Hiznî, whose full name is reported as Samî Şêxmûs Hiso, lived in the Muftî neighborhood of Hesekê. He was a member of the Hesekê Brigade and had previously fought with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As part of the integration process, his unit was incorporated into the Syrian army as a brigade.

Hemo: Several suspects arrested

Sîpan Hemo, Syria’s Deputy Defense Minister for the Eastern Region and a former YPG commander, condemned Hiznî’s killing as a “brutal and treacherous crime” and extended his condolences to the family. “Sîpan was a fighter with the Hesekê Brigade and served for years to protect the security of the region and its people,” Hemo said.

According to Hemo, the relevant security forces have arrested several people involved in the killing. The search will continue until all those responsible have been apprehended and brought to justice, he added.

Hemo also warned against escalating tensions in the wake of the killing, saying: “I condemn any inflammatory media rhetoric that incites violence and killing.” He urged the public to act with restraint and not to be drawn into attempts to foment social conflict.

Protests in Hesekê, Qamişlo and Amûdê

Hiznî’s killing and the circulation of the footage have sparked protests in Rojava. In Qamişlo, large numbers of people, including many young people, took to the streets. Security forces were also present during the protest. In Amûdê, residents blocked a main road. Demonstrators protested Hiznî’s killing and demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. In Hesekê itself, large numbers of people gathered outside the hospital where the young man’s body had been taken.

Hiznî was among the former SDF fighters who were integrated into the Syrian army as part of the agreement with Damascus. The former SDF units were incorporated as brigades after the alliance was dissolved as an independent structure around two weeks ago. In mid-August, two fighters were killed and two others wounded in an armed attack on the Qamişlo Brigade.

In the tradition of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, religious orders have been regarded as a second front operating alongside the state’s direct instruments of coercion, including the army, gendarmerie and village guard system. Their role has been to manufacture consent, sanctify obedience and reshape collective memory.

The historical roots of religious orders, the role they have assumed in Kurdistan, their organic integration with the state under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and their efforts to reshape the social order are increasingly coming to light.

The Republic’s hidden partner

Official historiography maintains that the Republic completely dismantled religious orders through legislation enacted in 1925. Yet the founding cadres of the state never abandoned pragmatic alliances with religious sheikhs and aghas, particularly as a means of maintaining control in Kurdistan.

The state adopted a selective approach in the aftermath of the Sheikh Said (Şêx Seîd) Rebellion. It dismantled some religious networks in an effort to undermine the religious basis of the rebellion’s legitimacy, while repositioning other religious orders and madrasa circles that it had brought under its influence as instruments of regional control.

This dual strategy involved suppressing religious and social leaders associated with rebellion, autonomy or national consciousness while strengthening obedient circles willing to accommodate the state. Beneath the rhetoric of “secularism”, what emerged in practice was a state policy of “controlled religion”.

The role of state-religious order cooperation in Kurdistan

The ideological writings of the Kurdish Freedom Movement have frequently argued that religion has played a different role in Kurdistan from that in western Turkey. Religious networks have also served as a means of replacing national identity, language and traditions of self-organisation with a predominantly religious identity.

The state sought to substitute Kurdish identity with a discourse of “Muslim brotherhood”, confining the population’s national demands within a religious framework. The state promoted religious orders and communities in Kurdistan with renewed and far greater systematic intensity, particularly following the 1980 military coup, as part of its efforts to counter left-wing and national movements.

Quran courses, boarding Imam Hatip religious schools and foundations affiliated with religious orders established during this period did more than provide religious education. They also sought to distance younger generations from the national liberation struggle and channel them towards an identity integrated with the state.

Hezbollah: The state’s counter-guerrilla experiment

One of the darkest examples in the political memory of the Kurdish Freedom Movement is Hezbollah, which was active in several major cities in Kurdistan, including Diyarbakır (Amed), Batman (Êlih) and Gaziantep (Dîlok), during the 1980s and 1990s and whose activities were also recorded in official documents. Reports by Parliament’s Commission for the Investigation of Unsolved Murders, along with judicial proceedings from the period, documented that the organisation carried out a systematic campaign of killings targeting intellectuals, politicians and activists close to the Kurdish political movement, with the knowledge and, at times, direct support of the state.

The case occupies a central place in analyses of Hezbollah as one of the clearest examples of how religious discourse could be transformed by the state into a direct instrument of conflict and intimidation.

Naqshbandism and the Nur movement: Silent assimilation

Some branches of the Naqshbandi order and circles associated with the Nur movement built up a religious-conservative middle class in cities across Kurdistan through networks of foundations, student residences and private education centres. This social stratum took shape around an internalisation of the state discourse that portrayed national demands as “separatism”, while becoming economically dependent on public contracts and state resources.

These networks became a key arena for manufacturing consent and establishing ideological hegemony among sections of society that could not be reached through armed coercion.

A varied map of influence across Kurdistan’s cities

The influence of religious orders is not evenly distributed across Kurdistan. Different religious networks have gained prominence according to the particular historical and social fabric of each city. The Naqshbandi-rooted madrasa tradition is more visible in and around Diyarbakır, while groups close to the Menzil community are seen as having considerable influence over public-sector employment in the Batman and Siirt (Sêrt) area. In Şırnak (Şirnex) and Hakkari (Colemêrg), tribal-religious alliances intertwined with the village guard system are more prominent.

The Kurdish movement’s experience of organising across the region suggests that these differences are not accidental. Rather than pursuing a uniform centralised policy, the state has sought to identify the most influential religious and social network specific to each city, form alliances with it and implement a localised model of control.

The Menzil community and its institutional partnership with the government

The Menzil community, centred in Adıyaman (Semsûr), illustrates the new dimension that relations between religious orders and the state assumed in the 2000s. Media reports have frequently alleged that members of the community became increasingly concentrated in public institutions, particularly in the health sector and the bureaucracy. This has been interpreted as evidence that the relationship between religious orders and the state had moved beyond informal influence and developed into a practice of institutional recruitment.

Numerous reports have also documented claims that similar networks expanded across Kurdish cities through public-sector employment and their relationships with local authorities.

The AKP era: The organic integration of religious orders into the state

The relationship between religious orders and the state evolved from indirect cooperation into a direct partnership in power following the AKP rise to government. The rapid expansion of the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the allocation of public resources to foundations affiliated with religious orders and privileges reportedly granted to certain religious communities in public tenders emerged as tangible signs of this transformation.

In Kurdistan, this process unfolded alongside the self-government resistance that began in 2015 and the subsequent state of emergency. Contractor networks close to religious orders were favoured in the reconstruction of devastated cities, as part of an effort to rebuild Kurdish urban spaces around a more explicitly religious identity.

Numerous media reports from the same period also documented close cooperation between state-appointed trustee administrations and religious networks in the fields of culture and education after municipalities governed by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) were taken over by trustees.

Where official and unofficial religion converge

The Presidency of Religious Affairs formally presents itself as the institutional expression of state-sanctioned religion and maintains an official distance from religious orders. The reality on the ground, however, points to a different picture. Regional media reports and academic field studies have frequently observed that a significant number of muftis and preachers appointed to Kurdish cities have organic ties to particular religious networks, while the content of Friday sermons and official religious education often overlaps with the discourse promoted by these groups.

The boundary between official and unofficial religion is therefore effectively blurred. The state itself comes to resemble a network of religious orders, while those networks become extensions of the state’s local apparatus. This intertwining enables control to operate not from a single centre, but through a multi-layered network of overlapping structures.

Social engineering through education, women’s bodies and identity

Religious networks also engage in a form of social engineering centred on women’s bodies and the institution of the family. Directing girls towards boarding Quran courses, reproducing practices of early marriage through religious legitimisation and promoting narratives that seek to withdraw women from public life constitute a dual barrier in Kurdistan to a project of liberation based on both national freedom and gender equality.

The expansion of Imam Hatip religious schools across Kurdistan and the centralisation of the curriculum are also seen as systematic instruments of assimilation, restricting the transmission of local languages, history and traditions of self-organisation to younger generations.

The Süleymancı movement and the cycle of economic dependence

Networks of student residences and boarding houses associated with the Süleymancı movement represent another mechanism aimed particularly at children from poor Kurdish families. In rural areas and impoverished urban neighbourhoods, these organisations provide free accommodation and food, removing children from their families and social environments at an early age and bringing them directly into the hierarchy of the religious order.

This practice forms part of a broader system in which poverty is exploited as a means of reshaping identity. Many children raised in these residences later enter the state bureaucracy or institutions affiliated with the religious order, integrating them into the same system in adulthood.

The trustee regime and the religious transformation of local government

The appointment of trustees to dozens of municipalities governed by the HDP after 2016 brought a fundamental shift in the allocation of local government budgets for culture, arts and education. Resources previously allocated to Kurdish-language courses, women’s shelters and autonomous cultural centres were redirected under trustee administrations, largely towards Quran courses, mosque construction and social assistance programmes transferred to foundations affiliated with religious orders.

The Kurdish movement’s model of municipal governance, centred on local decision-making and multiculturalism, was replaced under the trustees by a centralised and increasingly religion-oriented approach to local government.

This shift demonstrated how religious networks were no longer confined to the social sphere but had become embedded directly within local structures of the state.

My brother Vedat Aydin became politically active at a very young age

Aydin said he learned two weeks ago that his brother Vedat Aydin and his cousin Fatih Aydin had fallen martyrs Aydin also said: “My brother Vedat Aydin became politically active at a very young age. In 2014, while he was still at high school, he joined the movement with five of his friends. He fought against ISIS in Rojava for three months. He then went to Qandil, where he continued his training. In 2018, he went to Shengal and fought against ISIS amid the Yazidi genocide. Following the liberation of Shengal, he moved to the Zap region, where he continued fighting the Turkish army and fell a martyr in 2019.”

My faith in peace was shaken most during the condolences

Aydin said he and his brother Vedat, who was one year older than him, grew up together in Barman village in Savur (Stewrê), Mardin. He said news of his brother’s death arrived on 22 August, just as the condolences for his cousin Fatih Aydin had ended.

Aydin stressed that his faith in peace was shaken most by what happened during the condolences in Mardin. Aydin said: “There is a place in Mardin that the local community built themselves. We were going to receive condolences there. But when we arrived, we saw that the building and the surrounding area had been blockaded by soldiers. They refused to give us the keys, claiming that we had not obtained permission. We went to the Pınardere Gendarmerie Station in Savur, Mardin, but no one there would deal with us. Although they claimed that we needed permission to hold the condolences, there was no one we could actually speak to. No one engaged in any dialogue with us. They sent us from one room to another as though someone was eventually going to see us, but no one would speak to us. They were simply trying to stall us.”

They talk about returns while building new prisons

Aydin continued: “You could see from their looks and their behaviour that they harboured hostility towards us. They could not tolerate us. Since there was no one willing to speak to us, we eventually left. They later called us and said we needed permission from the district governor. But when we went to the district governor’s office, once again there was no one we could speak to. We were told that the district governor had guests. I submitted a petition requesting permission to hold the condolences. They said they would get back to us, but two weeks have passed and we have heard nothing.

Once we had submitted the petition, we informed MPs from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) about the situation. They contacted the Mardin Governor’s Office. The Pınardere Gendarmerie Station eventually backed down following a decision from the governor’s office, but gendarmes continued patrolling the area even while the condolences were being held. If they were sincere about a solution, they would not have subjected us to this oppression on such a painful day. We will not forget what they did to us. Now they say there will be returns under the Framework Law, yet at the same time new prisons are being built. These practices give us no hope.”

The statement said: “Four years have passed since the Jin Jiyan Azadî revolution. Born out of an environment of repression, discrimination and oppression, the revolution became a turning point in Iran’s modern history. Led by women and joined by young people, workers, teachers, students, lawyers and other sections of society, this revolution was not simply a temporary protest. On the contrary, it marked the beginning of a profound social transformation that turned fear into resistance, silence into an outcry, and demands for freedom, equality, justice and human dignity into a shared cause.”

The organisations said women in Iran had demonstrated that the struggle for women’s liberation could not be separated from the struggle for the freedom and liberation of society as a whole. They said the Iranian regime had responded by resorting to policies of repression, arrests, torture, executions and intimidation.

The statement said, “But they could not break the will of society.”

Freedom, justice and economic demands are inseparable

The organisations said the people of Iran had followed the same path in the latest protests, with those exhausted by poverty and corruption taking to the streets to demand their right to life, freedom and justice.

The statement said the protests had once again demonstrated that economic demands and the struggle for freedom and justice could not be separated, stressing that no society could achieve prosperity or justice without freedom.

Women continue to resist compulsory hijab

The statement described women’s resistance to compulsory hijab and their challenge to one of the Islamic Republic’s principal instruments of power and control as one of the most enduring gains of the Jin Jiyan Azadî revolution.

The statement said, “Millions of women, by going without the hijab or choosing what they want to wear, have shown in the streets, universities, workplaces and their daily lives that human dignity, freedom and the right to choose cannot be erased through repression, threats or punishment.”

The statement continued: “These actions have not only challenged the legitimacy of the government’s anti-women policies, but have also become a symbol of civil disobedience and a source of inspiration for struggles for freedom, equality and human rights across societies. Defending the right to choose what to wear today means defending the freedom of all citizens and represents a fundamental step towards ending all forms of discrimination and oppression.”

The organisations said the increasing use of the death penalty, including against protesters and political prisoners, the imposition of heavy fines on civil society, professional and political activists, and continuing pressure on organisations were signs that the policy of intimidation remained in place.

They added that the families of those killed continued to seek justice despite threats, arrests and security pressure, saying that by keeping alive the memory and aspirations of those they had lost, the families had become a voice of conscience that continued to inform society.

The Jin Jiyan Azadî revolution continues

The statement stressed that justice and women’s resistance were among the fundamental principles of the liberation movement of the Kurdish and Iranian peoples: “We, the Kurdistan Women’s Organisation and the Kurdistan Justice Organisation, respectfully commemorate those who lost their lives on the path to freedom and stress the need for the unconditional release of all political and religious prisoners, the abolition of the death penalty, an end to repression and the elimination of all forms of gender, national, religious and class discrimination. The right to choose what to wear and other fundamental freedoms must also be guaranteed, along with equality, social justice and the right of bereaved families to seek justice.”

The statement concluded: “We believe that the Jin Jiyan Azadî revolution is not an event that belongs to the past. On the contrary, it is a living and continuing process, sustained through the daily resistance of women, workers, teachers, pensioners, students, young people, families seeking justice and all those struggling for freedom to build a free, equal and democratic society founded on human dignity.”

Lawyer Yusuf Erdoğan, Co-Spokesperson of the Central Prison Commission of the Human Rights Association (IHD), spoke to ANF about the deepening regime of isolation in prisons, the architecture of new-type prisons, the unlawful practices of Administration and Observation Boards and the situation of ill prisoners.

Erdoğan said political prisoners were labelled as “dangerous” and as “people who must be kept away from society” from the moment they were detained and arrested.

Political prisoners are subjected to isolation from the outset

Erdoğan said the authorities’ approach towards political prisoners begins even before imprisonment: “People can be detained because of their political identity, views or activities and may subsequently be remanded in custody or sentenced. This goes hand in hand with a process in which political prisoners are defined by the state and those in power as ‘dangerous’ and as ‘people who must be kept away from society’, while such a perception is also created within society.”

Erdoğan said the state and successive governments had pursued a policy of “isolating” people engaged in opposition activities and dissent from society from the outset, and that the same approach continued inside prisons: “As a result, the treatment of political prisoners continues in parallel with the policies governing their imprisonment. The targeting of political movements and individuals outside prison enters a different phase inside prisons through a policy of ‘isolation’.”

New-type prisons impose isolation within isolation

Erdoğan said changes in the physical structure of prisons in Turkey were crucial to understanding the prison regime. He said the process that began with F-type prisons was followed by prison campuses, high-security prisons and S- and Y-type prisons.

Erdoğan said these facilities had become places where prisoners, particularly political prisoners, were subjected to severe isolation and restrictions on communication: “Changes in the physical conditions of prisons in Turkey offer an important insight into this issue. The prison regime in Turkey can be better understood by looking at certain historical periods. There was once a period when the prison population, and consequently the number of prisons, was relatively low, prisoners were held in communal wards and restrictions on communication were comparatively limited. This was followed by the transition to F-type prisons and then by the construction of vast prison campuses far from prisoners’ families and lawyers. Most importantly, the move from F-type prisons to high-security, S-type and Y-type prisons has ushered in a period in which prisoners, particularly political prisoners, face the most severe forms of isolation and restrictions on communication.”

Erdoğan said IHD had repeatedly documented conditions in these prisons in its reports and statements, noting that high-security, S-type and Y-type prisons were designed to minimise communication between prisoners and had frequently been the scene of suspicious deaths.

He also said: “As our association has repeatedly stated in numerous reports and public statements, high-security, S-type and Y-type prisons are based on isolation. Communication between prisoners is reduced to a minimum, and suspicious deaths occur frequently in these facilities.”

Erdoğan said these practices were presented as a “modern prison regime”, but in reality subjected prisoners to “isolation within isolation”.

Prisoners are being left with a sense of loneliness

Erdoğan said isolation was not limited to physical conditions, stressing that restrictions on communication and social interaction formed part of a complex system that also targeted prisoners’ psychological and social well-being.

He said workshops, courses, communal activities and sports, which were suspended on health grounds during the Covid-19 pandemic, remained restricted or had not resumed at all in some prisons.

Erdoğan said: “Isolation is not simply a physical intervention. Isolation and the obstruction of communication form part of a complex situation that also interferes with prisoners’ psychological well-being.”

Erdoğan said prisoners’ communication with the outside world was also obstructed in various ways, with opposition newspapers and magazines withheld and letters sometimes censored. 

He said, “A political approach aimed at leaving prisoners with a ‘sense of loneliness’ continues to be pursued.”

Ill prisoners are trapped in lengthy bureaucratic and legal processes

Lawyer Yusuf Erdoğan said a large proportion of the complaints received by IHD concerned rights violations affecting ill prisoners. He pointed to the use of handcuffs during medical examinations, delays in hospital transfers, procedures involving the Forensic Medicine Institute and the legal criteria applied to decisions on release: “Violations involving prisoners’ access to healthcare are among the issues on which we receive the highest number of complaints. There are many problems, particularly delays in transferring ill prisoners to hospital, the use of handcuffs during transfers and medical examinations, and the denial of release to seriously ill prisoners through reports declaring them ‘fit to remain in prison’. These problems have become systematic and arise partly from administrative practices and partly from legal obstacles. Keeping seriously ill prisoners who are unable to manage their daily lives independently in prison leads to a range of rights violations, particularly difficulties in accessing treatment, with consequences that can amount to violations of the right to life. Since its establishment, our association has monitored and documented the situation of ill prisoners and pursued numerous cases through correspondence and legal applications. Unfortunately, we continue to encounter many obstacles arising from both legislation and its implementation. Prisoners already report that they are unable to receive adequate treatment for their illnesses, that hospital appointments are delayed and that they face problems with decisions issued by the Forensic Medicine Institute when applying for the suspension of their sentences. Reports issued by fully equipped state hospitals concerning the suspension of sentences for ill prisoners are not considered sufficient, and a decision by the Forensic Medicine Institute is required. The Forensic Medicine Institute is treated as the sole authority empowered to make decisions concerning ill prisoners. The process often takes a long time, and administrative procedures delay prisoners’ release.”

Erdoğan also said: “The obstacles to release do not arise solely from institutional practices. Law No. 5275 on the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures also creates barriers. Even an examination of Article 16 of the law shows that additional criteria may be applied despite a medical report stating that a prisoner is ‘unfit to remain in prison’. For example, a finding that an ill prisoner is unable to manage their daily life independently may not be sufficient on its own. The relevant provision also allows an assessment of whether the prisoner would pose a ‘serious and concrete threat to public security’. As this demonstrates, ill prisoners are trapped between treatment procedures inside prisons, medical board reports from state hospitals, the Forensic Medicine Institute process and legal criteria, subjecting them to lengthy bureaucratic procedures. For ill prisoners, such delays can have severe consequences, amounting to violations not only of the right to health but also of the right to life.”

Erdoğan called for the medical files of ill prisoners to be reviewed urgently, for release procedures to be initiated by the authorities without requiring individual applications, and for mechanisms to be established to reduce bureaucratic obstacles.

Administration and Observation Boards must be abolished immediately

Erdoğan said the Administration and Observation Boards, which have been operating since 2021, had become a mechanism for depriving prisoners of their right to conditional release. Erdoğan continued: “Our association receives many complaints about prisoners having their sentences effectively extended through decisions by Administration and Observation Boards. As you know, these boards were introduced in 2020, and we saw the first decisions implemented in 2021. Since then, we have been able to follow decisions postponing the release of political prisoners in particular. When we examine both prisoners’ accounts and the texts of these decisions, it is clear that the questions asked by the boards and their decisions to postpone release cannot be explained on any legal basis.”

Erdoğan said no ruling had yet been issued in the case filed by IHD with the Council of State on 12 December 2020 seeking the annulment and suspension of the Regulation on Observation and Classification Centres and the Evaluation of Convicts. He said the regulation granted the boards extensive powers to assess prisoners.

Erdoğan said: “These boards, established under the regulation and empowered to make decisions on almost every aspect of a prisoner’s situation, have in many cases regarded prisoners as being of ‘good conduct’ right up until their scheduled release date, only to decide shortly beforehand that they are ‘not of good conduct’. The concept of ‘good conduct’, which directly affects the right to liberty and security, has effectively been left to the arbitrary discretion of prison authorities.

Appeals against these decisions by prisoners and their lawyers produce no results, and prisoners’ release can be postponed for prolonged periods. We have found that the questions put to prisoners by the boards are particularly subjective and often seek to compel them to express political views. A board also has the authority to postpone a prisoner’s release repeatedly on the grounds that they are not of ‘good conduct’. The boards have therefore been granted broad discretionary powers, leaving prisoners’ ‘hope’ of release at their ‘mercy’. Any administration that regards itself as governed by the rule of law must uphold legal certainty and predictability.”

Erdoğan called for the Administration and Observation Boards to be abolished: “These boards must be abolished immediately. Decisions concerning prisoners’ release must be based on objective assessments. Discriminatory practices must end, and international conventions guaranteeing prisoners’ rights must serve as the basis for the system.”

Nergis Haydari was also sanctioned for failing to comply with mandatory hijab rules during sports activities and for sharing these activities with the public.

The statement said that at least 59 political prisoners had been executed in Rojhilatê Kurdistan and Iran over the past six months. Of these, 29 were people who had recently taken part in protest demonstrations, while three had been detained during the “Jin Jiyan Azadî” Revolution protests.

The organization stated that some of those executed were under the age of 18.

It was also reported that five people were executed in public in an effort to instill fear among the population.

The organization also drew attention to another issue, stating that 29 of the cases had no connection to the recent events and that the individuals had been sentenced to death under the pretext of “war.” It said that their statements had been obtained under pressure and torture and that they had subsequently been sentenced to death.

Garzan Cemetery was bombed from the air by the military in 2017 and subsequently destroyed with excavators. The remains of 267 guerrillas buried in the cemetery were exhumed and taken to Istanbul. It later emerged that the remains had been buried at a site in Kilyos, prompting families to embark on a years-long struggle to recover their loved ones.

Hundreds of families have still been unable to recover the remains of their relatives despite providing DNA samples.

Lütfiye Oruç was among the mothers who spent their lives struggling to recover the remains of their children. Years after finding the remains of her children, she laid them to rest in Garzan Cemetery, only to lose them for a second time when the cemetery was bombed.

Her son Serhat Oruç said his mother continued searching for her children’s remains until her final breath. He said, “My mother’s final wish became a gravestone for us.”

She struggled for years for her son and daughter

Lütfiye Oruç, who died at the age of 90, lived a life marked by forced displacement and loss. Six civilians from the Oruç family were killed when the village of Girs (Kırıkkaya), in Ahlat (Xelat), was evacuated in 1993.

Lütfiye Oruç lived in major cities for a short period before returning to Bitlis. Three of her children, two sons and a daughter, joined the guerrillas and were martyred. She continued her struggle to recover their remains until the end of her life and eventually found the remains of her son Ethem and her daughter in 2013. She was never able to recover the remains of her other son, Sertip.

Lütfiye Oruç found the remains of her eldest son, Ethem, in Bitlis. She found the remains of her daughter Şadiye and two of Şadiye’s cousins in a village in Eruh (Dihê), a district of Siirt (Sêrt), and laid them to rest in Garzan Cemetery.

They were left without graves for a second time

The families’ struggle began anew when Garzan Cemetery was bombed and the remains buried there were taken elsewhere.

Lütfiye Oruç continued until the final years of her life to seek answers about what had happened to her children’s remains and to give them a grave with a headstone.

Lütfiye Oruç had buried her children and two other relatives at Garzan Cemetery, which was established during the peace process. She visited the cemetery almost every day to pray, describing it as a place where she could “breathe”. After the remains were removed from the cemetery, she said in a statement to the press: “I cannot breathe again.”

Lütfiye Oruç filed applications seeking the return of the remains after the cemetery where her children were buried was bombed and the remains were taken elsewhere. She died without receiving any results.

My mother could breathe there

Serhat Oruç said more than 200 sets of remains were brought together and taken to Garzan as part of the process that began in 2013. Describing how his mother visited the cemetery every day, Oruç said: “I was arrested in 2016, and later learned that the cemetery had been bombed. Once the cemetery was established, I used to take my mother there almost every day. She could breathe there among the gravestones and she would pray. Every day, she would talk to the children she had spent years searching for.”

Oruç said his mother’s condition steadily deteriorated after the remains were removed from the cemetery: “Once they took those remains away, my mother’s condition deteriorated in every respect. Towards the end, she had also lost her memory. She was nearly 90 when she died.”

Only the bones remained

Serhat Oruç said his brother Ethem Oruç was martyred alongside five of his comrades in August 1991 and that their remains were not handed over to the family at the time.

Oruç said remains were later recovered from different areas as the process progressed. His family went to the site where they had been told his brother was buried, but found only bones.

Oruç also said: “Once the process began, remains were recovered from many different places. We went to the place where we had been told he was buried. Only the bones remained. We found five skulls there. People wanted to recover their loved ones even if only their bones remained. Mothers would do anything just to have a gravestone.”

I will fulfil my mother’s final wish

Oruç said his mother had endured immense hardship throughout her life, including the burning of her village and the loss of three of her children.

She added: “She lived to that age with tremendous strength and determination. My mother always stood on her own feet. She endured so much pain. Their village was burned and three of her children lost their lives in this conflict.”

Oruç said his sister and brother had been buried in Garzan Cemetery and that his mother had provided DNA samples several times, but their remains had still not been recovered.

She also said: “She gave DNA samples many times, but the remains could not be found. It was my mother’s final wish. She would say, ‘Whatever happens, bring them back, even if all that remains are their bones.’”

Our struggle will continue

Oruç said that after being released from prison following seven years of imprisonment, he continued his struggle to fulfil his mother’s final wish and called for the fate of the remains to be established. Oruç said: “A society that does not claim the remains of its dead cannot be a society. They are my siblings. Whatever the outcome, I will continue to apply to every relevant authority and do everything I can to recover their remains.”

Oruç called for the whereabouts of the remains and the place where they were buried to be disclosed and said: “It was winter when this happened. It must be established where those remains were taken and where they were buried. Even if only their bones remain, we want them to have gravestones.”

The remains must be returned to the families

Oruç stressed that he would continue his struggle to fulfil his mother’s final wish and called for the remains to be returned to their families.

Oruç also said: “I am ready to do everything I can. Whatever happens, I will try to fulfil her final wish. The remains must be returned. The remains buried in Kilyos must be handed over to their families. The families’ pain must not be deepened any further. This suffering must come to an end.”

The meeting discussed the progress of the integration process, the status of service institutions in Hasakah province, and the reactivation of these institutions.

The meeting also included an exchange of views on strengthening coordination among the parties concerned.

The festival began on the anniversary of the death of Kurdish director and filmmaker Yılmaz Güney. Around 650 films from 31 countries were submitted to the festival, and the jury selected 108 films from 23 countries for the festival program.

Award for Kurdish musician Mehmûd Berazî

Kurdish musician Mehmûd Berazî received an award as part of the festival. Known for bringing traditional Kurdish music together with modern music, Berazî has worked with Hunergeha Welat and the Film Commune on the preparation and promotion of traditional folk music works.

Originally from Kobanê, Berazî began his musical career in 1994 in Serêkaniyê. He received his first musical training from Kurdish poet and musician Bê Bihar, and later learned to play various musical instruments, particularly the daf.

As part of the 6th Silêmanî International Film Festival, which will run until 15 September, panels on cinema and two masterclasses will also be held.

Commemorations are being held in Amed, Batman, Siirt, Van, Bitlis, Kars, Ağrı, Muş, Iğdır, Erzurum, Adıyaman, Antep, Mersin, Adana, Hatay, and Istanbul, as well as in numerous districts. In many places, the gatherings continue for several days.

The commemoration venues are decorated with photographs of the martyrs and banners bearing slogans such as “Şehîd namirin” [Martyrs are immortal]. In addition to relatives, representatives of political parties and civil society organizations, as well as numerous local residents, are taking part in the events paying tribute to those who fell in the struggle for freedom.

Hundreds attend the commemoration in Amed

In Amed, hundreds of people gathered in the Bağlar district for a commemoration organized by MEBYA-DER (Association for Assistance, Solidarity, Unity and Culture for Families Who Lost Relatives in the Cradle of Civilisations). Alongside the families of the martyrs, politicians and representatives of civil society organizations also attended the gathering.

Inside the hall, photographs of the fallen guerrilla fighters were displayed on a long table and adorned with roses. The slogans “Şehîd namirin” and “Bijî Serok Apo” [Long Live Leader Öcalan] were repeatedly chanted. The event began with a minute of silence in memory of the martyrs, followed by the singing of the Kurdish anthem “Çerxa Şoreşê.”

Afterwards, particularly large numbers of mothers spoke with the families and touched the displayed photographs of the martyrs. The commemoration in Bağlar is scheduled to continue for three days. Multi-day gatherings are also taking place in the districts of Bismil, Çınar, Silvan, and Ergani.

Thousands attend commemorations across the Kurdish region

Participation is also high in other regions. In Batman, visits continued on the final day of the commemoration. In the Özalp district of Van, thousands of people gathered for the commemoration. After the hall reached full capacity, additional tents were set up outside.

In Bitlis, DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan attended the second day of the commemoration. In Siirt, DBP Co-Chair Keskin Bayındır attended the commemorative event and told the families: “The struggle of our martyrs illuminates our path. We are grateful to them.”

Further events were held in Doğubeyazıt, Patnos, Erciş, Özalp, Varto, Bulanık, Malazgirt, Tekman, Karayazı, Hınıs and Karaçoban districts of Ağrı, Van, Muş and Erzurum.

In Iğdır, a three-day commemoration concluded after thousands of visits with a film screening about the lives and struggle of the fallen.

Families in Istanbul call for support for the peace process

Commemorative events were also held in Istanbul, including in Esenyurt and Sultangazi districts. In Esenyurt, numerous people gathered at the DEM Party premises. Following a minute of silence, a film screening presented the life stories of the martyrs.

Speaking here, TJA activist Sevgi Yılmaz said: “Our pain is great, but we walk with our heads held high. We will remain committed to their struggle and preserve the legacy they have left behind.”

Relatives also linked the commemoration to the ongoing process for peace and a democratic society. “Our only demand is that everyone support this process,” they said.

Following speeches by DEM Party politician Arife Çınar and Nevzat Öztürk, who was released after 32 years in prison, participants offered their condolences to the families.

Tuncel: Commemoration should not be limited to mourning

In Sultangazi, numerous people attended a commemoration held at the DEM Party premises. Among those commemorated were the fallen guerrilla fighters Berfin and Şerzan.

TJA activist Sebahat Tuncel recalled the circumstances under which young Kurds joined the freedom struggle: “Our young people joined the struggle to say, ‘We exist,’ on behalf of a people whose language and identity were banned.”

Remarking that the commemoration should not be limited to mourning the martyrs, Tuncel stated: “If we have come to this commemoration, it is because we attach importance to this path. It is not about weeping for them, but about carrying their flag forward. To do that, we must struggle even harder.”

Former political prisoner Murat Arslan, who was released after 31 years in prison, described continuing the struggle as an obligation to the martyrs. “The more strongly we carry this resistance forward and overcome our shortcomings, the more we will do justice to them.” The event concluded with a film screening.

Commemorations announced in Urfa

Three-day commemorative events are also planned in Urfa starting on September 11. The relatives’ association KAT-DER is organizing gatherings in the districts of Eyyübiye, Suruç and Viranşehir. A religious ceremony with broader participation is scheduled to be held on September 13 to conclude the commemorations.

The project by the OYAK cement factory was exempted from an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in December 2021. The Amed Bar Association, the Amed Ecology Association, and residents of Husikan filed a lawsuit against the decision. The court has now suspended the decision pending the conclusion of the proceedings, stating that allowing the project to continue could cause damage that would be difficult to remedy.

Risks to drinking water and pastoral farming

The decision is based in part on an expert report prepared following a site inspection in April. The report identified significant shortcomings in the project documentation. The planned mining area is located only around 118 meters from a water reservoir used by the local population. Fuel or oil leaks from machinery could affect water quality, potentially endangering both drinking and utility water as well as the water supply for livestock, it said.

According to the court, the impact on pastoral farming, which constitutes a key source of livelihood for the local population, was also inadequately assessed. Although the project documents included calculations on noise and air quality, they did not address the potential loss of grazing land, restrictions on livestock movement, or a reduction in available feed sources. The court noted that an environmental assessment must take into account not only the physical impacts of a project but also the economic and social activities in the affected area.

Information on forests and biodiversity deemed insufficient

The entire project area is located on land classified as forest under Turkish forestry law. According to the submitted plans, an average of 120 trees per hectare would be cut down, with five times as many trees to be planted elsewhere as compensation. However, the court criticized the lack of clarity regarding the inventory, land measurements, or forestry criteria on which the estimate of 120 trees per hectare was based.

The studies on flora and fauna were also deemed inadequate. Accordingly, these studies relied largely on observations, literature, and indirect sources rather than surveys conducted directly within the project area. As a result, they did not sufficiently reflect the actual state of the ecosystem or the potential loss of habitats.

The expert report also identified a geological risk that had not been adequately assessed. Although the area is susceptible to landslides due to its volcanic structure, specific hazard zones had not been clearly identified, it stated.

Court finds right to a healthy environment at risk

In its reasoning, the Administrative Court explicitly referred to the constitutionally protected right to live in a healthy and balanced environment, saying that the potential impacts of the mining project on the environment and ecological balance could violate this right.

Since implementing the project before the conclusion of the court proceedings could cause damage that would be difficult to remedy, the court suspended the “EIA Not Required” decision until the proceedings are concluded. The ruling was issued unanimously and is not subject to appeal.

Resistance to the project

There has been resistance to the mining project in Husikan for years. After the project was exempted from an Environmental Impact Assessment in 2021, the company began cutting down trees. In November 2025, the village was sealed off by a massive military presence during work to collect soil samples. Hundreds of soldiers, along with armored vehicles and water cannons, were deployed. Residents who opposed the project were temporarily prevented from leaving the village.

The local population had repeatedly warned about the destruction of forests and grazing land and the consequences of mining for their livelihoods.

Qamishlo

Students marched from the Qermûtî Junction to the Regional Directorate building in Qamishlo, carrying banners demanding their right to education in their mother tongue and calling for Kurdish to be recognized as an official language.

At the end of the march, the students met with Qamishlo Regional Director Cîhan Hesam and stated that they would not accept Kurdish-language education being limited to three hours. Cîhan Hesam said that he would convey the students’ demands to the relevant authorities.

Dêrik

At Yûsif El Ezma School in Dêrik, residents set up a protest tent and announced that their action would continue for three days. On the first day, dozens of students and their families joined the protest. Speaking on behalf of the Student Initiative, Esma Îsam stated that the interim government’s decision constitutes a violation of human rights. Îsam emphasized that the people of Rojava would never give up the gains achieved through the Rojava Revolution and called for Kurdish to be recognized as an official language in the Syrian constitution.

Amûdê

Speaking at a demonstration held by residents at Jina Azad Junction in Amûdê, researcher Arşek Baravî said: “The Syrian Ministry of Education’s decision to limit Kurdish-language education to three hours is incompatible with the culture of the Kurdish people. Kurds have struggled for years for the right to education in their own language. Our protests will continue until our demand for all classes to be taught in Kurdish is met.”

Çilaxa

Students boycotting classes and their families gathered outside the Education Center in Çilaxa, carrying banners which said that Kurdish-language education is their legal and political right. A statement delivered by Henîfa Reşîd emphasized that the Syrian Ministry of Education’s decision is unacceptable. The statement recalled that students in Rojava have been receiving education in Kurdish from primary school through university for the past 14 years. The students and their families called for their demands to be conveyed to the relevant authorities.

Til Temir

The Til Temir Council of Martyrs’ Families and students issued statements demanding Kurdish-language education at the Council of Martyrs’ Families Park and Meyselûn School. The statements emphasized that the Kurdish language is an integral part of identity and a cultural right, and that Kurdish children have the right to receive education in Kurdish. They called on the interim government to withdraw its decision regarding Kurdish-language education.

The statements stressed that demands for Kurdish-language education were being expressed through peaceful means and concluded with the slogan, “Bê ziman jiyan nabe” (“There is no life without language”).

Hesekê, Dirbêsiyê, Tirbespiyê

Students and council members issued a joint statement at the Councils of Martyrs’ Families in Hesekê, Dirbêsiyê, and Tirbespiyê.

The statement said that decisions that seek to suppress the Kurdish language by restricting it to a symbolic few hours of instruction are a continuation of a monolithic and assimilationist mentality. It emphasized that Kurdish is not merely a means of communication, but the essence of existence, identity, the people, and their history.

The three main points emphasized in the statements were as follows:

1. Rejection of chauvinist decisions: We reject the decision to reduce Kurdish-language classes and view this regressive step as a direct violation of the January 29 Agreement and of the existence of the Kurdish people.

2. The necessity of mother-tongue education: We demand that Kurdish, alongside Arabic, be recognized as an official language of instruction in all high schools and at all levels of education in the region.

3. An end to policies of demographic change: Any attempt to change the Kurdish names of places in the region, or any effort to sever our children’s connection with their mother tongue, constitutes a serious threat to social peace and the fraternity of peoples.

Drawing attention to Öcalan’s role in the peace and democratic resolution process, demonstrators called for the necessary conditions to be established to enable the Kurdish leader to engage in free and effective negotiations and for his right to hope to be guaranteed.

Members of the London Communes Union also took part in the demonstration.

Statements made during the demonstration said that a new opportunity had emerged for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. It was emphasized that the failure of previous peace initiatives had led to further deaths, arrests, displacement, and social distrust.

Call for Öcalan’s conditions to be improved

The press statement on behalf of demonstrators noted that a new period began with Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” on 27 February 2025 and recalled that this was followed by a ceasefire, the PKK’s decision to end its organizational activities, and concrete steps toward disarmament.

The statement described Öcalan as the chief negotiator of the Kurdish movement and emphasized that the necessary conditions must be established for him to effectively fulfill this role.

The statement stressed that Öcalan should be able to communicate freely and regularly with political representatives, lawyers, civil society, and the Kurdish community. It also called for Öcalan’s legal status and working conditions to be addressed as part of the peace process.

Another statement stressed the need to strengthen the conditions for dialogue and negotiations in order to achieve lasting peace, conveying the message: “Öcalan’s conditions must be improved, and he must be allowed to communicate freely and regularly.”

‘Hope is also the foundation of peace’

The statement also drew attention to Öcalan’s legal situation, calling on the Council of Europe and European states to take responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.

Speakers emphasized that Öcalan’s right to hope is not limited to the legal situation of a single individual: “Hope is also the foundation of peace.”

Call on the UK government

Messages directed at the UK government also featured prominently during the demonstration.

Drawing attention to the large Kurdish community living in the UK, demonstrators noted that Kurds have built their lives in the country for decades and contributed to society. Emphasizing that Kurdish political and social activities should not be viewed primarily through a security lens, the speakers called on the UK government to establish a more democratic and constructive relationship with the Kurdish community, civil society organizations, elected representatives, and policymakers.

They also stressed that peaceful Kurdish political and cultural activities should not be criminalized, while the UK’s experience in peacebuilding and conflict resolution could be used to support the peace process in Turkey.

The UK government was also called on to encourage Turkey to take the necessary legal and democratic steps.

Speeches delivered during the demonstration called for strengthening dialogue for peace, creating the conditions for negotiations toward a democratic resolution, guaranteeing Öcalan’s right to hope, and implementing the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.

The main demands of the protesters were “dialogue for peace, negotiations for a democratic resolution, free conditions for Öcalan to negotiate, and the right to hope as hope for peace.”

During the demonstration, hundreds of leaflets outlining Öcalan’s thoughts and ideas on achieving a comprehensive peace from an island prison were distributed. The demonstration concluded with slogans.

Speaking to ANF, Önel pointed in particular to the continued blocking of digital platforms operated by Kurdish news agencies, newspapers and magazines. The free press, she said, is therefore confronted with the question of how journalistic information can reach society at all when the channels through which it is disseminated are repeatedly blocked.

Three decades of repression against the Free Press

Önel recalled that the tradition of the free press has faced state repression for more than three decades. “Journalists have been killed, media outlets shut down and newsrooms attacked.” The fact that the free press continues to exist despite this, she said, is the result of decades of resistance.

“The reason we can speak of this so naturally today is that very heavy prices have been paid along the way,” Önel explained. The pursuit of truth, she added, has always been at the heart of the free press.

Governments may have changed, but the methods used have largely remained the same: “Repression, closures, bombings and killings — all of these have been political methods. Pressure increases particularly during periods of political upheaval. When a resolution process is being discussed, when a period of conflict begins, or even when such a period comes to an end, attempts are made to prevent the reality from reaching the public directly.”

Digital censorship as a political instrument

According to Önel, the growing importance of digital media has also changed the form of repression. While media outlets using manipulative, provocative and divisive language are given space, the digital platforms used by the free press are censored. The so-called censorship law has also created a legal basis for this. Websites operated by news agencies, magazines and newspapers are blocked almost daily.

Önel directly linked this practice to the current political process: “For about two years, there has been a process for a democratic society. On the one hand, there is talk of peace; on the other, there are anti-democratic practices. There is an approach that divides society.” Under these conditions, she added, journalists are repeatedly confronted with the question of how they can disseminate reliable information: “How are we supposed to practice journalism? How can we actually reach people and provide them with accurate information?”

At the same time, she posed a concrete question to the Turkish government: “Are we supposed to open a new website every time another one is blocked, or will you create conditions under which we can carry out our work on a more democratic basis?” So far, she said, there has been no positive response.

‘We need broad solidarity’

Önel warned of the consequences of censorship for the public’s access to information. Due to blocks and algorithmic restrictions, many current news reports disappear before they can even be read or noticed. “Instead, attempts are being made to impose dirty information circulating in virtual media on the public,” the DFG Co-Chair said. She stressed that this must be countered through stronger cooperation among journalists. “For years, our only principle and motto has been the commitment to seek the truth. As journalists from the tradition of the free press, we must never abandon our relationship with the truth.”

What is needed, she said, is lasting and broad solidarity among media professionals committed to this principle. “At the same time, a journalistic language must be developed that accompanies the current process in accordance with the principles of peace journalism. To prevent dirty information from taking the place of the truth, we need a broad network of journalists and comprehensive solidarity,” Önel concluded.

The letter said: "As you know, a devastating war has engulfed the entire Middle East. This war has had grave economic and political consequences and has ripped through the social fabric of the region. While claiming to resolve the present conflicts, the international and global actors are preparing themselves for even more wars and conflicts. In such a context, a new voice is rising from the Middle East which seeks to resolve the problems through non-violent approaches. This voice, echoed in the “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”, belongs to the Kurdish People’s Leader Mr. Abdullah Öcalan and embodies a new vision for the solution of the conflicts in the Middle East.

The “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” declared on February 27, 2025, has since had many positive implications in the region. It has led to an immediate cease-fire by the PKK, followed by the dissolution of the Movement, the abandonment of the strategy of military struggle, the burning of the weapons, and the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from Turkey. As a result, hostilities have ceased in Turkey, Northern Syria and Northern Iraq; and Turkey appears to be the only country not directly involved in the Middle East conflict. In the face of the recent challenges in Syria, Mr. Öcalan reached out to the involved parties, offering his perspective on the importance of de-escalation and the potential for political negotiations as a means to achieve long-term stability."

The letter added: "The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) used to bear the brunt of Turkey’s Kurdish issue and suffered hundreds of civilian losses due to the aerial and ground operations of the Turkish army. Mr. Öcalan’s call led to the cessation of hostilities for the last one and a half years in this region and both the regional authorities and the Kurdish public opinion have supported the call and embraced it as a glimpse of hope for peace and stability.

Despite the considerable challenges posed by ongoing regional turmoil, Mr. Öcalan has, over the past year, demonstrated a consistent commitment to translating his statements into tangible actions. On the anniversary of his 2025 call, Mr. Öcalan issued a further statement reaffirming his commitment to peace and the democratisation of the Republic of Turkey. In this context, last year hundreds of institutions and personalities, among them 88 Nobel Prize laureates, voiced their support for Mr. Öcalan’s actions in the promotion of coexistence between nations. Unfortunately, Mr. Öcalan's capacity to act on his expressed readiness to engage in compromise for a de-escalated solution is constrained by the conditions of his imprisonment on Imrali Island. His prison conditions have not changed, and his ability to communicate with the outside world remains dependent on the political conjuncture of the Turkish government."

The letter recalled that "in February 2026, the Commission released its final report. Although the report emphasises the importance of full compliance with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Constitutional Court (AYM) and recommends strengthening existing mechanisms, its continued use of the framework of counterterrorism remains a barrier to true dialogue and reconciliation. The reportindicates that the Turkish government took note of the recommendation issued by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe last September, but no concrete measures were implemented.

In this light, we, as Kurdish political parties, Civil Society Organizations, and distinguished personalities of KRI, call on the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to ensure the implementation of the ECHR 2014 decision in Öcalan's case and recognise the “right to hope.” This constitutes a crucial first step toward addressing Mr. Öcalan’s legal status and enabling him to contribute fully to the peace process.

We call for Abdullah Öcalan's release and for him to be given full and unrestricted opportunity to participate in the further peace process."

The signatories are as follows:

Political Parties

1. Kurdistan Toilers’ Party

2. Kurdistan Communist Party

3. Kurdistan Green Party

4. Movement of The Democratic People of Kurdistan

5. Kurdistan Conservative Party

6. National Stance Movement

7. Democratic National Movement of Kurdistan

Civil Society Organizations

1. Azadbun (Being Free) Organization

2. Dabin Organization

3. Kurdish Women’s Relation Office (Rêpak)

4. The International Network of Kurdish Organizations against Genocide and Crimes

5. The Organization for “Campaign For Life against Capital Punishment in Kurdistan”

6. Kurdish Watch (CHAK)

7. YASNA Organization for the Development of Zoroastrian Philosophy

8. The Organization for Women’s Independence

Personalities

1. Kafiya Suleyman, Former Minister of Municipalities and Tourism in KRG, Women’s Rights Defender, The Founding Member of Kurdistan Women’s Union

2. Dr. Muhsin Edib, Director of Suleymaniyah Bureau for Intelligent affairs

3. Rêzan Şêx Dilêrê, Lawyer and Former MP of Iraqi Parliament

4. Dr. Sarwar Abdulrahman, The Head of PAY Organization for Development and Education

5. Bilêse Cebbar Ferman, Former MP in Iraqi Parliament

6. Dr. Fayeq Muhammad Gulpi, Physician and Former KRG MP

7. Prof. Dr. Shoresh Hassan Omar, University Lecturer, Law Expert

8. Prof. Dr. Mariwan Omar Dewlet, University Lecturer

9. Cemîl Muhammad Hawramî, Head of Kurdistan Veteran Peshmerga Assembly

10. Kardo Muhammad Pîr Dawûd, Former MP in KRG parliament

11. Muhammad Emîn Pêncwînî, Writer, Member of Kurdistan National Congress

12. Shena Ali Khayat, Political Activist, Women’s Rights Defender

13. Esrewan Awat Husameddin Zardashti, Member of YASNA, Political activist

The transition from the monarchical rule of the Ottoman Empire to a republican system with the establishment of the new Turkey was significant. Yet a republic that fails to democratise cannot be a genuine republic. A government that is not elected in a democratic environment represents little more than a formal transformation of monarchical or theocratic rule. Genuine republicans therefore seek democratisation. The 1920s and 1930s were a period in which authoritarian tendencies were gaining ground across the world. In Turkey, the instinct for self-preservation came to the fore following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The ruling classes at the time believed that the country could best be protected through authoritarian regimes. Over the years, it became increasingly clear that this was not the way to safeguard a country, and demands for democratisation gradually grew in Turkey. Nearly all political forces that came to power through elections in Turkey spoke of democratisation. In other words, the call to democratise the republic has found support in every period. Yet the republic has never truly been democratised.

Turkey has seen no shortage of struggles for democratisation, and heavy prices have been paid along the way. Socialists and other democratic forces have faced repression in every period. Military coups, too, were primarily interventions against the forces driving democratisation. The majority of people in Turkey, particularly Kurds, Alevis, workers and women, have demanded democracy. Why, then, has democratisation failed to take root? Many factors and explanations can be put forward. Yet when the past century of political history is considered, the argument that democratisation has been obstructed out of fear that Kurds would benefit from it emerges as a compelling one.

The main reason democratic forces have been unable to overcome this situation is their failure to come together and forge a common position. In a country such as Turkey in particular, it is extremely difficult to achieve results unless democratic forces unite across the broadest possible spectrum. Everyone seeking democratisation must therefore recognise the importance of an alliance for democracy and work towards building one. No political force can credibly claim to support democratisation without making such an effort. Those seeking to establish a democratic republic must therefore aim to build the broadest possible alliance. In launching the Democratic Republic Movement, the DEM Party has pledged to forge the broadest possible democratic alliance. The political tradition represented by the DEM Party has long regarded socialist forces as among its principal allies. Alevis, as one of the sections of society with the greatest need for democracy, have also been a key ally and component of the democratic struggle. Women, meanwhile, have always been regarded as a central force in the struggle within the DEM Party tradition. In short, no single force can create a democratic republic on its own. Nor can the struggle for democracy succeed through an alliance of only two or three components. Everyone who needs democracy must be brought into the Democratic Republic Movement.

Any force that fails to recognise the importance of the broadest possible democratic front, or does not regard democratisation as Turkey’s fundamental political programme and objective of struggle, is consciously or unconsciously accepting life under the existing undemocratic system. Assessing the formation of a democratic front merely in terms of how much strength one group or another possesses reflects a narrow approach to the struggle for democracy. Abdullah Öcalan has consistently advocated the broadest possible alliance in the struggle for democracy. He believes that Turkey can democratise only through such an alliance. Öcalan has called for the creation of a democratic republic and a democratic society movement. A democratic society can be achieved only by organising the people on a democratic basis, and this cannot be accomplished through the participation of only one section of society or a limited number of groups.

Öcalan has consistently said that the democratic alliance that emerges will determine the character of the process as he seeks a democratic political solution with the existing state and discusses this issue with state officials. Through an alliance and struggle for democracy, Öcalan aims to make society as a whole an active participant in the Peace and Democratic Society Process. His objective, therefore, is genuine democratisation. Anyone with an understanding of democracy knows how this can be achieved. Misinterpreting or misjudging Öcalan’s efforts on Imrali would mean disregarding the struggle for democracy he has waged for decades. Öcalan is calling on all democratic forces to come together and struggle for democratic demands. The Kurdish people and Kurdish democratic forces will continue to fulfil their responsibilities in the struggle for democracy in Turkey, just as they have done in the past.

Source: Yeni Yaşam newspaper

This helps explain why the “framework law”, passed by Parliament with ambitious claims, has failed to translate into concrete measures capable of meeting public expectations and has instead remained largely theoretical. The main reason for this lack of progress is the government’s insistence on making the advancement of the process entirely dependent on steps taken by the other side and subjecting it solely to the approval of the National Security Council.

The creation of bureaucratic subcommittees, in the context of an approach that has itself brought the search for a solution to an impasse, risks appearing little more than a delaying tactic. Lasting peace and social reconciliation, however, require moving beyond outdated and rigid rules and developing a legal framework that recognises all sides as legitimate interlocutors. This demands a far bolder political vision, because overcoming the current impasse requires a fundamental change in approach that brings historical and social realities together on a sound basis.

The problem with absolute preconditions and ‘law in books’

The fundamental weakness of the current “framework law” is that it makes a dynamic process, one that should unfold gradually and develop through mutual trust, dependent from the outset on an absolute precondition that is virtually impossible to fulfil. Requiring all parties to lay down their arms and withdraw simultaneously, demanding that this be fully documented by official institutions and then making progress contingent on approval at the highest administrative level leaves an inherently fragile process vulnerable to provocation. This institutional insistence is one of the clearest examples of what Pound described as “law in books”: rules devised in isolation from realities on the ground are being imposed on society. 

From the perspective of political science, the ultimate objective of a process cannot also be made the condition for beginning that process. A genuine model of living law is built not by waiting for bureaucratic mechanisms to determine what happens next, but by providing immediate legal protection to every actor, group and individual who chooses non-violent means. International examples clearly demonstrate the value of such flexibility. In Colombia, the disarmament of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was not imposed as a precondition but was instead incorporated into a flexible 180-day timetable. In Northern Ireland, disarmament was completed seven years after the peace agreement. In both cases, disarmament was treated not as a prerequisite for negotiations but as an outcome of democratic guarantees, allowing the legal framework to respond to realities on the ground. Historical experiences in the Basque Country and South Africa likewise demonstrate how rigid legal frameworks can be adapted to social and political realities.

As these examples demonstrate, preventing laws from remaining merely on paper and giving the framework law genuine social meaning requires connecting its theoretical foundations with realities on the ground. The philosophy of the “Democratic Nation” is presented here as the basis for achieving that social cohesion. By asserting that a territory with existing borders belongs not to a single ethnic group or dominant culture but to all the peoples who have historically shaped it, this approach seeks to move peace beyond the confines of a technical negotiation.

A lasting end to armed conflict, in this view, depends on the state committing itself to a legal framework for coexistence that recognises all identities within the country as equal and constituent elements of the homeland. Rejecting the homogenising logic of the nation-state and providing legal guarantees for democratic transformation rooted in social, historical and geographical realities therefore becomes the fundamental philosophical condition for establishing living law.

Open channels of communication and the power of ‘living law’

One of the fundamental requirements for making a peace process lasting is to ensure that actors capable of influencing broad sections of society retain the freedom to act, develop their ideas and engage in dialogue. Abdullah Öcalan is the principal driving force behind both the philosophical and practical foundations of this process. Yet the institutional approach pursued so far has excluded both the basis for dialogue and the most critical actors in the legal process from the framework law. Leaving Öcalan, who has the capacity to make strategic decisions, communicate directly with his people and movement and help advance the process, until the final stage when it comes to legal rights represents a structural contradiction. For the Kurdish Freedom Movement to put its democratic transformation into practice and work together with Öcalan, there must be an unrestricted, transparent and direct channel of communication between the relevant decision-making bodies. This is essential to the success of the process. The absence of such communication has prevented the current “framework law” from gaining either social legitimacy or practical effect. As a result, the legislation remains trapped in bureaucracy rather than functioning as a living body of law.

Historical experiences around the world offer concrete examples of how such a crisis of political interlocution can be overcome. South Africa provides perhaps the clearest example. The apartheid government began by fundamentally changing the prison conditions of Nelson Mandela, one of the principal architects of the peace process. Mandela was given the means to maintain uninterrupted contact with the outside world, his political colleagues and the wider public. This enabled his leadership to help guide both the movement and broader sections of society towards a democratic political process.

These international experiences show that the Turkish state must abandon the policy of isolation and clearly recognise the sociological reality of the Kurdish people. Such recognition stands in contrast to the state’s homogenising legal framework and draws its strength from the philosophy of the Democratic Nation, which seeks to enable different peoples to coexist. This philosophy defines the nation not through race, religion or a uniform culture, but through democratic coexistence and free will. The ability to persuade broad sections of society to embrace such a fundamental transformation, from a homogenising conception of the nation towards the idea of a Democratic Nation, ultimately rests with those whom these communities themselves recognise as legitimate representatives. In this context, ending Öcalan’s isolation and creating conditions in which he can work and develop his ideas freely, while communicating without restriction with his colleagues and social base, would be the first step towards turning the framework law into living law.

The conflict between a static approach and a dynamic solution

The paralysis created by the current legal framework in practice reflects a fundamental conflict between the state’s rigid, security-oriented approach and society’s demand for transformation and peace. When the state treats conflict resolution as a mechanical “protocol of surrender”, it fails to recognise both the social realities that shape a peace process and the flexibility such a process requires. Successful experiences around the world, as well as the region’s longstanding tradition of coexistence, demonstrate that peace cannot be imposed from above. It must be built through mutual guarantees and a shared political vision. The structural divide between the current approach and this broader understanding of peace therefore reflects the very distinction between law on paper and law in practice.

The first dimension of this divide concerns timing. The current static model makes complete and comprehensive disarmament a “precondition” at the very outset, imposing a form of “law in books” that is detached from realities on the ground. A dynamic model informed by international experience and the Middle East’s historical traditions of reconciliation, by contrast, treats disarmament not as a starting point but as a natural outcome of a mature climate of legal, political and social trust: living law in practice. What can ultimately bring violence to an end is not the technical imposition of disarmament, but a fundamental sense of trust between the parties and recognition of each other’s legitimate existence.

Building such comprehensive trust is possible only by properly defining political interlocutors and ensuring genuine representation. A static approach regards the isolation of key actors capable of influencing and persuading broad sections of society as a means of maintaining absolute control. A dynamic approach to peace, by contrast, gives socially legitimate leadership sufficient room to act and makes continuous dialogue an essential component of living law. This is precisely where Abdullah Öcalan’s role and political paradigm become critical. A legal framework that keeps a central interlocutor and driving force of the process under isolation undermines its own prospects for implementation because it cannot generate the necessary social consent. The current domestic legal framework also leaves the security of the process dependent on internal bureaucratic structures and shifting administrative considerations, an approach fundamentally at odds with the principle of institutional trust. Successful international examples have instead relied on independent commissions and far-reaching constitutional reforms. In the historical experience of this region, the same principle is rooted in a tradition of social consent in which the parties recognise each other’s existence and rights. Genuine guarantees therefore lie not in unilateral and rigid legal texts imposed by the state, but in a mutually binding legal consensus and a shared social contract of the kind advocated by Öcalan.

The future of that social contract will ultimately depend on the nature of political integration and transformation. Current proposals leave the legal basis for the transition of armed structures into civilian and democratic life unclear, leaving the other party in prolonged uncertainty. International models and the philosophy of the Democratic Nation, by contrast, envisage structural integration as a means of overcoming the status quo. Such a transformation would enable local and social forces, with their distinct identities and characteristics, to become legally and constitutionally protected political actors able to participate on equal terms. In doing so, it would turn “law in books” into a body of law grounded in the living realities of society and history.

The solution: Democratic integration

Overcoming the historical and political deadlock and building a lasting social consensus requires a broad strategy of democratic transformation that does not reduce the issue to a matter of security. At the heart of this new approach and the framework for democratic integration must be a collective and non-discriminatory system of legal protection. This requires abandoning an exclusionary approach that divides the organisational structure into categories and creates disparities in legal treatment between different levels. All actors and components involved in the process must be covered by the same legal guarantees without distinction, because the rule of law can become a meaningful instrument of justice only when it encompasses all parties to the peace process rather than dividing them.

Such inclusiveness must be supported by a flexible and dynamic model of participation. The rigid requirement that “everyone leave the field at the same time” should be abandoned in favour of an approach under which every individual or group that takes a step towards democratic participation immediately becomes eligible for legal rights and protections. Rather than withholding legal guarantees until the end of a lengthy process of bureaucratic verification, they should be introduced from the outset as a means of facilitating transformation. Instead of leaving society in prolonged uncertainty, access to democratic participation should be made immediately available to every actor that declares its willingness to engage.

These steps must be made permanent by expanding the scope of constitutional politics. Constitutional guarantees should enable distinct identities and political forces to participate legally while preserving their own identities and political agency. Unless the historical and sociological conditions that have fuelled violence are addressed, legal reforms will remain lifeless texts on paper. This is the philosophical essence of the strategy of democratic integration conceptualised by Abdullah Öcalan: enabling the full range of pluralistic social forces to enter the sphere of legal politics while retaining their distinct identities, thereby turning law on paper into law that functions in society and everyday life.

The current legal framework appears to be less an attempt to establish social peace than a political response shaped by immediate circumstances and aimed at avoiding historical responsibility. A genuine solution lies not in tactical measures that postpone practical steps or in bureaucratic delays, but in fundamentally changing the institutional logic of the law. Peace is neither a security operation nor a protocol of surrender; it is a process of far-reaching, egalitarian democratic integration. Disarmament, in this context, should not be imposed as a “precondition” for legal mechanisms to take effect. It should instead emerge as the natural and ultimately inevitable outcome of broad legal rights, unrestricted channels of communication and an inclusive framework for dialogue that recognises Öcalan’s central role in the process. If the state and the governing bloc are genuinely committed to achieving peace, they must revise the law in line with Öcalan’s Manifesto for a Democratic Society and take concrete steps without delay.

Xelîl Xemgîn, an artist with the Movement for Culture and Art (TEV ÇAND), spoke to ANF about the new process in Rojava, saying that for more than a century Kurds have faced policies of denial, repression and cultural erasure across a geography divided between four states. Xemgîn said the developments unfolding today should also be viewed within the context of this historical process.

Kurds have been seeking a solution for a century

Xemgîn said Kurds had paid a heavy price over many years to preserve their identity and existence in a geography divided between four states, adding that past uprisings and struggles reflected different attempts to find a solution.

Xemgîn said the central challenge facing Kurds today was to assess the experience gained through past struggles alongside current regional and international conditions. Rather than pursuing a politics that repeats the experiences of the past, he argued, Kurds should develop an approach that responds to present conditions while prioritising the preservation of their identity, language, culture and social existence.

Xemgîn said: “Our country has been divided into four parts. Over the past century in particular, Kurds have lived not only with their own unresolved question, but as a question within four states and the wider world system. The Kurdish language, culture and all our values were banned and plundered. The leaders and representatives of the Kurdish people were killed. Kurds have faced cultural erasure for a century. Every possible method has been tried over the past hundred years to resolve this question. There have been uprisings, enormous sacrifices have been made and Kurds have waged major struggles. Today, a new path towards a solution is being discussed so that Kurds can preserve their identity and existence. I believe we must now assess this process within the realities of the region and the wider world.”

The struggle in Rojava secured gains at a heavy cost

Xemgîn assessed the new situation following the integration of the political and social structures established in Rojava over the years into Syrian state institutions. He said discussions about the future of Kurdish gains and the status of the region could not be separated from regional dynamics or the positions of international powers.

Xemgîn stressed that the path Kurds choose in this new period would be crucial to their future, saying: “Kurds in Rojava waged a major struggle for their identity, their existence and their own defence. An enormous price was paid. These sacrifices were made not only by Kurds, but by different peoples together. International powers were also involved in this process. The United States in particular, along with other international powers, supported the struggle in Rojava. But the Kurdish people also fought for their own identity, existence and security. Now that we have reached the stage of seeking a solution, we need to discuss which approaches are appropriate to the current circumstances. The Kurdish people must not ignore this reality, because global politics, regional dynamics and the situation that has emerged in Rojava today are all interconnected.”

Integration does not mean giving up Kurdish identity

Xemgîn said much of the criticism surrounding the integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions centred on whether integration would mean relinquishing the gains Kurds had secured. He argued that integration should not be understood in those terms.

Xemgîn said, “The real question is not whether Kurds should become part of the Syrian state, but under what conditions, with what rights and how they can become part of that structure while preserving their identity.” 

Xemgîn said integration should be approached from this perspective and that Kurds should participate in building the new Syria while preserving their language, culture and social institutions.

Xemgîn also said: “Our primary aim is to protect our identity, culture and language. Like other peoples and communities, we want to continue our existence with our own language and culture. One way of doing this today, given the current circumstances, is to express ourselves within the Syrian state. We must also play an active role in the process of building this new state. We must be partners in it. Integration does not mean giving up our language, identity or existence. On the contrary, it means becoming part of that state while preserving our own existence and being able to develop our cultural and social institutions. What matters is that Kurds can take their place within that structure with their own identity, without losing who they are.”

The new Syria must not repeat the denial of Kurds

Xemgîn said Syria’s reconstruction could offer Kurds a historic opportunity, but only if the new state breaks with the policies of denial pursued in the past.

He said Kurds had played a historical, cultural and social role in shaping Syria and should therefore be regarded not simply as a community being “integrated” into the new Syria, but as one of the peoples with a say in building the state.

Xemgîn said: “Kurds are the second-largest people in Rojava after Arabs. Historically, culturally and in terms of the sacrifices we have made, we too have played a part in shaping this state. Kurds, Arabs and other peoples have all contributed to its formation. What matters now is that this reality is properly recognised. We want a new Syria to be built, and we must be equal partners in that state in every respect. It should not be a state built on denial, as it was in the past, or one that refuses to recognise Kurds. It should be a state that moves towards normalisation, is just and protects all the different identities and cultures within it. In such a state, we Kurds can preserve and develop our own existence.”

A realistic political approach is needed

Xemgîn said that under the current circumstances, Kurds should focus on preserving the gains they have made and creating a broader democratic political space rather than pursuing objectives that are currently beyond reach. He stressed that this did not mean diminishing Kurdish aspirations.

Xemgîn said the political structure that had emerged in Rojava and the integration process had moved the Kurdish struggle for identity and existence onto a different political terrain, adding that regional and international dynamics had to be taken into account.

Xemgîn continued: “Our goals are not modest. They are ambitious. But politics also requires us to recognise the realities we face. There are global dynamics, regional conditions and the interests of international powers. It would be wrong to pursue politics without taking these factors into account. What matters most to us is our identity, culture, language and existence. We want to preserve them and, like other peoples, live with our own language and culture. Under the conditions that exist today, we need to assess rationally how this can be achieved.”

The process is also important in terms of Öcalan’s vision for a solution

Xemgîn said the integration process should be assessed not only in the context of political developments in Syria, but also in terms of the approach to a solution developed by Abdullah Öcalan.

Xemgîn said: “I believe this process is also important in terms of the ideas Öcalan has developed for a solution. It could serve as a model for resolving the Kurdish question and also offer a model for overcoming the chaotic deadlock in the Middle East. Integration does not mean giving up our own existence. It means becoming part of a new structure while preserving our language, culture and institutions. The rebuilding of Syria is important, and we must be partners in building this state. It should not be a state that denies and disregards Kurds, as it did in the past, but a just state in which all peoples and all identities can preserve their existence.”

We must not turn our values into instruments for other purposes

Xelîl Xemgîn said the latest developments in Rojava marked a new period in the struggle Kurds have waged for years and stressed that the political landscape emerging after integration needed to be carefully assessed.

Xemgîn said that correctly understanding the current circumstances and determining how the process develops from this point onwards would be decisive. He concluded: “What matters now is that we manage this process properly while preserving the values we have gained. Kurds have paid a heavy price. We must now properly understand the purpose of the struggle embodied by these values and by our martyrs. Rather than turning these values into instruments for other purposes, we need to develop a solution that protects the identity, existence and future of the people, as they wanted.”

Developments in the process are being closely followed internationally, as well as in Turkey, Kurdistan and the wider region. ANF spoke to Gianfranco Fattorini, representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva of the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples (MRAP), who has closely followed the Kurdish question for many years, about the latest developments.

The law is important but insufficient

As someone who has closely followed the Kurdish question, how do you assess the law adopted as part of the Peace and Democratic Society Process?

To put it plainly, this law deals solely with the issue of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). That needs to be stated clearly. It includes provisions resembling a form of amnesty, such as suspended sentences and even immediate release in cases involving less serious “offences”. This is a small step towards peace in Turkey. However, many elements are still missing if a genuine climate of peace is to be established in the country and the Kurdish people are to be able to develop fully as a people.

Öcalan must be free to take part in negotiations

Abdullah Öcalan described this law as a step forward. What legal and political guarantees do you believe are necessary to strengthen Öcalan’s role in ensuring that the process continues?

A political step must follow the legal one. If the Turkish government and the president genuinely intend to bring about a concrete change in relations with the Kurdish people, they must be able to sit at the same table with Abdullah Öcalan. Put another way, Abdullah Öcalan must be able to sit at the negotiating table on an equal footing with the other parties. A framework that goes beyond a single law is therefore needed to genuinely conduct and sustain these negotiations and bring all the elements of a peace process into the process.

The aim should not be disarmament alone

The return of members of the Kurdish Freedom Movement and Kurdish politicians living in exile is one of the most important issues in this process. Do the current regulations provide sufficient guarantees to ensure that PKK members who have laid down their arms and politicians can return to the country safely and with legal protection?

Not really. First of all, saying that all these people can return to the country is one thing, but what will they be returning to do? That is precisely the issue. The law that was adopted was drawn up on the basis of the same approach as the parliamentary report prepared by the commission established within the TBMM. In other words, the aim is to have the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, lay down its arms and dissolve the organisation.

But what happens afterwards? That is the real issue. If we genuinely want to achieve a peace process, there are several stages involved. It is all well and good to say that these people can return to the country, but what will they return to do? And under what guarantees? There is another issue behind all of this. In every country that has experienced conflict and subsequently moved towards a resolution, the “crimes” committed by both sides have been confronted and efforts have been made to address the wrongs that were committed. Here, however, only one side is being scrutinised. A peace process following a conflict requires a process of transitional justice, similar to those seen in South Africa and other countries in South America.

This means that all sides must acknowledge the wrongs and crimes that have been committed. Here, however, the focus remains solely on one side, and no genuine guarantees are being provided. They are being told that they can return, but then what? What happens afterwards?

All the rights of the Kurdish people must be guaranteed

As you have also pointed out, the law does not provide a fundamental solution to the Kurdish question, and there has been considerable criticism in this regard. It is often argued that numerous measures are needed to safeguard the fundamental rights of the Kurdish people. What would you say about this?

That is precisely the issue I was referring to earlier. This is not simply about laying down arms and dissolving a party. A process of peace and social reconciliation must also involve acknowledging the wrongs committed by previous governments.

There also needs to be a comprehensive process of redress for confiscated land, livestock that was destroyed and the loss of livelihoods based on animal husbandry. Take, for example, university academics who were imprisoned simply because of statements they made. What we are really talking about here are crimes of opinion. If we genuinely want a peace process, all these issues must therefore form part of the peace negotiations.

There are also all the issues concerning the cultural, economic and social rights of the Kurdish people, none of which have been addressed so far. There is therefore still a long way to go. The political steps taken from this point onwards will allow us to see and assess how much genuine determination the government and the president have to bring peace to the country by resolving the Kurdish question.

Öcalan should now be at the negotiating table, not in prison

One of the most important issues frequently raised by the Kurdish Freedom Movement concerns the situation of Abdullah Öcalan, the principal actor in the process. Despite the adoption of the law, his status remains unclear and his imprisonment continues, which is regarded as unacceptable. Considering examples of peace processes around the world, how important is Öcalan’s freedom to the success of this process?

Abdullah Öcalan’s freedom is one of the most important elements of the entire peace process. In a sense, it could be said that Abdullah Öcalan is being held hostage by the authorities. We can assume that the authorities now expect the PKK, on the basis of this law, to fully lay down its arms and declare that the party has been dissolved. They may then envisage moving forward with the process concerning PKK members, including Abdullah Öcalan. But as I said at the outset, if the Turkish authorities genuinely have the political will to pursue this peace process, they must accept that Abdullah Öcalan should no longer be in prison but at the negotiating table.

That is very clear. It is a step the authorities must take, a threshold they must cross, to demonstrate their good faith in this process. The issue is not simply to disarm a movement that has struggled for decades; it is about showing the Kurdish people what kind of political will exists to resolve this entire question.

International powers must change their approach

We have seen the international community play an important role in helping conflicts in many parts of the world evolve towards peace. Yet the same powers and institutions have chosen to remain passive when it comes to resolving the Kurdish question. As someone who has frequently worked on the Kurdish question within the United Nations, what would you say about the responsibility of these powers in resolving the issue? Do they have such a responsibility?

Yes, of course. The PKK is still designated as a “terrorist” organisation by both the European Union and the United States. In a process such as this, these powers should therefore begin by removing the PKK from this designation. If they want to support the process, that should be the first step they take.

There are also, as we know very well, issues that extend beyond the Kurdish question in Turkey. The broader Kurdish question forms part of discussions involving the United States and the European Union, not only in Turkey but also in Syria, Iraq and Iran. We have also recently seen a process develop in Syria. An integration process has taken place between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the transitional administration, or more precisely al-Sharaa’s transitional administration. As we know very well, this can also be understood as an indication that the process received a green light from Ankara, as well as from Washington and Brussels.

It is clear that a more positive and active approach by the European Union towards the peace process in Turkey would certainly help facilitate progress in the negotiations.

Thank you very much for your important assessments. Is there anything you would like to add?

I extend my best wishes to the PKK leadership and the Kurdish people for the establishment of a genuine climate of peace in Turkey. Achieving this, however, requires going through the kinds of processes that we know well and have seen in other countries. Such processes require everyone to acknowledge their own responsibilities, followed by the recognition of all rights.

Recognition of Kurdish culture in Turkey and ensuring that the Kurdish people can fully exercise their economic, social, cultural and political rights would also constitute an important step.