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          BolehVPN review: A capable service that's not for novices      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   

BolehVPN in brief:

  • P2P allowed: Yes
  • Business location: Malaysia and Seychelles
  • Number of servers: 35
  • Number of country locations: 12
  • Cost: $80 per year
  • VPN protocol: OpenVPN and L2TP
  • Data encryption: AES-256
  • Data authentication: SHA2
  • Handshake encryption: RSA-4096

Many VPNs right now are trying to be as user friendly as possible with a simple connect button and a simplified list of server locations. Not so with BolehVPN. This Malaysia-based VPN is not focused on ease of use, but at the same time there may not be quite enough here to satisfy power users.

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          The Trump collusion timeline      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   
The Trump collusion timeline

by digby

Just Security has put together a nice timeline of Trump's interactions with the Russian government since he was elected. It's quite interesting when you look at it all together. It's certainly fine to propose a fresh start with relations between the two countries. But they seemed to have a much more specific agenda from thevery beginning.

I've just excerpted the first six months after the election:

Nov. 14, 2016 — In their first official phone call, President-elect Trump and Putin agree on the “absolutely unsatisfactory state of bilateral relations” between Russia and the U.S., according to the New York Times. The two leaders agreed to meet at some point in the future and “endorse” the idea of taking efforts “to normalize relations and pursue constructive cooperation on the broadest possible range of issues.”

Nov. 18, 2016 — President-elect Trump names retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as his national security advisor, stirring controversy in part because of Flynn’s ties to Russia, according to the Washington Post. In 2015, Flynn accepted payment from RT — a Russian news channel that had become a propaganda arm — to attend the station’s gala event in Moscow. Putin also attended the gala, and RT later published photos of the two dining next to each other.

Dec. 1 or 2, 2016 — Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak meets with former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and Trump Senior Advisor Jared Kushner in Trump Tower. The meeting is not disclosed to the public until March 2017. The White House first states that its purpose was to “establish a line of communication.” Kislyak later reports to superiors in Moscow that, in the meeting, Kushner suggested setting up a secure channel between the Trump transition team and the Kremlin, to be hosted at the Russian embassy or consulate, according to the Washington Post.

Dec. 12, 2016 — President-elect Trump officially nominates Rex Tillerson as secretary of state, spurring controversy because of Tillerson’s close relationship with Russia. As CEO of Exxon Mobil, Tillerson had engaged in joint ventures with Rosneft, a state-backed Russian oil company, and had received the Order of Friendship from Russia in 2013, according to the New York Times.

Dec. 13, 2016 — Senior Trump Advisor Jared Kushner meets with Sergey Gorkov, then-chairman of Russia’s government-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB) and a close ally of Putin, at Russian Ambassador Kislyak’s request. The bank was placed on the sanctions list following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. In June 2017, the Washington Post reports that VEB says the meeting was conducted in relation to Kushner’s family real estate business. However, the Trump White House later maintains it was a diplomatic meeting in which Kushner was acting in his role as soon-to-be presidential adviser. Kushner testifies on July 24, 2017 to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees that Kislyak had recommended the meeting because Gorkov “had a direct relationship with” Putin. Kushner said they discussed the general poor state of US-Russian relations but that they didn’t touch on any specific policies nor on Obama-era sanctions against Russia. “At no time was there any discussion about my companies, business transactions, real estate projects, loans, banking arrangements or any private business of any kind.”

Dec. 29, 2016 — Shortly after the White House notifies Russia of sanctions that the Obama administration will impose for election interference, Michael Flynn speaks with Russian Ambassador Kislyak. During the phone call, Flynn discusses the sanctions. According to several current and former officials who read transcripts of the call, Flynn told Kislyak that Russia should not overreact to impending sanctions for election interference because the Trump administration would be in a position to revisit the sanctions and change policy toward Russia, according to the Washington Post. Nearly one year later, Flynn pleads guilty to lying to investigators regarding his conversations with the Russian ambassador.

Dec. 29, 2016 — Within four hours of the Obama White House’s announced sanctions against Russia for election interference, Trump issues a written statement in response saying, “It’s time for our country to move on to bigger and better things.”

Dec. 30, 2016 — Following Russia’s surprise turnaround decision not to respond to the U.S. sanctions in-kind, Trump tweets: “Great move on delay (by V. Putin) – I always knew he was very smart!” Putin’s decision came as a surprise in part because Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had earlier said in televised remarks, “Of course, we cannot leave these sanctions unanswered … Reciprocity is the law of diplomacy and international relations.”

Jan. 3-4, 2017 — In a series of tweets, Trump disparages the intelligence from U.S. agencies scheduled to brief him on their findings that Russia interfered in the 2016 election.

Jan. 6, 2017 – May 9, 2017 — Jan. 6 is the date then-FBI Director James Comey helped brief Trump on Russian election interference, and May 9 was his final day as FBI Director. In his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Comey is asked (by Senator Joe Manchin) whether Trump showed “any concern or interest or curiosity about what the Russians were doing.” Comey responds that he does not recall any conversations with Trump about Russian election interference during the former FBI Director’s time in office. Comey is also asked (by Senator Martin Heinrich), “Did the President in any of those interactions that you’ve shared with us today ask you what you should be doing or what our government should be doing — or the intelligence community — to protect America against Russian interference in our election system?” Comey says he does not recall any conversation like that–“never.”

Jan. 6-7, 2017 — After the briefing by intelligence officials, Trump acknowledgesthat the Russian government may have been involved in the hacking of Democratic National Committee computers, but says it didn’t affect the outcome of the election because Russia didn’t gain access to voting systems, and says he wants to improve relations with Russia.

Jan. 11, 2017 — George Nader, a Lebanese-American fixer and advisor to the United Arab Emirates, convenes a secret meeting in the Seychelles at the “behest” of UAE Crown Prince Mohammed, according to the New York Times. The meeting is between Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater and a Trump supporter (and brother of Betsy DeVos, Trump’s then-nominee to be secretary of education), and Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian wealth fund manager with ties to President Putin. The apparent purpose of the meeting is to test Russia’s commitment to Iran and to set up a communication channel between President-elect Trump and Moscow, according to the Washington Post.

Prince testifies before Congress in November that the meeting with Dmitriev was a “chance-encounter,” and that he traveled to the Seychelles to pursue a “business opportunity” with potential customers from the UAE, who had suggested that he meet with a Russian businessman staying at the same hotel, Vox reports. However, according to reporting by ABC News and the Washington Post, Special Counsel Robert Mueller reportedly has new evidence and a cooperating witness in Nader, who is allegedly testifying that the meeting was preplanned to set up communications between the Trump transition team and Moscow so that they could “discuss future relations between the countries.” The New York Times also reports that Kirill Dmitriev had met Trump associate Anthony Scaramucci at the 2017 Davos forum, after which Scaramucci criticized the Obama administration sanctions on Russia with a TASS reporter.

Jan. 11, 2017 — At a news conference, Trump says, “I think it was Russia” that hacked the 2016 U.S. election, but then diminishes its significance, adding, “But I think we also get hacked by other countries and other people.” He draws comparisons to other incidents of hacking, and suggests that the DNC left itself open to hacking and deserves some blame. Trump also says, “Russia will have much greater respect for our country when I am leading it than when other people have led it,” according to CNN.

Post-Jan. 20, 2017 — In the “early weeks” of the administration, top Trump administration officials task State Department staff “with developing proposals for the lifting of economic sanctions,” until their efforts are blocked by State Department officials and members of Congress, according to reporting by Michael Isikoff of Yahoo News.

Jan. 20-early Feb., 2017 — National Security Advisor Michael Flynn advocates for closer military communication with Russia to fight ISIS. According to several current and former Pentagon sources cited by the Daily Beast, Flynn suggests that a military communications channel originally established to prevent in-air collisions be expanded for other purposes that could have approached “outright cooperation” with Russia. Both the Pentagon and Centcom oppose Flynn’s idea.

Jan. 26-Feb. 13, 2017 — Acting Attorney General Sally Yates meets personally with White House Counsel Don McGahn about National Security Advisor Flynn’s conversations with Russian Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016. Yates warns the White House Counsel that Flynn’s statement that he did not discuss sanctions with the Russian Ambassador is untrue and that in her view Flynn is accordingly vulnerable to being blackmailed by Russia. Yates is fired on January 30 for refusing to enforce the immigration ban. (ABC News). It is not until February 13 that Flynn is asked to resign, following a Washington Post story revealing the meeting with Yates and the White House Counsel. (New York Times) (Washington Post)

Feb. 6, 2017 — In a Super Bowl interview with Bill O’Reilly, Trump says he respects Putin and dismisses the host’s characterization of the Russian president as a “killer.” “There are a lot of killers,” Trump says. “Do you think our country is so innocent?

Feb. 14, 2017 — The New York Times reports that Russia has deployed a cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) treatysigned by President Ronald Reagan and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev. In congressional testimony, Gen. Paul Selva, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states, “We believe that the Russians have deliberately deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO and to facilities within the NATO area of responsibility.” The administration does not issue a public statement rebuking Russia. When Trump is asked about the violation in a February 24 interview with Reuters, he says, “To me, it’s a big deal,” and adds that he “would bring it up” with Putin “if and when we meet.” The State Department reiterated the alleged violation in its April 2017 report and in December 2017, released a strategy to counter the alleged violations, according to the Arms Control Association.

March 21, 2017 — The State Department announces that Secretary Rex Tillerson will not attend his intended first NATO meeting in Brussels on April 5-6, and will instead stay in the U.S. to join Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida. During the same announcement, the State Department notes that Tillerson will travel to Russia in April, drawing criticism that the administration is prioritizing Russia over historical allies and the NATO alliance, according to Reuters. Subsequently, the State Department offers new dates to reschedule the NATO meeting, and Tillerson attends.

March 31, 2017 — Tillerson meets with NATO leaders in Brussels. In his remarks, Tillerson reiterates the frequent U.S. exhortation over the years that allies increase their defense spending, but seems to take it a step further, saying: “As President Trump has made clear, it is no longer sustainable for the U.S. to maintain a disproportionate share of NATO’s defense expenditures.”

April 2-27, 2017 — In an interview on April 2, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley says: “Certainly I think Russia was involved in the U.S. election.” On April 5, Haley criticizes Russia for obstructing UN action on Syria and for supporting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Haley says Russia made an “unconscionable choice” by opposing a resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons, and rhetorically asks “how many more children have to die before Russia cares?”

However, during a working lunch on April 24 with UN Security Council ambassadors including Haley, Trump jests, “Now, does everybody like Nikki? Because if you don’t … she can easily be replaced,” according to the Washington Post. Further, on April 27, Secretary of State Tillerson sends UN Ambassador Haley an email instructing her that, from then on, her comments should be “re-cleared with Washington if they are substantively different from the building blocks, or if they are on a high-profile issue,” according to the New York Times.

April 6, 2017 — In response to a reported chemical attack perpetrated by the Assad regime, the Trump administration launches a military attack on a Syrian-government airfield near Homs from which the chemical weapons attack reportedly was launched, according to NBC News. In an interview with Fox News, National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster suggests Russia may have known about the chemical attacks in advance saying: “I think what we should do is ask Russia, how could it be, if you have advisers at that airfield, that you didn’t know that the Syrian air force was preparing and executing a mass murder attack with chemical weapons?”

April 23, 2017 — In an Associated Press interview, Trump expresses strong support for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen in upcoming French elections; Le Pen is supported by Putin and promises to remove France from the EU, a long-term goal for Putin. Le Pen had also visited Trump Tower in January, according to AP and Politico.

May 10, 2017 — Secretary of State Tillerson meets with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Ambassador Kislyak and says the U.S. would no longer require Russia to unfreeze the construction of an American consulate in St. Petersburgbefore considering handing back seized Russian diplomatic compounds in Maryland and New York as part of the Obama sanctions for election interference. The statement represented a reversal of the position staked out two days prior by Undersecretary of State Thomas Shannon, the Washington Post reports.

May 10, 2017 — During an Oval Office meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Ambassador Kislyak, Trump tells the Russian officials that he had fired the “nut job” FBI director (James Comey) who was investigating Russian election interference, according to the New York Times. Trump also says he had faced “great pressure” because of Russia, which had now been relieved. Additionally, Trump discloses highly classified information to the Russian officials. The intelligence was provided by Israel, which had not authorized the U.S. to share it, according to the Washington Post. The intelligence centered on Syrian extremist bomb-making plans, and was obtained in part through highly classified cyber operations, the disclosure of which “infuriated” Israeli officials, according to the New York Times. Israel subsequently changes its intelligence sharing protocols with the United States. No U.S. press are allowed into the Oval Office meeting, but Trump does allow TASS, the Russian state-owned agency, according to the Washington Post. Trump does not disclose to the press that Kislyak attended the meeting until TASS publishes photographs showing him in the room; the White House releasefollowing the meeting only mentions Lavrov. In a later interview, National Security Advisor McMaster refuses to confirm that Russian interference was discussed, even when asked directly about it.

May 10, 2017 — Following the meeting with Trump, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov tells TASS: “At present, our dialogue is not as politicized as it used to be during Obama’s presidency. The Trump administration, including the President himself and the Secretary of State, are people of action who are willing to negotiate.”

May 25 – 26, 2017 — Arriving in Europe with Trump, top White House economic advisor Gary Cohn tells reporters that the U.S. is “looking at” the future of sanctions on Russia. When pressed on what the current U.S. position is, he says: “Right now we don’t have a position.” The following day, Cohn counters that statement, saying the U.S. will not ease sanctions on Russia and, “if anything, we would probably look to get tougher.”

May 25, 2017 — In Europe, Trump chastises NATO leaders for their “chronic underpayments” to the alliance and fails to reaffirm U.S. commitment to Article 5 – the collective defense clause of the NATO agreement – promising only to “never forsake the friends that stood by our side” in the wake of Sept. 11 (a statement later labelled by the administration as an affirmation of Article 5). According to Politico, several Trump advisors, including National Security Advisor McMaster, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, are surprised by the omission, having endeavored to include language supporting Article 5 in Trump’s remarks prior to the summit. Additionally, National Security Council spokesman Michael Anton says Russia was not discussed in a larger meeting between American and European officials, but that he could not speak for a meeting involving just Trump, President of the European Council Donald Tusk, and President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. Tusk later says he is “not 100 percent sure” he and Trump share a “common position, common opinion, about Russia,” according to the New York Times.

May 26, 2017 — At a political rally the day after the Brussels meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel says: “The times in which we could rely fully on others — they are somewhat over. This is what I experienced in the last few days. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands,” implying that Europe could no longer rely on a close alliance with the U.S.

May 30, 2017 — In a press briefing, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer is asked about Trump’s reaction to Angela Merkel’s comments implying Europe could no longer rely on the U.S. He responds that Europe, “working in friendship with the U.S., the U.K., Russia, and other partners,” is precisely “what the President called for.” (May 30 press briefing). Trump reacts to Merkel’s comments on Twitter: “We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military. Very bad for U.S. This will change.”

          Emirates outlines 2Q19 service reductions for Dubai Airport runway upgrade project      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   

Emirates recently filed changes in its inventory, which sees the closure of various flights due to planned runway upgrades at Dubai International Airport in the second quarter of 2019.

From 16APR19 to 30MAY19 (based on Dubai departure, selected service to Australia until 29MAY19), following service sees the closure of reservation. Additional changes remain highly possible.

Dubai – Accra Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 27 closed for booking
Dubai – Addis Ababa Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 135 closed for booking
Dubai – Adelaide Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 245 closed for booking
Dubai – Ahmedabad Reduce from 9 to 6 weekly, EK538/539 closed for booking on Day 234 (Day 345 from AMD)
Dubai – Algiers Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 137 closed for booking
Dubai – Amman Reduce from 21 to 14 weekly, following flights closed for booking
EK901/902 Day 135
EK905/906 Day x135 (Day x246 from AMM)

Day x135 closed for booking = Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays, Sundays closed for booking

Dubai – Athens Reduce from 2 to 1 daily, EK103/104 closed for booking
Dubai – Auckland Reduce from 7 to 6 weekly for nonstop sector, Day 2 (Day 3 from AKL) closed for booking
Dubai – Baghdad Reduce from 7 to 2 weekly, Day x24 closed for booking
Dubai – Bahrain Reduce from 28 to 14 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK833/834 Daily
EK835/836 Day x7
EK839/840 Day 7

Dubai – Bangalore Reduce from 21 to 19 weekly, EK564/565 Day 24 closed for booking
Dubai – Bangkok Reduce from 6 to 4 daily, EK370/371 and EK376/377 closed for booking
Dubai – Barcelona Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly, EK185/186 closed for booking on Day 136
Dubai – Beirut Reduce from 21 to 14 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK953/954 Day 6
EK957/958 Day 247
EK955/956 Day 135 (Day 246 from BEY)

Dubai – Birmingham Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly, EK039/040 closed for booking on Day 356
Dubai – Bologna Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 13 closed for booking
Dubai – Boston Reduce from 7 to 6 weekly, Day 6 closed for booking
Dubai – Brisbane Reduce from 2 to 1 daily for nonstop sector, EK430/431 closed for booking
Dubai – Brussels Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK181/182 Day 357
EK183/184 Day x357

Dubai – Budapest Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 457 closed for booking
Dubai – Cairo Reduce from 21 to 18 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK925/926 Day 27 (Day 13 from CAI)
EK927/928 Day 7

Dubai – Casablanca Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 13 closed for booking
Dubai – Cebu – Clark – Dubai Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 46 closed for booking
Dubai – Chennai Reduce from 21 to 17 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK546/547 Day 34
EK542/543 Day 5 (Day 6 from MAA)
EK544/545 Day 7

Dubai – Chicago O’Hare Reduce from 7 to 6 weekly, Day 2 closed for booking
Dubai – Colombo – Singapore 1 daily service cancelled, closed for booking (Overall Dubai – Colombo nonstop sector reduce from 3 to 2 daily)
Dubai – Conakry – Dakar – Dubai Reduce from 4 to 3 weekly, Day 5 closed for booking
Dubai – Copenhagen Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 13 closed for booking
Dubai – Dallas/Ft. Worth Reduce from 7 to 6 weekly, Day 2 closed for booking
Dubai – Dammam Reduce from 28 to 13 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK827/828 Day x135
EK821/822 Day x7
EK823/824 Day x246
EK825/826 Day 7

Dubai – Dar es Salaam Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 47 closed for booking
Dubai – Delhi Reduce from 28 to 24 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK512/513 Day 135 (DEL departure EK513 still available for booking on Day 246)
EK510/511 Day 7

Dubai – Denpasar Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly, EK398/399 closed for booking on Day 256 (Day 367 from DPS)
Dubai – Denpasar – Auckland Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 14 closed for booking
Dubai – Dhaka Reduce from 3 to 2 daily, EK586/587 closed for booking
Dubai – Dublin Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly, EK161/162 closed for booking on Day 245
Dubai – Durban Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 47 closed for booking
Dubai – Dusseldorf Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK057/058 Day x367
EK055/056 Day 367

Dubai – Edinburgh Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 357 closed for booking
Dubai – Entebbe Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 247 closed for booking
Dubai – Ft. Lauderdale Reduce from 5 to 3 weekly, Day 57 closed for booking
Dubai – Frankfurt Reduce from 21 to 18 weekly, EK043/044 closed for booking on Day 267
Dubai – Geneva Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK083/084 Day 247
EK089/090 Day x247

Dubai – Glasgow Reduce from 2 to 1 daily, EK027/028 closed for booking
Dubai – Hamburg Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK061/062 Day 246
EK059/060 Day x246

Dubai – Ho Chi Minh City Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 16 closed for booking
Dubai – Hyderabad Reduce from 21 to 17 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK524/525 Day 35 (Day 46 from HYD)
EK526/527 Day 12 (Day 2 from 23APR19)

Dubai – Islamabad Reduce from 11 to 7 weekly, EK614/615 (4 weekly) closed for booking
Dubai – Istanbul Reduce from 11 to 7 weekly, EK121/122 Day x134 closed for booking
Dubai – Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen Reduce from 5 to 3 weekly, Day 45 closed for booking
Dubai – Jakarta Reduce from 2 to 1 daily, EK358/359 closed for booking
Dubai – Jeddah Reduce from 21 to 18 weekly, EK803/804 Day 167 closed for booking
Dubai – Johannesburg Reduce from 28 to 23 weekly . Following flights closed for booking
EK765/766 Day 134
EK761/762 Day 5
EK763/764 Day 6

Dubai – Kabul Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 67 closed for booking
Dubai – Karachi Reduce from 35 to 23 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK606/607 Day x3 (Day x4 from KHI)
EK602/603 Day x257
EK604/605 Day 27 (from 21APR19)

Dubai – Khartoum Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 127 closed for booking
Dubai – Kochi Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly, EK532/533 closed for booking on Day 456 (Day 567 from COK)
Dubai – Kolkata Reduce from 11 to 6 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK572/573 Day 3
EK570/571 Day x125

Dubai – Kuala Lumpur Reduce from 3 to 2 daily, EK344/345 closed for booking
Dubai – Kuwait City Reduce from 42 to 21 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK857/858 Daily
EK855/856 Day x135
EK875/876 Daily
EK853/854 Day 23
EK859/860 Day 5

Dubai – Lagos Reduce from 14 to 10 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK781/782 Day 56
EK783/784 Day 16

Dubai – Lahore
Reduce from 10 to 9 weekly, EK624/625 closed for booking on Day 1
Dubai – Larnaca – Malta
Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 245 closed for booking
Dubai – Lisbon Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK193/194 Day 236
EK191/192 Day 4

Dubai – London Gatwick Reduce from 3 to 2 daily, EK011/012 closed for booking
Dubai – London Heathrow
Reduce from 42 to 31 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK031/032 Day x356
EK029/030 Daily

Dubai – London Stansted Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 156 closed for booking
Dubai – Luanda Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 35 closed for booking
Dubai – Lusaka – Harare Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 45 closed for booking
Dubai – Madinah Reduce from 2 to 1 daily
EK807/808 Day x457 (From 17APR19)
EK809/810 Day 457

Dubai – Madrid Reduce from 14 to 10 weekly, EK141/142 closed for booking on Day x367
Dubai – Mahe Island (Seychelles) Reduce from 2 to 1 daily, EK707/708 closed for booking
Dubai – Male Reduce from 3 to 2 daily from 17APR19, EK656/657 closed for booking
Dubai – Manchester Reduce from 3 to 2 daily, EK021/022 closed for booking
Dubai – Mashad Reduce from 5 to 1 weekly, DXB departure Day x147 closed for booking
Dubai – Mauritius Reduce from 2 to 1 daily, EK701/702 closed for booking
Dubai – Milan Malpensa Reduce from 3 to 2 daily, EK101/102 closed for booking
Dubai – Moscow Domodedovo Reduce from 14 to 11 weekly, EK133/134 closed for booking on Day x134
Dubai – Multan 4 weekly service temporary cancelled, closed for booking from 16APR19 to 30MAY19
Dubai – Munich Reduce from 3 to 2 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK049/050 Day 26
EK053/054 Day x267
EK051/052 Day 7

Dubai – Muscat Reduce from 3 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK862/863 Day x7 (From 17APR19)
EK866/867 Daily (From 17APR19)
EK864/865 Day 7

Dubai – Nairobi Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK719/720 Day 134
EK721/722 Day x134

Dubai – Newark Nonstop sector cancelled, EK223/224 closed for booking (Dubai – Athens – Newark maintains 1 daily)
Dubai – Newcastle Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 357 closed for booking
Dubai – New York JFK Reduce from 14 to 12 weekly, EK203/204 closed for booking on Day 35
Dubai – Nice Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 47 closed for booking
Dubai – Orlando Reduce from 5 to 4 weekly, Day 6 closed for booking
Dubai – Oslo Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 356 closed for booking
Dubai – Perth Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. EK424/425 closed for booking
Dubai – Peshawar Reduce from 5 to 3 weekly, Day 35 closed for booking
Dubai – Prague Reduce from 14 to 8 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK139/140 Day x357
EK137/138 Day 37

Dubai – Rio de Janeiro Galeao – Buenos Aires Ezeiza Reduce from 7 to 6 weekly, Day 2 closed for booking (Day 3 from GIG)
Dubai – Riyadh Reduce from 21 to 16 weekly, EK817/818 closed for booking on Day x15
Dubai – St. Petersburg Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly. Day 136 closed for booking
Dubai – Sao Paulo Guarulhos Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 257 closed for booking
Dubai – Sao Paulo Guarulhos – Santiago de Chile Reduce from 5 to 3 weekly, Day 46 closed for booking
Dubai – Sialkot 1 daily service temporary cancelled, closed for booking from 17APR19 to 30MAY19
Dubai – Singapore Nonstop sector reduces from 4 to 3 daily, EK354/355 closed for booking
Dubai – Stockholm Arlanda Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 14 closed for booking
Dubai – Sydney Reduce from 3 to 2 daily for nonstop sector, EK416/417 closed for booking
Dubai – Tehran Imam Khomeini Reduce from 28 to 15 weekly. Following flights closed for booking
EK977/978 Daily
EK971/972 Day x2 (from 17APR19)

Dubai – Thiruvananthapuram Reduce from 11 to 7 weekly, EK522/523 closed for booking on Day x126 (Day x237 from TRV)
Dubai – Tokyo Haneda Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 36 (Day 47 from HND) closed for booking
Dubai – Tunis Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 127 closed for booking
Dubai – Venice Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 27 closed for booking
Dubai – Vienna Reduce from 2 to 1 daily. Following flights closed for booking
EK127/128 Day x136
EK125/126 Day 136

Dubai – Warsaw Reduce from 7 to 5 weekly, Day 25 closed for booking
Dubai – Washington Dulles Reduce from 7 to 6 weekly, Day 2 closed for booking
Dubai – Yangon – Phnom Penh Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 236 (Day 347 from RGN) closed for booking
Dubai – Zagreb Reduce from 7 to 4 weekly, Day 357 closed for booking
Dubai – Zurich Reduce from 14 to 12 weekly, EK087/088 closed for booking on Day 23

          #makeupaddict - makeupbycourtneyjade_      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   
POST GOT DELETED 😭 I did this burgundy / purple eyeshadow look with a glossy lip 💜 one of my favourite combos at the moment ✨ Products Used: Face: @anastasiabeverlyhills @norvina Brow Powder Duo ‘Taupe’ @anastasiabeverlyhills @norvina Tinted Brow Gel ‘Blonde’ @benefitcosmetics Porefessional Primer @meccamaxima Life Proof Longwear Foundation ‘Ivory’ @lagirlcosmetics Pro Coverage Long Wear Illuminating Foundation ‘Coffee’ @maccosmetics Pro Conceal and Correct Palette ‘Light’ (W10 & NC15) @lauramercier Loose Translucent Setting Powder @australiscosmetics Fresh and Flawless Powder @maccosmetics Mineralise Skin ‘Deep Darkest’ @benefitcosmetics Hoola Bronzer @maccosmetics Blush ‘Peaches’ @maccosmetics Mineralise Skin Finish ‘Soft & Gentle’ @hudabeauty @shophudabeauty 3D Golden Sands Highlighting Palette ‘Seychelles’ & ‘Tahiti’ Eyes: @plouise_makeup_academy Base ‘Shade 2 - Rumour’ @plouise_makeup_academy Palette @maccosmetics tics Pro Longwear Fluidline ‘Blacktrack’ @nyxcosmetics Slide on Pencil ‘Jet Black’ @benefitcosmetics They’re Real Mascara Lips: @maccosmetics Lip Liner ‘Stripdown’ @nyxcosmetics Butter Gloss ‘Creme Brûlée’ & ‘Fortune Cookie’ • • • • • • #wakeupandmakeup #beatthatface #undiscoveredmuas #hudabeauty #makeupdolls #beautygram #sephoragirls #motd #underratedmuas #wakeup2slay #glamfanatics #glowgetter #glamrezy #makeupinspo #makeupmafia #makeupaddict #beautyjunkie #beautybloggers #glowup #mua #makeupartist #makeupartistworldwide #peachyqueenblog #makeupoftheday #beauty #beautyblog #makeuptutorial #vegas_nay
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SADC Develops Regional Strategy on Women, Peace and Security
10 JUL, 2018 - 00:07
Nyarai Kampilipili Correspondent

Southern Africa has developed a regional framework that will serve as a guide on mainstreaming gender into the regional peace and security systems and processes.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat a recent meeting of senior officials responsible for gender and women affairs in the region that the strategy will be launched at the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government scheduled for August 17-18 in Windhoek, Namibia.

The SADC Regional Strategy on Women, Peace and Security (2018-2022) aims to address challenges experienced by women and children by ensuring that they fully participate in peace and security activities, programmes and projects in the region.

The strategy was first presented to senior officials at their meeting in Ezulwini, the Kingdom of Eswatini, in 2017 and was further presented to the Ministerial Council of the Organ for approval.

The development of the strategy involved various stakeholders who included gender and security experts from all the SADC member states.

The strategy and its accompanying action plan are to be implemented from 2018-2022 and member states have been urged to develop national action plans and mobilise resources to implement proposed activities at national level.

Southern Africa is making significant progress towards promoting gender equality and equity in the region. However, there is need to maintain the momentum and push forward the regional gender agenda, particularly in issues to do with peace and security.

This requires intensification of regional efforts to mainstream gender into peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes if sustainable peace is to be achieved.

Although progress is being made in the development of strategies that mainstream gender in peace and security matters, the number of women and children being affected by conflict remains high.

High-ranking women in the security sector in SADC member states remains low.

For example, only three SADC member states have had women ministers of defence in the period 2009-2018. These are Botswana, Madagascar and South Africa.

South Africa remains the only country in SADC with a woman Minister of Defence who has held the position since 2012.

According to a 2015 UN Women report, women constitute fewer than 10 percent of peace negotiators globally, and only three percent of signatories to peace agreements.

In this regard, there is need to include more women in peace processes so that their issues are mainstreamed into the negotiations.

Other key issues being discussed by the SADC senior officials responsible for gender and women affairs during the annual meeting include the need to expedite processes towards combating trafficking in persons; accelerating efforts towards achieving 50:50 representation in politics and decision-making and the need for member states that have not signed the Agreement Amending the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development to do so.

To date only Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, eSwatini, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have signed the agreement amending the protocol while Namibia and South Africa have indicated that they will sign during the SADC Summit in Namibia.

The senior officials responsible for gender and women affairs meet prior to the annual meeting of SADC ministers responsible for gender and women affairs.

The ministers meeting will discuss the SADC regional gender programme and share progress towards the implementation of gender commitments made by the countries.

A total of 11 SADC member states – Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe – are attended the meeting, which ran from July 3-5 in Johannesburg.


          Remittance rip-offs      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   

All over the world migrant workers are sending money home to their families. The money pays hospital bills and school fees, buys land, builds houses and sets up small businesses. The cash goes from the US back to Mexico, from the Gulf back to India, from the UK back to Somalia, and from South Africa back to Malawi, Zimbabwe and the rest of southern Africa. 

But what these workers probably do not realize, since they usually only ever send to one country, is that the cost of sending money varies greatly. Now a study of the cost of remittances, carried out by London's Overseas Development Institute with support from the fund-raising charity Comic Relief, has revealed that transfers to African countries cost around half as much again as the global average, and twice as much as transfers to Latin America. 

The ODI estimates that if remittance charges were brought down to the world average, the money saved could educate an extra 14 million primary school children, half of all those currently out of school on the continent.

The bulk of this money goes through money transfer companies rather than banks, since the recipients are unlikely to have bank accounts, and transfer companies are quick, efficient and have a wide network of agents. But just two big international players dominate the business in Africa, Moneygram and Western Union, and participants in a meeting to launch the research were highly critical of the way they seemed to be abusing their market dominance.

Rwanda's High Commissioner in London, Williams Nkurunziza, said he was shocked at what the report revealed. “If you look at the remittances, 30 or 40 percent of the money that goes to Africa goes to rural areas,” he said. “This money goes to the people who are most needy, and you are allowing a multinational corporation to take bread out of the mouth of hungry children. This is not what I would call responsible capitalism!”

Glenys Kinnock, opposition spokesman on International Development in the upper house of the UK parliament, who chaired the meeting, called on the country's financial regulatory authority to intervene over the issue of excessive charges. “It is not a technocratic issue,” she said, “although it may sound like one. It is also about people's lives and the future of their children... These things have to change. We can't put up any longer with the prospect of its making things so difficult, very often impossible, for people who have such needs.”

At the end of last year, when the ODI did its research, the fees and charges to send money to most of Africa were around 12 percent - a bit less to Zambia or Tanzania, a bit more to Uganda, Malawi and the Gambia - against a world average of just over 8 percent. Even that is quite expensive; the governments of the G8 and G20 countries have pledged themselves to working towards reducing this to 5 percent.

It found that in more than 30 countries the two big players had more than 50 percent of the market; and in 10 countries they had more than 90 percent. Sometimes either Moneygram or Western Union had an effective monopoly, but even where both companies were present it did not necessarily mean that customers had much choice; one company could still have a monopoly of outlets in a particular area, and the companies habitually make their paying-out agents sign contracts promising not to also act as agents for their rivals. 

Somalia different

Significantly, the one country where the big two are absent - Somalia - has far lower remittance charges; transfers go through a number of smaller, competing companies.

Competition has been limited by the fallout from the US “war on terror”, with the banks who do bulk international transfers citing money-laundering and anti-terrorism regulations as the reason they are reluctant to extend facilities to smaller companies. Now only the biggest of the Somali companies, Dahabshiil, still has an account with a major British bank (Barclays) and even that concession was forced by a court case and is only until other arrangements can be put in place.

Inter-Africa transfers cost most

But if charges to send money to Africa from outside are steep, the cost of sending money from one African country to another can be eye-watering. 

Dilip Ratha, who works on these issues for the World Bank says exchange controls are one of the reasons the rates are so high; in some places sending money out of the country is illegal. “So if you are sending money,” he says, “let's say from Benin to Ghana, it is actually allowed (in some countries it's not even allowed) but first the CFA has to be passed through into euros or sterling or dollars, and then it has to be transferred back into the local cedi, and in both cases you pay commission. Some sort of regional currency market really needs to be created.” 

"So if you are sending money, let's say from Benin to Ghana, it is actually allowed (in some countries it's not even allowed) but first the CFA has to be passed through into euros or sterling or dollars, and then it has to be transferred back into the local cedi, and in both cases you pay commission. Some sort of regional currency market really needs to be created"  

The report found 10 routes with bank transfer charges over 20 percent. Charges from Nigeria to Ghana were 22 percent. To send from Tanzania to the rest of East Africa, or from South Africa to its near neighbours is particularly expensive, peaking at 25 percent for bank transfers between South African and Malawi. Some of the fees charged by money transfer companies are even higher; if you send money that way from Ghana to Nigeria you may have to pay a staggering 39 percent.

In some places mobile phone based systems like M-Pesa have made in-country transfers much easier and cheaper, but they haven't really taken off internationally, largely because conservative, inflexible regulatory systems insist that all international transfers must go through conventional banks. And African banks tend to have very high charges, often because they are forced by governments to finance government projects or make uncommercial loans. 

Chukwuemeka Chikezie of the Up Africa consultancy told IRIN a lot of the responsibility lay with African governments. “One of the reasons M-Pesa took off in Kenya was because the authorities nurtured and enabled innovation. If you look at other countries the regulators have tended to stifle innovation. They are very risk-averse and they don't enable even limited experiments to prove that the markets can absorb technical innovation.”

In addition, money-laundering regulations are putting impossible demands on systems designed to serve the poor, requiring, for instance, “know your customer” procedures like taking copies of ID documents for anyone receiving an international payout. Selma Ribica of M-Pesa points out this is an impossibility for agents in rural areas with no power supply. She told IRIN she would like to see a more realistic, tiered approach with much lighter regulation for small international transfers (under, say, US$200-300) which are most unlikely to have anything to do with money laundering.

Beware Facebook, Walmart

M-Pesa depends on moving money between different customers' mobile phone accounts. Now people are beginning to think of other kinds of electronic “purses” which might be linked in the same way. 

Facebook has just proposed allowing transfers between customers who have accounts with the company which they normally use to make payments for online games. So far this is only proposed for payments within the European Union, but Facebook has a huge geographical spread and has said it is keen to extend its reach in Africa. 

And the big profits made by the transfer companies are tempting other players into the market. The latest to announce it is starting money transfers is the US supermarket chain Walmart, with recipients being able to pick up their cash from any shop in the chain. To start with this will only work within the United States and Puerto Rico, but Walmart is an international group with nearly 350 stores in South Africa, and it also has a presence in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique, opening up the tempting prospect of a new, and cheaper way for workers to send money home.

All these new ways of sending money aim to undercut Moneygram and Western Union. Now Western Union has responded by offering so-called “zero-fee” transfers to Africa if the money is sent from a bank account rather by credit card or cash. This would mean a saving of just under £5 ($8.40) for someone sending $100 from the UK to Liberia. The company would still make money (nearly $4) by using a favourable exchange rate, but it would bring the cost down to just below the G8/G20 target. 

For African's hard-pressed and hard-working migrants and their families back home, change may - finally - be on the way.


99977 201404221522570983.jpg Feature Politics and Economics Remittance rip-offs IRIN LONDON Angola Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Botswana DRC Congo, Republic of Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Colombia Cape Verde Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Ghana Gambia Guinea Equatorial Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Liberia Lesotho Morocco Madagascar Mali Mauritania Mauritius Malawi Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Seychelles Sudan Sierra Leone Senegal Somalia Sao Tome and Principe eSwatini Chad Togo Tanzania Uganda Samoa South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe
          Seychelles: Disaster Risk Management Act, 2014 (Act No.15 of 2014)      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   
Publisher: National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities - Document type: National Decrees, Circulars, Regulation, Policy Documents
          Etihad/ Air Seychelles : $91 RT Abu Dhabi to Mumbai      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   
- books into W, earns 25% on Air Seychelles but 130% as Etihad - plenty of miles as Mahe is out of the way - quality airline to begin with - free stopover possible? ...
          Trump Putin MbZ      Cache   Translate Page   Web Page Cache   
"Israeli, Saudi, and Emirati Officials Privately Pushed for Trump to Strike a “Grand Bargain” with Putin" (Entous):
"During a private meeting shortly before the November, 2016, election, Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, floated to a longtime American interlocutor what sounded, at the time, like an unlikely grand bargain. The Emirati leader told the American that Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, might be interested in resolving the conflict in Syria in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Current and former U.S. officials said that bin Zayed, known as M.B.Z., was not the only leader in the region who favored rapprochement between the former Cold War adversaries. While America’s closest allies in Europe viewed with a sense of dread Trump’s interest in partnering with Putin, three countries that enjoyed unparallelled influence with the incoming Administration—Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.—privately embraced the goal. Officials from the three countries have repeatedly encouraged their American counterparts to consider ending the Ukraine-related sanctions in return for Putin’s help in removing Iranian forces from Syria."
"Nine days before Trump’s Inauguration, Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater and a confidant of Steve Bannon, met at M.B.Z.’s resort in the Seychelles with Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, whom the Emiratis used as a go-between with Putin. (An April, 2017, Washington Post story that I co-wrote revealed the Indian Ocean encounter and stated that “the UAE agreed to broker the meeting in part to explore whether Russia could be persuaded to curtail its relationship with Iran, including in Syria, a Trump administration objective that would be likely to require major concessions to Moscow on U.S. sanctions.”)

Mueller’s team has also focussed on Trump transition-team meetings in December, 2016, that involved Emirati and Russian officials. One, at a New York hotel, was attended by M.B.Z., and another, at Trump Tower, was attended by Sergey Kislyak, then Russia’s Ambassador in Washington. During the December 1, 2016, meeting between Kislyak and Trump’s transition team, both sides wanted to discuss the conflict in Syria, and the Russian Ambassador proposed arranging a conversation between Michael Flynn, the incoming national-security adviser, and people he referred to as his “generals,” according to congressional testimony by Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser. To prevent intelligence agencies from eavesdropping on the conversation, Kislyak proposed using a “secure line,” prompting Kushner to suggest using the secure communications gear housed at the Russian Embassy in Washington."
"Israeli officials lobbied for rapprochement between Washington and Moscow soon after Trump’s election victory. In a private meeting during the transition, Ron Dermer, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States and one of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest confidants, said that the Israeli government was encouraging the incoming Trump Administration to coöperate more closely with Putin, starting in Syria, with the hope of convincing Moscow to push the Iranians to leave the country, an attendee told me.

Like M.B.Z., Netanyahu made courting Putin a priority, particularly after Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015. The Israeli leader wanted to insure that Israeli forces could continue to access Syrian airspace, which the Russians partially controlled, to prevent the deployment of advanced weapons systems by Iran and its proxies that could threaten the Jewish state. A senior Israeli official declined to comment on Dermer’s message but said that “Israel does believe it is possible to get a U.S.-Russian agreement in Syria that would push the Iranians out,” and that doing so “could be the beginning of an improvement in U.S.-Russian relations over all.”

Separately, a former U.S. official recalled having a conversation after Trump’s Inauguration with an Israeli Cabinet minister with close ties to Netanyahu in which the minister pitched the American on the idea of “trading Ukraine for Syria.” The former official told me, “You can understand why Russia’s help with Syria is a far higher priority for Israel than pushing back on Russian aggression in Ukraine. But I considered it a major stretch for Israel to try to convince the United States that U.S. interests are well served by looking the other way at Russian aggression in Ukraine. Of course, Trump may disagree for his own reasons.”"
So much for the 'human rights' of Ukrainians, traded for a useless promise of keeping Iranians out of southern Syria!  It is also rather striking that the countries with abnormal access to, and influence over, Trump, are not Russia, which is instead part of the horse-trading scheme proposed by other countries which do have so much influence they can propose ridiculous schemes which aren't even well thought out.

Also (the cynicism!):  "Major Israeli Daily: Our Government Is "Arming Neo-Nazis In Ukraine"" (Dueden).

"Iran Sanctions Are Different This Time" (Cunningham).  You can almost see a path free to rational American decision making, but the Americans, under the strict Khazar yoke, can't follow it.

This scheming could work out fairly well, if Russia gets the sanctions lifted with no change in the status of Crimea (and is re-legitimized internationally by being allowed back into the G-7, er, 8), and presumably some side promise not to have the Ukrainians start WWIII - thus completely screwing the Ukrainians over.  Putin won't be able to deliver on any promises made on Iran, and everybody knows this, so presumably the Gulf/Khazar conspirators will be looking for some other concessions from Putin in the near future.  If jiggling in hydrocarbon production is required, Putin is your man.

"The sad fact is that the pretense of U.S. global leadership now consists of a basket of new “rules” that are both arbitrary and basically illegal supported by pretexts that are essentially fabricated."

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