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Dodon said he had discussed possible price reduction with CEO of Russia’s gas giant Gazprom, Alexei Miller
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"Cooperation within the CIS [the Commonwealth of Independent States, an assembly of post-Soviet states] and the EAEU is crucial for our country", Igor Dodon said
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[…] prezinte candidații. Dar nu a fost să fie. Au zis că-s Pro Moldova, au fluturat cu drapelele, și-au arătat noile achiziții în materie de membri și duși au […]
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Este un fățarnic, cinic, viclean și minciunos vechiul kgb-ist Dumitru Diakov, ca și șeful lui de partid, talpa iadului Plahotniuk! PD este un partid AUTOCRAT și din cuvântul șefului de partid nu îndrăznește nimeni să iasă. Dacă talpa iadului Plahotniuk le-ar da prikaz, ar face-o! După alegerile din februarie talpa iadului Plahotniuk va trebui să facă alianță cu monstrul mancurt și idiot Igor Dodon și de aceia nu va merge împotriva monstrului mancurt în ceea ce privește limba de stat în Constituție. Partidele de dreapta, după lecția primită de PLDM și PL, se vor ține departe ca tămâia de dracii talpei iadului Plahotniuk. ALIANȚĂ CU TALPA IADULUI PLAHOTNIUK NU VOR FACE NICIODATĂ!
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De ce arată așa chinuită tânăra dnă Federica Mogherini? Numai ce i-a picat vestea, că dracii talpei iadului Plahotniuk vor să umple UE cu arabi cu pașapoarte moldovenești! Taman acum se gândește ce să facă...
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Doamne ferește, tovarișci Nicolai de o eventuală nouă invazie rusească! Pentru tine asta-i glumă, dar pentru noi înseamnă "Stalingrad moldovenesc"! Cât despre Chiril Gaburici, el este ostaticul talpei iadului Plahotniuk, asemenea celuilalt ostatec, Iurie Leancă, deoarece ca și Iurie Leancă, fiind prim ministrul a scos sute de milioane din Tezaur și le-a dat escrocului "juif" Ilan Țor la Banca de Economii, ca acesta să-i fure. Chiril Gaburici trebuie să fie la dubală, alături de Iurie Leancă și nu să-i aducă Moldovei cetățeni arabi cu bani! Tare o să se mai bucure în UE, când o să vadă că la ei mișună arabii cu pașapoarte moldovenești!
          La volan fără permis de conducere      Cache   Translate Page      

La sfârşitul săptămânii trecute, în Punctul de Trecere a Frontierei Galați-rutier s-a prezentat pentru efectuarea formalităţilor de control necesare trecerii frontierei, un bărbat de 30 de ani din Republica Moldova. Acesta se afla la volanului unui autoturism marca Mercedes Vito, înmatriculat în Moldova. Deoarece, la controlul de frontieră, bărbatul nu a putut prezenta permisul de […]

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          Cod galben de ceață densă până la ora 13.00      Cache   Translate Page      

Meteorologii au emis astăzi un cod galben de vreme severă imediată pentru mai multe județe din Moldova, inclusiv Galațiul. Local se va semnala ceață densă, care scade vizibilitatea sub 200 de metri, izlat chiar și sub 50 de metri. Avertizarea meteorologilor este valabilă până la ora 13.00.

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          Conspiracy theory has gone mainstream in Russia. But how does it work?      Cache   Translate Page      

Inside Russia’s conspiracy machine, things are more complicated than they seem. A new book demonstrates the pitfalls of conspiracy thinking.

April 2016: journalists at a Moscow newspaper watch "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin". Photo: Aleksandr Vilf / VisualRIAN. All rights reserved.

A review of Fortress Russia: Conspiracy Theories in the Post-Soviet World by Ilya Yablokov.

Ilya Yablokov’s Fortress Russia: Conspiracy Theories in the Post-Soviet World is a solid and illuminating piece of scholarship. Based on the author’s PhD dissertation, this book investigates the role, scope, uses and implications of conspiracy theories in post-Soviet Russia. Tracing the origins of Russian conspiracy theories back to the Crimean War in 1853-1856, Yablokov investigates the evolution of conspiratorial thinking in Russia’s Imperial and Soviet periods and, finally, turns to his ultimate goal: the uses of conspiracy theories in post-Soviet Russia.

Yablokov shows convincingly that instead of being primarily a grassroots phenomena as in case of the US, the capital of conspiratorial culture, in post-Soviet Russia, conspiracy theories exist in a complex political environment with many participants: grassroots activists, public intellectuals, as well as journalists, politicians, members of legislative and executive branches of the government. After Boris Yeltsin came to power in the 1990s, conspiracy theories were widely employed by the opposition to Yeltsin’s regime. The adversaries of Russia’s first independent president interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as a planned action envisioned by the West – and executed by the corrupt Soviet elite and predatory opposition.

However, after Putin’s rise to power, these theories migrated to another layer of political life. Putin’s government turned them into a vital instrument for mobilising supporters and discrediting opponents. This shift was closely associated with a number of Russian political technologists and politicians, such as Gleb Pavlovsky, chief of the pro-Kremlin Foundation for Effective Politics, and Vladislav Surkov, First Deputy Chief of Presidential Administration, who crafted conceptual framework underlying the new regime and developed a network of pro-Kremlin public intellectuals, educational programmes and publishing houses. Having moved from the bottom-up to the top-down level, conspiratorial thinking also migrated from the margins of Russia’s public sphere to the very core of the country’s political discourse – especially after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2013-2014.

Conspiratorial thinking migrated from the margins of Russia’s public sphere to the very core of the country’s political discourse – especially after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2013-2014

Yablokov exceeds in detailing the particular exchanges of conspiracy arguments between elites and the technology of their dissemination. It is common knowledge that conspiracy theories have become an important tool for the Putin regime, but the technology behind their dissemination isn’t.

Here is an example of a specific case Yablokov describes. In December 2006, state-owned newspaper Rossiiskaia Gazeta published an interview with Boris Ratnikov, a former general of Russia’s Federal Guard Service, in which he claimed that former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright thought that mankind should distribute Russia’s rich natural resources under the control of the US. In 2007, this particular idea was further developed during a presidential press conference, when a worker from Novosibirsk Alexander Sibert asked Putin a question on this topic. Since all questions are planned in advance during these events, it is logical to assume that this reiteration of Ratnikov’s theory was a part of the government’s anti-Western propaganda campaign during Russia’s 2007 parliamentary elections. In 2014, the “Ratnikov-Sibert theory” was reiterated by Putin, though both Ratnikov and Sibert denied that Albright made this statement.

Boris Ratnikov. Source: YouTube. This exchange demonstrates the way the system works: first, pro-regime politicians or intellectuals launch conspiracy theory in the public sphere. Second, it is mobilised by the regime as a resource to convince supporters and discredit opponents. At the same time, the regime denies its authorship of the theory to avoid responsibility. Rather than referring to anecdotal evidence, Yablokov uses the Ratnikov-Sibert case and many others to build a robust and comprehensive picture of the way the Kremlin’s intellectual and propaganda machinery functions.

Yablokov’s research also shows good ideological analysis. It clearly and vividly depicts how the Kremlin’s intellectual framework has undergone major ideological shifts since the 1990s. From its inability to establish intellectual hegemony in the 1990s to the “Putin majority” of the 2000s; from the clear ideological divide between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet forces to reconciliation with the Stalinist past; from the Soviet vision of the West as an enemy to Surkov’s vision of the West as a competitor – all these tectonic changes in the regime’s intellectual foundations are carefully analysed and theorised. Moreover, the elite and pro-Kremlin networks producing and conveying these ideas are not depicted as a monolithic whole. Instead, Yablokov builds a complex picture, identifying tensions, disagreements and conflicts. Sometimes, the Kremlin authorises the use of conspiracy theories, but distances itself from them – as in the case of Ratnikov. Sometimes, particular elites and intellectuals, such as Alexander Dugin and Sergey Glazyev, become silenced or ousted because they are “too excessively devoted to conspiracies to be part of the rational and cynical Russian politics.”

The arguments mentioned above demonstrate the strong side of the book – given this analysis, it is a worthy read. However, there are some points that lack empirical confirmation and theoretical clarity which I want to point out. Some of them are shortcomings of the book. In this case, they indicate common theoretical and methodological problems associated with the analysis of post-Soviet reality rather than personal or intellectual flaws of the author. Some are, rather, possible avenues for further research absent in contemporary public and academic debate but still essential.

Methodological remarks

Despite the book’s informative and illuminating argument, there are still some shortcomings that should be addressed. First of all, Yablokov’s analysis of the uses of conspiracy theories is often based on hypotheses and can hardly be fully confirmed empirically. This problem is related to the limits of the method selected for the analysis and cannot be resolved in the conceptual analysis based on the publicly available sources presented in the book. My comments are therefore a suggestion for further research rather than criticism.

It is not sufficiently clear what the nature of the links between different agents involved in Russia’s conspiracy machine is. For instance, in 2007, the Russian publishing house Evropa, which is associated with political technologist Gleb Pavlovsky, published the book Vragi Putina (Putin’s Enemies) as part of an effort to provide Putin with intellectual support and discredit his opponents. Later that year, Putin addressed his supporters during a mass rally held at the Luzhniki stadium. Here, he repeated arguments from the book “almost word for word” in Yablokov’s view. The author concludes that “since the book had been published before the rally, these parallels demonstrate a close relationship between Putin’s speechwriters and the ideas elaborated by the pro-Kremlin spin doctors” (p. 148). Similarly, in 2005, Vladislav Surkov gave a speech at a closed association of Russian businessmen in which he prioritised the creation of a “sovereign democracy” in Russia. A few weeks before that, Putin mentioned that the collapse of the Soviet Union is a “major geopolitical disaster.”

Vladislav Surkov, 2010. Photo CC BY 4.0: Kremlin.ru / Wikipedia. Some rights reserved. On this, Yablokov concludes: “the articulation of these two ideas in such a short space of time demonstrates growing concern among political elites at this time about social cohesion” (p. 7). These conclusions based on indirect evidence, such as proximity in time, are common in the book and are, in nature, educated guesses: they do not guarantee that the link exists. To build a more convincing empirical foundation for the argument, the author would need to triangulate data and draw on a more wide variety of sources, including expert interviews and, in the best case scenario, interviews with people who were or are close to the Russian presidential administration.

This purely external view of the conspiratorial machine narrows the picture and prevents us from analysing essential and yet unseen mechanisms. Who has the agency in this complicated alliance – the executive branch or Kremlin-affiliated intellectuals? Did people like Pavlovsky or Surkov come up with their ideas because they were asked to, or were the concepts introduced based on their initiative and then taken up by the executive? To what extent did the executive constrain them?

Consider the following example. In 2014, Russian independent magazine Colta published a number of anonymous interviews with employees of Russian TV channels, detailing the way the propaganda machinery works. What was clear from these interview is that in the beginning of the Ukraine conflict in 2014, Russian TV channels were being managed manually by members of the Presidential Administration. As one of the interviewees notes, even the use of particular phrases (such as “junta”, “Banderites”, “ukropi”) was coordinated personally by press secretary Dmitry Peskov at weekly meetings. In contrast, anonymous interviews with employees of Russian TV channels published by independent magazine The Insider in 2017 tells an entirely different story.

In 2017, there was no manual control anymore. There were “curators” who were supposed to control journalists, TV anchors and managers of TV channels, but employees managed themselves according to implicit, but clear and intuitive “internal rules”. These rules dictated the understanding of what the Presidential Administration expects them to do – they became a part of the journalistic routine. If this assumption is correct, then we witnessed a tremendous change in the way the Russian propaganda machine, including conspiracy theories and theorists, operates. Instead of being piloted manually, this machine became autonomous. It is clear that the analysis of such issues requires different methods, such as personal interviews, and it is tough and potentially dangerous to find insiders in the administration and TV channels who could and would willing to provide such details. However, given the topic of Yablokov’s analysis, it would greatly complement the purely external analysis of the way Russia’s conspiratorial/propagandist apparatus functions and would allow building more stereoscopic multidimensional picture.

Do we actually study conspiracy theories?

An excellent analysis of the uses of conspiracy theories, Yablokov’s research also lacks the depth of theoretical, empirical and comparative study of conspiracy theories themselves. Conspiracy theories in the book are rather considered as frames used to mobilise supporters and discredit opponents at particular moments.

In terms of data, the in-depth analysis of conspiracy theories themselves is somewhat limited compared to the circumstances surrounding them. Being stripped of specific conspiracy theories used as examples, the text would still have a coherent argument. It considers the main events in post-Soviet Russian history, the main actors involved and would be a legitimate example of political history/political science analysis of post-Soviet Russia. Collecting data for his book about conspiracy theories, Eliot Borenstein set up a website, Plots Against Russia. The analysis is yet to be done, but Borenstein’s archive represents a systematic effort to collect conspiracy theories in post-Soviet Russia. Yablokov’s research would also benefit from this kind of systematic basis.

Regarding theory, a few theoretical remarks about conspiracy theories are limited to brief mentions of scholars like Ernesto Laclau, Michael Foucault, and others, and theorise very general features not specific to conspiracy theories, such as the intersection of knowledge and power and Lacan-based linguistic rules of organising the political subject. The author gives an impression that the argument will not suffer much if it is stripped of the theoretical framework.

Conspiracy theories worldwide

Concerning comparative analysis, the author does not put Russia’s conspiracy machine into an international perspective. (In fact, the post-Soviet World mentioned in the title is not discussed in the book at all: the analysis is limited to Russia.) Although Yablokov frequently cites scholars of conspiracy theories in the West, his main conclusion is limited to the fact that conspiracy theories in Russia are initiated from above as compared to the grassroots nature of western conspiracy theories. This argument is illuminating. Yet the book and our understanding of the subject would benefit from a more fundamental comparison. According to the author, the way “the Russian political and intellectual elites have made use of conspiracy theories in the new millennium show how they can be imported from, and, later, exported to, other countries”. However, the analysis of how they are exported, adjusted and reinterpreted is limited to a few remarks about the particular conspiracy theory about “the New World Order.”

Perhaps, a more systematic comparison would yield interesting results. For instance, in his book on Russia’s post-colonial identity, Viatcheslav Morozov argues that Russia is a subaltern empire: Russia is a subaltern in relationships with the West, and yet has to borrow the western language of the rule of law and democracy because it does not have its own language of self-description. Other scholars show that Putin’s regime increasingly relies on Western far-right to build legitimacy in the eyes of both domestic population and international audiences. Being transported to Russia, do Western conspiracy theories dictate the shape and content of their Russian variations? Or they are instead entirely reshaped to fit local political narratives? The way imported conspiracy theories are reshaped to fit local narrative would give us a better understanding of the local political environment.

Putting Russia in the international perspective is essential for understanding the global political process, not only Russian specifics

Moreover, after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2013 and the 2016 US presidential election, the use of conspiratorial thinking and arguments has become increasingly popular around the world. In the Baltic States, the topic of Russian influence is instrumentalised by domestic elites to achieve political goals. As Russian journalist Alexey Kovalev argues in a 2017 discussion about the effects of Russian propaganda outside Russia, in the Baltic States “more people are reading articles about the danger of Russian propaganda than are reading the propaganda itself”. Vytautas Bruveris, a Lithuanian journalist, continues: “(Russian propaganda) has become a convenient way for western political elites to discount their own failures, crises and impotence.” Finally, in this same discussion, journalist and analyst Vladimir Soloviev argues that “rebroadcasting this notorious ‘propaganda’” has become a means to keep audiences engaged and earn money in Moldova.

Similarly, after the 2016 US presidential elections, the alleged link to Russia has become an important trope used in political debate to deal with dissent in the US. “Russia” is a codename for “Donald Trump” for American liberals, as brilliantly noted by Ivan Krastev. These arguments do not belittle the authoritarian nature of Putin’s regime. They demonstrate that conspiracy theories in public discourse have become a common tactic. This pattern should be studied as a whole: putting Russia in the international perspective is essential for understanding the global political process, not only Russian specifics.

Political context

There are several inaccuracies and missing events that slightly weaken the book’s argument. First of all, Yablokov is interested in how conspiracy theories are employed and used to legitimise or induce conservative social change. For instance, quoting other scholars, the author argues that “Putin’s remark that the Internet was a ‘CIA project’ served to kick-start the Kremlin’s offensive against the Internet industry” (p. 184). Similarly, conspiracy theories were “the starting point for this new round of legislative amendments” intended to repress independent NGOs in 2015 (p. 184). These connections are hypothesised rather than proven: Yablokov did not conduct interviews with people involved in decision-making who would indicate that repressive legislation resulted from conspiracy theories; similarly, there are no publicly available documents indicating that conspiracy theories are the reason for this particular piece of legislation. However, there are other cases not mentioned in this book where this link is clear.

For instance, in 2012, Russian channel NTV released “The Anatomy of Protest”, a documentary film consisting of pro-government conspiracy theories about the 2011-2012 Russian protests. The film, produced by journalist Arkady Mamontov, provoked a wide controversy but did not lead to any actions by the government. However, a second “Anatomy of Protest” released later that year directly led to the actions taken by the Russian Prosecutor General. Based on conspiracy theories in this film, the Prosecutor General launched an investigation resulting in the criminal charges against three important left-wing opposition leaders – Sergey Udaltsov, Konstantin Lebedev and Leonid Razvozhaev. All three were found guilty. Unlike in the cases of NGO and the Internet, in the Udaltsov-Razvozhaev-Lebedev case, conspiracy theories were directly used as evidence for criminal charges.

Further, Yablokov’s analysis inaccurately depicts the context around the idea of the “Putin majority” in 2011-2012. In one of the chapters, Yablokov analyses the 2011-2012 post-election protests and the regime’s reaction to it. In particular, he argues that Kremlin attempted to construct the concept of a “Putin majority”, representing “the majority of the Russian people, who opposed the minority of ‘dissatisfied Muscovites’” (p. 162).

As it follows from Yablokov’s analysis, this conceptual figure of a majority was constructed and promoted by pro-Kremlin media, spin doctors and regime-affiliated intellectuals only. This is not accurate. As researcher Ilya Matveev shows in his analysis, many prominent intellectuals in the 2011-2012 protest movement, such as Dmitry Olshansky, Andrey Loshak and others, reproduced this discourse. Matveev concludes that liberal intellectuals “accept the rules of the polemics forced on them by the Kremlin and to treat the image of the ‘people’ created by the Kremlin as an accurate reflection of the ‘people’ they write about themselves. In this culture war, the two sides are fueling each other’s cause.”

This particular inaccuracy is indicative of a more general flaw. In Yablokov’s narrative, there are three distinct forces involved in the process of production, distribution and consumption of conspiracy theories: the elite, oppositional intellectuals and the general public. Yablokov gives a nuanced and stereoscopic view of the first group: the executive branch does not coincide with pro-Kremlin intellectuals; they do not always agree, sometimes have conflicts, and the relationships between them are structured in a complicated way. However, the public and the opposition seem to be depicted as monolithic wholes.

As Ilya Mateev demonstrates, the Russian opposition is unevenly structured too. Some of them tend to accept Kremlin narratives depending on their social position, some of them do not. Do they share conspiracy theories? What conspiracy theories do they share and why? This kind of multi-actor analysis of production and dissemination is necessary for building a more realistic argument, and yet it remains absent.

Persuasion, elite discourse and public opinion

The Russian public also remains the weak link of the book. Yablokov extensively relies on polling data as a self-evident source of evidence and positive conclusions that the conspiracy theories disseminated by Kremlin and Kremlin-sympathetic networks did or do work. According to the author, conspiracy theories are used by the regime to achieve national cohesion, gather support and discredit opponents; all these goals are achieved with varying degrees of success depending on particular periods and circumstances. Yet there is no way to establish whether conspiracy theories speak to Russian public given contemporary Russian circumstances.

The Levada Center data frequently cited by Yablokov as evidence is not credible due to certain methodological and theoretical problems. Indeed, there are problems associated with public opinion research in authoritarian regimes and post-Soviet society. For many Russian citizens, pollsters represent an opportunity to reach the government with their complaints and requests, which biases results. Also, given the dramatically low response rate to surveys in Russia, it is safe to assume that most people who refuse to answer interviewers’ questions are dissatisfied and have political reasons to be so. As a result, they are not detected by pollsters.This phenomenon is also known as “preference falsification” and is extensively studied in political science.

For many Russian citizens, pollsters represent an opportunity to reach the government with their complaints and requests, which biases results

Likewise, there is an authoritative and long-standing theoretical tradition in the field of political communication which questions the idea of asking questions and accepting responses at face value regardless of particular political context. Based on dual theories of cognition backed by solid experimental data, scholars in political communication have found that the opinion formation process is very much dependent on a wide number of factors, such as political knowledge, context, distance of events. For the majority of people not interested in politics, an individual’s opinion and perception of politics is a product of a complicated machinery of tricks used to ease one’s cognitive load and arrive at a conclusion without effort.

US sociologist John Mueller ironically summarises the difficulty of polling people in the context of fluctuating opinion:

“The respondent, on his doorstep or in his living room, is barraged with a set of questions on a wide variety of subjects (…) aware that their views are being preserved for the ages, they do not wish to appear unprepared at that moment. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find respondents pontificating in a seemingly authoritative, if basically ‘truthful’, manner on subjects about which they know nothing or to which they have never given any thought whatsoever”.

The analysis of public opinion in all its complexity using quantitative data would require theoretical and methodological resources that Russian pollsters do not possess. When qualitative data is used, the results are very different. For instance, Ellen Mickiewicz shows that instead of being convinced by the state agenda, Russian TV viewers in the 2000s were highly skilled at processing media messages critically and identifying persuasive intent. My research shows a similar picture in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: when Russian TV viewers are involved in discussion, their opinions are far from being shaped by Kremlin discourse. Also, the intensity and duration of media campaigns are crucially important when trying to understand the effect elite discourse has on the public. After several years of aggressive political propaganda, Russian TV viewers are very tired of negative reporting which makes them even more critical. These findings go in line with quantitative data indicating the decrease of popularity of TV channels due to their focus on the Ukrainian conflict. Russian viewers’ reactions to TV propaganda today is not the same as their reaction to TV propaganda before the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The Crimea Consensus has been generated largely through propaganda. Photo: Yaghobzadeh Rafael / ABACA / PA Images. All rights reserved.All these complexities mean that Yablokov should at least say that the Kremlin attempts to shape public opinion instead of claiming that “the Vesti nedeli reports became a powerful political instrument in shaping domestic public opinion” (p. 179) or “the call to rally round ‘Putin’s flag’ was strong enough to guarantee the success of the ruling party” (p. 180). At best, we need resources, expertise, theoretical and methodological innovation to build institutions capable of supplying the public and researches with reliable data about public opinion.

Theories of everyday life

Even if we assume that conspiracy theories have a profound effect on Russian audience (which, again, is a problematic statement at the very least), it probably won’t be the theories voiced by Vladislav Surkov or Arkady Mamontov. Yablokov’s research is focused on spokespersons of the regime, while he ignores the vast majority of conspiracy theories in culture and entertainment which are in more immediate proximity for most people in Russia. In his chronicle of the work in Russia as a TV producer, Peter Pomerantsev argues that in the early 2000s the Kremlin realised that the main mistake of Soviet TV was that it was “dull”. The task was, then, “to synthesise Soviet control with Western entertainment”.

Pomerantsev’s work itself is prone to generalisations about audiences and media which are not always grounded in evidence. However, this point is a reasonable one. Given the fact that entertainment is the primary type of media content consumed by most audiences and the fact that conspiracy theories are produced en masse by popular TV shows such as “Voennaya Taina” (Military Secret) and “Sovershenno Sekretno” (Top Secret) on NTV, it is logical to analyse these theories that are instead a part of entertainment/everyday life rather than official political discourse. If we assume that conspiracy theories have a substantial effect on audiences, these everyday life theories may work as a source of conspiracy theories for the general public or a background for amplifying the impact of official political conspiracy theories.

I want to reiterate here: in some cases, I refer to the shortcomings and flaws of the book; yet, in most cases, I instead suggest possible avenues for further research. As such, Yablokov’s book is an interesting, informative and illuminating read. It presents a complicated and convincing picture of an important phenomenon that is rarely analysed in public and academic discourse about Russia beyond anecdotal evidence.

 

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          Meet Russian anarchist Ilya Romanov. He’s spent nearly 20 years in prison      Cache   Translate Page      

Through radical protest of the 1990s and 2000s to the repressive machine of today, Romanov's biography shows how the Russian government’s attitude to protest has hardened. RU

Ilya Romanov, August 2015. Source: Grani.ru.Ilya Romanov is 50 years old, and has been active in protest movements in Russia since the end of the 1980s. His war on the Russian authorities began in his native city of Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod) when he was 13, secretly publishing and distributing leaflets denouncing the Communist regime. After being expelled from university in his hometown, he joined the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists, producing local newspapers at the height of perestroika in the late 1980s – before becoming involved in social and ecological protests in Russia during the 1990s.

But Romanov has spent most of the last two decades behind bars. He is relatively unknown to the latest generation of Russian anarchists – and the wider world. After being sentenced to nine years on terrorism charges in Nizhny Novgorod in 2015, he is now facing a new charge of fomenting terrorist activity while serving his sentence in Mordovia. According to investigators, while in prison hospital Romanov posted an “Islamist video” to Facebook in summer 2017. Romanov claims that he is not in any way religious and that this was a provocation on the part of the Russian security services. This new case against Romanov has now been transferred to the courts.

Looking at Romanov’s life, we can see how the reaction of the Russian law enforcement to resistance has changed over time: while in the early 1990s, anarchists could seize regional administration buildings and still remain at liberty, now they face criminal charges for their Facebook posts.

Between Maoism and the Democratic Union

“Ilya has always had his own view of the world, an usual way of looking at the world, a specific philosophy,” says Romanov’s ex-wife Larisa. “His ideas were always in step with his actions.”

Larisa recalls how Ilya once, on a train, gave his jacket to a homeless person who was bemoaning his life. Ilya and Larisa were together between 1996 and 1998 and have a child together. Larisa now has a new family, but hasn’t divorced Romanova in order to help him in prison.

After leaving school, Romanov began a degree at Nizhny Novgorod’s medical institute, but left after three years when he had qualified as a paramedic. He was thrown out for a protest action where he hung a barbed wire wreath on the local KGB building. At this time he was also a member of the “Democratic Union” organisation, which brought together people with various opposition views, including left wingers. “There’s a photo of him walking along a street with Valeriya Novodvorskaya,” Larisa recalls, referring to the organisation’s prominent leader.

Ilya Romanov with Valeria Novodvorskaya, Soviet dissident, leader of Democratic Union and later prominent Russian liberal commentator. Source: Larisa Romanova. In the 1980s, Romanov was also interested in Maoism, but then he started hanging out with anarchists. Moscow anarchist philosopher Pyotr Ryabov recalls how he met Romanov when the latter was already leading the Gorky section of the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists. Romanov also helped publish the “Obshchina” (“Community”) nationwide anarchist newspaper and produced an edition of his own paper, “Solntse” (Sun) and several editions of the “Chastnoye Litso” [Private Citizen] journal. Another member of the Confederation at the time was Andrey Isayev, who later abandoned his left wing views in the 1990s and is now an influential United Russia MP.

Larisa has also had direct experience of losing her freedom. In the late 1990s, she was given a four years suspended sentence for an assassination attempt on Nikolay Kondratenko, the then governor of the Krasnodar Krai who was famous for his ultra-right and anti-Semitic views. Larisa then spent five and a half years behind bars for involvement in the case of the “New Revolutionary Alternative”, which was allegedly responsible for two small explosions in the reception area of the FSB building in Moscow and the blowing up of a monument to Tsar Nicholas II in the Moscow region. On her release, Larisa worked for Andrey Babushkin’s “Committee for Civil Rights”. She has four children.

Russia’s Anarcho-Syndicalist movement split up pretty quickly and Romanov later claimed that the Confederation was created by the KGB to manipulate the protest movement. He wrote a long article on the subject in his own “Grass and Freedom” newspaper. Ryabov considers this to be a conspiracy theory.

The battle for the environment

In the 1990s, Russian anarchists were very active in social and environmental movements and protests against the war in Chechnya, and Romanov made his presence felt on both fronts. Anarchist Anna Pavlova remembers first meeting him in 1994, when he was an organiser of anti-war actions – they sprayed graffiti on recruitment centres together.

Ilya Romanov (centre). Date and place unknown. Source: Larisa Romanova. “In 1992, Romanov was at an environmental camp in Lipetsk with his then wife Lada and their one-year-old son Rodion. A Swedish company in Lipetsk wanted to open a rape seed processing plant – it’s a pretty toxic process, and the environment there was impoverished already. The locals wrecked the future plant construction site with tractors and then called in the anarcho-ecologists,” Ryabov recalls. “Looking at the situation today, it’s hard to imagine that people at the camp, anarchists and local residents, seized the Lipetsk regional administration building, removed its Russian flag and raised a flag with the black anarchist cat image on it. They also seized the regional head’s office, where the phone with the direct line to central government was also located. They were arrested by police special forces, but all that happened was that after they got the crap kicked out of them, they were held till evening in the slammer and then released. They weren’t even taken to court.”

When the special forces team arrested the “invaders” of the Lipetsk administration building, a legend popular among Russian anarchists was born. It told of a certain “Slepukha”, the “anarchist-in-chief”, who was never caught at an action but who organised environmental protests. The factory in Lipetsk was never built.

“When some Moscow State University student was recently hauled up for scrawling ‘No to the fanzone’ on a bollard, I remembered how in the early 1990s you could seize an entire administration building and just get locked up in a police cell till the evening,” muses Ryabov nostalgically.

The radical battle for the environment didn’t stop at Lipetsk: Romanov decided to campaign on behalf of ancient forests in Russia’s North Caucasus.

“Ilya gathered people together to hold an action to spike beech trees [where camouflaged nails are driven into tree trunks to hamper felling],” Larisa recalls. “The beeches were cut down and removed by helicopter, as they were worth their weight in gold. The locals were afraid that if they were caught obstructing this business, they would be thrown into the nearest ravine and never be seen again. It had to be done by non-locals who could come and go. So we came, spiked and left.”

In the capital

In 1996, Romanov was living in Moscow, in a squat on the Ostozhenka, a street now lined with expensive real estate. Hippies lived in one flat in the squat, anarchists in another, and the third was occupied by Paul Spengler, an American famous for his attempts to protect Moscow’s historic buildings from the bulldozers. In Moscow, Ilya took part in protests to preserve the Neskuchny Sad, when anarchists, locals and Tolkien enthusiasts succeeded in saving this park in the very centre of Moscow from destruction.

According to Ryabov, Romanov was friendly not only with other anarchists, but also with Trotskyites. In 1993, he sold the Trotskyite “Workers’ Democracy” newspaper on Red Square. One day, he was attacked by “Barkashovites” (followers of Aleksandr Barkashov, the founder and leader of the "Russian National Unity" movement), who grabbed his papers and broke two of his ribs. In return, a group of anarchists and Trotskyites attacked the Barkashovites in possibly the first ever anti-fascist street protest in Russian history.

Ilya Romanova and Larisa Romanova at Neskuchnyi sad, Moscow. Source: Larisa Romanova. In 2014, by the way, Romanov denied that he was pro-Bolshevik: “Bolshevism as a phenomenon is possible in a backward, mainly peasant country exhausted by a basically interminable war. There are absolutely no preconditions for its appearance in today’s ‘consumer society’. So organisations that called and still call themselves by that name are in a complete state of degradation and can only be seen as sects of clowns – they have no effect on society.”

In the mid-1990s, Romanov’s first wife Lada converted from anarchism to conservative Orthodoxy and returned to her parents’ home in the Nizhny Novgorod region. A common attraction to anarchism and environmentalism brought him together with his second wife Larisa, with whom he began to publish the “Grass and Freedom” newspaper. The journal, with its radical articles and interesting illustrations, had a significant influence on anarchists at the time. “These days, it would lead to 100 criminal charges,” says Ryabov.

Aleksandr Zimbovsky, an activist with the Trotskyite Workers’ Revolutionary Party, remembers Romanov being part of a medical team during the Russian constitutional crisis of October 1993 – an initiative of Muscovite left wing radicals who decided not to take sides in armed confrontations, but instead to act as stretcher bearers, getting wounded away from the White House government building.

According to Zimbovsky, Romanov also took part in a second action in front of the White House, the miners’ camp protest of 1998. In protest against months of delays in receiving wages, miners set up a protest camp outside the government building for several months.

Romanov found himself behind bars for the first time in the same year – for possession of a small amount of drugs. In those days, there was no risk of a long sentence, and according to Larissa, it was even unusual for a suspect to be remanded in custody on that charge. Evidently, the FSB hoped to tie him into a case against the anarchist “New Revolutionary Alternative” organisation, but couldn’t find enough evidence.

Larisa Romanova and Ilya Romanov at a commune in Tver oblast, 1996-1997. Source: Larisa Romanova.As a result, Romanov was amnestied on the drugs charge, but declared insane – on FSB orders, Larissa believes. He was sent back to his home city of Nizhny Novgorod for treatment, thanks to the intervention of his father, a well-known cardiologist.

The Odesa Komsomol Case

Romanov returned to Moscow in 2002, but it was clear that the FSB were still on his case. He was arrested and driven by car to Penza, a city 550 km south-east of the capital, where an acquaintance made a statement to the effect that he and Ilya had made improvised explosives together in the 1990s. On arrival in Penza, Romanov slit his wrists. There was no other evidence against him, and the man who had given the initial evidence against him was certified as insane, so they had to release Romanov.

Romanov then left Russia for Ukraine, as anarchists there had promised to help him leave the the former Soviet Union in order to put him beyond the reach of the FSB. He didn’t actually meet up with them, but got involved in protests on Kyiv’s Maidan demanding the resignation of the then President Leonid Kuchma, where he met communists from Odesa and other Ukrainian cities. In December 2002, he was arrested again, this time in connection with the so-called “Odesa Komsomol Case”.

This case involved 11 citizens of Russia, Moldova and Ukraine being accused of setting up a so-called “Black Sea Soviet Republic”, as well as possession of arms, robbery with violence and other criminal offences. The arrestees were subjected to horrific torture, and one suspect died under torture during the investigation. Romanov was given a 10 year prison sentence for carrying out an explosion in Kyiv, next to Ukraine’s Security Services (SBU) headquarters.

“Odesa Komsomol members”. Source: Anarchy today.“Ilya was tortured for a long time,” Larisa tells me. “He only took the witness box after he was taken to Kherson and put in a cell with two police informants who tried to rape him. He tried to escape from the cell by saying he would give evidence. But he only gave it against himself; he refused to implicate anyone else.”

Anarchist Anna Pavlova recalls how Romanov fought for the rights of his fellow prisoners during his time in Ukrainian prison, and succeeded in having the prison governor removed from his post. Romanov was eventually released in 2012. Two years later, the “Black Sea Soviet Republic” would become part of the mythology behind the so-called “People’s Republics” in eastern Ukraine, as “the first attempt to create the state of Novorossiya”. Andrey Yakovenko, another defendant in the “Odesa Komsomol Case”, succeeded in being sent to a colony inside the separatist-controlled area, where he was released “with honour”. In 2014, Romanov was more inclined to support the Maidan protests than the Donbas separatists.

Romanov has stated that the “Odesa Case” was concocted by the SBU: there was no actual revolutionary group at all. “The investigators dreamed up an ‘organised group’ from a few unconnected incidents, to make up a more serious case… An organisation would have had a name of some sort, but the police couldn’t discover one here, which is significant in itself. In the end, they just convicted everyone of ‘banditry’, i.e. they defined the ‘organisation’ as a criminal ‘band’. But Ukraine’s Supreme Court removed that crime from my list of offences – even that ridiculous judicial system recognised that I wasn’t part of anything like that.”

“When a ‘banditry’ case is investigated, it always follows the same pattern. Various crimes committed by completely different people or groups of people are put down to a single organiser who plans everything and hands out roles to his co-conspirators. The ‘Odesa Case’ was no exception. Fewer than half the accused were ‘Odesa Komsomol members’: the rest were either not from Odesa, nor Komsomol members, or neither.”

Release is not on the cards

Ilya was free between December 2012 and October 2013. “Returning to Russia from Ukraine was a big mistake,” says Larisa. “There’s no way he could be freed here. They told him that would be the case, but he wouldn’t listen. He went for a job in a furniture factory in Nizhny Novgorod, but he couldn’t work there because of a back injury, and he couldn’t earn anything in a security job either. Then he got work at a sweet factory where they paid a decent wage. That employer gave him a reasonable recommendation in the later criminal case against him.”

Indeed, Romanov’s freedom was quickly cut short. In late October 2013, a homemade firework went off while he was holding it, and one of his hands had to be amputated in hospital. This provided the cops with an excuse to re-arrest him on a charge of terrorism.

Romanov claims that the local anti-extremism police hacked into his computer and posted several files, including a text file that included the following statement: “Shantsev, Sorokin, Kondrashov (leading Nizhny Novogorod officials): if you don’t stop destroying our parks I’ll blow you all the **** up.” A second file was entitled: “Aryan Terror: a guideline for training white terrorists”. These became the basis for a charge of planning a terrorist act, for which Romanov is now serving a nine-year sentence.

Ilya Romanov, August 2015. Source: OVD-Info. Then, in summer 2017, Romanov was faced with yet another charge – for posting an Islamist video with Hebrew subtitles on Facebook. The implication was that Romanov supported Islamic terrorism. The case materials have been handed over to the courts.

Romanov claims that he doesn’t know how to transfer files from his mobile phone to the internet, that he has no connection with Islam and that he is the victim of a local FSB operation. Judging from the case materials, law enforcement fabricated a medical diagnosis that allowed him to be transferred from prison colony to a prison hospital, which is easier to bug. There he shared a ward with another prisoner, who cooperates with the security services.

This prisoner gave Romanov a phone which he could use to access the internet (prisoners are forbidden to use mobile phones) and set up an account for him on Facebook. In the more comfortable conditions of the hospital, Romanov began to enjoy himself: he carried out Buddhist rites for the death of Vladimir Putin and posted caricatures of the Russian president with male and female sexual organs on his Facebook page. FSB officers eavesdropped on his ward for several months without doing anything more, but then posted a Jihadist video on the Facebook page they had set up for him and initiated a new criminal case against him.

Anna Pavlova notes that no human rights organisations are supporting Romanov, despite evidence of police abuse of power and the practice of “adding sentences”. Romanov is little known even amongst those who embraced anarchism in Russia in the 2010s, although he was among the founders of today’s anarchist movement. This is probably because of his radical convictions, which don’t chime with high profile rights campaigns.

Romanov’s activist experience goes back to the pre-Putin era, when you could scuffle with far-right agitators on Red Square or seize a regional administration building and hoist a black flag above it with impunity. He has not yet been able to take part in today’s Russian protest movement, but his attitude to the Russian authorities is understandable: he comes from an era when there was incomparably more freedom in Russia.

 

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Unul dintre cei mai cunoscuţi sculptori români, Ion Jalea, s-a născut la 19 mai 1887, în Casimcea, judeţul Tulcea. A urmat gimnaziul pentru băieţi "Mircea cel Bătrân" din Constanţa (1899) şi apoi Şcoala de Belle-Arte şi Meserii (1903-1907), aceasta fiind perioada în care şi-a descoperit talentul pentru artele plastice sub îndrumarea unuia dintre cei mai cunoscuţi pictori constănţeni ai vremii. Sprijinit de Primăria Constanţa, care i-a acordat o bursă, Ion Jalea şi-a continuat studiile la Academia de Arte Frumoase din Bucureşti, cu Frederick Storck şi Dimitrie Paciurea (din 1915), potrivit lucrărilor ''Membrii Academiei Române /1866-2003'' (Editura Academiei Române, 2003) şi ''Dicţionarul artiştilor români contemporani'' (Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1976). În 1912 a debutat cu o expoziţie personală la Bucureşti, unde a expus lucrări inspirate din vechile basme româneşti: Sfarmă-Piatră, Briar, Remuşcarea etc. Şi-a desăvârşit educaţia artistică la Academia Julian din Paris şi la ''Grande Chaumiere'', sub îndrumarea lui Antoine Bourdelle. De asemenea, a lucrat şi în atelierul marelui sculptor impresionist Auguste Rodin. Ion Jalea a participat la Războiul de Reîntregire Naţională, pe frontul din Moldova, unde, în urma unei răni primite, şi-a pierdut braţul stâng. Pasiunea pentru sculptură şi talentul său l-au determinat să-şi depăşească limitările impuse de infirmitatea sa, continuând să îşi "modeleze" operele cu o singură mână.   Sursa foto: (c) MARIA POSTELNICU / AGERPRES FOTO   În cadrul unei expoziţii colective, organizată la Iaşi de artiştii mobilizaţi, au fost expuse schiţele de front, în care artistul a evocat amintirea războiului, dar şi ororile faţă de tragediile pe care le-a provocat şi sentimentul de recunoştinţă pentru eroii căzuţi la datorie, toate aceste sentimente regăsindu-se transpuse în ''Monumentul soldaţilor francezi căzuţi pe teritoriul României'' (Bucureşti, 1922), ''Monumentul eroilor ceferişti'' (Bucureşti, 1923), ''Monumentul dedicat soldaţilor români, foşti prizonieri în Germania'' (ridicat la Dieuse, Franţa), precum şi în basorelieful ''Mausoleului de la Mărăşeşti'', realizat împreună cu Cornel Medrea, potrivit lucrării ''Membrii Academiei Române /1866-2003'' (Editura Academiei Române, 2003).   Sursa foto: (c) ION DUMITRU / AGERPRES FOTO   Sculptorul român a întreprins călătorii de studii în: Franţa, Anglia, Italia (1923), URSS (1958, 1963), Austria (1961), Franţa (1962), SUA (1963), Japonia (1966). În 1922, a expus la Salonul de toamnă de la Paris. Din 1924, a participat la saloane oficiale, la expoziţii anuale de stat, la manifestări de artă românească, organizate la: Rotterdam şi Haga (1930); Zürich şi Bratislava (1943); Budapesta (1947); Moscova (1958); Helsinki, Leningrad, Budapesta, Bratislava, Minsk, Praga, Atena, Berlin, Belgrad (1960); Paris, Istanbul, Damasc, Alexandria, Cairo (1961); Pekin, Phenian (1966); Ulan Bator (1967); Torino (1970), precum şi la expoziţii internaţionale: Barcelona (1929); Paris (1937); New York (1939); Bienala de la Veneţia (1958); Berlin (1966); Anvers (1967); Paris (muzeul ''Rodin'', 1971), conform ''Dicţionarului artiştilor români contemporani'' (Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1976). În 1915, 1923, 1936 (retrospectivă) a avut expoziţii personale la Bucureşti, organizate la Ateneul Român, Salonul oficial, Căminul Artelor, Sala Dalles. A acoperit cu activitatea sa bogată o perioadă de şase decenii, ciclurile sale tematice incluzând scene alegorice, religioase sau mitologice, scene de război sau de muncă, nuduri, portrete, figuri de ţărani, reliefuri şi basoreliefuri, statui, busturi, statuete, culminând cu lucrările sale monumentale. Dintre lucrările sale, realizate în cele mai diverse materiale - gips, bronz, piatră sau marmură - amintim: ''Hercule doborând centaurul'', ''Minerva'', ''Bacante'', ''Arcaş odihnindu-se'', ''Spiru Haret'' (statuie, Bucureşti, 1935), ''Monumentul infanteriei'' (Bucureşti, 1936), ''Mihai Eminescu'' (Bucureşti), ''Mircea cel Bătrân'' (Tulcea), ''Decebal'' (Deva), ''Traian Demetrescu'' (Craiova), ''La sapă'', ''Muncitori cărând saci'', ''Cu cobiliţa'', ''Lăptăresele'' ş.a.   Sursa foto: (c) CORNEL MOCANU / AGERPRES FOTO A fost membru corespondent (31 mai 1946; 2 noiembrie 1948) şi membru titular (21 martie 1963) al Academiei Române. De asemenea, a fost preşedinte activ (1956) şi preşedinte de onoare (1968) al Uniunii Artiştilor Plastici, ''Dicţionarului artiştilor români contemporani'' (Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1976). În 1932 a devenit profesor la Academia de Arte Frumoase din Bucureşti, iar în 1942 director în Ministerul Artelor.   Sursa foto: (c) CRISTIAN NISTOR / AGERPRES FOTO A fost premiat la Expoziţia internaţională de la Barcelona (1932) şi a primit Marele Premiu al Expoziţiei internaţionale de la Paris (1937), Premiul Naţional pentru sculptură (Barcelona, 1941), Premiul de Stat (1957). A fost distins cu titlurile de Maestru Emerit al Artei şi Artist al Poporului (1957). Sculptorul Ion Jalea a murit la 7 noiembrie 1983, la Bucureşti, la vârsta de 96 de ani. În 1968, Ion Jalea a donat Muzeului de Artă din Constanţa, 108 dintre lucrările sale cele mai însemnate, potrivit https://muzeuldeartaconstanta.ro. O mică parte dintre acestea a fost expusă în clădirea principală a muzeului, restul de lucrări putând fi admirate în cadrul Muzeului de Sculptură ''Ion Jalea'', înfiinţat cu ocazia acestei donaţii a artistului. Printre lucrările expuse se regăsesc autoportrete ale artistului, portrete ale părinţilor săi şi ale celor două fiice, portretul scriitorului Liviu Rebreanu şi un cap de Madonă de o inestimabilă valoare. Colecţia a fost întregită în 1984, cu o serie de alte sculpturi dăruite de familia artistului, ajungând astfel la un total de 227 de lucrări.   Sursa foto: (c) CRISTIAN NISTOR / AGERPRES FOTO Muzeul de sculptură "Ion Jalea" este găzduit de o clădire în stil naţional (neo-românesc) proiectată de arhitectul Victor Stephanescu după marele război, aflată în zona istorică a oraşului Constanţa, notează https://muzeuldeartaconstanta.ro. Casa a aparţinut prefectului de Constanţa Constantin Pariano. AGERPRES/(Documentare - Irina Andreea Cristea, redactor Arhiva Foto: Elena Bălan, Mihaela Tufega; editor: Marina Bădulescu, editor online: Alexandru Cojocaru)
          Spiritual Keys to Open Windows of Heaven and Receive God's Blessings      Cache   Translate Page      

November is one of the most glorious months of the year! It is during this time of jubilant holidays we get to escape from work and school, and with Christmas bonuses we are encouraged to think about others and bless them instead of thinking only about ourselves. We see our favorite bell ringers and hear about all of the great work that is being done all around the world for those who are living without basic necessities. It is a joyous time for humanity to come together and celebrate life! And yet for some people, this time of the year has the opposite effect, and they are filled with dread because they shudder at any opportunity to give their money away. Instead of taking joy in the season of giving, they clench their fist tightly around their money and grumble. For these people, tithing is agony, giving is a veritable apocalypse and missions is Armageddon itself.

This kind of giving fear never seems to be connected to the lottery or casinos, both of which depend on people's faith not in God but in luck and chance. Instead of "agony" and "apocalypse," the world uses :"amazing," "astonishing," "awesome" and "awe-inspiring," power words to describe the $1 billion lottery jackpot. If the world can muster the faith to trust a gamble, why can't God's people trust Him to make good on His infinite promise to provide for their needs and to bless them abundantly?

The kingdom of God is full of people of light, love and life. We are the children of His promises, which include abundant living. His track record of faithfulness to carry out His Word stretches back millennia. And yet stinginess and the fear of lack is nothing new among people. Jesus addressed it head-on. He warns us, "You cannot serve God and be enslaved to money" (Luke 16:13b, NLT), and taught that "if you have not been faithful in the unrighteous wealth, who will commit to your trust the true riches?" (Luke 16:11, MEV). He got to the core of the matter when He declared, "for where your treasure is, there your heart will be also" (Matt. 6:21). Pastor Craig Groeschel puts it this way: "We give up things we love for things we love even more."

The truth is, God has money for anything He wants done, and He will channel that money through people. Trusting God with our tithing and giving opens up the windows of heaven to allow God to pour out blessings we cannot contain so that we can be a conduit for His provision. If we believe obedience to the Word of the living God can allow us to conquer any adversary; if we believe that being filled with the Holy Spirit and praying faith-filled prayers have the power to change nations, open up doors that no man can shut and release us to be God's witness to the ends of the world; and if we truly desire to live a life of epic, excellent and exciting power, we must understand what the Word of God has to say about giving. Then we must do what it tells us to do.

It is up to us to share with the world the power that can be gained through trusting Jesus Christ, God's Word and the Holy Spirit. But it is also up to us as leaders, servants, pastors and evangelists to correct people's misperceptions about giving. People may have chosen to block out the Word of God and all that it can offer their life simply because someone in the past presented the idea of tithing in a negative way. There are actual people in the world today who believe all God wants is their money and that there is nothing else for them in Jesus Christ or the church. We must be the ones to help eliminate this lie from the world and help people to understand the true nature and power of God's Word. God is not trying to take away from people; He is trying to open people up so He can bless their lives far beyond measure.

This season, it is also up to teach our congregations the importance of a heart-attitude that trusts God enough to love and bless those who are in need freely, as well as tithe into His kingdom. As we present the Word of God, let us be mindful of the power of our words and the effect they can have on people's perception of God. We must present tithing in appropriate terms. We must present salvation in appropriate ways. We must model for them that when we create a lifestyle of helping others to be blessed by God, He shall bless us in the process! As Proverbs 11:25b (NLT) says, "Those who refresh others will themselves be refreshed."

Be refreshed, be renewed and be blessed.

You are beautiful; I see Jesus in you.

Have an awesome week! {eoa}

Mikel French has challenged spiritual awakening all across America, where many celebrations extended into multiple weeks, and has conducted celebrations in France, Sweden, Russia, Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, Germany, South Africa, Malawi, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Haiti, Japan, Singapore, India and Thailand. He conducted an outreach celebration in Manila, Philippines, reaching 200,000 teenagers with the Book of Hope. Through the generous support of partners, he has presented the message of Jesus Christ to millions of people in the nation of Russia through televised citywide soul-winning celebrations. Mikel considers it an honor to assist in conducting the annual pastor's conference, where thousands of pastors from Russia's 11 time zones come for training, teaching and equipping. Mikel and his wife, Marsha, reside in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


          Regulile privind introducerea în țară a bunurilor personale. Ce prevede legislația      Cache   Translate Page      
„Ce bunuri pot fi introduse în țară fără a achita taxe?!” și „Care este cuantumul neimpozabil pentru bunurile aduse în scop personal?!”. Acestea continuă a fi unele dintre cele mai frecvente întrebări adresate operatorilor Liniei de informare a Vămii. Pentru a răspunde acestora, Serviciul Vamal face trimitere la prevederile Legii cu privire la modul de introducere și scoatere a bunurilor de pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova.
          Comisia parlamentară de anchetă în cazul „Open Dialog” amână audierile programate pentru săptămâna curentă      Cache   Translate Page      
Comisia de anchetă în cazul acuzațiilor de imixtiune din partea Fundației „Otwarty Dialog” (Dialog Deschis) și fondatoarei acesteia, Ludmila Kozlowska, în treburile interne ale Republicii Moldova și a finanțării unor partide politice a decis amânarea audierilor programate pentru săptămâna curentă. Potrivit Parlamentului, decizia a fost luată ca urmare a solicitărilor venite din partea unor persoane care urmau să fie audiate și care au invocat imposibilitatea de a da curs invitației.
          CFM va procura 12 locomotive noi în valoare de 45 de milioane de euro. Primele vor ajunge în țară în 2020      Cache   Translate Page      
„Calea Ferată din Moldova” va procura 12 locomotive magistrale noi, și se va alege de renovarea Depoului. Un contract în acest sens, a fost semnat, astăzi, de administrația CFM și reprezentanții companiei americane, câștigătoare a licitației – General Electric Transportation. Costul total al acestora ajunge la 45 milioane de euro, iar documentul prevede că firma va livra primele locomotive la începutul anului 2020.
          Moldova György - A rövid élet titka - Jelenlegi ára: 950 Ft      Cache   Translate Page      
Moldova György - A rövid élet titka
Dunakanyar, 2000
Moldova György - A rövid élet titka
Jelenlegi ára: 950 Ft
Az aukció vége: 2018-11-07 10:53
          Între doi și cinci copii dispar zilnic în Moldova. Recomandările Poliției pentru a evita asemenea cazuri      Cache   Translate Page      
De la începutul anului 478 de copii din țara noastră au abandonat domiciliul sau forma de protecție a copilului de unde aceștia au fost plasați. Dintre aceștia 251 de au fost fete, iar 227 - băieți. Potrivit Inspectoratului General de Poliție, zilnic în țara noastră sunt înregistrate între două și cinci cazuri de dispariție a copiilor.
          Amerika figyelmezteti Magyarországot, Románia meg úgy tesz, mintha nem látna semmit      Cache   Translate Page      
Pedig Orbán Viktor hadai már döngetik a román nemzet kapuit, pont a Centenárium évében. És a drága Moldovai Köztársaság is cserben hagyta a mioritikus hazát.
[...] Bővebben!

          Fonduri europene accesate de Consiliul Județean, pentru dezvoltarea turismului subacvatic      Cache   Translate Page      
Consiliul Judeţean Constanţa anunță, marți, că, în calitate de Lider de parteneriat, împreună cu Asociaţia Bulgară pentru Transferul Tehnologiei, Inovaţiei din Bulgaria şi Consiliul Raional Ungheni din Republica Moldova şi [...]
          NOI TENSIUNI ÎN DONBASS. Rusia vizează părţi din Moldova şi Ucraina      Cache   Translate Page      
Tensiunile din estul Ucrainei au reizbucnit. În ultimele 24 de ore, insurgenţii proruşi au deschis focul de 14 ori.
          Doi deputati au cerut Curtii Constitutionale sa verifice cat de constutionala este prevederea care permite deschiderea benzinariilor duty-free la frontiera cu Moldova      Cache   Translate Page      
Liberal-democratul Tudor Deliu si liberalul Lilian Carp invoca faptul ca amendamentul a fost votat in
          Cooperarea Republicii Moldova cu NATO, subiect abordat la Bruxelles      Cache   Translate Page      
Cooperarea Republicii Moldova cu Alianţa Nord-Atlantică şi asistenţa oferită de ţările aliate în contextul dezvoltării şi modernizării Armatei Naţionale au constituit principalele subiecte discutate marţi, la Bruxelles, de ministrul Apărării Eugen Sturza cu Rose Gottemoeller, Secretarul General Adjunct al NATO.
          Mii de proiecte in valoare de sute de milioane de euro au fost implementate in ultimii ani in Republica Moldova, datorita Guvernului Romaniei - VIDEO      Cache   Translate Page      
  Dupa mai bine de 25 de ani, sediul central “Dadiani” al Muzeului National de de Arta
          Comment on Igor Munteanu: „Nu se ajung bani nici pentru colivă, nici pentru cruci în satele noastre” by ivancelgroaznic      Cache   Translate Page      
"motoarele de creștere economică a R. Moldova sunt oprite și că sistemul de administrare este total opus, de fapt, intereselor de creștere economică a țării." Apai si Maia a adus destula distruzhere si tradare de interese ale tari, si acu se scalda in angazhamente mincinoase.
          Comment on Parlamentul ar fi comis încălcări la votarea facilităților suplimentare pentru vânzările duty-free by Lider Moldovan      Cache   Translate Page      
Legea benzinăriilor duty-free timp de un an transferă din bugetul de stat în bugetul "juif"-ului Ilan Șor peste 1,5 miliarde de lei. Din momentul promulgătii legii de monstrul mancurt Igor Dodon circa 0,15 miliarde de lei, adică 150 de milioane de lei au trecut deja din bugetul statului R. Moldova în buzunarele "juif"-ului Ilan Șor și a "juif"-oaicei sau "juif"-oaucăi lui, Sara Șor. Mândrește-te popor moldovenesc că-i hrănești din banii luați de la gura copiilor tăi pe "juif"-ii aceștea oploșiți la tine! În schimb "juif"-ul Ilan Șor îți va da concerte gratis oriunde te-ai afla! ÎN SPATELE "JUIF"-ULUI ILAN ȘOR ȘI AFACERILOR LUI, FURTUL CELOR 2,9 MILIARDE DE DOLARI, BENZINĂRIILE DUTY-FREE , ETC., SE AFLĂ TALPA IADULUI PLAHOTNIUK.
          Exclusiv. Avem prețurile noului Mercedes-Benz GLE în Moldova!      Cache   Translate Page      

Compania Mercedes-Benz a prezentat noua generație a SUV-ului GLE în cadrul Salonului Auto de la Paris, la începutul lunii octombrie. Acum, redacția AutoExpert în exclusivitate dezvăluie prețurile pentru noul SUV nemțesc. Pe piața din Republica Moldova, Mercedes-Benz GLE va fi propus în trei motorizări, iar prețul de pornire este de 57.370 de euro. Din punct de vedere estetic,

Articolul Exclusiv. Avem prețurile noului Mercedes-Benz GLE în Moldova! apare prima dată în AutoExpert.


          Екатерина      Cache   Translate Page      
photo#source%3Dgooglier%2Ecom#https%3A%2F%2Fgooglier%2Ecom%2Fpage%2F%2F10000\ Екатерина, 28 y.o. , Moldova

          Filmul lui Vlad Zamfirescu, "Secretul Fericirii", are proiecții speciale în Moldova      Cache   Translate Page      
Filmul lui Vlad Zamfirescu, „Secretul Fericirii”, poate fi vizionat în acest weekend în trei orașe din zona Moldovei. Astfel, sâmbătă 10 noiembrie, începând cu ora 19:00, filmul poate fi vizionat la Cinema Unirea, din Botoșani, iar biletele pot fi achiziționate de la casieria cinematografului. Iar...
           Legea pentru Autostrada Unirii a fost adoptată n Parlament. Ce prevede textul pentru autostrada A8 Tg. Mureș - Iași      Cache   Translate Page      
Proiectul Autostrăzii Unirii, așa cum a fost supranumită A8 Tg. Mureș - Iași - Ungheni, a fost aprobat printr-o lege în Parlament cu votul a 269 de deputați. Legea prevede ca autostrada de circa 320 de km să fie realizată până la granița cu Republica Moldova, cu un pod peste Prut la Ungheni, să fie realizată pe fonduri europene, iar procedurile să demareze în termen de 30 de zile de la promulgare. De ce a ales Parlamentul să adopte o lege pentru un proiect de investiție? "Proiectul acesta de lege vine din exasperare. Ai un Guvern care efectiv refuză să facă pași pentru acest proiect", a declarat pentru HotNews.ro deputatul USR Cătălin Drulă.
          Parlamentarii PSD vor vota in favoarea construirii autostrazii Iasi – Targu Mures. Doar cativa agitatori fac scandal degeaba      Cache   Translate Page      

Ziua de miercuri este una care se va dovedi istorica pentru zona Moldova! Pe 7 noiembrie 2018, in an centenar, va fi pus...
          Conferinta "Romanian Business Leaders Iasi": "Cum conectam Moldova la dezvoltarea pe termen lung"      Cache   Translate Page      

Persoanele cu spirit antreprenor sunt invitate sa se alature comunitatii Romanian Business Leaders (RBL) Iasi - platform...
          Vosganian anunță că parlamentari ALDE nu votează bugetul pe 2019 dacă nu e inclusă Autostrada Unirii      Cache   Translate Page      
Vicepreședintele ALDE Varujan a anunțat, miercuri, în plen, că parlamentarii liberal-democrați din Moldova nu vor vota legea bugetului de stat pe 2019 dacă în proiect nu este inclusă finanțarea pentru Autostrada Unirii.
Citește mai departe...
          ȘANTAJ fără PERDEA: ALDE amenință PSD că nu votează bugetul pe 2019      Cache   Translate Page      
Vicepreședintele ALDE Varujan a anunțat, miercuri, în plen, că parlamentarii liberal-democrați din Moldova nu vor vota legea bugetului de stat pe 2019 dacă în proiect nu este inclusă finanțarea pentru Autostrada Unirii.
Citește mai departe...
          Comment on Did Senate Republicans cave on Kavanaugh? by The Grundle King      Cache   Translate Page      
And like a true simpleton, you copypasta his comment, without doing any further analysis. I looked at the human freedom index as it pertains to 'Homicide', as that is the most relevant to the discussion at hand. I'll qualify that remark by pointing out the fact that whilst you and Gerard bitch and whine about AR-15's and the people who own 20+ guns...you absolutely CANNOT escape the fact that the vast majority of homicides by firearm in the U.S. are NOT committed with AR-15s, and are NOT committed by gun collectors. So here's just a little sampling of some of those hotbeds of freedom that (somehow) ranked higher in the Human Freedom Index (HFI) when comparing only Homicide: - Kazakhstan - Rwanda - Turkey - Latvia - Liberia - Moldova - Armenia - Albania - Jordan - Cambodia - Vietnam - Oman - Serbia - Croatia Please. Choose one. Move there. Apparently genocides don't count as homicides. Strangely enough, I didn't find any sort of category for ranking that captured one's ability to arm themselves for purposes of self-defense. The 'Safety & Security' categories all provide ranks on how likely you are to be victimized, and with the exception of Homicide, the U.S. gets very high marks on all categories. Why I found the absence of legally-protected firearm ownership strange is that, if you lefties were able to achieve your wet dream of gun control, it wouldn't move the needle for the U.S. one tiny bit...because there's no HFI ranking for it. So we'd still be ranked 17th...and we'd probably be headed lower, because if you finally win that battle, I shudder to imagine what freedoms you'd go after next.
          MOLDOVAN I. IOANA-MARIA - FIZIOKINETOTERAPEUT      Cache   Translate Page      
Firma MOLDOVAN I. IOANA-MARIA - FIZIOKINETOTERAPEUT, Cui:37656277, Nrc:-/-/-, Cifra de afaceri: 0
          11/7/2018: Sport: Capping rookie players to lock them down is sending out the wrong message      Cache   Translate Page      

SHOULD Declan Rice opt to pursue an international career with England, Ireland’s World Cup qualifier with Moldova last October will be remembered for what might have been. The argument is that Martin O’Neill should have capped Rice in that fixture to...
          11/7/2018: Sport: O’Neill slams ‘crazy’ view of missed Rice opportunity      Cache   Translate Page      
MARTIN O’NEILL has dismissed the suggestion that he should have capped Declan Rice in the World Cup qualifier with Moldova 13 months ago in order to tie him to Ireland. O’Neill is still waiting for an answer on Rice’s international future after Gareth...
          Ayvalık'ta Ödüllü Zeytin Karikatürleri Sergisi      Cache   Translate Page      
2018 ÖDÜLLÜ ZEYTİN KARİKATÜRLERİ AYVALIK’TA SERGİLENDİ
(05 Kasım 2018 – Girne) Girne Belediyesi ile Kıbrıs Türk Karikatürcüler Derneği tarafından düzenlenen 2018 Zeytin Karikatürleri Yarışması’nda ödül kazanan eserler, Girne Belediyesi ile Türkiye’deki Ayvalık Belediyesi’nin işbirliği sonucu, 14. Ayvalık Uluslararası Zeytin Hasat Günleri’nde sergilendi.
Girne Belediye Başkanı Nidai Güngördü ile Kıbrıs Türk Karikatürcüler Derneği Başkanı M. Serhan Gazioğlu’nun yanısıra, kalabalık bir heyet, 14. Ayvalık Uluslararası Zeytin Hasat Günleri’ne katıldı.
26 – 28 Ekim 2018 tarihleri arasında, Ayvalık’taki Cumhuriyet Meydanı’nda yer alan 2018 Uluslararası Ödüllü Zeytin Karikatürleri Sergisi’nde, 62 ülkeden 122 çizerin eserleri sergilendi.
Sergi açılışında yaptığı konuşmada, 2018 Uluslararası Ödüllü Zeytin Karikatürleri Sergisi’nin gerçekleştirilmesine katkı koyan herkesi kutlayan Ayvalık Belediye Başkanı Rahmi Gençer, sanatın ve karikatürün öneminin farkındalığı içinde olduklarını söyledi. Rahmi Gençer, Girne Belediyesi ile Kıbrıs Türk Karikatürcüler Derneği’nin başarı ile düzenlediği 2018 Uluslararası Zeytin Karikatürleri Yarışması’nda dereceye giren eserleri Ayvalıklılarla buluşturmaları; ödül kazanan İranlı karikatürcüleri de Ayvalık’ta ağırlamalarına vesile olduğu için Nidai Güngördü’ye teşekkür etti ve işbirliğinin sürmesini diledi.
Girne Belediye Başkanı Nidai Güngördü ise, Girne ve Ayvalık arasındaki dostluğu pekiştirdiği için Rahmi Gençer’e teşekkür ederek, Ayvalık’ın sloganı olan “Sevgi”yi ziyaretleri sırasında fazlasıyla hissettiklerini belirttti. Ayvalık Belediye Başkanı Rahmi Gençer’e, seramikten yapılmış Kıbrıs Kapısı hediye eden Nidai Güngördü, “Bu kapı önce hoşgörüye, sonra sevgiye, sonra barışa açılacak” dedi.
Kıbrıs Türk Karikatürcüler Derneği başkanı M. Serhan Gazioğlu, sergi açılışında yaptığı konuşmada şunları söyledi: “Ayvalık’ın doğal güzellikleri ve barındırdığı kültür mirasları yanında, tanış olduğumuz sizlerle Akdenizli olmamızın doğasından gelen kültürel benzerliklerimiz ve sıcaklığınız bizleri etkilemiştir. Dilerim, insanlık ve Zeytin ilelebet birlikte yaşarlar ve böylesi ortak etkinlikler geleneksel bir şekilde devam eder.”
KIBRIS TÜRK KARİKATÜRCÜLER DERNEĞİ
YÖNETİM KURULU

          Blog Post: New publications added to Lexis Advance news content      Cache   Translate Page      
Several new publications have been added to Lexis Advance news content, including: * High Net Worth Insights Journal Retirement Market Insights Journal Millionaire Corner Newsletter       Lianhe Wanbao Shin Min Daily News Accord Fintech BSE Bizcommunity Caravan Alive Daily News (Tanzania) HT Ranchi Edition Manila Bulletin Nuffoods Spectrum Paper VC   The Conversation—Australia The Conversation—United States The Conversation—Africa The Conversation—United Kingdom The Conversation—Canada The Conversation—France The Conversation—Spanish Intellinews—Armenia Today Intellinews—Azerbaijan Today Intellinews—Belarus Today Intellinews—Georgia Today Intellinews—Iran Today Intellinews—Kosovo Today Intellinews—Kyrgyzstan Today Intellinews—Moldova Today Intellinews—Mongolia Today Intellinews—Slovenia Today Intellinews—Tajikistan Today Intellinews—Turkmenistan Today Intellinews—Uzbekistan Today Publisher, Content Engine LLC: Ambito Financiero Andina Agencia Noticiera Diario Meridiano, Venezuela Clarin El Cronista Comercial Infobae Revista Fairway REIT Magazine—coming soon   * Some news sources listed may or may not be available depending on your current LexisNexis® subscription.
          Dodon: Russia ready to cut gas price for Moldova      Cache   Translate Page      
Russia is ready to cut the price for its gas to Moldova, Moldovan President Igor Dodon said, adding he had discussed that matter with Russian President Vladimir Putin during recent talks in Moscow. …
          Comentariu la Telenovela Moldovanu – arteni (2008-2009) sau „тупой и ещё тупее” de blogul lui eugen      Cache   Translate Page      
[…] Chiar dacă Dondiuc a plecat, „его дело живет”. Acum semnături strânge cel care cândva a luptat cu Moldovanu pentru postul de șef pe medicină în Chișinău și vicele lui Dondiuc, Ion Artenii. […]
          Galaţi: Universitatea Dunărea de Jos a lansat un proiect de monitorizare a mediului în Bazinul Mării Negre      Cache   Translate Page      
Universitatea Dunărea de Jos din Galaţi a lansat, alături de instituţii partenere din Republica Moldova şi Grecia, un proiect de monitorizare a mediului în Bazinul Mării Negre, în valoare de peste 950.000 de euro, a declarat, miercuri, coordonatorul proiectului, Antoaneta Ene, de la Facultatea de Ştiinţe şi Mediu a instituţiei gălăţene. Potrivit acesteia, proiectului "Reţea de cooperare interdisciplinară în Bazinul Mării Negre pentru monitorizarea comună durabilă a migraţiei compuşilor toxici în mediu, evaluarea îmbunătăţită a stării ecologice şi a impactului substanţelor dăunătoare asupra sănătăţii umane şi prevenirea expunerii populaţiei - MONITOX" este finanţat de Uniunea Europeană (UE) prin intermediul Instrumentului European de Vecinătate în cadrul Programului Operaţional Comun "Bazinul Mării Negre" 2014-2020 şi are o durată de implementare de 30 de luni. Bugetul total al proiectului este de 952.583,55 de euro, din care contribuţia UE este de 876.576,85 de euro. MONITOX este o reţea de cooperare interdisciplinară având ca scop monitorizarea în comun a şase clase de substanţe toxice din şapte componente de mediu interconectate - sol, apă de suprafaţă, apă subterană, roca mamă, sediment, vegetaţie, faună -, prin opt tipuri de investigaţii complexe. "Obiectivul general al proiectului este întărirea cooperării regionale transfrontaliere pentru îmbunătăţirea monitorizării în comun a poluării mediului înconjurător cu substanţe toxice şi o mai bună partajare a metodologiei de analiză a datelor, a informaţiilor privind starea ecologică şi impactul substanţelor nocive asupra sănătăţii umane. Acest obiectiv implică, pe de o parte, construirea unei reţele puternice de laboratoare analitice şi de experţi în Bazinul Mării Negre, pentru elaborarea unui sistem comun de monitorizare ecotoxicologică, menit să sprijine programele regionale de protecţie şi gestionare durabilă a mediului şi, pe de altă parte, crearea unei platforme ştiinţifice cu informaţii armonizate privind toxicanţii existenţi în diverse compartimente de mediu: sol, apă, sediment, biotă, în zonele riverane, deltaice şi maritime partajate, dar şi impactul lor potenţial asupra ecosistemelor şi asupra sănătăţii populaţiei", a spus Antoaneta Ene. Ea a precizat că proiectul prevede şi crearea unui calculator de risc pentru sănătate care, în baza studiilor privind concentraţia de compuşi toxici dintr-o anumită zonă, ar putea ajuta populaţia să îşi calculeze, singură, gradul de periculozitate pe care îl reprezintă un peşte pescuit în Marea Neagră de pildă, o legumă cultivată într-un sol poluat sau chiar gradul de pericol pe care îl reprezintă nisipul din parcul în care se joacă copiii. Partenerii Universităţii Dunărea de Jos în acest proiect sunt Institutul de Zoologie Chişinău (Republica Moldova), Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology Kavala (Grecia), Institutul de Geologie şi Seismologie Chişinău şi Institutul Naţional de Cercetare-Dezvoltare Delta Dunării Tulcea. AGERPRES/(A - autor: Dan Paic, editor: Nona Jalbă; editor online: Magdalena Tănăsescu)   Sursa foto: Universitatea Dunărea de Jos din Galaţi/Facebook 
           Guvernul Dancilă modifică din pix traseul unei alte autostrăzii planificate n Moldova: Vrea să facă PPP pe Iași - Tg. Neamț - Suceava, deși n Master Plan există un alt traseu stabilit pentru nordul regiunii      Cache   Translate Page      
În turneul recent din țările arabe din zona Golfului, premierul Viorica Dăncilă a prezentat proiectele pe care Guvernul vrea să le realizeze în Parteneriat Public-Privat. Printre aceste proiecte apare o autostradă care nu există nicaieri în documentele oficiale ale autorităților precum Master Planul General de Transport: o autostradă de la Tg. Neamț la Suceava și mai departe spre granița cu Ucraina. Acest tronson este "lipit" de Guvern de bucata de la Tg Neamț - Iași - Ungheni, parte din A8. În Master Plan, în schimb, există un drum de mare viteză de la Suceava la Pașcani și mai departe spre sudul țării spre București.

          Spiritual Keys to Open Windows of Heaven and Receive God's Blessings      Cache   Translate Page      

November is one of the most glorious months of the year! It is during this time of jubilant holidays we get to escape from work and school, and with Christmas bonuses we are encouraged to think about others and bless them instead of thinking only about ourselves. We see our favorite bell ringers and hear about all of the great work that is being done all around the world for those who are living without basic necessities. It is a joyous time for humanity to come together and celebrate life! And yet for some people, this time of the year has the opposite effect, and they are filled with dread because they shudder at any opportunity to give their money away. Instead of taking joy in the season of giving, they clench their fist tightly around their money and grumble. For these people, tithing is agony, giving is a veritable apocalypse and missions is Armageddon itself.

This kind of giving fear never seems to be connected to the lottery or casinos, both of which depend on people's faith not in God but in luck and chance. Instead of "agony" and "apocalypse," the world uses :"amazing," "astonishing," "awesome" and "awe-inspiring," power words to describe the $1 billion lottery jackpot. If the world can muster the faith to trust a gamble, why can't God's people trust Him to make good on His infinite promise to provide for their needs and to bless them abundantly?

The kingdom of God is full of people of light, love and life. We are the children of His promises, which include abundant living. His track record of faithfulness to carry out His Word stretches back millennia. And yet stinginess and the fear of lack is nothing new among people. Jesus addressed it head-on. He warns us, "You cannot serve God and be enslaved to money" (Luke 16:13b, NLT), and taught that "if you have not been faithful in the unrighteous wealth, who will commit to your trust the true riches?" (Luke 16:11, MEV). He got to the core of the matter when He declared, "for where your treasure is, there your heart will be also" (Matt. 6:21). Pastor Craig Groeschel puts it this way: "We give up things we love for things we love even more."

The truth is, God has money for anything He wants done, and He will channel that money through people. Trusting God with our tithing and giving opens up the windows of heaven to allow God to pour out blessings we cannot contain so that we can be a conduit for His provision. If we believe obedience to the Word of the living God can allow us to conquer any adversary; if we believe that being filled with the Holy Spirit and praying faith-filled prayers have the power to change nations, open up doors that no man can shut and release us to be God's witness to the ends of the world; and if we truly desire to live a life of epic, excellent and exciting power, we must understand what the Word of God has to say about giving. Then we must do what it tells us to do.

It is up to us to share with the world the power that can be gained through trusting Jesus Christ, God's Word and the Holy Spirit. But it is also up to us as leaders, servants, pastors and evangelists to correct people's misperceptions about giving. People may have chosen to block out the Word of God and all that it can offer their life simply because someone in the past presented the idea of tithing in a negative way. There are actual people in the world today who believe all God wants is their money and that there is nothing else for them in Jesus Christ or the church. We must be the ones to help eliminate this lie from the world and help people to understand the true nature and power of God's Word. God is not trying to take away from people; He is trying to open people up so He can bless their lives far beyond measure.

This season, it is also up to teach our congregations the importance of a heart-attitude that trusts God enough to love and bless those who are in need freely, as well as tithe into His kingdom. As we present the Word of God, let us be mindful of the power of our words and the effect they can have on people's perception of God. We must present tithing in appropriate terms. We must present salvation in appropriate ways. We must model for them that when we create a lifestyle of helping others to be blessed by God, He shall bless us in the process! As Proverbs 11:25b (NLT) says, "Those who refresh others will themselves be refreshed."

Be refreshed, be renewed and be blessed.

You are beautiful; I see Jesus in you.

Have an awesome week! {eoa}

Mikel French has challenged spiritual awakening all across America, where many celebrations extended into multiple weeks, and has conducted celebrations in France, Sweden, Russia, Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, Germany, South Africa, Malawi, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Haiti, Japan, Singapore, India and Thailand. He conducted an outreach celebration in Manila, Philippines, reaching 200,000 teenagers with the Book of Hope. Through the generous support of partners, he has presented the message of Jesus Christ to millions of people in the nation of Russia through televised citywide soul-winning celebrations. Mikel considers it an honor to assist in conducting the annual pastor's conference, where thousands of pastors from Russia's 11 time zones come for training, teaching and equipping. Mikel and his wife, Marsha, reside in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


          Eveniment monden dedicat pasionatilor de lumea modei. Unde si cand      Cache   Translate Page      
Joia viitoare (15 noiembrie) va avea loc urmatoarea editie de Fashion’s Night Out. Evenimentul se va desfasura la Restaurantul „Poesis” de pe strada Mircea cel Batran cu incepere de la ora 19.00. In cadrul evenimentului isi vor prezenta creatiile: Angelica Tufo, Diana Breban, Cosmin Muresan, Mia Ardelean, Miha Cirlugea, Narcisa Moldovan, Priscilla Ionta, Raluca Muresan, […]

          Directorul AOAM: „Menținerea ratingului de țară a R. Moldovei de către Moody’s este un puternic SEMNAL pozitiv pentru investitori”      Cache   Translate Page      
Menținerea de către Agenția Moody’s a ratingului de țară „B3”, cu perspectivă stabilă pentru R. Moldova, este un puternic semnal pozitiv pentru investitori, consideră directorul executiv al Asociației Oamenilor de Afaceri din Moldova (AOAM), Alexandru Baltag.
          Dodon vrea ca R. Moldova să se ÎMPRUMUTE cu un miliard de la PUTIN      Cache   Translate Page      
Federația Rusă ar putea acorda Republicii Moldova un miliard de dolari pentru reparația drumurilor. Declarația a fost făcută de președintele Igor Dodon în cadrul unei ediții speciale la postul de televiziune NTV. Șeful statului spune că a discutat cu președintele Rusiei, Vladimir Putin, despre un suport masiv pentru proiecte de infrastructură, transmite IPN.
          Forumul de afaceri Moldova-Rusia      Cache   Translate Page