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          Re: gambia      Cache   Translate Page      
Agree with you regarding Gambia,you should also include other Islamic countries in Africa such as Senegal,Mali,Mauritania,Sudan. These are places to be avoided at all costs,they are extremely intolerant of gays,and risk your life,just for a few minutes of fun. No amount of money or any other incentive would ever lure me to visit such barbaric countries.
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KTFA

JJonesMX » February 9th, 2019


I found it curious (even IRAQ in a transitional stage) ....that Christine Lagarde; had no mention of IRAQ as an emerging country Amongst the other/s neighboring countries.... Time will tell

Laying the Foundations of Good Fiscal Management in the Arab World

By Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Fourth Arab Fiscal Forum, Dubai
February 9, 2019

As Prepared for Delivery

Good morning--Sabah Al-Khair! I am delighted to be back in Dubai, this city of tomorrow, where you—its economic leaders—are dedicated to realizing the vision of a better tomorrow.

This vision is predicated on prosperity that is shared by all, benefiting the poor and the middle class, citizens and immigrants alike; and opportunities that are open to all, including women. It is a vision of fairness over cronyism and partiality, and of trust that government policy is oriented toward the common good.

​This is a big vision. But as Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum once said “The bigger your vision, the bigger your achievement will be…we cannot let fear keep us small. We have to be brave to be big."

As you know so well, fiscal policy plays a vital role in creating and nurturing this vision of sustainable and inclusive growth—especially as encapsulated in the Sustainable Development Goals. This is because we need fiscal space for spending on health, education, social protection, and public investment—all key priorities in this region.

This is why I wanted to come back to the Arab Fiscal Forum—my fourth time now. In past years, I talked in detail about fiscal policy—the spending and revenue measures needed to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth. This year, I want to go one level deeper—into the foundations of fiscal policy and good fiscal management.

Because without a stable foundation, even the best policies can flounder. Without a stable foundation, fiscal policy will lack credibility.

In this vein, I will address two key pillars of good fiscal management: (i) strong fiscal frameworks; and (ii) good governance and transparency.

Prelude: Global and regional context

Before I do this, let me say a few words about the broader economic context bearing on fiscal policy in the region.

Unfortunately, the region has yet to fully recover from the global financial crisis and other big economic dislocations over the past decade.

Among oil importers, growth has picked up, but it is still below pre-crisis levels. Fiscal deficits remain high, and public debt has risen rapidly—from 64 percent of GDP in 2008 to 85 percent of GDP a decade later. Public debt now exceeds 90 percent of GDP in nearly half of these countries.

The oil exporters have not fully recovered from the dramatic oil price shock of 2014. Modest growth continues, but the outlook is highly uncertain—reflecting in part the need for countries to shift rapidly toward renewable energy over the new few decades, in line with the Paris Agreement.

With revenues down, fiscal deficits are only slowly declining—despite significant reforms on both the spending and revenue sides, including the introduction of VAT and excise taxes. This has led to a sharp increase in public debt—from 13 percent of GDP in 2013 to 33 percent in 2018.

At this juncture, the global expansion is weakening, and risks are rising. Just a few weeks ago, we released our revised forecasts. We now think that the global economy will grow by 3.5 percent this year, 0.2 percentage points below what we expected in October. And risks are up, given escalating trade tensions and tightening financial conditions.

Unsurprisingly, a weaker global environment has knock-on effects on the region through a variety of channels—trade, remittances, capital flows, commodity prices, and financing conditions.

The bottom line: the economic path ahead for the region is challenging. This makes the task of fiscal policy that much harder, which in turn makes it even more important to build strong foundations to anchor fiscal policy.

1. Fiscal Frameworks

The first building block of this foundation is a good fiscal framework. By this I mean the set of laws, institutional arrangements, and procedures needed to achieve a country’s fiscal policy objectives. Such a framework allows governments to map out budgets over the medium term in a way that reflects clear, consistent, and credible goals.

There is scope to improve fiscal frameworks in this region. Some of the weaknesses are short-termism and insufficient credibility.

On short-termism: given that inclusive and sustainable growth is an inherently medium-term goal, fiscal policy needs a medium-term orientation.

Focusing on the immediate horizon makes it harder to implement critical but longer-term reforms in such areas as tackling high public wage bills, designing effective social protection systems, and getting rid of harmful fuel subsidies. Short-termism implies that fiscal policy amplifies rather than tames the waves of booms and busts—making it more difficult to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

Turning to fiscal credibility: I am referring to such factors as large amounts of spending kept off-budget and poor risk management. Across the region, it is common for sovereign wealth funds to directly finance projects, bypassing the normal budget process.

And state-owned enterprises in some countries have high levels of borrowing—again, outside of the budget. Addressing these fiscal risks would not only enhance budget credibility and transparency but would help keep a lid on corruption. Budgetary credibility also calls for better risk management, with a more comprehensive budget based on realistic forecasts.

The good news is that numerous countries are already strengthening their fiscal frameworks—many with IMF assistance. Just to give some examples:

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Sudan, Qatar, and Lebanon have all set up macro-fiscal units—a useful first step in strengthening the fiscal framework.

Algeria has recently adopted a new budget law with a strong medium-term orientation, and Bahrain has introduced a fiscal program designed to achieve balance over the medium term.

Mauritania, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon are making great progress with medium-term public investment planning and execution.

Egypt now publishes a fiscal risk statement with its budget and produces an internal in-year budget risk assessment. The UAE too is rolling out a fiscal risk management project—with the IMF’s help—and will produce its first fiscal stress test this year.

There is scope for further improvement. Perhaps the oil exporters could follow the example of other resource-rich countries such as Chile and Norway in using fiscal rules to protect key priorities such as social spending from commodity price volatility.

Strong fiscal frameworks have other important benefits. They form the basis for sound debt management. They also allow for better coordination between fiscal and monetary policies, so that the two arms of macroeconomic management work together, not at cross purposes.

2. Good Governance and Transparency

Let me now turn to the second pillar of good fiscal management—good governance and transparency. In this context, governance refers to the institutional frameworks and practices of the public sector. Strong institutions are crucial for legitimacy, for fostering a clearer understanding of policy objectives among citizens, enhancing their voice, and generating buy-in for fiscal policy.

On the other hand, as many of you have said, weak institutions imply a weak policy foundation that could crack and crumble—because there is inadequate legitimacy and public accountability. Even worse, these cracks could also let corruption creep in. And you know so well, this is social poison—it feeds discord, disengagement, and disillusionment, especially among the young. The word corruption, after all, comes from Latin root for rotting, breaking apart—disintegration. And the word in Arabic, fasad, also connotes this idea of rotting or coming undone.

Corruption is the great disruptor of fiscal policy. Without trust in the fairness of the tax system, it becomes harder to raise the revenue needed for critical spending on health, education, and social protection. And governments might be tempted to favor white elephant projects instead of investments in people and productive potential. Add this up, and we have a recipe for unsustainable fiscal policy combined with social discord.

This a global issue—relevant for large and small countries, advanced and low-income economies, and the public and private sectors. Given this, it is no surprise that IMF research found that weak governance and corruption are associated with significantly lower growth, investment, FDI, and tax revenues—and higher inequality and exclusion.

Specifically, we found that improving on an index of corruption and governance by moving from the bottom quarter to the mean is associated with an increase in the investment-to-GDP ratio of 1.5–2 percentage points and a bump up in annual GDP per capita growth by half a percentage point or more. [1] We will have more analysis in the upcoming Fiscal Monitor, which will be devoted to the topic of the fiscal costs of corruption and the role of fiscal institutions.

What is the solution to weak governance and corruption? In the fiscal domain, it calls for heightened fiscal transparency—shining a light on all aspects of the budget and the public accounts. This would provide a more accurate picture of the fiscal position and prospects, the long-term costs and benefits of any policy changes, and the potential fiscal risks that might throw them off course. This region has some room for improvement here.

We know that these kinds of reforms pay off. Take the case of Georgia, for example. Until 2003, it was seen as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. But after that, it reformed its institutions and cracked down on corruption. This, along with tax reform, led to immediate improvements. Tax revenues increased from 12 percent of GDP in 2003 to 25 percent of GDP in 2008, as taxpayers had greater faith in the fairness of the system.

I should note that the IMF has been stepping up its engagement in the area of governance and corruption. Last year, we put in place a new framework predicated on a more systematic, evenhanded, effective, and candid engagement on these issues with member countries. We will be reaching out to leaders in this region to discuss how we can work together to implement this framework.

With better governance, we can replace the “disintegration” of corruption with the “integration” of all into the productive economy. We can replace fasad with islah—reforms to set things right, to reconcile people with one another.

Conclusion

Let me wrap up. I have argued this morning that good fiscal policy requires good institutional foundations. And solid foundations in areas such as fiscal frameworks and governance give citizens confidence that fiscal policy serves the good of all, not just the wealthy or the well-connected.

Let me end with some wise words attributed to the great Ibn Khaldun, “He who finds a new path is a pathfinder, even if the trail has to be found again by others; and he who walks far ahead of his contemporaries is a leader.”

You are the pathfinders, the leaders, the visionaries. We hope that we can give useful guidance, but we look to you to find the right path to make this vision a reality.
Thank you--shukran!

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/02/08/sp0209-md-laying-the-foundations-of-good-fiscal-management-in-the-arab-world?cid=em-COM-123-38361

Samson » February 9th, 2019

International Monetary Fund warns of the gap between the rate of growth of Arab countries and their foreign debts


9th February, 2019

An official warned the International Monetary Fund of the gap between the growth rate of the economies of Arab countries and the level of external debt.

The Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said at the Public Finance Forum held in Dubai on Saturday that there was a significant discrepancy between the level of growth of Arab economies and the size of external debt, according to the UAE Ministry of Economy. Jihad Azour called for the need for further reforms and measures to improve the fiscal policies of Arab countries.

Azour said financial policymakers in the Middle East should take into account the value of the likely increase in debt service costs, improve spending quality and take additional measures to increase investments in physical capital. He also called on the Arab countries to work to support financial institutions by raising the efficiency of the human element. Azour made the remarks at a session entitled "Laying the foundations of the management of fiscal policy in the Arab countries" on the sidelines of the Fourth Forum of Public Finance in the Arab States, which is part of the World Summit of Governments 2019 in Dubai.

The session discussed the financial performance indicators of the countries of the region and their growth levels compared to other countries in the world, in addition to the impact of the decline in oil prices on the financial policies of countries and the accompanying economic slowdown requires the work seriously to improve financial policies and adoption of technological systems to enhance transparency and confidence in governments.

Azour noted that most MENA countries over the last three years have adopted measures to reduce spending and boost revenues, leading to a reduction in the deficit in those countries, but these reforms have not always been conducive to growth.

He added that this does not mean abandoning the reform programs because what is going through the global economy helps the countries of the region to take precautionary steps to avoid the shocks that may result from economic fluctuations.

Azour pointed to the need for some countries to increase tax revenues and work to reduce corporate exemptions, support small and medium enterprises; and expand the tax base so that governments can more equitable distribution of the tax burden.

The meetings of the Forum on Public Finance of Arab States in the Emirate of Dubai, today, on the sidelines of the World Summit of Governments held in the UAE. International Monetary Fund director Christine Lagarde said on the sidelines of the Arab Finance Forum that oil exporters did not fully recover from the crude price shock of 2014. LINK

Source: Dinar Recaps
          Mauritania acoge el ejercicio «Flintlock 19» de EE.UU. y en el que participa España      Cache   Translate Page      
Militares de España que forman parte de unidades presentes en el Sahel participarán en este mes de febrero y marzo en ejercicio en «Flintlock 19» y que cada año organiza Mando de Operaciones Especiales de Estados Unidos en África. En 2019 se celebra en Mauritania y Burkina Fasso. Este año en Sahel habrá despliegue de integrantes de la Brigada Canarias (Brican XVI) del Ejército de Tierra en Mali. Más de 2.000 miembros del servicio de más de 30 naciones africanas y occidentales asociadas participarán en «Flintlock 2019» en múltiples ubicaciones en Burkina Faso y Mauritania del 18 de febrero al uno de marzo de 2019. En 2019, Flintlock será ubicado en Burkina Faso y Mauritania. El ejercicio está diseñado para fortalecer la capacidad de las naciones socias clave en la región para contrarrestar a las organizaciones extremistas violentas, proteger sus fronteras y brindar seguridad a la sociedad. El ejercicio refuerza las alianzas entre las Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales de las naciones africanas y occidentales y los organismos encargados de hacer cumplir la ley, aumentando su capacidad para trabajar juntos durante las operaciones multinacionales en curso y en respuesta a las crisis. Las naciones africanas participantes incluyen Argelia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Camerún, Cabo Verde, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Marruecos, Níger, Nigeria, Senegal y Túnez. Los socios occidentales incluyen Austria, Bélgica, Canadá, República Checa, Dinamarca, Francia, Italia, Japón, Países Bajos, Noruega, Polonia, Portugal, Suiza, Reino Unido y Estados Unidos.
          Re: gambia      Cache   Translate Page      
Agree with you regarding Gambia,you should also include other Islamic countries in Africa such as Senegal,Mali,Mauritania,Sudan. These are places to be avoided at all costs,they are extremely intolerant of gays,and risk your life,just for a few minutes of fun. No amount of money or any other incentive would ever lure me to visit such barbaric countries.
          Re: gambia      Cache   Translate Page      
Agree with you regarding Gambia,you should also include other Islamic countries in Africa such as Senegal,Mali,Mauritania,Sudan. These are places to be avoided at all costs,they are extremely intolerant of gays,and risk your life,just for a few minutes of fun. No amount of money or any other incentive would ever lure me to visit such barbaric countries.
          La represión (silenciada) en el Sáhara occidental      Cache   Translate Page      

Equipe Media y la Plataforma Valenciana de Solidaridad con el Sahara denuncian el ataque a periodistas por parte de Marruecos
*Fuente: Rebelión. Enric Llopis. 9 de febrero de 2019
 “Golpéale”, ordena un miembro del ejército marroquí durante una protesta en el Sáhara Occidental ocupado. “Hacen todo lo posible para que la situación no se difunda, la policía de Marruecos robó la primera cámara en 2009”, cuenta el activista de Equipe Media que graba la manifestación, escondido en una azotea; es descubierto por las fuerzas de seguridad, que le empujan por el borde. La secuencia aparece en el cortometraje de 17 minutos “Tres cámaras robadas”, producido en 2017 por los periodistas de Equipe Media y el colectivo de cineastas y activistas suecos RaFILM. La película tiene como referente un documental sobre la resistencia del pueblo palestino -“Cinco cámaras rotas”-, de los realizadores Edmat Burnat y Guy Davidi. Los productores de “Tres cámaras robadas” han denunciado las presiones del Reino de Marruecos para que la película no se proyecte; de hecho, fue censurada en Líbano, en octubre de 2017, aunque después se haya seleccionado y premiado en festivales como el de Cine y Derechos Humanos de Barcelona o el de Slemani, en el Kurdistán iraquí.
El presidente y cofundador de Equipe Media, Ettanji Ahmed, presentó el audiovisual el 4 de enero en el Casal Obrer i Popular de Valencia, en un acto organizado por la Plataforma Valenciana de Solidaridad con el Pueblo Saharaui (PVSPS). El grupo de activistas surgió en 2009 para romper el bloqueo informativo que impone Marruecos. “Filmamos manifestaciones y difundimos información en árabe, inglés, francés y castellano para que el mundo sepa qué está ocurriendo; hemos ido aprendiendo sobre el terreno, por necesidad”, explica el redactor y fotógrafo.
Los comunicadores denuncian que han sido objeto de detenciones, encarcelamientos y torturas por parte de la ocupación marroquí. Ettanji Ahmed realiza tareas de sensibilización y difusión en el exterior; informa que el 28 de enero las fuerzas militares expulsaron a tres activistas de Pamplona, miembros de la Asociación Navarra de Amigos del Sáhara, que se hallaban en los territorios ocupados; y añade que la policía marroquí impidió el pasado 15 de enero al abogado Luis Mangrané –miembro del Observatorio Aragonés para el Sáhara Occidental- entrar en El Aaiún (en 2015 Mangrané ya fue expulsado cuando se dirigía al Sahara Occidental junto al fotógrafo Gervasio Sánchez).
En la lista de saharauis perseguidos figura Mohamed Barkan, periodista detenido e interrogado por la policía marroquí a finales de enero; a este miembro de Equipe Media se le acusa de participar en una manifestación no autorizada en mayo de 2013. En la nómina de informadores represaliados está Mohamed Bambary, para quien el Grupo de Trabajo sobre Detenciones Arbitrarias de Naciones Unidas ha pedido la puesta en libertad; un tribunal de El Aaiún condenó al periodista a 12 años de prisión en 2015, pena reducida a seis en apelación. Al-Bambary fue detenido ese año en la comisaría de Dajla, donde se dirigió para renovar la cédula de identidad. Tras la celebración del juicio, en el que se denunciaron numerosas irregularidades, el activista inició una huelga de hambre.
El pasado 30 de octubre otro periodista de Equipe Media, El Bachir Kadda, decidió suspender una huelga de hambre que ya duraba 43 días; condenado a 20 años por participar en la resistencia de Gdeim Izik (2010), sus familiares afirmaron que estaba sufriendo humillaciones y malos tratos en la prisión marroquí de Tiflet-2. Del colectivo Equipe Media forma parte asimismo Lekhfaouni Abdaiahi, otro de los 23 saharauis condenados -en julio de 2017- en el juicio por las movilizaciones en los campamentos de Gdeim Izik, al este de El Aaiún, reprimidas por la policía y el ejército de Marruecos con balas y gases lacrimógenos.
En septiembre de 2018 la represión en los tribunales marroquís tuvo como víctimas a un periodista -Mohamed Salem Mayara- y un fotógrafo -Mohamed Aljomayaai-, los dos del Smara News; unos meses antes de la condena fueron encerrados en la llamada “prisión negra” de El Aaiún, por una supuesta participación en altercados; pero Equipe Media recogió, citando al activista Salek Batal, otra explicación: “Es una represalia contra el Smara News, ya que este medio ha podido –a pesar del cerco policial y militar- mostrar al mundo la realidad de la ciudad ocupada”.
“Nos siguen, nos espían, nos amenazan y acosan a nuestras familias, nos roban nuestros equipos y nos agreden”, resumió el periodista saharaui Bachar Hamadi el tres de mayo, fecha en que la UNESCO celebra el Día Mundial de la Libertad de Prensa. Un día antes de la conmemoración, la policía de Marruecos detuvo a Laroussi Ndour, editor y fotógrafo de Bentili, uno de los medios que trabaja en el Sáhara Occidental además de Equipe Media, Smara News, Red de Activistas, Saharawi Center for Media (SCMC), Red Maizirat, Salwan Media o los corresponsales de la radio y la televisión nacionales.
Sobre la represión y las persecuciones se impone la espiral del silencio. El informe de Equipe Media “Bocas y manos atadas en el Sáhara” constata, entre las numerosas detenciones, la de cuatro periodistas de este medio independiente y la del fotógrafo catalán, Bernat Millet, el 9 de febrero de 2017; tras practicar las cinco capturas en El Aaiún, las autoridades marroquíes expulsaron al fotoperiodista de los territorios ocupados. Así, tal vez las circunstancias cambien según el caso, pero no el trasfondo del conflicto. A finales de diciembre la agencia oficial Sahara Press Service (SPS) dio cuenta del traslado del periodista y activista saharaui, Salah Eddine Lebsir, a la prisión marroquí de Bouzakarn. Su detención se produjo en 2015, por participar en manifestaciones pacíficas en la ciudad de Smara, y fue condenado a cuatro años de prisión, informa el comunicado. Durante los años de encarcelamiento, ha protagonizado varias huelgas de hambre.
Pero no sólo se trata de la persecución de comunicadores. La Coordinadora Estatal de Asociaciones Solidarias con el Sáhara (CEAS), que reúne a más de 200 organizaciones del estado español, contabiliza y hace un seguimiento de los presos (políticos) saharauis: 51 reclusos repartidos en 11 cárceles de Marruecos en septiembre de 2018; en octubre el Colectivo de Defensores Saharauis de Derechos Humanos (CODESA) informó de la huelga de hambre iniciada por un grupo de presos “para protestar por la terrible y miserable situación en que se hallan, y a la que se suman los continuos malos tratos por parte de las autoridades de las prisiones”.
En el acto organizado por la plataforma valenciana, Ettanji Ahmed informó de la muerte el 6 de febrero de un joven saharaui, Ahmed Salem Lamghaimad, tras prenderse fuego con gasolina en la zona de Guerguerat; en este paso fronterizo -entre el Sahara ocupado por Marruecos y Mauritania- prolifera el pequeño comercio, “del que son discriminados los comerciantes saharauis; de hecho, un oficial de aduanas marroquí le confiscó a Ahmed Salem las mercancías”, explica. Una semana antes, el joven comerciante “había organizado una ‘sentada’ para protestar por los maltratos policiales a los que fue sometido”, según informó la agencia SPS.
La discriminación y los ataques se perpetran de diferentes modos. Ettanji Ahmed apunta que un colono marroquí mató a puñaladas –este mes de febrero- a un ciudadano saharaui en Dajla (cerca de esta ciudad ocupada, unos 50 ciudadanos saharauis han iniciado una protesta, acampados en jaimas, contra el “empobrecimiento” y la “marginación” al que les somete, según denuncian, las autoridades de Marruecos). “Continúa la represión de manifestantes saharauis en las zonas ocupadas”, tituló SPS una información del 5 de febrero sobre la “intervención brutal” de la policía marroquí frente quienes reivindicaban el “cese al bloqueo” de El Aaiún; la agencia añade que al activista Hammoud al-Laili, corresponsal de la televisión nacional saharaui, le fueron requisadas dos cámaras con las que pretendía grabar la movilización; fue detenido y “sometido a interrogatorio y hostigamientos” durante más de cuatro horas, remata la nota informativa.
Fuente de la imagen: Equipe Media

          Re: gambia      Cache   Translate Page      
Agree with you regarding Gambia,you should also include other Islamic countries in Africa such as Senegal,Mali,Mauritania,Sudan. These are places to be avoided at all costs,they are extremely intolerant of gays,and risk your life,just for a few minutes of fun. No amount of money or any other incentive would ever lure me to visit such barbaric countries.


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