarusian Security Council meeting, Lukashenka set forth his general vision by saying, “With the departure of Western companies from the markets of the Union State of Belarus and Russia, large niches have been vacated that we need to fill.”
Isolation from the West after August 2020 had already led Belarus to refocus on Russia. Trade between Belarus and Russia in 2021 exceeded $40bn (135 per cent in comparison with 2020). That is a remarkable figure because analysts predicted just 10 per cent growth, to $34bn of annual trade volume, after economic data for the first half-year were published.
Belarusian foreign trade in goods (blue—total, red—export, green—import). Image: Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Last year, state statistics committee Belstat stopped publishing many statistics on exports and imports. But it is safe to assume growth has been driven by the consequences of increasing Western sanctions. Media also reported of Belarusian firms responding to Western sanctions by turning to Russia. For example, BelAZ exchanged the US engines on its trucks for Russian ones.
Trade with Russia will keep growing this year. Harsher Western sanctions on Belarus and the collapse of trade with Ukraine (Belarus’ second-largest economic partner) have produced knock-on effects. Minsk has lost commercial opportunities in multiple areas. At the same time, there are new opportunities in Russian markets due to the rupture in commercial links between Russia and the West.
The Belarusian government hopes to benefit from the increasing access of Belarusian firms to Russian public procurement. In May, Russia’s Finance Ministry will initiate proceedings to empower five Belarusian banks to issue guarantees for suppliers willing to participate in Russian government procurements. This will simplify participation in Russian state orders for Belarusian suppliers. During the recent Far-East visit, Lukashenka lobbied for Belarusian participation in the construction of Russia’s new spaceport near Blagoveshchensk. The purpose of the spaceport is to diminish Moscow’s dependence on the former Soviet Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.
Energy problems
More important news was announced after the Lukashenka-Putin summit. An agreement is in the works between Russia and Belarus to set up a single electricity market, which would launch in 2024. Such an agreement will help Minsk to export excess electricity from Belarus’ nuclear power plant—built with a Russian loan—to Russia.
After investing heavily in energy, Minsk found itself in dire straits when meaningful economic ties with all neighbouring countries except Russia became disrupted. Belarus itself does not need additional energy. The country in 2020, even without a working nuclear power plant (NPP), had an energy surplus: generation amounted to 38.68bn kWh, with a consumption of 33.2bn kWh, and a relatively stable internal demand for electricity.
Astraviets nuclear power plant. Image: zviazda.by.
Minsk built an NPP for two reasons. First, it sought to reduce dependence on Russian gas. Throughout the 2010s, Minsk quarrelled with Gazprom. The second reason it built an NPP was to export energy. Lithuania has opposed the project from the very beginning. The first 1.2 GW nuclear power unit of the Russian-built NPP in Belarus was put into commercial operation in July 2021, and the second will go online by the end of 2022. But in recent months all prospects for export in the foreseeable future have evaporated.
Minimal export opportunities
Another important point discussed at the Putin-Lukashenka talks involves oil deals: Russia announced its willingness to support Belarusian refineries. They are the most advanced in the region but have suddenly lost their regional market access.
Although Minsk signed contracts with Russian oil suppliers for 2022 on better terms than in previous years, the EU in June 2021 introduced sanctions against Belarusian oil and chemical exports. Belarusian petrochemical products cannot be exported via traditional routes. Anticipating troubles, the Belarusian government planned only 12.5m tons of crude oil would be refined this year. To compare, Belarusian refineries usually refine about 17–18m tons a year.
What helps the Belarusian authorities to keep the country running is getting gas from Russia at a fixed price of $128.5 per 1,000 cubic metres, which is a fraction of world market prices. Presidential Administration Deputy Head and former Economy Minister Dzmitry Krutoy earlier commented that Belarus considers gas agreements with Russia as a resource to compensate for losses incurred by sanctions and as a source of competitive advantage.
Dzmitry Krutoy. Image: BelTA.
A history of troubled relations
Good relations between Minsk and Moscow are not taken for granted, and the Belarusian leadership is perfectly aware of this. When asked in jest whether Lukashenka himself would like to journey into outer space, he responded in kind, “I would like to! I used to think that my older brother might send me there and never bring me back. Now, I don’t think so anymore.”
Lukashenka’s reply alludes to the complicated history between Minsk and Moscow. For example, on 13 January, President Putin held an open, friendly meeting with Dmitri Mazepin, owner of Uralkhim, a major potash producer and the key competitor of Belarus’ potash company Belaruskali. Recent allegations were made that Uralkhim had financed political projects aimed at toppling Lukashenka. Russian newspaper Kommersant reported, “We can safely assume that Uralkhim owner [Dmitri Mazepin] financed the Belarusian opposition with the blessing of the Russian president.”
The new political economy of the Belarusian regime—with Belarus’ external economic relations being either limited to Russia or done through Russia—has been a predictable consequence of the 2020 post-election crisis in Belarus and the deterioration between Belarus and the West that followed. The government can preserve the current political situation in Belarus for as long as Putin backs it because of severed ties with all but Russia. That, obviously, harms the development prospects of a nation that can tap on Russian resources but has been largely cut off from the rest of the world.