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          Haji Jabir presenta a Forlì in prima nazionale "Fuga dalla piccola Roma"      Cache   Translate Page      
09/11/2018 - Venerdì 9 novembre alle 17,all'Auditorium Cariromagna di Forlì Il quarto appuntamento del 2018 della XXIV edizione della rassegna "Incontri con l'Autore", promossa dalla Fondazione Cassa dei Risparmi di Forlì presso l'Auditorium Cariromagna, sarà con uno degli intellettuali più importanti della diaspora eritrea nel mondo arabo ovvero Haji Jabir. Scrittore e giornalista, è stato per anni corrispondente per la TV tedesca Deutsche Welle in Arabia Saudita per poi trasferirsi a Doha, in Qatar, dove lavora come giornalista per Al Jazira TV. Fin dal primo suo primo romanzo, vincitore nel 2012 dello Sharjah Prize per la creatività, si è proposto di indagare la sofferenza della diaspora, il dramma di chi non è riuscito né a tornare in patria né a trovare stabilità emotiva nei paesi di arrivo. Jabir non tratta nei suoi romanzi il tema tradizionale del colonialismo, né fa cenno a oscuri complotti o colpe dell'Occidente, nonostante tratti a fondo la questione della migrazione e del traffico di esseri umani, ma affronta la vicenda eritrea dall’interno. L’intenzione di Jabir è infatti quella di mostrare realisticamente la vita vissuta dagli eritrei sia dentro che fuori il loro paese, e per farlo utilizza in "Fuga dalla piccola Roma", pubblicato per la prima volta in Italia a cura di Gassid Mohammed, professore di lingua araba presso la sede forlivese dell'Università di Bologna, lo stratagemma della ricerca della donna amata per far attraversare al protagonista l'infermo della dittatura interna al paese e dei campi profughi esterni al confine eritreo. L'attualità del tema trova poi ulteriori motivi di interesse - oltre che nella qualità letteraria della scrittura - nei rimandi storici (l'Eritrea è stata colonia italiana fino al 1941) ed in quelli letterari (in particolar modo a Fenoglio e Levi). L'incontro, ad ingresso libero e con omaggio a tutti gli intervenuti di copia del volume presentato, è fissato per venerdì 9 novembre alle 17 presso l'Auditorium forlivese di via Flavio Biondo 16. https://www.facebook.com/events/259593658010108/
          El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU estudia levantar las sanciones a Eritrea la próxima semana      Cache   Translate Page      
El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU está considerando levantar las sanciones contra Eritrea la próxima semana tras el acercamiento del país con Etiopía, aunque algunos miembros quieren mantener cierta presión diplomática para garantizar que se resuelve una disputa con Yibuti, según han indicado fuentes diplomáticas.
          Ethiopian Ministry of Revenue Preparing Trade Rules with Eritrea      Cache   Translate Page      
The opening of the Serha-Zalambessa border crossing between Eritrea and Ethiopia


Ethiopian Ministry of Revenue Preparing Trade Rules with Eritrea

By Ezega

The Ethiopian Ministry of Revenue is Preparing trade rules with Eritrea, according to ENA report. A legal framework is being prepared that regulates the import-export trade between Ethiopia and Eritrea, according to Ethiopian Ministry of Revenue.

Ethiopia and Eritrea started normalization relations since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited the Eritrean capital on July 8, 2018.

Since then, the Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki has visted Ethiopia twice. The two countries has since signed peace agreements and exchanged diplomatic posts.

Following the cessation of hostilities, the border between the two countries was opened on Ethiopian new year, September 11, 2018.

Eritrea has also been renovating Massawa and Assab port infrastructures for use by Ethiopia for import and export.

Ethiopian Revenues Minister Adanech Abeebe told ENA that the legal framework will include tax system similar to those with other countries.

Restrictions have been imposed on fuel and other commodities sent to Eritrea, according to communique from the revenues ministry.

Currently, there is also restriction on the cross-border trade times. Trade and Industry State Minister Mebrahtu Meles said interim restrictions on timing of daily trades put in place will remain in effect until a system is established.

Committee drawn from the federal government and Tigray regional government has compiled the necessary information on current economic transactions taking place at the border areas.

Daily transaction in the border areas of the two countries has accordingly been arranged to take place between 6 A.M in the morning and 6 P.M in the afternoon.



          Somalia: Security Council Adopts Resolution 2442 (2018), Authorizing 12-Month Extension for International Naval Forces Fighting Piracy off Somali Coast      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN Security Council
Country: Somalia

SC/13566
6 NOVEMBER 2018
SECURITY COUNCIL
8391ST MEETING (AM)

The Security Council, acting by consensus today, decided to renew for 12 months authorizations allowing international naval forces to join in the fight against piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia.

Adopting resolution 2442 (2018) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the 15-member Council deplored all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast. While noting improvements in Somalia, it nevertheless recognized that piracy exacerbates instability in the country and stressed the need for a comprehensive, international response that also works to tackle the underlying causes of the phenomenon.

By the terms of the text, the Council encouraged the Parliament of Somalia to approve a draft coast guard law and urged the Somali authorities to continue efforts towards passing a comprehensive set of anti-piracy and maritime laws without further delay. It also called upon the authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, while calling upon Member States to assist Somalia ‑ at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General ‑ to strengthen its maritime capacity.

Welcoming the initiative of the Seychelles to establish a court for piracy and maritime crime and the successful prosecution of piracy cases by that entity, the Council also recognized the need for States, international and regional organizations and other appropriate partners to share information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes. In addition, it noted the need for those partners to keep under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013). The Council also called upon all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council renewed its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to join the fight against piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft; providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces; and seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy-related crimes. It further encouraged the Government of Somalia to accede to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and urged all States to take appropriate actions under their domestic laws to prevent the illicit financing of piracy acts and the laundering of its proceeds.

The meeting began at 10:05 a.m. and ended at 10:07 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2442 (2018) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recognizing that 2018 marks the tenth anniversary of resolution 1816 on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012) 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015), and 2316 (2016) and 2383 (2017) as well as the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,

“Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/903), as requested by resolution 2383 (2017), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

“Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s sovereign rights in accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries,

“Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, with no successful ship hijackings reported off the coast of Somalia since March 2017 however, recognizing the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing vessels operating in conformity with international law, commending countries that have deployed naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin to dissuade piracy networks from carrying out acts of piracy,

“Welcoming the reinstatement of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC) meeting held from 9 to 10 July 2018 between the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and international partners which called for enhanced cooperation in strengthening Somalia’s maritime security as a key priority for both the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States and urged the National Security Council to agree on a delineation of roles of the Somali maritime forces, as required by the Transition Plan and recognizing the importance of engaging in transition planning,

“Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

“Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and reiterating its concern over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts,

“Noting with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against pirates off the coast of Somalia, which has led to pirates in many cases being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and reiterating that, consistent with the provisions of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for, or suspected of seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation,

“Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, noting the several requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 25 October 2018, from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, asking member states and international organizations to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zone, and requesting that the provisions of resolution 2383 (2017) be renewed for an additional 12 months,

“Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and regional partners in the 21st plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in Nairobi, Kenya, 11–13 July 2018, co-hosted by the Indian Ocean Commission under the Chairmanship of Mauritius,

“Recognizing the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and the intentions of the Regional Capacity Building Working Group to identify regional priorities and coordination of capacity-building activities and regional responsibilities,

“Noting the progress made to enhance Somali capacity building through the National Maritime Coordination Committee (NMCC) to assess maritime priorities between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States,

“Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in accordance with applicable international human rights law, noting with appreciation the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to ensure that pirates are held accountable,

“Commending the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA and EUCAP Somalia, Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region,

“Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), and to allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while urging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international law,

“Welcoming and encouraging the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union’s activities under the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) which assists Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity in order to enable it to enforce maritime law more effectively, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,

“Supporting the development of a coastguard at the federal level and coastguard police at the Federal Member State level, noting with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and in relevant parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk Area and recognizing the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, noting the efforts of the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing PCASP on board ships in high-risk areas, and further welcoming the European Union’s EUCAP Somalia, which is working to develop the maritime security capacities of Somalia,

“Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the ongoing work of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance of enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecute acts of piracy,

“Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and welcoming international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL’s Global Database on Maritime Piracy, and commending the establishment of the Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar, the sister centre of the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles following the signing of the Regional Agreement for the Setting up of a Regional Maritime Information Exchange and Sharing Mechanism in the Western Indian Ocean by Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Union of Comoros and Seychelles , including the establishment of the Piracy Prosecution Readiness Plan which, under the auspices of UNODC and in partnership with EU NAVFOR, will further develop the region’s capacity to conduct piracy prosecutions,

“Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, strongly condemning the continuing practice of hostage-taking by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, expressing serious concern at the inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, recognizing the adverse impact on their families, calling for the immediate release of all remaining hostages, and noting the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,

“Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and the United Republic of Tanzania, for their efforts to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and noting with appreciation the assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS, to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, the United Republic of Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international human rights law, and emphasizing the need for States and international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,

“Welcoming the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and acknowledging the return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to serve their sentences in Somalia, and noting that the sentences served must be those passed by the courts of the prosecuting states and that any proposal to vary the sentences must be in conformity with the 2011 Transfer Agreement with the Seychelles,

“Welcoming the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC), the central mechanism for developing capability and identifying and channelling support, as highlighted at the London Somalia Conference in May 2017, and encouraging the Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing responsibility for counter-piracy initiatives,

“Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and noting the complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, recognizing that IUU fishing accounts for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can contribute to destabilization among coastal communities,

“Noting Somalia’s accession to the FAO’s Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, recognizing the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing Somalia’s capacity to combat such activities, and stressing the need for States and international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing Somalia’s capacity to combat such activities,

“Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licences, commending in this regard the implementation of a component of the EU-funded Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (CCAP) with FAO aims to promote proper and transparent licensed and regulated fishing with regional states, and encouraging further efforts in this regard, with the support of the international community,

“Recalling the reports of the Secretary General which illustrate the seriousness of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized anti-piracy courts,

“Remaining concerned that four-Iranian seafarers from the FV Siraj remain as hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and welcoming the work of International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) and Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) in the provision of post trauma intervention and financial support to victims of piracy and their families; as well as the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF), which provides funds for the survivors of Somali piracy, and for their families, to provide a range of support during and after captivity and recognizing the need to continue supporting these initiatives and contributions to funds,

“Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,

“Noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law,

“Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, noting the operations of information-sharing centres in, Kenya, and the United Republic of Tanzania, recognizing the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected pirates,

“Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further emphasizing that Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National Army, and Somali Police Force,

“Welcoming the Padang Communique and Maritime Cooperation Declaration adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of Ministers meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation to address maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs,

“Welcoming the publication in June 2018 by BIMCO, International Chamber of Shipping, International Group of Protection & Indemnity Clubs, Intertanko, The Oil Companies International Marine Forum and others, of version 5 of Best Management Practices to deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (BMP5), acknowledging that the information and guidance contained within helps to reduce the risks to mariners and seafarers engaged in their lawful occupations,

“Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,

“Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;

“2. While noting improvements in Somalia, recognizes that piracy exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime, corruption, and terrorism;

“3. Stresses the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community in collaboration with Somali authorities and other relevant actors;

“4. Underlines the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, encourages the approval by the Parliament of the draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities, with the support of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia have submitted to the Council of Ministers and urges the Somali authorities, to continue their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti-piracy and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;

“5. Recognizes the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, urges States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;

“6. Calls upon the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;

“7. Calls upon the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;

“8. Calls upon States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;

“9. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate release;

“10. Welcomes the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court for piracy and maritime crime and further welcomes the successful prosecution of piracy cases by this body;

“11. Recognizes the need for States, international and regional organizations, and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;

“12. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;

“13. Highlights the importance of coordination among States and international organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and urges continued support of these efforts;

“14. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and decides that, for a further period of 13 months from the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2383 (2017) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;

“15. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been renewed in response to the 25 October 2018 letter conveying the request of Somali authorities;

“16. Decides that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above;

“17. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;

“18. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;

“19. Calls upon all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;

“20. Welcomes, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme’s continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international human rights law;

“21. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as part of its efforts to target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks survive;

“22. Urges all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;

“23. Urges States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;

“24. Urges all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land-based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;

“25. Urges all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global piracy database, through appropriate channels;

“26. Commends the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO-funded Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non-State actors affected by piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;

“27. Urges States parties to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;

“28. Acknowledges the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;

“29. Encourages flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;

“30. Invites the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry, and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO’s role concerning privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;

“31. Notes the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;

“32. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;

“33. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within twelve months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;

“34. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;

“35. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

For information media. Not an official record.


          Ethiopia: New Responses to the Refugee Crisis: Promises and Challenges in Ethiopia, A case study of World Bank financing for refugee-hosting nations      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: International Rescue Committee
Country: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan

Executive Summary

In 2016, the Government of Ethiopia made nine pledges to improve the lives of refugees and host communities. Soon thereafter it rolled out the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, and became one the first countries to receive multiyear, concessional financing from the World Bank’s 18th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA18) sub-window for refugee-hosting nations. Together, these commitments, framework and financing hold the promise of significantly improving the lives of refugees and their host communities across the country.

New policies and programs are underway. The Government is revising its Refugee Proclamation and is expected to expand its policies that will enable more refugees to move freely from camps and access education and jobs. New livelihoods and education projects, supported by the World Bank and UK’s Department for International Development, are being designed to support refugees and host communities. Although still early in his tenure, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali appears reform-minded and could be a champion of these approaches to the protracted refugee situation.

While progress is being made, there are a number of concerns that, if not addressed, run the risk of hampering impact. The Bank’s working groups for sub-window financed projects are distinct from CRRF working groups, and both appear to have consultative processes that often leave key constituencies, such as refugees, local governments and regional bodies, out of decision-making regarding policies and program design. The World Bank’s earliest investments are weighted towards solutions like industrial parks that do not adequately address refugees’ barriers to decent work and are unlikely to generate enough jobs in the medium term. And the government has not yet passed the Refugee Proclamation—key to ensuring refugees can access their rights, and critical for Bank programs to begin in earnest.

This case study seeks to determine what impact the CRRF and development financing are having—and are likely to have moving forward. Based on these observations, this case study offers recommendations for the Government of Ethiopia, the World Bank, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Ethiopia’s Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), NGOs and other stakeholders. It calls on the Government to swiftly pass the Refugee Proclamation, allowing refugees to move more freely, and access schools and formal jobs. It recommends the World Bank, UNHCR and ARRA streamline their multistakeholder engagement process to ensure key actors, such as different levels of government, regional bodies, refugees, and NGOs can contribute to decision-making processes; and to ensure projects adequately reflect the evidence base, for instance on refugee and host community livelihood skills and needs.


          Kenya: Kenya: Kakuma New Arrival Registration Trends 2018 (as of 31 October 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zimbabwe


          Kenya: Kenya: Kalobeyei Settlement Population Statistics by Country of Origin, Sex and Age Group (as of 31 October 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania


          Kenya: Kenya: Kakuma and Kalobeyei Population Statistics by Country of Origin, Sex and Age Group (as of 31 October 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zimbabwe


          Kenya: Kenya: Kakuma Camp Population Statistics by Country of Origin, Sex and Age Group (as of 31 October 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zimbabwe


          Ethiopia: UNHCR Ethiopia: Durable Solutions Factsheet (September 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Canada, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Italy, Kenya, New Zealand, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Sweden, United States of America

  • Ethiopia hosts 905,831 refugees and asylum seekers within its borders, including the 36,185 who arrived since the start of 2018.

  • The Government of Ethiopia has committed to address the concerns of refugees, including a pledge to grant local integration to those who have lived in the country for 20 years and above.

  • Resettlement remains the chief durable solution for refugees in Ethiopia, but limited quotas mean that only 3,240 refugees will be referred to resettlement countries in 2018.

HIGHLIGHTS

  • UNHCR supports the Government of Ethiopia in discharging its international obligations, fulfilling the organization’s core objectives to provide refugees and other persons of concern with international protection, and to seek durable solutions for them. The three traditional durable solutions are complementary and are pursued together:

    • Voluntary repatriation, in which refugees return in safety and with dignity to their countries of origin and re-avail themselves of national protection;
    • Resettlement, in which refugees are selected and transferred from the country of refuge to a third state which has agreed to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status; and
    • Local integration, in which refugees legally, economically and socially integrate in the host country, availing themselves of the national protection of the host government.
  • UNHCR and partners support livelihoods programmes for refugees in order to reduce vulnerability and dependency on humanitarian assistance. Refugees who actively support themselves are better equipped to take on the challenges of any of the durable solutions. UNHCR recognizes the stress that the presence of refugees can place on already-impoverished host communities and works closely with development actors and regional governments to mitigate the impact. UNHCR advocates for complementarity of services for refugees and host communities, and seeks to ensure that refugees are included in their intervention and development plans, thereby promoting peaceful co-existence.

  • UNHCR Ethiopia is committed to assisting refugees in accessing complementary legal pathways including family reunification and other humanitarian migration programmes, such as private sponsorship, study and employment possibilities. UNHCR Ethiopia continues to issue refugees with proof of registration documents and provides advice on how to process family reunification cases. Specifically, UNHCR directly assists unregistered refugee children in accessing the services and documentation necessary to reunite with their family members abroad. UNHCR Ethiopia is also involved in the issuance of Convention Travel Documents (CTDs), which permits refugees to undertake international travel for employment, education and to seek medical treatment unavailable in Ethiopia.

  • The innovative Italian Humanitarian Corridor program was officially launched in 2017 and aims to relocate 500 refugees to Italy. UNHCR has undertaken this project with two faith-based organizations, Caritas Italiana and Sant’Egidio Community, through which refugees with family links in Italy as well as those with protection and medical vulnerabilities are able to find a durable solution. To date, 327 refugees have departed for new lives in Italy.


          Ethiopia: UNHCR Ethiopia: Urban Refugees Factsheet (September 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen

HIGHLIGHTS

  • By the end of September 2018, there were a total of 22,885 refugees in the capital Addis Ababa, mainly from Eritrea, Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and refugees of other nationalities, including those from the Great Lakes region.

  • Of the total population, 868 are children, who either arrived alone (377 children) or were separated from their parents or relatives during flight (491 children).

  • Of the urban refugee population, 18,122 (79%) are Eritrean refugees. Of these, 17,217 are beneficiaries of the Government’s Out-Of-Camp Policy.

  • UNHCR provides reception services at the Urban Refugee Reception Centre, located around what is popularly known as the Hayahulet Mazoriya in Addis Ababa. In addition to registration and documentation services, individual protection and resettlement counselling are available at the center from Monday to Thursday every week, between 9:00 am and 4:30 pm.

  • UNHCR undertook its yearly participatory assessment with refugees living in Addis Ababa in August 2018.The findings will assist the UN Refugee Agency to better understand the situation of refugees and will inform the planned programmatic and service delivery activities.

  • Coordination of protection programs targeting refugees in Addis Ababa is done through the monthly Urban and Kenya Borena Sub-Working Group meetings, that are held every 1st Wednesday of the month from 10:00 am to 12:00 pm at the UNHCR office in Bole. The forum brings together the government refugee agency (ARRA), UNHCR and all the partners working with refugees in Addis Ababa in order to ensure coordinated response in service delivery and efficient use of resources in line with UNHCR protection priorities.


          Ethiopia: UNHCR Ethiopia: Resettlement Factsheet (September 2018)      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Canada, Eritrea, Ethiopia, New Zealand, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Sweden, United States of America

  • Out of 905,831 registered refugees in Ethiopia, 65,750 are in need of resettlement in 2018.

  • UNHCR Ethiopia’s resettlement submissions target for 2018 was 4,240 individuals to the USA, New Zealand, Sweden and Canada, which was revised downwards to 3,240 individuals.

  • To date, 2,136 refugees were referred to the RSC for onward submission to resettlement countries, 1,907 refugees have been submitted and 608 have departed.

HIGHLIGHTS

  • Resettlement is an invaluable protection tool for UNHCR Ethiopia as it addresses the specific needs of refugees who are vulnerable due to their experiences in their country of origin and/or whose safety, health or other fundamental rights are at risk in Ethiopia, by providing them an opportunity to rebuild their lives in a new country.

  • Resettlement remains the primary durable solution available to refugees in Ethiopia due to the continued instability in neighboring countries rendering voluntary repatriation untenable. Opportunities for local integration remain limited although the future looks bright in this regard with Ethiopia as a focus country for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

  • Resettlement as a durable solution is available only to those refugees who meet very precise criteria. Although over 65,000 refugees in Ethiopia satisfy these criteria, the primary constraint on resettlement abroad is the quota provided by countries of resettlement, which is far too low to meet current need.

  • As resettlement numbers are dictated by quota and not need, resettlement is not a right that can be claimed by refugees.

  • UNHCR Ethiopia identifies and addresses the needs of the vulnerable within all refugee populations hosted in the country, including those with specific needs as well as those in protracted situations. The main refugee populations resettled abroad from Ethiopia are Eritreans, Somalis, South Sudanese, Sudanese as well as a few refugees from the Great Lakes.

  • UNHCR Ethiopia’s resettlement submissions target for 2018 was set at 4,240 refugees, mainly to the USA, but had to be revised to 3,240. However, UNHCR continued to advocate for resettlement quota with different countries and has secured submissions to New Zealand, Sweden and Canada for 2018.

  • As of September 2018, 2,136 refugees were referred to the Regional Service Centre in Nairobi for onward submission to resettlement countries and 1,907 refugees have been submitted to resettlement countries.

  • In light of the changes that US made in relation to Somalis, UNHCR Ethiopia had to revise the overall target in September and it was adjusted to 3,240 individuals.


          UN Security Council considers lifting Eritrea sanctions next week      Cache   Translate Page      
REUTERS: The U.N. Security Council is considering lifting sanctions on Eritrea next week after a rapprochement with Ethiopia, although some members want to maintain some diplomatic pressure to ensure a dispute with Djibouti is resolved, diplomats said on Monday. A British-drafted resolution, seen ...
          Eritrea: Ex-Finanzminister Abrehe entführt – Kritiker verschwinden hinter Gittern      Cache   Translate Page      
Im afrikanischen Eritrea wird Kritik an der sozialistischen Diktatur quasi nicht geduldet. Wer seine Meinung äußert, läuft Gefahr, verhaftet zu werden und zu „verschwinden“. Berhane Abrehe (siehe Foto), der ehemals Finanzminister des Landes war, sitzt am Morgen des 17. Septembers 2018 mit einem seiner Söhne in einem Restaurant beim Frühstück, als kommunistische Sicherheitsbeamte auf ihn […]
          24.05.1991: Eritreas Kampf um die Unabhängigkeit von Äthiopien endet      Cache   Translate Page      
Von Bettina Rühl
          Afrikas Gulag - Flüchtlinge berichten aus Eritrea      Cache   Translate Page      
Aus keinem anderen afrikanischen Land fliehen so viele Menschen wie aus Eritrea. Wer noch einen Funken Körperkraft hat, muss als Soldat dienen oder auf Feldern und in Betrieben von Militärs arbeiten. Dieser Zwangs-Militärdienst verwandelt das ganze Land faktisch in ein Arbeitslager. So berichten es die Menschen, die die Flucht nach Europa oder Israel überleben.
          Saudi Arabia Praised by 75% of UN Delegates in Human Rights Review      Cache   Translate Page      

Above: Saudi delegate addresses today’s UNHRC session GENEVA, Nov. 5, 2018 — Following is a selection of the praise that Saudi Arabia received when its human rights record was reviewed today, as a part of a mandatory review that every country undergoes every five years at the UN Human Rights Council: Venezuela: “We commend Saudi Arabia for empowering women.” Pakistan: “We commend efforts [by Saudi Arabia] to empower women and promote gender equality.” United Arab Emirates: “We commend Saudi Arabia for mainstreaming human rights.” State of Palestine: “We believe that Saudi Arabia places great importance on human rights. We welcome its efforts in promoting human rights, protecting development and ensuring accountability.” Yemen: “We commend the support provided [by Saudi Arabia] at all levels to the people of Yemen.” Bahrain: “We hail the positive steps taken[by Saudi Arabia] to protect human rights.” Jordan: “The Saudi government has made human rights one of its main priorities.” Malaysia: “The efforts [by Saudi Arabia] in advancing women’s rights are commendable.” Mauritania: “We applaud progress [by Saudi Arabia] in the fields of women’s rights, children’s rights, and rights of people with disabilities.” Nigeria: “We commend efforts [by Saudi Arabia] in combating human trafficking and to promote the rights of domestic service workers.” Eritrea: “We commend symbolic steps taken [by Saudi Arabia] to ensure equality.” Gabon: “We commend reforms [by Saudi Arabia] to promote the rights of women and bring about their empowerment.” Senegal: “We commend efforts [by Saudi Arabia] made to combat human trafficking.” China: “We commend Saudi Arabia for its adoption and implementation of the Saudi Vision 2030, as well as for its efforts in the …

The post Saudi Arabia Praised by 75% of UN Delegates in Human Rights Review appeared first on UN Watch.


          Adulis: la città perduta      Cache   Translate Page      

da 05/11/18 a 21/12/18

Pontificio Istituto di Archeologia Cristiana

Il percorso espositivo illustra i risultati degli scavi archeologici in corso a partire dal 2011 nella città-emporio di Adulis (Eritrea).

La mostra celebra inoltre la recente pace tra Eritrea ed Etiopia.


                Cache   Translate Page      


A Racial Shakedown in Portland, Oregon

In a 30-second video recorded on Oct. 28, a female pedestrian holding a bicycle helmet is seen making a phone call. She’s complaining about a car blocking a crosswalk on a busy street in Portland, Ore. The phone call ends and the car’s occupants—a young black man and woman—walk up to her and take her to task for reporting them. Some angry words are directed at the bicyclist by the man—“go back to your f—ing neighborhood”—and then the video ends.

If this encounter had unfolded in a normal part of the world, this would be where the story ends: Just another squabble in the battle between drivers and non-drivers over public space. But Portland is not normal. This is a city where antifa mobs are allowed to set up roadblocks and mob elderly drivers, all with the mayor’s apparent acquiescence. 

The latest, above-described victim is a 28-year-old white woman who was captured on video during a phone call with the Portland Bureau of Transportation’s non-emergency parking hotline. The car belonged to Rashsaan Muhammad, who was with his partner, Mattie Khan. They parked improperly on a North Portland street while ordering food from a nearby burger restaurant. While filming, Ms. Khan accused the bicyclist of being “another white person calling the police on a black person.” She wasn’t. Portland Police have no record of that phone call taking place.

It is hard to know how the pedestrian, derogatorily christened “Crosswalk Cathy” on social media, could have known the race of the car’s owners. Portland doesn’t offer its residents race-tagged parking permits (yet), and the incident occurred on a busy business street. But that didn’t stop Portland Mercury news editor Alex Zielinski from writing a provocative (and wrong) story with the headline, “Woman calls cops on Portland man’s parking job. She’s white. He’s black.”

The report, video, and misinformation went viral and spawned a series of other stories targeting the woman. “Portland, Ore., couple Rashsaan Muhammad and Mattie Khan were running to grab a quick bite to eat at Big Burger (sic) when they spotted a woman bearing the skin color of an American terrorist standing across the street looking at their parked car,” read one unsubtle story at The Root. “White lady dubbed ‘Crosswalk Cathy’ called cops because she didn’t like how black couple parked,” headlined another on BET. Newsweek was slightly more charitable, saying she had “allegedly” called the cops. They were all wrong.

Last week’s race controversy ignited by Portland Mercury is not the first time the progressive alternative paper has published race-baiting content. Last year, it ran a libelous (and subsequently retracted) column accusing various restaurants of religious and cultural appropriation—and suggesting they were guilty of “culinary white supremacy.” The predictable result of that column was the siccing of a mob on the female owners of Kook’s Burritos, the business featured most prominently in the piece. They deleted their social media accounts, shut down their food cart, and went into hiding.

“Tribal hatreds are a dangerous thing to stoke,” said Heather Mac Donald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of The Diversity Delusion. She says most Americans are naïve about the tribal violence that defines much of the historical and modern human experience. “In the worst case, [victim ideologues] are fueling the fires of violent civil strife.”

The genre of “white people doing something to black people” is, by now, a well-established media genre that generates easy clicks. But there is also an unsettling subplot that few seem willing to discuss. The two people of color who star in last week’s viral video both act abominably toward a young woman they’ve just met. In a city where too many bicyclists and pedestrians have been struck and killed in car accidents (2017 was one of the deadliest years with 45 killed), the woman did her role as a good citizen by calling a non-emergency hotline to report the car blocking the crosswalk.

And it was Ms. Khan, not the pedestrian, who instantly racialized the incident, while her male partner called the woman an “idiot” and told her that she doesn’t belong in the neighborhood. Who’s the racist—not to mention segregationist—here?

The couple’s abominable behavior didn’t end after that encounter and the publication of the video on Oct. 29, however. Within hours, Ms. Khan named the bicyclist publicly and posted her photo on social media. Friends and followers of Ms. Khan then continued the doxing, publishing more photos and personal details of the woman. Twitter activist “@Sahluwal,” who only identified himself to me as “Simar,” reposted the video in a tweet watched over 200,000 times. “Twitter, do your thing and identify this woman,” he wrote. Simar told me he was not a witness and did not verify the claim in the video.

Sha Ongelungel, who was recently profiled glowingly as a racial justice activist in The Guardian, published the woman’s employer information on Twitter and encouraged others to call or email them. They obliged and demanded that she be fired. Ms. Ongelungel stopped responding after I inquired if she took any steps to verify the couple’s (false) allegation.

And like the owners of Kook’s Burritos the year before, the victim at the center of the video has deleted her social media presence, taken down her website, and gone into hiding. Her email is no longer listed at her employer’s page. Even some of her family who share the same surname have done the same. This sort of disappearing act now happens regularly in Portland—a new form of excommunication.

While Ms. Khan’s behavior may seem cruel and anti-social, there is a sort of rational logic to it: Progressive Portland is a city where even the most absurd claims of racism are taken seriously and prosecuted hysterically by the media and public.

In May, for instance, a black woman named Lillian Green launched a web campaign against Portland’s Back to Eden Bakery after the vegan shop declined to serve her after closing hours. In the video, she was admirably forthright about her motives for telling the world about this experience: Using the hashtag #LivingWhileBlack, Ms. Green—a doctoral student at Lewis and Clark College—explained that she wants to “blast their ass” on Facebook.

And blasted it was. The owners fired the two women working that evening and offered Ms. Green a job training the remaining employees in “racial inclusivity.” Such incidents send a clear message: Shaming white people, with or without merit, works. People will treat you as a hero. And you will get what you want.

Mattie Khan is now selling clothing merchandise of “Crosswalk Cathy.” She announced the sale on Facebook with a video of Rashsaan Muhammad modeling one of the hoodies at $45 a pop (t-shirts are $25).

In a city whose guilty whites seem ready to roll over on any pretext, no complaint is too absurd to become fodder for race hustling.

SOURCE







False Hopes and Invisible Enemies

Today, many educated people believe that (1) our lives are controlled by invisible, malevolent forces like "structural racism." (2) An evil class of people is born with special powers ("privilege") that allow them to manipulate these forces for their own benefit

written by Jonny Anomaly

People are pattern-seekers. When we observe patterns in the natural world we often seek a deeper explanation for them. An example of a pattern that has captured the attention of academics is the disparity between men and women in fields like mechanical engineering and pediatrics.

Culture is an obvious explanation for some disparities: if a wave of Irish immigrants to Boston joins fire departments, and Italians start restaurants, then we might expect that the next generation of Bostonians will contain a disproportionate number of Irish firefighters and Italian restaurant owners. Similarly, if low-skilled immigrants tend to work in jobs like construction and agriculture, we might expect to find a lot of low-skilled workers who move from Central America to the United States to work on construction sites and strawberry farms.

Another obvious way to explain divergent outcomes between groups is that some groups – ranging from races and sexes, to religions and political partisans – have been discriminated against or persecuted by others. In other words, members of some groups throughout history were not given the opportunity to show their true talents in some fields.

Historically, ethnic discrimination was the norm, not the exception. In fact, ethnic discrimination was almost certainly adaptive for our ancestors who had to decipher, however crudely, who to trust and who to shun. Discrimination often served the function of increasing trust within a group by preventing members of other groups from enjoying access to valuable social goods that took effort to produce and preserve.

Persistent Performance Gaps

When we want to explain performance gaps, the obvious places to start are culture, bias, and discrimination. But in the mid-to-late twentieth century nearly every Western country abolished discriminatory laws, and many also implemented affirmative action programs. Governments, universities, and private firms made active efforts to recruit traditionally persecuted minorities into schools and jobs to which they previously lacked full access.

Under these conditions, some groups improved their outcomes while others did not. Jews and Asians, in particular, have thrived in every Western country in which they are found, and in many cases, they make more money, commit fewer crimes, and attain higher levels of education than the majority group in the societies to which they have migrated.

Moreover, despite the tedious proclamations of politicians that women have a long way to go in Western countries, we are much closer to parity than many believe. The majority of college graduates are now women, and the pay gap between men and women is almost non-existent when we compare workers in the same occupation at the same level. (According to Harvard economist Claudia Golden, most pay gaps are due to choices made by men and women to work in different occupations based on personal interests: women who have children, for example, understandably prefer more flexible jobs, which often pay less.)

As explicit discrimination decreased, social scientists began proposing alternatives to explain remaining gaps. Two, in particular, became popular in the 1990s: stereotype threat and epigenetics. Stereotype threat (supposedly) occurs when people are asked to perform a task and then informed that, on average, members of their group are not especially good at that task. They then perform worse than they otherwise would have. Epigenetics refers to the fact that gene expression is influenced by extra-genomic factors. Some social scientists proposed that if genes can be expressed differently in different environments, perhaps stressful environments can lead some groups to perform more poorly than others by affecting gene expression.

But stereotype threat has turned out to be a spectacular failure in explaining achievement gaps. And epigenetics is unlikely to explain disparities like why Asians outperform Africans on math exams, and why Africans outperform Asians in sports that involve sprinting.

Unfalsifiable Hypotheses

When the predictions generated by these explanations failed to pan out, many began to turn to invisible forces like “structural racism” and “implicit bias” to explain achievement gaps. One problem with these hypotheses (as they are often employed) is that they are impossible to falsify. In fact, that seems to be the point: if we can’t test the hypothesis that unconscious bias and structural racism explain achievement gaps, they become perfect candidates for an all-purpose explanation that can be held with the force of a religious dogma.

When we see an achievement gap, we can invoke bias without even thinking about alternatives, and dismiss as a “racist” or “sexist” anyone who proposes the hypothesis that biology plays a role in explaining some achievement gaps.

Of course, biases exist, and sometimes they are at odds with our explicit value judgments. In these cases, it’s worth spreading social norms that aim to combat unfair biases. But some biases are useful heuristics, and some stereotypes are rational generalizations, like the belief that we have a greater chance of being violently assaulted by a man than a woman, or that the next international chess champion is more likely to be Jewish than Eritrean. In these cases, it is arguably morally wrong to prevent ourselves from believing what the evidence suggests.

When we hear someone attribute achievement gaps to implicit bias or structural racism, an obvious question to ask is: What would count as evidence against your hypothesis?

Vague Language

Structural racism (or sexism) is such an amorphous term that it is hard to know how to analyze it. We might first look to government institutions and private firms and ask whether they have policies of discrimination. In some countries, government agencies and businesses alike have policies that explicitly discriminate against entire classes of people (for example, in Saudi Arabia a man’s testimony in court has twice the evidentiary value of a woman’s). But in many Western countries like the United States and Australia, discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and sexual orientation is explicitly forbidden by law. Affirmative action programs actually do allow employers to discriminate – but they typically discriminate against rather than in favor of men of Asian or European descent.

Of course, we might think that although laws forbid discrimination, implicit bias leads some people to unconsciously discriminate against potential employees and co-workers. Implicit bias is hard to test, but the best evidence we have so far suggests that even when implicit bias exists it does not affect behavior very much, if at all. Despite the weak evidence for implicit bias as an explanation for achievement gaps, many corporations, and educational institutions have diversity training programs aimed at combating its allegedly pernicious effects.

Similar claims can be made about “misogyny,” which is the new term for “sexism” coined by radical feminists who claim that even if most people don’t consciously discriminate against women, an unconscious hatred of women helps explain why men and women exhibit different characteristics, which lead to different outcomes.

Will those who cite implicit bias, structural racism, or internalized misogyny respond to the evidence against their claims? Or will they instead retreat to untestable claims couched in vague language which allows them to save their hypothesis no matter what scientists find?

Conclusion

Those of us who suspect biology plays a role in explaining some group differences do not deny the existence of bias, which is especially powerful in traditional societies that lack norms of toleration and laws that protect minorities. But we are skeptical that racism or sexism or other pernicious forms of bias can explain all of the gaps that we see. More importantly, our hypothesis is falsifiable. One way to falsify it would be to find that genes which influence physical and mental traits – including abilities and interests – are identically distributed across human groups.

If people want to search for the different causes of achievement gaps by proposing testable scientific hypotheses, we welcome them to the debate. But we are frustrated by the seemingly unfalsifiable nature of the hypotheses that are increasingly put forward to defend the view that all groups are the same, and that all indications of difference are evidence of evil.

SOURCE






'I'm not meant to be a bloke': Woman who changed gender to become a man called Lee 15 years ago says sex swap was a huge mistake and wants to switch back

Sex changes are very often regretted

A transgender man who had a sex change 15 years ago has branded it the biggest mistake of his life and wishes he was still a woman.

Lee Harries, 60, of Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, was born Debbie Karemer but underwent gender reassignment surgery at the age of 44.

After years of struggling with his sexual identity, he had his breasts, uterus, ovaries and fallopian tubes removed, before doctors made a prosthetic penis for him.

But years later he says: 'I'm not meant to be a bloke' and believes he is not transgender.

Mr Harries, who married his partner Alan before he transitioned, has undergone counselling, where experts have told him he has PTSD as a result of being sexually assaulted by his father.

He told the Mirror: 'I wish I could turn back the clock and just have the foresight of what the nightmare the next 15 years would be.

'I'm a woman I'm not meant to be a bloke. I'm trapped. It's a complete mess - where do you even start? I just regret the decision.

'I'm sure a lot of transgender men feel the same too but I'm the only one honest and brave one to come out and say it.'

Mr Harries says he feels 'mutilated' and believes he had the surgery because he thought if he did not have a vagina anymore he could not be raped.

His trauma has also left him with objectum sexuality, which means he is attracted to inanimate objects.

Mr Harries says he has developed sexual attractions to a fishing rod and a radio, before having a 'relationship' with an electric guitar.

The 60-year-old is currently on the waiting list for an NHS operation to reverse his sex change, but feels 'trapped' in his male body.

SOURCE






The super-rich will regret their vulgar displays

clare foges

UK: Public anger is rising against flashy billionaires such as Philip Green and it’s bound to give a boost to Corbyn’s cause

A full month before pantomime season begins, our favourite villain has returned to the stage in a puff of green smoke: Sir Philip of Monaco. Boo! Hiss! Bubbling under recent coverage has been something approaching delight. Many long for Green’s comeuppance. Dislike of the man stretches back long before these bullying accusations, before BHS hit the rocks and before his shoddy treatment of its pensioners. Two words sum up why Green is long-loathed: greed and vulgarity.

It is one thing to be rich, another to parade it as showily as Green has done (while limiting payments to the taxman). Most famously, there were the parties. His 50th birthday bash was a £5 million event that saw Sir Philip dressed as Emperor Nero. His 55th had performances by George Michael and Jennifer Lopez, pushing the bill up to a rumoured £20 million. The 60th was a more modest affair, only £6 million to cover the numerous bottles of Pol Roger and singalong with Stevie Wonder. Green is a cartoon tycoon, perma-tanned and model-draped, possessing the daddy of all yachts in Lionheart. This £115 million, 295-foot monster troubles the Med’s prettiest harbours each summer blaring the message that its owner is, as the old Harry Enfield character used to declare, “considerably richer than you”.

Green is not the only person to splash the cash, of course, but his profile and pugnacity make him a lightning rod for our dislike of flashy braggarts everywhere. He embodies the culture of vulgarity that has grown ever since loadsamoney City traders flashed their wads of notes in the Eighties. It used to be that modesty was lauded and greed was a cardinal sin. Now the reverse seems true. Displays of wealth that would once have seemed unbelievably crass now barely raise an eyebrow.

The property developer Nick Candy boasts in an interview of the fleet of sports cars he and his brother Christian once owned: Rolls-Royce Phantom, Rolls-Royce convertible, Mercedes SLR McLaren, Ferrari F430 Spider and 575M Maranello, two Range Rovers and a Cherokee Jeep.

Tamara Ecclestone (daughter of Bernie, the Formula One boss) stars in a reality show that lingers on the details of her luxuriant life, from her £70 million house to her many butlers. Plutocrats’ offspring display incredible wealth on Instagram: being waited on in Monte Carlo and buried under Tiffany purchases in New York. A craze sweeping Russia and China shows how such tackiness has gone global. The “flaunt your wealth” challenge has Instagrammers posing corpse-like on the ground next to their luxury car or aircraft as though just pitched out of it, surrounded by Gucci bags, Prada sunglasses, piles of banknotes and jewels.

Most notoriously there is the endless race among the super-rich to build bigger and swankier boats. Last week this paper reported on a surge in demand for mega-yachts, with a predicted 40 per cent increase in the number of 100 metre-plus vessels built in the next few years. One industry figure puts this down to one-upmanship: owners needing to trump each other with multiple decks, helicopter pads, submersible vehicles, piano bars and cinemas.

Criticism of such excess is easily shut down as “the politics of envy”. Defenders of the super-rich ask, “Why shouldn’t they enjoy the fruits of their labours? Lighten up! Let the high-rollers roll!” Call it the politics of envy all you like, but the truth is that as life continues to grind hard for many in our country, as wages continue to stagnate, conspicuous consumption seems not only tacky and crass but taunting and cruel.

Green once complained that he was the victim of “envy and jealousy” but such lifestyles are designed to draw attention and inevitably spark envy. For many among the super-rich, their bought delights are not to be privately enjoyed but publicly shared. Part of the pleasure is in people witnessing your extravagance. In an age when social media and celebrity coverage trumpet every movement of the rich and famous, this means decadent, champagne-spraying spending being rubbed in the face of millions who have bugger all. These displays don’t inspire the hospital porter on the night shift or the carer on minimum wage to reach for the stars — they just make them feel inadequate and small, locked out of a Gatsby-like world.

This is why those who wear their wealth gaudily on their sleeve should be careful. The resentment caused is grist to the socialists’ mill. Anger about inequality is growing, not only among the have-nots but among the have-somethings. The more the super-rich seem to float off into a gilded bubble beyond the rest of us, the more voters will wish for them to be brought to heel. If a Corbyn government should come to “eat the rich”, as the hard-left placards say, if Chancellor McDonnell plays Robin Hood with some painfully (and destructively) redistributive policies, the flashy rich may only have themselves to blame.

To be clear: I don’t believe being on the Rich List makes you a bad person — far from it. I have great admiration for those with the entrepreneurial chutzpah to rise high and prosper. But there are ways to handle extreme wealth with class and even grace. In an essay entitled The Gospel of Wealth, the great Gilded Age philanthropist Andrew Carnegie said the duties of the very wealthy were to shun “display or extravagance” and consider themselves “trustees for the poor”.

Many around the world have taken these words as a manifesto. There are the highly generous, like Bill Gates with his Giving Pledge, and there are those who shun extravagance too. Ingvar Kamprad, the late founder of Ikea, flew only in economy class. The Mexican magnate Carlos Slim drives himself to work. Warren Buffett never spends more than $3.17 on breakfast. In Britain there are many rich people who go about their business modestly and take their responsibilities as trustees for the poor seriously. They start schools in deprived areas, fund mentoring and scholarships, pay enormous amounts in tax and don’t deserve to be tarnished by the brush of Green and his flashy ilk.

The awful “flaunt your wealth” challenge brought to my mind a woman who died in AD 79 . On the outskirts of Pompeii archaeologists found her wearing heavy gold armbands, rings and chains, carrying a bag containing more bracelets, rings, necklaces and a thick braid of gold. Weighed down by her gaudy riches as she ran from the erupting Vesuvius, she is a symbol of the adage that you can’t take it with you.

The super-rich should consider not only how they want to be perceived today but remembered tomorrow. Do they wish to be fossilised surrounded by Ferraris, gold bathtubs and Cartier bracelets or remembered, as the Carnegies and the Rockefellers are, for something better? The choice is theirs.

SOURCE

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Political correctness is most pervasive in universities and colleges but I rarely report the  incidents concerned here as I have a separate blog for educational matters.

American "liberals" often deny being Leftists and say that they are very different from the Communist rulers of  other countries.  The only real difference, however, is how much power they have.  In America, their power is limited by democracy.  To see what they WOULD be like with more power, look at where they ARE already  very powerful: in America's educational system -- particularly in the universities and colleges.  They show there the same respect for free-speech and political diversity that Stalin did:  None.  So look to the colleges to see  what the whole country would be like if "liberals" had their way.  It would be a dictatorship.

For more postings from me, see TONGUE-TIED, GREENIE WATCH,   EDUCATION WATCH INTERNATIONAL, AUSTRALIAN POLITICS and  DISSECTING LEFTISM.   My Home Pages are here or   here or   here.  Email me (John Ray) here.  Email me (John Ray) here

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          Raffaelli (Amref) esalta presidente donna in Etiopia: ‘Ora fare di più in tutto il Corno d’Africa’      Cache   Translate Page      
ROMA, 6 NOVEMBRE – Il Presidente di Amref Italia, Mario Raffaelli,  ha partecipato la settimana scorsa al Vertice Italia-Africa, convocato a Roma e oggi commenta anche la partecipazione, tra gli altri, anche i ministri degli Esteri di Etiopia ed Eritrea, coinvolte in questi mesi da uno storico processo di pace. “Quanto sta accadendo – ha rilevato Raffaelli – è effettivamente un processo estremamente promettente ma anche molto delicato. I recentissimi passi etiopi, ad esempio, hanno avuto come risposta anche diversi focolai di tensione. Ciò significa quindi, come è comprensibile e fisiologico, che ci sarà una fase di transizione che andrà gestita al meglio. In questo quadro l’Italia e l’Europa devono svolgere un ruolo”. Sahle-Work Zewde, E un primo passo positivo, secondo il presidente di Amref, è stato proprio quello del governo italiano. “La visita del Presidente del Consiglio Giuseppe Conte nei due Paesi africani – primo leader europeo a farlo, dopo l’accordo di pace – è stato un gesto politicamente importante: è bene che l’Unione Europea segua quest’esempio. E che questi importanti e simbolici atti vengano seguiti dal supporto concreto del processo di riconciliazione tra i due Stati”. Proprio in Etiopia da pochi giorni il rinnovamento ha il volto di Sahle-Work [...]
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Senior Sudanese Official to Visit Eritrea Soon for Normalization Talks: Sources
Eritrean President Issaias Afeworki(R), seen here in March 2007 with Sudanese President Omer al-Beshir

November 6, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - The Sudanese Presidential Assistant Faisal Hassan Ibrahim would visit Asmara soon to discuss normalization of bilateral relations between Sudan and Eritrea, an informed source told Sudan Tribune on Tuesday

n January 2018, Sudan accused Eritrea of supporting rebel groups and closed the border after the deployment of thousands of troops. Four months later, Asmara accused Sudan, Ethiopia and Qatar of supporting armed opposition groups to overthrow President Isaias Afewerki’s government.

But in July, Ethiopia and Eritrea reconciled and normalized relations between the two neighbouring countries.

An informed source told Sudan Tribune that contacts between the two countries have been activated during the previous period, disclosing that Eritrea’s Ambassador to Khartoum has recently met with several Sudanese officials.

He pointed out that the Eritrean Ambassador has conveyed to the Sudanese officials President Isaias Afewerki’s queries about the reasons that led to the tensions and whether or not there were other parties that have intervened to spoil relations between the two countries.

The same source added the Sudanese officials told the Eritrean envoy that the deployment of troops on the border last January was a mere preventive measure to respond to any potential attack on the country.

It is noteworthy that Presidential Assistant Musa Mohamed Ahmed last week denied reports that he has engaged in talks with the Eritrean officials to ease tensions between the two countries during a recent visit to Asmara, saying he travelled to Eritrea to spend his annual holidays with his family.

However, the source underlined that Ahmed’s visit to Asmara “wasn’t necessarily a private affair”.

The same source stressed that Presidential Assistant Faisal Hassan Ibrahim is preparing to visit Asmara soon to normalize relations”.

Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) last June reiterated its keenness to develop a constructive relationship with neighbouring Eritrea.

Last September the IGAD Council of Minister said it would discuss the normalization of relations between Djibouti and Eritrea; and between Eritrea and Sudan. However, the east African bloc did not make any mention to the matter in it its statement after the meeting of 12 September.

(ST)

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Afwerki Praises Eritreans for 'Victorious Resilience'
Daniel Mumbere
Africa News

Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki has paid tribute to the ‘steadfastness and resilience’ of his people, saying they have emerged triumphant against decades-old tribulation that few other people could have withstood.

Afwerki was addressing an interview broadcast live on state television and radio, as he sought to update the nation on the significance of regional developments like the peace deal with Ethiopia.

“The peace process transcends Ethiopia’s full acceptance of EEBC border ruling,’‘ Afwerki said.

‘’(It) represents a new, fourth, epoch where external subterfuges of controlling the region have been vanquished through resilience of the Eritrean people,political dynamics in Ethiopia & global developments.”

Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace deal in July this year, ending two decades of hostilities over a border dispute.

Last week, it also emerged that sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009, are set to be lifted.

Afwerki said Eritrea will consolidate the new regional developments that have included normalisation of relations with Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.

‘‘The new reality will have its own contribution to the shared visions of cultivation of solid cooperation in the wider Horn of Africa, the Nile Basin and the Arabian Gulf that is endowed with substantial resources, huge populations and considerable human capital,’‘ said Afwerki.

Time for reforms?

The president is expected to address the impact of the regional developments on the internal politics of the country.

Eritrea, for a long time imposed stringent measures including compulsory and indefine national conscription and repression of dissenting views, in the name of protecting the nation against an aggressive and powerful enemy, Ethiopia.

With the peace deal reached with Ethiopia, many human rights advocates have called upon Eritrea to reform. READ MORE: Eritrea pledges to address human rights challenges

          After years in exile, an Ethiopian politician returns home with hope and fear      Cache   Translate Page      
A year ago, rebel leader Berhanu Nega was coordinating attacks against Ethiopian soldiers from his base across the border in Eritrea and faced a death penalty at home.

          After years in exile, an Ethiopian politician returns home with hope and fear      Cache   Translate Page      
A year ago, rebel leader Berhanu Nega was coordinating attacks against Ethiopian soldiers from his base across the border in Eritrea and faced a death penalty at home.

          After years in exile, an Ethiopian politician returns home with hope and fear      Cache   Translate Page      
A year ago, rebel leader Berhanu Nega was coordinating attacks against Ethiopian soldiers from his base across the border in Eritrea and faced a death penalty at home.

          After years in exile, an Ethiopian politician returns home with hope and fear      Cache   Translate Page      
ADDIS ABABA: A year ago, rebel leader Berhanu Nega was coordinating attacks against Ethiopian soldiers from his base across the border in Eritrea and faced a death penalty at home. In September, he returned to Ethiopia to address tens of thousands of cheering supporters in a stadium in the capital ...
          Senior Sudanese official to visit Eritrea soon for normalization talks: sources      Cache   Translate Page      
November 6, 2018 (KHARTOUM) – The Sudanese Presidential Assistant Faisal Hassan Ibrahim would visit Asmara soon to discuss normalization of bilateral relations between Sudan and Eritrea, an informed source told Sudan Tribune on Tuesday I Eritrean President Issaias Afeworki(R), seen here in March 2007 with Sudanese President Omer al-Beshir n January 2018, Sudan accused Eritrea […]
          Eritrea: International Antibacterial Week Will Be Observed Nationwide      Cache   Translate Page      
[Shabait] Asmara -International Antibacterial Week will be observed nationwide from 12 to 18 November with a view to increase public understanding of the application of antibiotic medicine. The initiative is being organized by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture.
          Eritrea hopes UN Security Council will soon lift sanctions      Cache   Translate Page      
Eritrea is hoping that the UN Security Council will soon lift sanctions it imposed on the East African nation in 2009, now that its relations have thawed with Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo and other tough sanctions on Eritrea for supplying weapons to al-Shabab Islamic militants opposed to […]

Source


          Kwart transmigranten in West-Vlaanderen beweert uit Eritrea afkomstig te zijn       Cache   Translate Page      

De Brugse correctionele rechtbank heeft niet minder dan zeven transmigranten uit Eritrea veroordeeld tot zes maanden effectieve celstraf voor het binnendringen van de haven van Zeebrugge. Volgens procureur Frank Demeester beweert ongeveer 25 procent van de in West-Vlaanderen opgepakte transmigranten uit Eritrea afkomstig te zijn.


          Ethiopia-Eritrea: What comes after the reconciliation?      Cache   Translate Page      

Last July, the Horn of Africa experienced a major event: Ethiopia and Eritrea reconciled and put into effect a peace deal. This reconciliation between the two ‘enemy brothers’, after two decades of no diplomatic relations, occurred only a few months after Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s youngest prime minister, came to power. However, while this reconciliation is […]

The post Ethiopia-Eritrea: What comes after the reconciliation? appeared first on Democracy in Africa.


          Somalia: UNHCR Somalia: Refugees and Asylum-seekers Statistical Report - 31 October 2018      Cache   Translate Page      
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Country: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen


          Cofidis sign Berhane and release Teklehaimanot      Cache   Translate Page      

Cofidis have signed another WorldTour rider, picking up Natnael Berhane from Dimension Data for the 2019 season. The Eritrean replaces his compatriot and former teammate Daniel Teklehaimanot, who has not received a contract extension.

It will be the second spell at a French team for Berhane, who turned pro with Europcar in 2013 and immediately won the Tour of Turkey.

In 2015 he joined the South African Dimension Data team - then MTN-Qhubeka - and has ridden the three Grand Tours with the team but hasn't managed to add to his win tally since landing the Eritrean national title in 2015.

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"I am the happiest of men because I really wanted to come back and race in France after those two great years with Europcar. Cofidis were on my radar and I didn't hesitate before signing my contract. The team performed strongly throughout the season and finished very strongly, notably at the Vuelta," Berhane said in an announcement from the team.

"As I'm an all-rounder, I will have the chance to work for team leaders in the different races, but I will also be able to show myself in the stage races where I have achieved my best results. One thing's for sure, I'm going to give my all for the team and I'm confident about what we can achieve."

With the signing of Berhane, Cofidis finalised their 2019 roster with 28 riders. After signing the Herrada brothers from Movistar last year, Berhane joins Darwin Atapuma (UAE Team Emirates), Jesper Hansen (Astana), and Marco Mathis (Katusha-Alpecin) as the latest recruits from WorldTour outfits. Former Sunweb rider Zico Waeytens has also joined from Veranda's Willems-Crelan, while Damien Touzé, Filippo Fortin, and Victor Lafay will all turn pro with the team next year.

You can read more at Cyclingnews.com


          Eritrea: Barentu Referral Hospital Providing Commendable Services      Cache   Translate Page      
[Shabait] Barentu -Dr. Yacob Hassan, Medical Director of the Barentu Referral Hospital, indicated that the hospital is working to provide efficient health services to the public.


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