Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) announced on 4 September that they were conducting a “special operation to expose a criminal organization headed by an official of the Prosecutor General’s Office” involved in
“providing protection for a network of fraudulent call centres and laundering assets”,
according to a joint statement cited by Interfax-Ukraine and Meduza. The agencies did not initially name the alleged leader or detail which premises were searched, but said the operation was ongoing.
As reported by Ben Aris of bne IntelliNews, the investigation marks a significant escalation because it is aimed at the top of the prosecution service, coming after NABU has already charged other senior figures in President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s administration, including former deputy chief of staff Iryna Mudra and then chief of staff Andriy Yermak.
Multiple Ukrainian outlets, citing law enforcement and business sources, identified the detained official as Serhii Kropyva, though they differed on his exact title. Ukrainska Pravda reported that NABU had detained Serhii Kropyva, deputy head of the international legal cooperation department at the Prosecutor General’s Office, who previously served as deputy head of the Odesa regional administration under Oleh Kiper with responsibility for digital development. NV and other outlets described Kropyva as head of the cyber department or cybersecurity department at the Prosecutor General’s Office.
As reported by a law enforcement source to the Kyiv Independent, NABU detained Serhiy Kropyva, a deputy head of the international cooperation department at the Prosecutor General’s Office, in connection with the case. Censor.net and other Ukrainian media similarly said NABU and SAPO had detained Serhii Kropyva, described as head of the cyber department of the Prosecutor General’s Office.
NV’s English service, reporting on “Operation Carthage”, said investigators alleged the Prosecutor General’s Office official created and headed the criminal organisation in mid-2025, setting up a system to receive regular bribes in exchange for allowing fraudulent call centres targeting Ukrainians and foreigners to operate without interference. The proceeds were allegedly laundered through property purchases, third‑party ownership schemes and bank accounts belonging to associates, with more than 20 million hryvnias (about $450,000) spent on real estate, jewellery and other valuable movable property, NV reported.
NABU said it had identified five people in the case under Article 255 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code (creation and leadership of, or participation in, a criminal organisation) and Article 209 (money laundering), carrying potential sentences of up to 15 years in prison if convicted, according to NV. The Kyiv Independent reported that five alleged members of the organisation had so far been identified.
Alongside the detention, several outlets cited sources saying searches were carried out at premises linked to very senior officials. As reported by Ukrainska Pravda’s sources, searches were under way at premises belonging to Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko, his deputy Mariia Vdovychenko and Oleh Kiper, now head of the Odesa Oblast Military Administration. The Kyiv Independent similarly reported, citing Ukrainska Pravda, that NABU searched the offices of Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko, his deputy Maria Vdovychenko and Oleh Kiper, governor of Odesa Oblast.
The Prosecutor General’s Office denied part of these reports. As reported by Mariana Haiovska, a spokesperson for the Prosecutor General’s Office, to Ukrainska Pravda, investigators had conducted no searches at Kravchenko’s home or in his office. No comparable denial was issued about Vdovychenko or Kiper, the Kyiv Post noted, as cited by bne IntelliNews.
The Prosecutor General’s Office issued a formal response saying it would cooperate fully with the anti-corruption authorities and provide all necessary information in accordance with the law, as quoted by multiple outlets including NV, the Kyiv Independent and Sud.ua. The office said the circumstances surrounding the possible involvement of one of its employees in illegal activity connected to fraudulent call centres must be established by investigators and receive an objective legal assessment, according to its statement cited by NV and Euromaidan Press.
As reported by the Prosecutor General’s Office to Ukrainska Pravda and Sud.ua, the employee whose possible involvement in illegal activity is under investigation would be suspended from his duties for the duration of the pre‑trial investigation. The office also highlighted its broader record against scam operations, saying authorities had carried out more than 1,050 searches over the past 12 months, shut down around 340 fraudulent call centres comprising more than 5,000 operator positions, and were investigating 147 criminal proceedings related to this activity, according to a statement cited by Euromaidan Press and Sud.ua.
Investigators allege the group received systematic bribes in exchange for allowing fraudulent call centres to operate without interference, according to NABU’s account as summarised by the Kyiv Independent. The call centres targeted both Ukrainian citizens and foreigners, investigators said, and operating such centres is one of the most profitable forms of criminal activity in Ukraine, NABU stated, as reported by the Kyiv Independent.
As reported by NV, the proceeds were laundered through a series of schemes, with more than 20 million hryvnias spent on real estate, jewellery and other valuable movable property. The Kyiv Independent added that the proceeds were allegedly laundered through property purchases, third‑party ownership schemes, and bank accounts belonging to associates.
The operation comes amid a broader government push against scam call centres. In August, police, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the prosecutor’s office carried out an operation against fraudulent call centres in various regions of Ukraine, uncovering 94 centres, seizing more than $2 million and eliminating 1,794 operator jobs, according to LIGA.net and UA.News. Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko reported that officers conducted over 400 searches, shut down 94 call centres and uncovered 1,794 workspaces set up for fraudsters, seizing thousands of devices, SIM cards, bank cards and crypto wallets, UA.News reported.
On 2 September, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy submitted two bills to the Verkhovna Rada intended to increase accountability for the operation of fraudulent call centres and tighten rules around “drop” schemes involving bank cards and accounts, as noted by LIGA.net and NV. The presidential office announced a new phase in the fight against fraudulent call centres, with prosecutors and law enforcement inspecting hundreds of addresses and identifying numerous financial instruments linked to criminal activity, according to UA.News.
Separate local investigations continue. In Mykolaiv, police exposed a fraudulent call centre that swindled people under the guise of crypto investments, renting an apartment as an office for seven operators and seizing phones and laptops, Korabelov.info reported. In Dnipro, law enforcement shut down fraudulent call centres whose employees posed as representatives of banks, mobile carriers and law enforcement agencies, under the guidance of regional prosecutors, UA.News reported.
Mariia Vdovychenko, the prosecutor general’s deputy mentioned in search reports, has been the subject of previous allegations. As reported by the Kyiv Independent, the Anti-Corruption Action Centre said in a 2025 investigation that a brother of hers works as a military prosecutor in Russia, her father has a business in Russian‑occupied Crimea and other relatives hold Russian passports. These claims have not been adjudicated in court and were cited by the watchdog, not by law enforcement in the current case.
Oleh Kiper, named in search reports, previously served as a senior prosecutor and regional official before becoming head of the Odesa Oblast Military Administration, according to multiple Ukrainian media accounts cited by bne IntelliNews and NV. Serhii Kropyva, the detained official, previously served as deputy head of the Odesa regional administration under Kiper with responsibility for digital development before moving to the Prosecutor General’s Office, Ukrainska Pravda reported.
NABU said it had identified five people in the case under Article 255 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code, covering the creation and leadership of a criminal organisation and participation in one, and Article 209, covering the laundering of assets, according to NV. If convicted, they face up to 15 years in prison, NV reported. The Prosecutor General’s Office said 147 criminal proceedings related to fraudulent call centre activity are under investigation, more than 183 persons have been notified of suspicion, and indictments have been sent to court for 93 people, according to its statement cited by Sud.ua.
]]>The European Commission has advanced preparations for its first EU‑wide anti‑corruption strategy after hosting a thematic workshop of the EU Network against Corruption in Brussels on 10–11 June 2026. As reported by EuReporter, the two‑day meeting brought together representatives of member states, EU institutions and bodies, civil society organisations and academia to develop a more coherent and comprehensive EU approach to combating corruption.
The future strategy builds on the European Commission’s 2023 Joint Communication on the fight against corruption and seeks to unite prevention, enforcement, institutional integrity and international cooperation within a single strategic framework, EuReporter noted. The workshop formed part of the Commission’s broader consultation process, which also includes a Call for Evidence, an Open Public Consultation and targeted stakeholder consultations, according to the same report.
Day one, dedicated to member states and EU bodies, was opened by Marie‑Hélène Boulanger, Acting Director for Rule of Law, Fundamental Rights and Democracy at the European Commission, EuReporter reported. Discussions centred on the key elements of an overarching EU anti‑corruption approach, including the implementation of Directive (EU) 2026/1021, the outlet noted.
Participants highlighted the importance of preventive measures, particularly risk assessment, as a cornerstone of effective anti‑corruption policies, according to EuReporter’s account of the workshop. The session also examined the enforcement dimension of the EU anti‑corruption framework, covering the effective criminalisation, detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption offences, as well as the role of cross‑border cooperation and information exchange, EuReporter wrote.
The workshop’s focus on Directive (EU) 2026/1021 reflects the measure’s central role in harmonising corruption offences and penalties across the EU. As reported by PLMJ, the directive was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 11 May 2026 and entered into force on 31 May 2026, with member states required to transpose the criminal law provisions by 1 June 2028 and specific preventive measures, including sector‑based risk assessments and national anti‑corruption strategies, by 1 June 2029.
Legal analysts note that the directive establishes minimum rules for defining criminal offences and penalties relating to corruption, alongside measures to improve prevention and enforcement capacity, PLMJ stated. The International Bar Association has described the directive as the first comprehensive EU criminal law framework to address corruption across all member states, introducing turnover‑based penalties for legal persons and a dual‑track corporate liability model.
Day two expanded participation to include civil society organisations and academia and was opened by Irena Moozová, Deputy Director‑General of DG Justice at the European Commission, EuReporter reported. The session centred on developing a whole‑of‑society approach to combating corruption, recognising the role of education, research, civil society, the media and other stakeholders in fostering a culture of integrity, the outlet noted.
Discussions also looked at better use of data to detect corruption risks and analyse gaps, according to EuReporter’s summary of the second day. This emphasis aligns with broader EU efforts to strengthen evidence‑based policy and improve the monitoring of corruption trends across sectors and borders, as reflected in the Commission’s ongoing consultation process for the strategy, EuReporter added.
The workshop formed part of the Commission’s broader consultation process for the preparation of the strategy, which includes a Call for Evidence, an Open Public Consultation and targeted stakeholder consultations, EuReporter stated. According to PLMJ, the public consultation on the future
“EU Strategy to prevent and fight corruption 2027–2030”
closed in July 2026, with adoption of the EU anti‑corruption strategy scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2026.
The Union’s first anti‑corruption strategy, entitled “EU Strategy to prevent and fight corruption 2027–2030”, aims to complement the directive with a political and preventive approach, PLMJ noted. The strategy is expected to bring together prevention, enforcement, institutional integrity and international cooperation within a single framework, building on the 2023 Joint Communication on the fight against corruption, as EuReporter reported.
Directive (EU) 2026/1021 spells out eight offences that every member state must criminalise: bribery in the public and private sectors, misappropriation, trading in influence, unlawful exercise of public functions, obstruction of justice, enrichment from corruption and concealment, according to analysis by business ethics speaker Chuck Gallagher cited on LinkedIn. For the most serious offences, including public and private sector bribery and misappropriation, member states must ensure maximum fines of no less than five per cent of a company’s total worldwide annual turnover or, alternatively, a fixed amount corresponding to €40m, the International Bar Association reported.
The workshop examined the enforcement dimension of the EU anti‑corruption framework, with discussions covering the effective criminalisation, detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption offences, as well as the role of cross‑border cooperation and information exchange, EuReporter wrote. This focus dovetails with wider EU plans to tighten links between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the anti‑fraud office OLAF, Europol and Eurojust, as officials have signalled in parallel anti‑fraud and anti‑corruption initiatives, The European Post reported.
Participants at the workshop highlighted the importance of preventive measures, particularly risk assessment, as a cornerstone of effective anti‑corruption policies, EuReporter noted. Under the directive, member states are required to conduct periodic sector‑based risk assessments and ensure that anti‑corruption bodies can act without unjustified interference, NautaDutilh explained.
The directive requires member states to adopt and publish a national anti‑corruption strategy, with a 36‑month deadline for provisions on risk assessments and national strategies, according to eucrim and NautaDutilh. PLMJ specified that member states must implement specific preventive measures, including sector‑specific risk assessments and national anti‑corruption strategies, by 1 June 2029.
The EU Anti‑Corruption Directive raises the bar on corporate liability by introducing turnover‑based penalties, with fines ranging from three to five per cent of total worldwide annual turnover, or fixed minimum maximums of €24m to €40m depending on the gravity of the offence, CIVAC reported. The directive’s dual‑track corporate liability model treats compliance programmes as a structured mitigating circumstance rather than a defence to liability, the International Bar Association noted.
Legal advisers urge companies to prioritise risk mapping, compliance programme reviews, third‑party due diligence, supervision and audit, and documentation of effectiveness ahead of the 2028 transposition deadline, PLMJ stated. The directive does not bind companies immediately, as it requires national transposition by 1 June 2028, CIVAC explained.
The new drive builds on an anti‑corruption directive that entered into force on 31 May 2026 and on the earlier 2023 anti‑corruption package, The European Post reported. Brussels plans to answer with a package of anti‑fraud and anti‑corruption measures before the end of 2026, including an EU anti‑corruption strategy, a review of the Union’s anti‑fraud architecture and a revision of the regulation governing the prosecutor’s office, the outlet added.
The Commission wants each capital to adopt a written anti‑fraud plan and to cooperate more closely with EU bodies that chase misused funds, as prosecutors warn of criminal damage to the EU budget running into tens of billions of euros, The European Post wrote. Officials have signalled tighter webbing between EPPO, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust to improve detection, investigation and recovery of misused funds, the outlet noted.
]]>Romania’s opposition Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) has asked the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) to investigate the preparation and award of projects financed through the European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument.
The criminal complaint raises questions about the selection of companies, negotiations, financing arrangements and implementation of projects supported by SAFE funding. AUR has alleged possible irregularities but stressed that no wrongdoing has yet been established.
The party has asked prosecutors to determine whether criminal offences were committed by public officials or other parties involved in the projects. The offences cited by AUR include abuse of office, false statements, forgery, the use of public office to favour particular parties and offences affecting the financial interests of the European Union.
AUR, which is currently in opposition, has called for a detailed examination of the decisions and documents connected with Romania’s SAFE programme.
The party said investigators should identify the officials who drafted, endorsed, approved or used the relevant documents. It also asked the DNA to review the complete procurement files associated with the projects.
AUR argued that the scale of the funding made transparency and proper documentation essential.
“When such sums are at stake, secrecy, the absence of a clear documentary trail and suspicions regarding the preferential treatment of certain economic operators cannot be overlooked,”
AUR said.
The complaint does not establish that the named companies or public officials committed offences. Instead, AUR is asking Romania’s anti-corruption prosecutors to verify whether the procedures complied with national and European rules.
A significant part of AUR’s complaint concerns contracts and agreements involving Rheinmetall, the German defence group.
The party has asked prosecutors to examine what it described as the concentration of high-value contracts awarded to the same industrial group. It also wants investigators to assess how technical specifications were prepared, whether other companies could have supplied equivalent products, which bids were considered and how procurement decisions were justified.
AUR has further raised questions about any changes in contract prices and the commitments linked to domestic production and technology transfer.
The party wants the investigation to establish whether the procurement specifications may have limited competition or favoured particular economic operators. It has also called for scrutiny of the rationale behind the selected contracts and the supporting documentation.
The complaint’s references to Rheinmetall concern the structure and award of the projects rather than a finding of criminal liability against the company. Any determination of wrongdoing would have to be made by the competent Romanian authorities following an investigation.
AUR also cited the rejection of a proposed project involving 139 Piranha 5 armoured personnel carriers.
The party has questioned why the proposed Piranha 5 project was rejected and why funds were redirected towards an infantry fighting vehicle programme. It is asking prosecutors to investigate the administrative and technical reasoning behind that decision.
The complaint seeks to establish which officials were involved in preparing and approving the relevant documents, as well as whether the redirection of funds complied with the conditions attached to SAFE financing.
There is no indication that prosecutors have established wrongdoing or that the Romanian government has been found to have breached procurement rules. The complaint represents AUR’s request for the DNA to examine the matter.
The AUR complaint also refers to an individual weapons system valued at €816.6 million.
The party has asked for information about the project’s preparation, financing, procurement process and implementation commitments. It wants investigators to establish how the value was determined and whether the procurement documents adequately explained the technical and financial requirements.
Another project cited by AUR is OCCULT-AI, which the party said was awarded to Digi, a telecommunications company. The project is reportedly worth approximately €190 million to €200 million.
AUR has questioned how Digi was selected and whether sufficient public information was made available about the project. The complaint reportedly asks prosecutors to examine the relevant documents, including the criteria used to select the company and the basis for the project’s estimated value.
The allegations remain unproven. The filing is a request for an investigation and should not be treated as evidence that Digi, Rheinmetall or any public official committed an offence.
The complaint is not limited to armoured vehicles and weapons systems.
AUR has also mentioned projects involving drones, counter-drone systems and naval contracts. The party has asked prosecutors to examine the procedures used to select the companies and projects in these areas.
The complaint reportedly raises broader concerns about the availability of public documentation. AUR said there was insufficient information about how companies were chosen and how the projects were prepared.
At the same time, the party acknowledged that some defence procurement information may be classified for national-security reasons. However, AUR argued that classification should not prevent prosecutors from reviewing the decisions, procurement files and supporting documents.
The central issue raised by the opposition party is whether confidential information can still be examined through lawful oversight mechanisms. AUR maintains that secrecy should not remove the possibility of verifying the legality of public spending.
The complaint comes after Romania received its first payment under the SAFE programme at the end of August.
Romania received €2.5 billion, equivalent to 15 per cent of its total allocation of €16.68 billion. Romania has the second-largest allocation among European Union member states under the instrument.
The funds are intended to support strategic transport infrastructure as well as defence and security projects.
Approximately €4.2 billion of Romania’s allocation is earmarked for strategic road transport infrastructure. The remaining funds are intended for defence and security procurement and related infrastructure projects.
Further payments will depend on Romania meeting agreed commitments and implementation milestones. This means the country’s access to additional funding will be linked to progress under the approved programme and compliance with the conditions attached to the financing.
SAFE is a €150 billion European Union instrument designed to provide long-term loans to member states for major defence investments.
The programme places particular emphasis on joint procurement and projects involving equipment produced within the European Union. It is intended to strengthen European defence capabilities while supporting cooperation between member states and European industry.
Romania’s planned use of SAFE funding therefore includes a combination of transport infrastructure, military procurement and security-related projects. The size of the allocation has made the programme a major element of the country’s defence and infrastructure planning.
AUR’s complaint focuses on whether the decisions taken during the preparation and award of SAFE-financed projects were transparent, competitive and properly documented.
The allegations made by AUR have not been proven, and the complaint itself does not amount to a finding of criminal conduct.
The party has asked the DNA to investigate potential offences and determine whether any officials or companies breached Romanian law or rules protecting the EU’s financial interests. Prosecutors would need to assess the documents, procurement procedures and decisions before reaching any conclusions.
There is no indication that Rheinmetall, Digi or the Romanian authorities have been found responsible for wrongdoing in connection with the allegations. Nor is there confirmation that the DNA has announced the opening of a formal criminal investigation.
The case could nevertheless lead to greater scrutiny of Romania’s SAFE programme, particularly because the projects involve billions of euros in European financing and major defence contracts.
]]>A joint meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and the Committee on Public Health (SANT) convened on Wednesday, 2 September 2026, in Brussels to consider a draft report on amending Directives 2001/18/EC and 2010/53/EU regarding the placing on the market of genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs) and the processing of human organs intended for transplantation.
According to the European Parliament’s press briefing, the session formed part of the SANT committee’s agenda for the day, with the biotechnology file listed under debates alongside other public health priorities including a study on the health effects of fine particulate matter. The co-rapporteurs for the procedure are Marta Temido (S&D, Portugal) and Adam Jarubas (EPP, Poland), who are steering the Parliament’s position through the legislative process.
The legislative file, registered under procedure number 2025/0405(COD), seeks to update two existing directives: Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment, and Directive 2010/53/EU on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation. The proposal comes as the EU moves towards relaxing certain GMO-related rules, following the European Parliament’s adoption in June 2026 of a new regulation on plants obtained by New Genomic Techniques (NGTs), which will apply from mid-2028.
The European Commission has justified its proposal to relax rules for genetically modified micro-organisms deliberately released into the environment by claiming that existing EU GMO regulations are blocking market access for products available in third countries. In a Staff Working Document published in May, the Commission argued that the EU’s GMO framework has
“resulted in no market authorisations for deliberate release …, effectively excluding the EU from the specific parts of global markets in biofertilisation, biocontrol, bioremediation, and bioleaching using GMMs.”
However, critics point out that even in countries with less stringent GMO rules, only a handful of non-medicinal GMM products have reached the market, suggesting that regulation is not the only obstacle to commercialisation. According to the Commission’s own overview, just four relevant GMM products or product families are currently on the market outside the EU: two long-established biopesticides, including a genetically engineered strain of Bacillus thuringiensis from Certis Bio approved in the United States in 1996, and a modified Rhizobium rhizogenes from BioCare Technology authorised in Australia as early as 1993.
Two more recent products are a biofertiliser from Pivot Bio, marketed in the United States since 2019, and Lumina, a genetically modified dental-care product from Lantern Bioworks, which entered the US market in 2023. Since these products have reached the market without meaningful regulatory scrutiny, there is practically no safety information publicly available to judge their potential adverse effects.
As reported by Save Our Seeds, an organisation focused on seed sovereignty and agro-biodiversity, the EU is moving towards weaker rules for genetically modified micro-organisms deliberately released into the environment. The group warned that the Commission’s latest proposal would remove the requirement to renew authorisations after ten years and reduce requirements relating to risk assessment and analytical detection. It would also create a new category of so-called “low-risk GMMs” for which regulatory requirements could be reduced further.
Scientists from the Germany Ecological Society have warned that the proposed changes, particularly the introduction of a “low-risk GMM” category, are not consistent with current scientific knowledge and could create major environmental risks. Professor Gabriele Berg, a leading microbiome researcher, similarly warned that
“the growing pressure to lower barriers for environmental GMM application should not compromise robust, science-based safeguards”.
She stressed:
“It is important to foster innovation but not at the expense of health, environmental integrity, or long-term biosafety. Once GMMs are released, control and recall are inherently limited.”
The proposed changes are particularly concerning because engineered micro-organisms pose specific challenges when deliberately released into the environment. Many micro-organisms reproduce rapidly and can evolve quickly, live within complex microbial communities whose interactions are still only partly understood, and some exchange genetic material with other organisms. Once released, engineered microbes may spread beyond the site where they were intended to act and interact with organisms and ecological networks in ways that are difficult to predict in advance.
Alongside the GMM file, the joint ENVI-SANT meeting also considered amendments to Directive 2010/53/EU on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation. The directive, originally adopted on 7 July 2010, establishes quality and safety standards for organs donated and transplanted within the EU to ensure a high level of human health protection.
Recent research published in the journal Transplant International has highlighted that a substantial proportion of recovered donor organs are not transplanted, pointing to the need for improved standards and processes in organ donation and transplantation systems. The proposed amendments under consideration by MEPs aim to modernise the directive in light of advances in medical science and changes in transplantation practices across member states.
The organ donation file is being handled jointly with the GMM proposal under a single legislative procedure, reflecting the broader biotechnology and public health policy context in which both files sit. The co-rapporteurs Temido and Jarubas are responsible for steering Parliament’s position on both elements of the package.
The Council of Ministers already adopted its position on the Commission’s GMM proposal on 16 June 2026, with minor amendments. The European Parliament is still debating the text, with a committee vote planned for 5 November 2026, and a plenary vote potentially following soon afterwards. Parliament and the Council will ultimately have to agree on a common text before the legislation can be adopted.
For the NGT regulation on gene-edited plants, which was adopted by the European Parliament on 17 June 2026, the rules will not apply until mid-2028, allowing for a two-year implementation period during which the European Commission will develop the necessary secondary legislation and implementing acts. The new framework establishes two distinct regulatory pathways based on a plant’s genetic equivalence to conventionally bred varieties, with Category 1 plants following a simplified pathway and Category 2 plants remaining subject to existing strict GMO rules.
The biotechnology directives under consideration form part of a wider EU policy push to update regulations governing genetic engineering and novel genomic techniques. Under the new NGT framework, plants obtained with certain new genomic techniques and involving limited genetic changes will be regulated in the same way as conventionally bred varieties from 2028 onwards.
However, neither NGT-1 nor NGT-2 plants will be allowed in organic production, maintaining a distinction between organic farming and gene-edited crops. The European Parliament’s adoption of the NGT regulation on 17 June 2026 marked a significant shift in EU agricultural biotechnology policy, with the regulation now proceeding to signature and publication in the Official Journal.
Critics argue that the EU should lead with rigorous science and effective oversight rather than race to remove rules designed to protect people and ecosystems. As Professor Berg noted, once GMMs are released into the environment, control and recall are inherently limited, underscoring the importance of robust pre-market assessment and post-market monitoring.
]]>As reported by European Pravda’s correspondent citing European Commission chief spokesperson Paula Pinho, the EU’s €90 billion loan facility for 2026–2027 “was indeed” calculated to cover two-thirds of Ukraine’s budgetary and defence requirements over the two-year period, with the remaining one-third to be met by other international partners. Pinho told European Pravda that disbursements under the loan are progressing, but remain tied to Kyiv’s implementation of reforms, which she described as “a critical aspect” of the facility’s design.
Pinho added that while the EU recognises Ukraine’s “extreme needs” and the urgency of deterring further aggression, Brussels’ immediate focus is on executing the already “very ambitious” disbursement plan rather than expanding the envelope. She noted that “there is one third which cannot be covered by the EU and where we have been urging our partners to come in and step in,” signalling that additional donor contributions are essential to close the gap.
According to European Pravda’s account of Pinho’s remarks, the Commission is “making very good progress” in processing Ukraine’s requests under the loan, but each tranche is linked to reforms gradually being introduced in Kyiv. This conditionality reflects the structure of the Ukraine Facility mechanism, under which the Council of the EU approved an updated reform plan on 30 July that enabled Ukraine to receive €8.3 billion in 2026 to cover budgetary needs.
Background reporting by European Pravda notes that Ukraine has not formally requested an early 2026 disbursement of the portion of the €90 billion loan earmarked for 2027, which could otherwise help address a projected €27 billion defence budget shortfall this year. On 24 August, the European Commission approved €6.1 billion in defence procurement for Ukraine under the same loan facility, while total disbursements to Ukraine by the end of 2026 are expected to reach around €20 billion, with new tranches potentially arriving in the coming weeks.
As reported by ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said 12 people were killed in overnight Russian attacks on Kyiv and its suburbs, including an Indian citizen, as Moscow’s aerial barrage entered a sixth consecutive day. Reuters correspondents in Kyiv reported that Russian air attacks killed 12 people and injured many more in the capital and surrounding region early on Tuesday, with air-raid alerts covering most of Ukraine’s territory in the early hours.
Emergency services in Kyiv said eight people were killed and five wounded in the capital, including three children, as fires broke out across several districts during the overnight strikes. Kyiv City Military Administration had earlier reported three fatalities and five injuries in the city, before later updates raised the toll as rescue operations continued.
As reported by Ukrainian Pravda, Russian forces struck a railway depot and other railway infrastructure in Kyiv with ballistic missiles on the night of 31 August–1 September, killing seven people, including six employees of Ukrzaliznytsia, Ukraine’s state railway operator. Oleksandr Pertsovskyi, chief executive of Ukrzaliznytsia, said the ballistic strike took the lives of seven people, six of whom were company employees, with one colleague hospitalised with injuries and “extensive destruction” at the site.
Ukrainian Pravda further reported that the attack caused fires at two locations in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district, where seven people were killed and one person remained in critical condition before the fires were extinguished. The railway strike formed part of a wider Russian targeting of military and energy facilities in Kyiv, Odesa and nearby areas, according to Russia’s Defence Ministry.
As reported by Ukrainian Pravda, a five-storey residential building and a business facility were damaged in an overnight attack on Boryspil in Kyiv Oblast, killing one person and injuring eight others, including a child. Local authorities said 48 people were evacuated from the damaged building, cars in a nearby car park caught fire, and all injured were receiving medical treatment.
In Kyiv itself, Ukrainian Pravda reported that Russian UAVs caused a fire in a 16-storey building in the Podilskyi district during daytime attacks on 1 September, while another drone fell near a residential building in the Sviatoshynskyi district. The State Emergency Service confirmed that eight people had been killed and five injured in Kyiv overall, including three children, as fires erupted at multiple locations across the capital.
As reported by Ukrainian Pravda, new power outages were recorded on the morning of 1 September in Kyiv, Donetsk, Sumy, Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts as a result of Russian missile and drone strikes. In Sumy Oblast, severe weather compounded the situation, leaving 188 settlements without electricity in addition to damage from the attacks.
As reported by Ukrainian Pravda, Ukraine’s defence forces struck multiple Russian military targets over 31 August and the night of 31 August–1 September, including UAV launch sites in temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk and Crimea. The General Staff’s update formed part of a broader pattern of reciprocal strikes, with Ukrainian drones also damaging Russia’s Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast early on 1 September, according to regional Governor Alexander Drozdenko.
As reported by Ukrainian Pravda, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called on member states to provide Ukraine with needed interceptor missiles, including systems nearing the end of their shelf life, to bolster air defences amid sustained Russian aerial attacks. The appeal came as Kyiv endured its sixth straight day of bombardment, with European Union defence ministers discussing the “hybrid” threat from Moscow in Europe.
]]>Washington is relying on extensive safeguards and dozens of oversight agencies to scrutinise and protect billions of dollars in US aid to Ukraine amid the country’s continuing struggle with corruption, a regional security expert said. The oversight comes as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s inner circle faces renewed political pressure from widening investigations, with several senior officials and aides resigning, being dismissed or facing investigations since 2025.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Carrie Filipetti, now executive director of the Vandenberg Coalition, said:
“Of course, in all of the former Soviet Union countries, there is significant corruption. A lot more work needs to be done. But we know, at least on the U.S. side, as we’re providing support for their military, we have a lot of mechanisms.”
Filipetti added that
“over 24 federal agencies are involved in oversight”
to ensure
“there are no consequences to the U.S. taxpayer, to our equipment in terms of the corruption issue”
and that
“U.S. contributions are very much protected.”
The US committed $67.8 billion in defence articles and services to Ukraine from February 2022 through March 2026 through the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and Foreign Military Financing, congressional reports show. About $195 billion has been appropriated for Operation Atlantic Resolve, including funds to replenish US weapons stocks, support US military operations in Europe and provide economic, development and humanitarian assistance.
In recent months, senior Ukrainian officials have resigned, been dismissed or faced scrutiny by the country’s independent anti-corruption bodies, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU). Those developments include Andriy Yermak’s 28 November 2025 resignation after investigators searched his premises and Iryna Mudra’s 19 August dismissal during a money-laundering probe.
As reported by multiple outlets including the Kyiv Independent and Ukrainska Pravda, Zelenskyy dismissed Iryna Mudra, a deputy head of the presidential office, on 19 August as anti-corruption investigators pursued a money-laundering case involving another deputy head of the office. Investigators have not named Mudra as a suspect, The Associated Press reported. However, NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) later said suspects in the case included former presidential Deputy Chief of Staff Iryna Mudra, lawmaker Vadym Stolar, former lawmaker Maksym Mykytas, and top executives of state-owned Sense Bank.
The bureau said the suspects are accused of laundering Hr 150 million ($3.4 million) posted as bail for a suspect in the “Midas” operation, a probe into alleged corruption at Energoatom, Ukraine’s state nuclear power company, which has become the biggest corruption investigation of Zelenskyy’s presidency. On 25 August, the High Anti-Corruption Court placed Mudra in custody for two months and set bail at Hr 20 million ($448,000), charging her with organised crime, money laundering and corporate raiding.
Former Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna was dismissed by Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s ambassador to the US on 3 August, two days before a suspicion notice was served against her, according to the Kyiv Post. He also fired Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov on 15 July in a broader reshuffle over internal wartime disagreements which sparked protests across the nation. In interviews after he left government, Fedorov also complained about what he described as ingrained corruption and patronage networks.
Zelenskyy has pushed back on suggestions that the investigations implicate him personally.
“The heads of anti-corruption agencies have zero questions for me,”
Zelenskyy said in remarks published 23 August regarding the investigations.
“They understand perfectly well that I am not involved in anything like that.”
Filipetti said:
“We’ve seen that Zelenskyy is taking really seriously the criticisms of corruption, and every time there is an allegation, he moves very swiftly to remove those individuals from the government. And the fact that there are these independent bodies is, I think, really important. They’re listening to them. They’re making sure that they’re trying to root it out as much as humanly possible.”
A February 2024 USAID inspector general review also found that the agency did not independently verify some Ukrainian health workers’ salary claims before reimbursement, though Filipetti said US economic aid is now reimbursed only after verification.
“A lot of what the United States has been providing, we’re making sure that everything is through a reimbursement mechanism,”
Filipetti said. She said US aid has not been tied to the money-laundering allegations and remains protected as Ukraine works to combat corruption.
The scrutiny also comes as Kyiv faces shortages of Patriot interceptors amid intensified Russian strikes and a need for air defence interceptors. Zelenskyy said he wants to secure 300 additional interceptors for the coming winter, while Ukraine’s air force has requested 360.
“One of the most urgent needs that the Ukrainians have right now is interceptor missiles,”
Filipetti said.
“This is why this idea of sending Patriot capabilities and allowing them to produce them on the ground in Ukraine has become so important to Zelenskyy.”
President Donald Trump has expressed reluctance to further deplete US missile inventories, saying the United States also needs the weapons, while pressing European allies to shoulder more of Ukraine’s defence burden. “We want missiles too,” Trump said 6 August when asked about Zelenskyy’s requests for long-range missiles and Patriot systems.
“Biden gave him so much, Biden gave $300 billion worth of ammunition.”
Filipetti also said Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts remain an important consideration for its NATO aspirations.
“I think every country has been really adamant that the Ukrainians move forward in their anti-corruption mechanisms,”
Filipetti said.
]]>“Obviously, if Ukraine ever wants to be a formal member of NATO, that’s something that they will need to prove and demonstrate.”
Hungary is racing to meet a 31 August 2026 European Union deadline to demonstrate it can root out corruption and transform public institutions, with billions of euros in frozen recovery funds hanging on the outcome. The new centre-right Tisza government of Prime Minister Péter Magyar, which ousted Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in April, has pursued “breakneck legislative reform and sweeping institutional shake-ups” to satisfy Brussels.
The EU set 27 “super milestones” tied to anti-corruption, transparency and judicial independence that Hungary must clear to access its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) money. Failure to reform could put at risk €6.51 billion ($7.5 billion) in grants and €3.92 billion in loans, while a separate €6.3 billion in development funding has been withheld since December 2022 under the EU’s rule-of-law conditionality mechanism.
Hungary is on track to fulfil all criteria by the end of August to unlock roughly €10 billion in frozen recovery funds, with two-thirds of the required milestones already met. In May, Magyar and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed to release €16.4 billion in EU funds previously frozen over rule-of-law and corruption concerns under Orbán’s government, including €10 billion from the RRF, €4.2 billion in cohesion funds and €2.2 billion linked to academic freedom reforms.
Of the 27 super milestones, 21 concern corruption and transparency, four cover judicial independence and two involve audits of how the funds are spent. EU officials have repeatedly pointed to tenders with limited competition, conflicts of interest, opaque spending, weak asset-declaration rules and doubts about whether prosecutors and other watchdogs are sufficiently independent or effective when politically sensitive cases arise.
Brussels’ demands focus on structural safeguards that will hold regardless of who is in power: stronger and more independent anti-corruption bodies, more transparent and competitive public tenders, tighter conflict-of-interest rules, better access to public information, and stronger judicial oversight when prosecutors decline to pursue corruption cases. Recovery funding has also been tied to broader judicial-independence reforms.
Since taking office, the Tisza government has moved quickly to deliver on its campaign promises. Reforms have ranged from Hungary joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to dismantling the controversial public asset-management foundations and creating new bodies like a National Asset Recovery and Protection Office.
In June, parliament adopted a sweeping anti-corruption package, including tougher asset-declaration rules for politicians, greater transparency in public tenders and the nationalisation of public-interest asset-management foundations, known as KEKVA, which had been used to transfer state assets, including universities, into private-style control. In July, lawmakers amended the tax code in line with the RRF milestones and passed related legislation covering the energy sector.
Hungary has also established the new National Asset Recovery and Protection Office, tasked with recovering state assets linked to suspected Orbán-era corruption, and Prime Minister Magyar has launched the process for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The revised National Recovery Plan includes measures to modernise the country’s energy grid, railways and rental housing stock.
The liquidation of the KEKVA foundations has become a centrepiece of the government’s anti-corruption drive. €276 million in state assets has returned to state control as Hungary completes the liquidation of its controversial KEKVA foundations.
The new Assets Recovery Office could be used to keep “certain designated political opponents” under investigation for years without proper judicial review, according to critics, while paving the way for companies disfavored by the government to be taken over or pushed out of the market. Yet the government frames the office as essential to recovering public money and holding the old elite to account.
Even as Budapest nears the deadline, senior officials are cautioning against complacency. Hungary’s top anti-graft watchdog has warned that pouring so much money into a system with a long history of corruption could create fresh opportunities for abuse.
Ferenc Bíró, president of Hungary’s Integrity Authority, said:
“There’s a genuine expectation toward assets being recovered, people who have stolen from the public to be brought to justice.”
He added:
“One of the key premises in the campaign of the current government was to stop corruption and to recover assets.”
Hungarian-language outlet 444.hu quoted Bíró as saying:
“Amikor arra kényszerülsz, hogy nagy összegeket költs el, mindig lesznek olyanok, akik ezekkel a lehetőségekkel vissza akarnak élni”
(“When you are forced to spend large amounts, there will always be those who want to abuse these opportunities”).
The Hungarian government must complete fast-track reforms by 31 August for the Commission to pay out the €10.4 billion held back over rule-of-law and corruption concerns.
The mood of public and institutional reckoning is unsettling to some in the ranks of Fidesz. János Bóka, the head of the Fidesz parliamentary group, said: “They are formulating political expectations toward the police, toward the prosecutor’s service and the courts: What kind of procedures should be opened against whom, and what is the desired outcome of these investigations?”
Bóka said that
“some of the criticism related to democratic backsliding had some merit,”
signalling a degree of concession by the former ruling party. Yet he remains skeptical of the benefits of joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, calling its track record “mixed at best,” and worries that the new Assets Recovery Office could be misused.
Even so, Bóka stopped short of opposing investigations outright. He said:
“If there is a probable cause and if there are lawful, legal procedures being undertaken against individuals, then of course everybody must face the consequences of [their] actions, including legal and criminal consequences.”
The broader timeline remains unchanged: all eligible milestones must be completed by 31 August, the final payment request must be submitted by 30 September, and Commission disbursements can be made through 31 December 2026.
If Hungary meets all its milestones by the end of August, the European Commission is expected to assess them in September, followed by a payment request and the eventual disbursement of funds later this year.
Monday midnight marked the expiry of the RRF’s key deadline, with the government fighting to save roughly €10 billion (close to 3,650 billion forints) in funding. The strategy includes reclassifying previously implemented projects under the RRF, large capital injections to the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) and a new railway rolling-stock management company, and accounting for network development and digital investments.
The 31 August deadline represents a major test for how Hungary, which became “riddled with crony capitalism” during Orbán’s 16 years in power, will transform its democracy. Although the goals were set before Magyar won office, securing them would amount to a political win for a government that campaigned on stopping corruption and bringing Hungary closer to the EU.
At the same time, the influx of funds carries risks. Watchdogs fear that rapid spending without robust safeguards could recreate the very abuses the reforms aim to prevent. For Brussels, the Hungarian case is not just about individual scandals but whether state institutions are strong enough to prevent public money from flowing to politically connected businesses, especially through public procurement.
]]>Podemos MEPs Irene Montero and Isa Serra have sent a letter to the European Commission requesting “urgent” action in response to the crisis facing Ceuta, the “negligent” management of the Spanish government, and recent “racist attacks” against migrants.
In the letter, addressed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Commissioners Magnus Brunner, responsible for Home Affairs and Migration, and Hadja Lahbib, responsible for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Aid, the MEPs criticize the government’s handling of the emergency and accuse it of neglecting its obligations regarding the “protection and reception” of migrants.
“The seriousness of this situation is inseparable from the negligent management of the emergency by the Government of Spain, contrary to the most basic principle of due diligence, and from a worrying neglect of its obligations of protection and reception,”
they stated in the letter.
Montero and Serra are calling on the Commission to “carry out specific monitoring of the situation” and ensure that
“the Spanish response is fully compatible with Union Law and with international obligations regarding human rights.”
The Podemos representatives also drew Brussels’ attention to what they described as a “climate of hostility and hatred” in the autonomous city, arguing that actions by far-right groups are fueling an escalation of violence and harassment.
They cited the blockade of a Red Cross convoy by protesters in Ceuta, as well as clashes on Benítez beach that resulted in police intervention.
Riot police also formed a line across El Trampolín beach to prevent residents from approaching a migrant camp, with warning shots reportedly fired into the air on August 26. The camp has remained in place since the mass entry at the end of July.
The MEPs are therefore asking the Commission to guarantee the protection of “organizations, activists, and defenders of human rights who work on the ground” and who they say are in a situation of “severe vulnerability.”
Podemos also informed the Commission of 16 reported sexual assaults since the beginning of the crisis in Ceuta.
The MEPs urged the European executive to immediately strengthen mechanisms for the prevention of and protection against sexual violence, as well as systems for identifying and assisting potential victims of human trafficking.
They also called for immediate guarantees of access to accommodation, food, water, healthcare, and hygiene, alongside stronger protection mechanisms for vulnerable groups.
Montero and Serra further called on the European Commission to investigate Morocco’s responsibility and its alleged “possible complicity” with the United States and Israel.
They also urged the Commission to promote diplomatic action proportionate to the seriousness of the situation in Ceuta.
The unrest follows the mass crossing of July 30, when Spain’s Interior Ministry initially estimated that around 50,000 people had arrived before later revising the figure sharply upward.
Around 69,500 people were reportedly returned to Morocco within four days, while dozens of people died during the crisis. Other reports have put the overall death toll even higher, with human rights organizations warning that the actual number could be greater.
In the weeks before the mass influx, border workers reportedly warned Spain’s central government that increasing numbers of people were arriving by sea, partly encouraged by social media, and warned that the situation could escalate.
Spanish authorities have defended their response, saying they had assessed different options before installing a floating barrier in the sea on August 1.
The European Commission has said it would continue working with Spain and Morocco to strengthen border controls, while the two countries investigate the events surrounding the mass arrivals.
The Sánchez government subsequently declared a situation of interest for national security in Ceuta, centralizing management of the crisis.
Spain’s government also announced temporary shelters for 1,800 migrants in the enclave in an effort to ease the humanitarian pressure created by the influx.
The Spanish migration authorities allocated €6.5 million in emergency funding to help Ceuta cope with the new arrivals.
Estimates of the number of migrants still in Ceuta have varied considerably. Local officials have estimated that between 9,000 and 10,000 migrants, including around 2,000 minors, could remain in the city, while Spain’s Interior Ministry has put the figure at approximately 5,000.
Spain’s opposition leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo has used the migration crisis to intensify criticism of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government, while also directing criticism toward Morocco and its handling of the border situation.
Feijóo described the situation as an unprecedented humanitarian, public health, and public order crisis and accused Sánchez’s government of “enormous negligence and incompetence.”
Former Spanish foreign minister and former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, meanwhile, described Europe’s response to the mass arrivals in Ceuta as “hysterical, disproportionate and absurd.”
Human rights organizations have urged the Spanish government and Ceuta’s local authorities to act urgently to provide adequate shelter for migrants and asylum seekers who have remained without proper accommodation since entering the enclave from Morocco.
They have also called for people who wish to seek asylum to be given a genuine opportunity to do so.
Human rights advocates say Spanish authorities should mobilize sufficient resources to provide adequate reception, either in Ceuta or elsewhere in Spain, and conduct individual assessments while ensuring access to legal advice in a language applicants can understand.
The mass crossings have generated wider European concern over border management and migration policy.
The European Commission has offered support through Frontex at the European Union’s only land border with Africa and indicated that additional financial assistance could be made available.
The Commission has also said it will continue cooperating with Spain and Morocco to strengthen border controls and address the consequences of the crisis.
]]>Hungary’s parliament on Friday, 28 August 2026, elected political scientist Anna Róza Unger as the first president of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH), a new super-agency with unprecedented investigative and prosecutorial powers to trace, secure and recover public assets allegedly removed unlawfully, while the selection process, Unger’s professional background and the office’s wide-ranging authority have sparked fierce political and expert debate over risks of politicisation and insufficient judicial safeguards.
As reported by multiple outlets including Euronews, Telex, and Xinhua, Hungary’s National Assembly held a secret ballot on Friday to choose the head of the NVVH, with Anna Róza Unger receiving 137 votes in favour, seven against and one abstention, comfortably clearing the two‑thirds majority threshold required for election. The institution’s deputy head, Katalin Tasnádi, was appointed as deputy president in charge of investigations, and the office will be run by a five‑member leadership, with three further deputy chairs still being sought after earlier applications were declared invalid.
Unger’s six‑year term is due to begin on 1 September 2026, and she will lead an agency that reports to parliament rather than the executive. In a Facebook post cited by Portfolio, Unger stressed that the NVVH’s success would depend on public trust, professional expertise and “uncompromising commitment” against corruption, and she publicly invited Miklós Ligeti, one of the other shortlisted candidates, to cooperate with the new office.
The NVVH was established by legislation passed in July by the governing centrist‑liberal Tisza Party, which won April’s election with a two‑thirds parliamentary majority, ending Viktor Orbán’s 16‑year rule, and Prime Minister Péter Magyar has presented the office as a central element of his anti‑corruption campaign dubbed “Operation Purgatory”. As reported by Euronews, the authority’s task is to track down, secure and, where possible, recover money and other assets that have unlawfully been removed from public ownership, but its powers extend far beyond asset recovery.
The NVVH can examine state and municipal decisions, public procurement procedures, concessions, subsidies, EU funds, state‑owned enterprises, chains of contracts, financial flows and the real beneficial owners behind them. It will not simply be a supervisory or advisory body: it can conduct its own investigations and preliminary proceedings, request and cross‑match data, initiate action by other authorities, and in the case of certain corruption offences and crimes involving public assets it will be able to carry out investigations itself.
Crucially, the office may also take over cases that are still pending before an indictment is brought, if it considers that this would allow the state’s criminal or financial claims to be asserted more effectively. In such cases it can step into the shoes of the prosecution service, bring charges and then represent the case as public prosecutor before the court, meaning that, after a recent amendment of the Fundamental Law, the Prosecutor General’s Office has lost its previous monopoly on acting as public prosecutor. The institution will be able to use administrative, criminal‑law and civil‑law instruments in parallel, a feature described by Euronews as the source of both its strength and of main rule‑of‑law concerns.
The selection process for the NVVH leadership sparked fierce debate even before the parliamentary vote. As reported by Euronews, parliament’s Committee on Justice and Constitutional Affairs heard three of the 96 original candidates during the week: Anna Róza Unger, a political scientist and lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE); lawyer Miklós Ligeti, legal director of Transparency International Hungary; and Nicholas Sárvári, a Canadian‑Hungarian businessman who runs a company specialising in international asset recovery and crisis management.
At the committee hearing, Unger warned that it would be unrealistic to expect final judgments in all major corruption cases within six years, and in her programme she spoke not only about uncovering individual cases but also about dismantling the institutional and political system that makes corruption possible. The committee eventually recommended Anna Unger to the National Assembly, with six MPs supporting her nomination, one opposing and one abstaining, while Miklós Ligeti received four votes in favour and four abstentions, and Nicholas Sárvári did not receive sufficient support.
Critics of the nomination procedure objected that while the committee had already selected three candidates to go through to the next round, the Tisza parliamentary group later put forward Nicholas Sárvári as a separate nominee, raising questions about whether he was competing on the same terms as the other participants in the open call. Many considered Miklós Ligeti to be the most qualified and experienced of the candidates, and therefore described the choice of Unger as outrageous and worrying, while supporters argue that the president’s primary task will not be to lead individual investigations but to build and provide strategic direction for an independent institution that brings together different areas of expertise.
Opposition parties and some commentators have voiced strong concerns about the NVVH’s design and leadership. As reported by The European Conservative, conservatives fear that the government’s “anti‑corruption” drive could become a tool for political retaliation, with the opposition arguing that the legislation grants the NVVH unusually extensive powers with insufficient judicial safeguards. They have compared it to the ÁVH, the political police of Hungary’s communist era, warning that its powers could affect a large number of citizens and businesses that have received state or EU funding.
MPs from Fidesz and the Mi Hazánk party did not take part in the committee’s decision, and according to Fidesz, the NVVH has been given excessively broad investigative, prosecutorial and information‑gathering powers without adequate external checks, and the authority could therefore easily become a tool for political score‑settling. The party has also initiated a constitutional court review of the legislation establishing the office.
Supporters of the new government counter that the NVVH, together with Hungary’s decision to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, is intended to signal that the new administration not only wants to protect future EU funds but also intends to track down and recover public money that was previously spent unlawfully. As reported by Euronews, setting up the NVVH was not, in itself, a precondition laid down in law for the release of EU funds, but there is nonetheless a close political and trust‑related link between the two issues, as Brussels withheld a significant share of the money due to Hungary because it did not consider corruption prevention, the monitoring of EU subsidies and the consistent investigation of irregularities to be sufficiently guaranteed.
Prime Minister Péter Magyar has stressed that the government plans to speed up and shorten criminal proceedings in order to prevent delaying tactics and impunity, but experts caution that the success of the new authority will not be determined by how many high‑profile proceedings it launches. As reported by Euronews, the key test will be whether its investigations lead to indictments that stand up in court, final judgments and assets actually recovered, noting that part of the money may be hidden in foreign bank accounts, complex corporate networks, real estate or ownership structures that are hard to identify, and recovering it may require lengthy international legal proceedings.
Unger herself has warned against expecting mass convictions within her six‑year term, arguing in her committee hearing that the NVVH’s success should be judged more by system‑wide exposure of corruption networks and the building of institutional expertise than by the number of final judgments. In her Facebook statement cited by Portfolio, she underlined that accountability must not become “political revenge” and called for cooperation across professional lines, including with Ligeti, to ensure the office’s work is seen as credible and technically sound.
]]>France is pushing to limit the duration of exemptions that allow Ukraine to purchase military equipment outside the European Union using funds from the bloc’s €90bn Ukraine Support Loan. Paris is seeking temporary limits on derogations for purchases outside the bloc, including for U.S.-made Patriot air-defence interceptor missiles, in a bid to steer more orders towards European defence companies.
The Council of the European Union approved the loan package at the end of April, with funding intended to meet Ukraine’s defence and economic needs in 2026 and 2027. One-third of the money is earmarked for macroeconomic and budgetary support, while the remaining two-thirds will finance defence-industrial capacity and weapons procurement, with the EU planning to raise the funds through borrowing on capital markets and repayment intended to come from Russian reparations to Ukraine.
Under the loan’s terms, Ukraine may spend up to 35% of the defence component outside the EU and the European Economic Area, provided products do not meet the 65% EU/Ukraine/Norway content threshold; exemptions can be granted if European products do not meet urgent needs, cannot be supplied in required quantities or timeframes, or are too expensive. Kyiv has so far requested two exemptions, covering Chinese components for drones produced in Ukraine and guided missiles for Patriot air-defence systems, both approved by the European Commission on the grounds that Europe currently lacks sufficient production capacity in key areas.
France wants such exemptions to remain temporary, arguing that because the EU organised the financing, a larger share of orders should ultimately go to manufacturers inside the bloc, including French producers. For air defence, the policy would support the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system as a European alternative to Patriot; Ukraine has recently received approval to produce missiles for SAMP/T.
Nine EU governments have opposed the French position, with Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Finland and Lithuania arguing that Ukraine must retain greater freedom to choose suppliers. In July, the defence ministers of those nine countries sent a letter to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius calling for Ukraine to be given maximum flexibility in its procurement, stressing that swift approval of product schedules is crucial, including through pragmatic use of the derogation for third-country materiel.
The nine countries advocating for Ukraine’s flexibility are Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Finland, Lithuania and the Netherlands, and they have warned against constraints that could delay access to urgently needed equipment. The letter underlines that the loan’s compliance conditions already tie funding to strict rule-of-law and anti-corruption standards, and that additional procurement limits could undermine Kyiv’s ability to defend itself against Russian bombardment.
Patriot procurement does not sit entirely outside Europe’s defence industry, with Germany and Poland producing, or planning to produce, missiles or components for the system, allowing part of a PAC-2 or PAC-3 order to be fulfilled within the EU. Nonetheless, the French push is seen as raising pressure on non-EU Patriot purchases and potentially delaying access to some weapons if exemptions are not renewed when Ukraine submits new funding requests.
The financing is part of the European Union’s €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, a facility launched alongside a July 15 signing ceremony in Kyiv that also marked a new €10bn deal for joint production of drones and long-range missiles handed over to President Volodymyr Zelensky and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The new agreement is embedded within the broader loan framework.
The assistance is subject to compliance conditions, with terms stating that funding will be linked to Ukraine’s compliance with strict conditions, such as respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption. Ukraine needs the EU to continue encouraging reforms, with the government facing pressure over some of the work required for membership even as it receives large-scale financial and military support. The tension between rapid defence procurement and long-term governance reforms is at the heart of the current debate over how flexibly Kyiv can spend the loan’s defence component.
On 24 August, the European Commission announced approval of Ukraine’s next defence spending envelope of €6.1bn for defence procurement as part of the €90bn loan programme, with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stating:
“On Ukraine’s Independence Day, Europe shows our support is unfaltering and concrete.”
The two remaining lists submitted by Ukrainian officials include a request to use EU funds to purchase U.S.-sourced Patriot missiles, which requires an exemption from EU member states, underscoring the immediacy of the air-defence question in the wider loan dispute.
For air defence, the French position would support the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system as a European alternative to Patriot. Ukraine has recently received approval to produce missiles for SAMP/T, a development Paris sees as a pathway to reduce reliance on non-EU interceptors over time. However, the European Commission has acknowledged that Europe currently lacks sufficient production capacity in certain areas of modern warfare, which is why it approved exemptions for Chinese drone components and U.S. Patriot interceptors.
The exemptions must be renewed each time Ukraine submits a new request for funding, and if, by that time, a European manufacturer is able to offer equivalent products in the required quantities, at the required price, and within the required timeframe, the European Commission may refuse to extend the exemption. This mechanism is at the centre of France’s push to make derogations temporary, with the aim of ensuring that EU funds will increasingly be directed toward European manufacturers in the future.
France wants Ukraine to spend more of the €90bn EU loan on weapons and military equipment produced in Europe, citing concerns that EU-backed funding should support European and potentially French defence production.
France insists on limiting the duration of the exemptions that allow Ukraine to purchase defence products outside the EU using funds from the loan, while noting that up to 35% of products may be purchased outside the bloc under current rules. The nine defence ministers have stressed that swift approval of product schedules is crucial, including through the pragmatic use of derogations for the purchase of materiel produced by third countries.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on 24 August:
“On Ukraine’s Independence Day, Europe shows our support is unfaltering and concrete,”
as the bloc approved €6.1bn for Ukraine’s defences under the loan programme. The July 15 signing ceremony also marked the launch of a new deal that will provide €10bn for joint production of drones and long-range missiles, financing that is part of the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan.
The dispute sets up a potential clash between Paris’s industrial policy goals and the urgent operational needs voiced by Kyiv and its eastern and northern European partners. If France succeeds in making exemptions strictly temporary, Ukraine could face delays in accessing Patriot interceptors or be pushed towards SAMP/T and other European systems sooner than production ramp-ups allow. Conversely, if the nine-country coalition prevails, Kyiv would retain maximum flexibility to procure from the U.S., China and other third countries where European capacity is insufficient, at the cost of diluting the loan’s intended boost to EU defence industry.
The outcome will likely hinge on negotiations between EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and member state capitals, as well as on the pace at which European manufacturers can scale output of air-defence missiles and drone components to meet Ukrainian demand. Until then, each new Ukrainian funding request will test whether exemptions are renewed or narrowed, keeping the question of who supplies Ukraine’s next layer of air defence at the forefront of European security policy.
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